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The Role of the Broadsheet Newspaper Media in Corporate Governance: An 
Exploration into the Market for Corporate Control  
Louise Gorman 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of broadsheet newspaper reporting of takeover offers and market abuse cases on the corporate governance quality of the UK listed companies involved. The study examined 111 takeover offers and 25 market abuse cases from 2001 to 2010. Corporate governance quality is assessed from the perspective of the board of directors using an original scoring methodology devised herein. The scoring methodology is founded upon principles of best practice set out in UK regulatory guidelines; the statutory responsibilities expected of boards of UK companies; and recommendations expressed in academic commentary and specialist reports on corporate governance. The level of newspaper reporting is measured using the archives of eight prominent UK broadsheet publications. The results of statistical analysis indicate a significant association between changes in corporate governance quality and newspaper reporting on takeover offers but not for market abuse cases. This study sheds insight into the role the broadsheet media plays in corporate governance and contributes to a growing strand of research on the capacity of the media to lower agency costs. Findings imply that the broadsheet newspaper media serves a potentially important function in facilitating the operation of the market for corporate control. Specifically, by reporting on companies’ vulnerability to takeover, the newspaper media can create reputational costs for target directors thereby encouraging governance improvements in target companies. This thesis adds to an extensive body of literature on corporate governance and the market for corporate control in the UK by identifying the newspaper media as a significant intermediary in the context of the London Stock Exchange. Findings suggest a need for enhanced shareholder monitoring of boards of targets of failed takeover offers; greater clarity in guidelines on best practice in corporate governance; and increased acknowledgement of the impact of the media on corporate governance at policy level.      
1  
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Introduction 
The role of external intermediaries and information gatekeepers is an important issue to 
consider in any analysis of a system of corporate governance. In the presence of agency 
problems between shareholders and managers, intermediaries and gatekeepers may reduce 
information asymmetries by assessing statements made by the company and by providing 
verification and certification services to shareholders (Coffee, 2002). Academic commentary 
however indicates that, due to a lack of independence from management and misaligned 
incentives, the value of traditional gatekeepers such as auditors, investment bankers and 
analysts to investors is limited (Black, 2001a; Coffee, 2002; 2004). As an implication, 
investors may have to rely on a range of intermediaries and gatekeepers to monitor 
management’s performance in maximising their wealth (Goergen, 2012).  
 One party which may avoid many of the conflicts of interests encountered by 
traditional intermediaries and potentially perform a valuable corporate governance role is the 
news media. Prior research has found that, by publicising events which may have implications 
for shareholders’ wealth, the news media, particularly the newspaper media, can inform 
shareholders and other company stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Kothari, Li and Short, 
2009; Bushee, Core, Guay and Hamm, 2010; Buehlmaier, 2013) and impose reputational 
penalties on underperforming managers and directors (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; 
Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann and Hambrick, 2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013).  
 Two events which may have a significant impact on shareholders’ wealth are 
takeovers and instances where the company’s shares are implicated in stock market abuse. 
Takeovers are a manifestation of the operation of the market for corporate control, a key 
external method of shareholder protection (Manne, 1965). Market abuse may impede the 
ability of the market for corporate control to serve this function and thus is undesirable from a 
shareholders’ perspective. There is reason to believe that such events may receive 
considerable attention in the news media since they have associated elements of 
2  
newsworthiness including change, conflict, deviant behaviour and transfers of power and 
wealth (Jamieson and Campbell, 2001 cited in Miller, 2006, p.1007). 
 This study investigates the impact of broadsheet newspaper coverage of takeover 
offers and market abuse cases on corporate governance quality in companies involved. 
Specifically, it measures the volume of reports published in the UK broadsheet newspaper 
media on takeover offers for UK listed public limited companies (hereinafter, plcs) and 
instances of market abuse in which shares of UK listed plcs are implicated between 1 January 
2001 and 31 December 2010 and it examines how the volume of reports is associated with 
changes in the structure and practices of their boards of directors.  
 
1.2. Basis of Thesis 
The topic of this thesis is corporate governance in UK listed plcs and, in particular, how it is 
influenced by the UK broadsheet newspaper media. Corporate governance is considered from 
the perspective of the board of directors, a key governance device operating within the 
company (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a).  
 Takeover offers and instances of market abuse provide attractive subjects on which to 
base an examination of the influence of the news media on corporate governance. A takeover 
offer is an offer made to shareholders to purchase their shares with the objective of acquiring 
control of the company. The theory of the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965), which 
is discussed at greater length in the next chapter, suggests that shareholders tend to exit 
underperforming companies by selling their shares. The resulting decline in the company’s 
share price renders it vulnerable to takeover, with the associated implication that a new more 
effective board will be put in place. Hence, takeovers are the market’s mechanism of 
disciplining underperforming managers and ineffective boards. It follows that a company 
being targeted for takeover implies that its board has failed as a corporate governance device.  
 Extant empirical evidence indicates that news media coverage of takeovers has an 
important impact on the acquiring managers’ and directors’ decisions and actions by virtue of 
its influence over their reputations vis-à-vis the labour markets (Liu and McConnell, 2013). It 
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also suggests that the news media’s assessment of the value of a potential takeover impacts 
target shareholders’ perceptions of the offeror management and hence their decisions as to 
whether or not to approve the takeover (Buehlmaier, 2013). Collectively, these findings 
indicate that by reporting on the operation of the market for corporate control, the news media 
has considerable influence over the offeror managers and directors and thus may serve a 
potentially important role in corporate governance. Given that the emergence of a takeover 
offer also places the offeree directors in the public spotlight, one might expect news media 
coverage of the offer to also impact their actions and decisions via its influence over their 
reputations. Accordingly, this study focuses on the influence of the news media on changes in 
the quality of corporate governance provided by boards in the offeree companies as distinct 
from the offeror companies.  
 This study also inquires if the news media may play a further role in situations where 
the effective operation of the market for corporate control is obstructed by market abuse. 
Market abuse may involve insider dealing; market manipulation; or improper disclosure, or 
misuse, of price sensitive inside information1. Boards must adhere to certain disclosure and 
transparency standards and implement robust internal controls so as to limit the potential for 
market abuse to occur (Cox, 1986; Benabou and Laroque, 1992; Chatterjea, Cherian and 
Jarrow, 1993; John and Naryanan, 1997; Maug, 2002). Accordingly, even when board 
members are not directly involved, market abuse may be perceived as a failure on their behalf. 
News media publicity surrounding such cases may then also impose reputational penalties on 
directors and signal that shareholders are at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to earn a 
return on their investment. There is a distinct lack of academic inquiry into the impact of news 
media coverage of market abuse cases on corporate governance in the companies whose 
shares are implicated. Consequently, this study investigates if broadsheet newspaper reporting 
on both the operation and possible breakdown of the market for corporate control impacts 
corporate governance at the company level.  
  
                                                     1 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 118. 
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1.3. Overview of the Study 
1.3.1. Motivation for the Study 
Widespread media coverage of collapse of Enron in the US appears to have stimulated the 
interest of corporate governance researchers in the influence of the media on management and 
board accountability (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Agrawal and Chanda, 2005; Johnson, 
Ellstrand, Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and 
Robinson, 2009). Research into the capacity of the news media to perform a corporate 
governance role by reporting on the operation of the market for corporate control is however 
very much in its infancy (Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Ahern and Sosyura, 
2014) and the impact of newspaper coverage of takeover offers on the target managers and 
directors remains to be investigated.  
 Newspaper publicity surrounding takeover offers may have a perceptible impact on 
target directors. In the context of the theory of the market for corporate control, newspaper 
coverage may highlight that the board, the company’s internal control device, has failed to 
correct management’s inefficiencies. Furthermore, it subjects the board’s response to the offer 
to the scrutiny of interested parties across the financial and labour markets and throughout 
society in general. In order to limit any potential reputational damage, directors may improve 
their efforts to protect shareholders’ wealth and to promote the success of the company such 
that governance improvements may come about before an effective takeover ensues. As such, 
the newspaper media may facilitate the effective operation of the market for corporate control 
by enhancing the disciplinary effects of a takeover threat. This study explores this possibility 
by testing for associations between the amount of reporting by the UK broadsheet newspaper 
media on takeover offers for UK listed plcs and changes in the quality of corporate 
governance provided by the boards of companies targeted.  
 Another issue which may attract the attention of the newspaper media is behaviour 
which may cause the market for corporate control to fail. By reporting on instances of market 
abuse, the newspaper media may inform shareholders and other stakeholders in companies of 
the potential breakdown of the market for corporate control. As considered in the previous 
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section, newspaper reporting on instances of market abuse may impose reputational costs upon 
the board irrespective of whether or not they are directly involved in the abuse as it can 
indicate a failure on the board’s behalf to observe disclosure and transparency requirements 
and to implement effective controls over the actions of those afforded access to inside 
information (Cox, 1986; John and Naryanan, 1997; Maug, 2002). The company’s reputation in 
the financial markets may be tarnished as investors consider that they have been caused an 
injustice by the incidence of the abuse (Bainbridge, 1993). Accordingly, this study also tests 
for associations between the amount of reports published in the UK broadsheet newspaper 
media on cases of market abuse in which the shares of UK listed plcs are implicated and 
changes in the quality of corporate governance provided by their boards.  
 
1.3.2. Objectives of the Study 
This thesis proposes that broadsheet newspaper reporting on takeover offers and instances of 
market abuse publicises a shortcoming on the behalf of the boards of companies concerned to 
monitor management and protect shareholders’ interests, thereby creating reputational costs 
for directors. The size of these costs is apt to increase with increasing newspaper coverage as 
the audience which learns of the shortcoming grows (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). 
To minimise these costs, boards may take actions to improve the quality of corporate 
governance within their companies. Hence, the extent of improvements in corporate 
governance quality may be associated with the volume of reports published on the offer or 
abuse. Accordingly, the following research question frames the present study: 
 
 Is the volume of broadsheet newspaper reports published on takeover targets or 
companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse associated with changes in the 
quality of corporate governance provided by their boards of directors? 
 
This broadly posed research question is developed into a specific research hypothesis in 
Chapter Five. 
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 Thus, the first objective of this study is to measure the volume of broadsheet 
newspaper reporting on (i) takeover offers for UK listed plcs and (ii) market abuse cases in 
which the shares of UK listed plcs are implicated. The second objective of the study is to 
determine the extent of changes in the quality of corporate governance provided by the boards 
of companies concerned over the course of the newspaper reporting. Finally, the third and 
main objective of the study is to investigate if the volume of newspaper reports published on 
takeover offers or market abuse cases is associated with the extent of changes in the corporate 
governance quality in companies concerned. 
 
1.3.3. Research Context 
In addition to the gaps in the literature identified above, a key motivation for the present study 
is to investigate the corporate governance role of the news media in the context of the UK. 
Heretofore, research into the news media’s influence on corporate governance has been 
largely US based. The lack of inquiry into the influence of the news media on corporate 
governance in the UK is curious given that, like US companies, UK listed companies are 
dispersedly owned such that information asymmetries among shareholders and between 
shareholders and management are particularly acute. Unlike the US, best practice in corporate 
governance is not mandated by law, with the implication that external information 
intermediaries have a particularly important role to play in monitoring managers and directors. 
Academic commentators have attributed the development of best practice guidelines in the UK 
in part to public pressure placed on policymakers through news media coverage of corporate 
governance failures at Polly Peck International, Maxwell Corporate Communications and the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce (Jones and Pollitt, 2001; 2004). However, the influence of the 
news media on corporate governance at the company level has not been considered in any 
great depth.  
 Takeover offers and instances of market abuse are prolific topics upon which to 
launch an investigation into the corporate governance role of the news media in the UK. The 
next chapter will outline that the UK hosts an active market for corporate control which serves 
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an important role in holding the managers and directors of listed companies to account. 
Accordingly, stock market abuse may have a particularly damaging effect on the wealth of 
shareholders in listed companies. It follows that an intermediary which reports on the 
operation and the potential breakdown of the market for corporate control may play an 
important role in the governance of UK listed plcs.   
 The takeover offers and instances of market abuse studied herein involve companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange’s Official List or Alternative Investment Market 
(hereinafter, the AIM) between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2010. All companies fall 
within the regulatory remit of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (hereinafter, the Panel), the 
UK’s supervisory authority which performs certain regulatory functions in relation to takeover 
offers, and the Financial Conduct Authority (hereinafter, the FCA), the authority with 
statutory responsibility for regulation of market abuse in the UK. Over the sample period, the 
role of the FCA was fulfilled by the Financial Services Authority (hereinafter, the FSA). 
Accordingly, all takeover offers studied have been supervised by the Panel and all instances of 
market abuse have been investigated by the FSA. While only companies listed on the Official 
List are required to adopt the UK Corporate Governance Code (previously, the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance), AIM listed companies are encouraged to do so. Accordingly, 
it is possible to evaluate the quality of governance provided by boards of sample companies 
relative to best practice guidelines.  
 The rationale for selection of the time period in which the study is set stems from the 
considerable developments which occurred in both the regulation of the UK market for 
corporate control and in corporate governance regulation over the first decade of the new 
millennium. In 2001, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (hereinafter, FSMA) 
established market abuse as a civil offence in the UK and created the FSA. In 2005, FSMA 
was amended to implement the European Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC) 
(hereinafter, MAD) which brought about revisions to, the Code of Market Conduct, issued by 
the FSA, and the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (hereinafter, the DTRs) and the Listing 
Rules of the London Stock Exchange (hereinafter, the Listing Rules), which were also issued 
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by the FSA in its capacity as the UK Listing Authority (hereinafter, the UKLA). In 2006, the 
Panel was granted powers to make and enforce the Rules of the Takeover Code (hereinafter, 
the Code) on a legislative basis2 pursuant to the 13th European Directive on Takeover Bids 
(Directive 2004/25/EC) (hereinafter, the Takeover Directive). This study converges upon early 
cases of takeover offers and market abuse under the new regulatory regimes. 
 At the beginning of the sample timeframe, the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (hereinafter, the Combined Code) (1998) set out standards of best practice in 
corporate governance for listed companies. 2003 witnessed the publication of the Smith 
Report, which provided guidance on audit committees, the Tyson Report on the Recruitment 
and Development of Non-executive Directors (hereinafter, the Tyson Report), and the Higgs 
Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors (hereinafter, the Higgs 
Review). These three reports led to the revision of the Combined Code in 2003, which was 
further revised in 2006 and 2008. At the end of the sample period, the Combined Code was 
replaced by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and the UK Stewardship Code (2010). 
Furthermore, the Companies Act 2006 introduced a number of provisions intended to clarify 
the duties expected of directors, making them more legally accountable to both to shareholders 
and to the company as a whole.  
 
The UK Broadsheet Newspaper Media 
The newspaper market in the UK offers 12 daily and 11 Sunday national newspapers (National 
Newspaper Survey, 2014a). Of the daily newspapers, seven are tabloids, four are mainstream 
broadsheets and one is a specialist financial broadsheet. Of the Sunday newspapers, seven are 
tabloids and four are mainstream broadsheets. The readership of mainstream UK broadsheets 
includes professional investors and other elites with direct interests in companies, such as 
managers, directors, policymakers, regulators and creditors (Doyle, 2006; Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007). Mainstream broadsheets also reach a broader section of society and report 
                                                     2 Companies Act 2006, s. 943. 
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in a more comprehendible language than specialist financial newspapers and thus can 
communicate corporate governance issues to a range of company stakeholders.  
 The impact of a newspaper report on a given issue depends on the degree to which the 
newspaper circulates among, and is read by, a population or a particular section of a 
population. Circulation is a precise count of the number of copies of a particular publication 
distributed among a population, while readership is a measure of how many individual readers 
a publication has (National Readership Survey, 2014b). In the UK, circulation is measured by 
the Audit Bureau of Circulations (hereinafter, the ABC) and readership is measured in the 
National Readership Survey (hereinafter, the NRS). Although circulation is a more accurate 
measure of a newspaper’s presence among a population, it does not account for the likelihood 
that a given copy will be read by a number of individuals.  
 The results of the NRS are classified by audience social grade. The ABC1 
demographic classification comprises managerial, administrative, professional, supervisory 
and clerical workers, while the C2DE category consists of manual workers, casual and low 
grade workers and the unemployed (NRS, 2014c). Broadsheet newspapers are read 
predominantly by audiences within the ABC1 category (NRS, 2014a)3. These audiences are 
apt to have a greater interest in and understanding of issues of management, business and 
finance and may hold professional positions whereby they perform corporate governance roles 
or are affected by how companies are governed. In addition to investing in companies and 
serving on their boards, certain members of mainstream broadsheet audiences construct, 
maintain and enforce national corporate policy; provide companies with credit, labour, 
materials and other resources; purchase their products; and lobby for issues in the 
communities in which they operate. Accordingly, broadsheet newspapers are expected to have 
a more discernible and meaningful influence on corporate governance in UK listed plcs than 
their tabloid counterparts. While specialist financial broadsheet newspapers may reach the 
investment community more directly, mainstream broadsheets are accessed by a greater 
amount of the public in general and thus may expose boards to the scrutiny of a range of 
                                                     3 See also Table 5.1, Chapter Five. 
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stakeholders in the company. As an implication, the potential reputational costs which 
directors may incur due to the company’s being targeted for takeover or the implication of its 
shares in market abuse are amplified. 
 This study focuses upon newspaper reports published in the eight UK mainstream 
broadsheet newspapers (four daily publications and four Sunday publications). These 
publications are listed in Figure 1.1 below. Figure 1.1 illustrates the changes in the circulation 
of these newspapers since 2001. As is evident, circulation has declined dramatically since the 
turn of the century; however, the greatest decline does not appear to have occurred until 2008, 
toward the end of the sample period. Thus, UK broadsheet newspapers are considered an 
appropriate media vehicle to employ in this study. 
 
Figure 1.1: UK Broadsheet Newspaper Circulation 2001-2013 
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1.3.4. Research Sample 
The research sample consists of 111 cases of takeover offers and 25 cases of market abuse. 
Each takeover case involves an offer where the Panel is required to apply one or more of the 
Rules of the Code. Each market abuse case involves an instance where a civil penalty is 
imposed by the FSA for market abuse as defined under Section 118 of FSMA. An initial 
sample of 161 cases (114 takeover offers and 47 instances of market abuse) was refined to 
exclude cases which commenced prior to 1 January 2001 and those which concern companies 
not listed on the Official List or the AIM of the London Stock Exchange. Eighty one per cent 
of takeover offers (90) concern companies on the Official List while 19% (21) concern 
companies listed on the AIM. Sixty per cent of market abuse cases (15) concern companies on 
the Official List, while 40% (10) concern companies listed on the AIM. A full description of 
this sample is provided in Chapter Six.  
 In addition, this study employs a control sample of companies as a basis for 
establishing a benchmark of corporate governance quality. This sample consists of 136 UK 
listed companies which have been targeted for takeover or similar control transaction but have 
not been subject to any additional regulatory oversight by the Panel or the FSA. Of these 
companies, 74% are listed on the Official List and 26% are listed on the AIM. A full 
description of this sample is also provided in Chapter Six. 
 
1.3.5. Research Methodology 
To explore the research question set out in Subsection 1.3.2, this study tests for statistically 
significant associations between the volume of broadsheet newspaper reports published on 
instances where (i) companies are targeted for takeover or (ii) companies’ shares are 
implicated in market abuse and changes in corporate governance quality, as provided by the 
boards of companies concerned. Accordingly, the methodology of the study concerns 
quantitative measurement of newspaper reporting and corporate governance quality.  
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Newspaper Reporting 
Newspaper reporting is assessed by collecting and manually analysing broadsheet newspaper 
reports published on the sample of takeover offers and market abuse cases. Newspaper reports 
are obtained from the archives of the eight UK broadsheet newspapers listed in Figure 1.1 for 
the ten year time period which the study encompasses. A measure of newspaper reporting is 
achieved by calculating the number of reports published over various timeframes in each 
takeover offer or market abuse case. In order to alleviate concerns regarding the possibility of 
endogeneity in the research sample, this measure is adjusted to ensure that it does not reflect 
the influence of factors which may also influence corporate governance quality. The potential 
for endogeneity to arise in the sample and the manner in which the newspaper reporting 
measure is adjusted are outlined in the next section and discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
Corporate Governance Quality  
Corporate governance quality is defined herein as the extent to which a company’s system of 
corporate governance lowers the agency costs borne by shareholders. The board of directors is 
a primary internal mechanism put in place to align the interests of management and 
shareholders (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). It follows that various characteristics of 
the board of directors should be largely indicative of the quality of a company’s internal 
system of corporate governance.  
 The quality of sample boards as corporate governance devices is assessed using a 
specific Corporate Governance Quality (hereinafter, CGQ) scoring system developed for the 
purposes of this study. CGQ is measured by evaluating ten different characteristics of sample 
boards, which are introduced in Chapter Three. Each characteristic is scored on a scale of one 
to ten. Each scale is founded upon the best practice guidelines contained in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and its predecessor the Combined Code; the legislative requirements 
of the Companies Act 2006 which boards must meet; and recommendations made in the 
academic literature and policy reports on corporate governance. The ten individual scores are 
combined to yield an aggregate quantitative measure of CGQ. This procedure is performed for 
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each sample company over three years surrounding the takeover or market abuse cases in 
which they are involved. This enables annual changes in CGQ over the course of newspaper 
reporting on cases to be assessed in a quantitative manner. A benchmark of CGQ is 
established by applying the scoring system to a control sample of companies. This benchmark 
is used to adjust CGQ and CGQ change for companies in the main research sample to account 
for the possibility that their governance quality may be influenced by their close involvement 
with regulatory authorities. The variables employed to measure CGQ and the years over which 
measurements are made are defined in Chapter Five.  
 
1.3.6. Research Model 
The research model involves two stages. Stage one tests for associations between newspaper 
reporting (NPRt) and five of its potential determinants and stage two tests for associations 
between benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality change (ΔCGQt→t+1(ad)) and 
newspaper reporting. The model is devised in this manner due to possible issues of 
endogeneity in the sample. Because the determinants of newspaper reporting on takeover and 
market abuse cases may simultaneously determine the extent of corporate governance quality 
change in the companies involved, an endogenous relationship may exist between corporate 
governance quality change and newspaper reporting. These determinants are company size, 
age and industrial location, the economic climate and the primary regulatory issue arising in 
the case. Their influence on newspaper reporting must be accounted for before testing for 
associations between corporate governance quality change and newspaper reporting. 
Accordingly, a measure of newspaper reporting which does not reflect the influence of these 
factors is derived from the first stage model which takes the following general form: 
 
NPRt = α1 + ∑ α2 potential determinants + t (1.1) 
 
The residual values for this model represent the difference between the observed values of 
newspaper reporting and those predicted by the potential determinants and thus, offer a 
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suitable measure of newspaper reporting for use in stage two of the modelling process. The 
residual values are employed to operationalise the adjusted newspaper reporting variable 
(RESNPRt) in the second stage, where the model takes the following general form: 
 
ΔCGQt→t+1(ad) = α1 + α2 RESNPRt + ∑ α3 potential determinants + ∑ α4 additional explanatory 
variables + t           (1.2) 
 
The issue of endogeneity in the present research and the approach taken to address it are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. Variables measuring the five potential determinants 
are also discussed and defined in Chapter Five as are the additional explanatory variables 
included in the second stage model. 
 
1.3.7. Data Employed  
Takeover offers are identified from the statements issued by the Panel regarding its 
supervision and regulation of the offers and instances of market abuse are identified from the 
final enforcement notices issued by the FSA following its investigations. The control sample is 
identified from the Zephyr Mergers and Acquisitions database. As mentioned above, 
newspaper reports are obtained from the archives of the eight UK broadsheet newspapers. The 
archives are accessed using the Lexis-Nexis (News and Business) database. Reports are 
collected using a specific search strategy outlined in Chapter Six. Data required to measure 
CGQ is taken from the annual reports of sample companies for the years surrounding cases 
and via Datastream.  
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1.3.8. Analytical Procedures Employed 
The study involves three main analytical phases. Firstly, a number of preliminary statistical 
tests are conducted so as to provide as much insight as possible into the sample and to 
establish causality. Following this, the research model is applied to the data to test for 
statistically significant associations between newspaper reporting and changes in corporate 
governance quality. Finally, tests of robustness and sensitivity are performed as a means of 
triangulating findings and to facilitate a deeper understanding of the nature of the impact of 
newspaper reporting on corporate governance quality in UK listed plcs. 
 
1.3.9. Findings of the Study 
At a peripheral level, this study finds that takeover cases receive significantly more broadsheet 
newspaper coverage than market abuse cases. One potential explanation for this finding is that 
information on takeover offers may be accessed more easily by journalists than that on market 
abuse. Another is that takeovers are considered more newsworthy in the mainstream 
newspaper media. Newspaper reporting on takeover cases is also timelier than that on market 
abuse cases; this may most likely be explained by the fact that signals of potential takeover 
offers are more perceptible than those on the possibility of market abuse. Belated coverage of 
market abuse cases may also be attributed to a number of barriers to investigative journalism 
which are discussed in Chapter Four. 
 Corporate governance quality is significantly higher in the main research sample than 
in the control sample in all years studied. The higher governance quality of companies in the 
main sample may be partly attributable their close involvement with market regulatory 
authorities; however, the higher ex-ante governance quality observed in the main sample 
indicates that the additional regulatory oversight to which they are exposed may only have a 
minor influence. Corporate governance quality is significantly higher in companies involved 
in takeover cases than in companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse. The 
corporate governance quality of companies involved in takeover cases also tends to be above 
the benchmark of CGQ set within the control sample, while the corporate governance quality 
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of companies involved in market abuse cases tends to be in line with the benchmark. For 
companies which survive the takeover attempt, corporate governance quality tends to increase 
in the year of the offer before declining once the threat of takeover passes, suggesting that 
governance improvements may only be a short-term measure taken by boards in an endeavour 
to overcome the takeover attempt. The corporate governance quality of companies whose 
shares are implicated in market abuse tends to improve in the year of the abuse and continues 
to improve thereafter. The lower corporate governance quality observed in companies 
implicated in market abuse may be indicative of poor internal controls over the disclosure and 
use of inside information and the trading activity of insiders. 
 The central finding of this study is that the amount of broadsheet newspaper reporting 
on takeover offers which eventually fail is significantly positively associated with changes in 
the corporate governance quality of companies targeted over the year following the 
publication of these reports. The greater the amount of reports published on a takeover offer 
prior to the termination of the offer, the greater the improvement in the corporate governance 
quality of the company targeted in the year in which the offer fails. Having taken measures to 
establish causality and to address potential endogeneity in the sample, it would appear that 
governance improvements which arise in the wake of a takeover threat may be partly 
attributed to the amount of publicity which the offer initially receives in the broadsheet 
newspaper media. This suggests that the newspaper media may catalyse the disciplinary 
operation of the market for corporate control by publicising the board’s vulnerability to 
replacement and by subjecting its response to the offer to public scrutiny thereby imposing 
potential reputational costs on directors.  
 This study does not find any evidence of a significant association between newspaper 
reporting on market abuse cases and changes in corporate governance quality in the companies 
whose shares are implicated. The lack of evidence in this regard may be attributed to low 
levels of mainstream broadsheet newspaper reporting on market abuse and also to a number of 
limitations of the study discussed in Chapter Nine. 
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1.3.10. Implications of Findings 
This study has a number of practical and policy-level implications, which are considered in 
detail in Chapter Eight. A summary of the main implications of the study is presented below.  
 The main finding of this study indicates that a fundamental aspect of the newspaper 
media’s corporate governance role is its capacity to encourage boards to act within 
shareholders’ interests by compromising directors’ reputations with the public in general. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the role performed by the broadsheet newspaper media in 
the context of a takeover offer is only a temporary one. The decline in corporate governance 
quality observed over the year following a takeover offer suggests that shareholders and other 
stakeholders in companies which avoid takeover may need to play a greater role in monitoring 
managers and directors in the wake of the offer. Accordingly, this study highlights the 
importance of pursuing policy initiatives4 aimed at reducing the barriers to shareholder 
activism in the UK.    
 By illustrating the extensive mainstream newspaper coverage which takeover offers 
receive, this study demonstrates that the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media may well be 
exploited as an information intermediary in practice. Notwithstanding this, there may be cause 
for concern regarding the extent to which newspaper reports are based on material generated 
by public relations (hereinafter, PR) agents of the offeror and offeree companies (Tambini, 
2008; Brennan, Daily and Harrington, 2010; Ahern and Sosyura, 2014). Furthermore, the 
evidence suggests a reluctance on the part of some newspaper publications to fully expose 
issues arising over the course of the offer, possibly due to affiliations between newspaper 
groups and target companies, such that a question remains over the reliability of reports. 
Accordingly, as the UK system of press regulation currently undergoes extensive reform5, this 
study urges policymakers to consider the need to set high standards of independence, 
credibility and accuracy for journalists, particularly those reporting on topics which may have 
significant economic implications.    
                                                     4 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012); Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2014. Building a culture of long-term equity investment- implementation of the Kay Review: progress report. 5 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013. 
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  The study’s failure to detect any association between newspaper reporting on market 
abuse and changes in the corporate governance quality in the companies whose shares are 
implicated, while attributable to limitations of the study, is also due to a lack of broadsheet 
newspaper reporting on market abuse cases. Thus, the impediments journalists face in 
investigating and reporting on corporate crime must be acknowledged to reduce the value of 
the newspaper media’s role in corporate governance in the context of market abuse. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight, these barriers may be difficult to surmount. As an implication, the 
newspaper media’s role appears be limited to reporting on the operation of the market for 
corporate control, and in doing so, facilitating its disciplinary effects, while signalling 
behaviour which may cause it to fail may be a task best left to those charged with policing the 
markets by statute. 
 
1.3.11. Contribution of the Study  
This study contributes to existing knowledge on corporate governance on a number of levels. 
In terms of theory, findings support the theory of the market for corporate control and suggest 
that the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media may facilitate the disciplinary operation of 
the market for corporate control by amplifying the reputational consequences of being targeted 
for takeover, thereby strengthening directors’ incentives to serve shareholders’ interests, albeit 
only in the short-term. 
 At an empirical level, this study contributes to extant research on the corporate 
governance role of newspaper coverage of takeover offers (Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and 
McConnell, 2013). In particular, the present findings, which indicate that newspaper coverage 
of an offer may encourage the target board to protect the company’s shareholders, add to those 
of Liu and McConnell (2013), who show that the news media aligns the interests of managers 
and shareholders in the acquiring company. 
 The present research methodology, which involves development of an aggregate 
measure of corporate governance quality, contrasts those employed in prior corporate 
governance research which employ aggregate measures developed by commercial agencies 
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(Brown and Caylor, 2006; Carcello, Hollingsworth and Klein, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008). This measure may be adjusted and developed in future studies. Furthermore, by 
devising and employing a two-stage research model which accounts for the potential 
simultaneous influence of multiple factors on both newspaper reporting and corporate 
governance quality change, this study develops research which aims to isolate an exogenous 
link between the newspaper media and corporate governance (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 
2008).  
 In terms of context, this study contributes to the vast body of research on the market 
for corporate control in the UK and on corporate governance in UK listed plcs, by identifying 
that the UK broadsheet newspaper media has an impact on the actions of boards of takeover 
targets. The present findings indicate that the news media is a factor which ought to receive 
greater consideration in academic research on corporate governance in the UK, both within 
and outside takeover situations.  
 On a practical level, this study shows that the mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
media is of considerable potential value to shareholders in UK listed companies in the context 
of takeover offers, due to its capacity to encourage boards to reform their governance 
practices. The value of the newspaper media as a reliable information intermediary is, 
however, contingent upon developments in press regulation and the ability of the newspaper 
media to adapt its business model to the digital age.  
 A full assessment of the contribution of the study is provided in Chapter Nine. 
 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
Having introduced the study, the remainder of this this thesis proceeds as follows; Chapter 
Two provides the background to the study. The theory framing the research is considered. The 
rationale for the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms in modern day 
companies is explained. Both internal and external methods of shareholder protection are 
assessed and the manner in which such methods interact is considered with a particular 
emphasis on the relationship between the market for corporate control and the board of 
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directors. The UK system of corporate governance is outlined and the framework of takeover 
and market abuse regulation in the UK is introduced. 
 Chapter Three presents a review of the literature on the role of the board of directors 
in corporate governance. To establish the criteria which boards of UK listed companies ought 
to meet in order to serve as high quality corporate governance devices, the standards of best 
practice in corporate governance set out in the UK Corporate Governance Codes of 2010 and 
2014 are discussed.      
 Chapter Four reviews the literature on the role of the news media in corporate 
governance and in the broader company environment, concentrating primarily on the 
broadsheet newspaper media. A number of characteristics of the broadsheet newspaper media 
which may have a bearing on its ability to perform a corporate governance role are discussed. 
Various factors which may determine the amount of newspaper attention paid to an issue or 
event in a company are considered and the newsworthiness of takeover offers and instances of 
market abuse is assessed. Empirical evidence on the role of the newspaper media as an 
information intermediary, a corporate watchdog and a controller of reputation is reviewed.  
 Chapter Five discusses the methodology employed to investigate how broadsheet 
newspaper reporting on takeover offers for UK listed companies and market abuse cases 
involving the shares of UK listed companies may be associated with changes in corporate 
governance quality in these companies. The research hypothesis is set out and the approach 
used to test it and the variables employed to measure the data are introduced.  
 Chapter Six proceeds to describe the process through which the sample is identified. 
The sources from which the newspaper reporting and corporate governance quality data is 
obtained and the manner in which it is collected are discussed. The chapter also addresses the 
problems and issues which arise in collecting the data.  
 Chapter Seven presents the results from descriptive statistical analysis of the data and 
the findings derived from investigating the research hypothesis. The results of further tests of 
robustness and sensitivity are also presented to provide for a deeper understanding of the 
nature of the influence of the newspaper media on corporate governance.  
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 Chapter Eight discusses this study’s findings in relation to UK broadsheet newspaper 
media coverage of takeover offers and market abuse cases, the corporate governance quality of 
the UK listed companies concerned and the association between the two. The implications of 
these findings are assessed in terms of policy, practice and academic research. 
 Finally, Chapter Nine presents a number of conclusions regarding the role served by 
the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media in corporate governance in the UK. The 
contribution of the study is considered in detail and recommendations are made as to how the 
potential value of the newspaper media in corporate governance may be exploited in the 
future. The limitations of the study are then addressed and a roadmap for future research is put 
forward. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
2.1. Introduction 
A primary focus of this thesis is corporate governance quality in UK listed plcs. This chapter 
will define corporate governance and explain why it is necessary for companies to have 
corporate governance systems in place. A number of theoretical models of corporate 
governance which may be applied to companies in the UK and in other Anglo-American 
jurisdictions are considered and the model upon which the present study is primarily based is 
distinguished. Following this the UK system of corporate governance is considered with a 
specific focus on the guidelines on best practice in corporate governance set out in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2014). This chapter concludes by discussing how managerial 
discipline and shareholder protection may be implemented by external, as well as internal, 
means. In doing so, the relationship between the board of directors and the market for 
corporate control is considered in order to establish the theoretical perspective from which this 
study is approached 
 
2.2. Theories of the Firm 
Before one may begin to define corporate governance, it is necessary to consider how theories 
of the firm have evolved over time and how capitalism has developed to a stage where the 
firm’s owners and managers are recognised as two distinct parties whose relationship relies on 
accountability, transparency and appropriate discipline and incentives.  
 
a. Classical Model 
The classical model of the firm assumes that the firm’s managers are its owners and therefore 
the sole risk-bearers (Fama, 1980). The owner-managers are thus considered to be entitled to 
all of the company’s profits. Accordingly, in managing the firm, shareholders’ interests take 
priority over those of other stakeholders such as employees and suppliers who also make a 
contribution to the production of goods and services (Parkinson, 1994; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). The firm is viewed as a utility maximising entity which adjusts to changes in market 
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conditions and issues which might arise internally, such as management underperformance, 
are not considered. Consequently, the classical model of the company provides little rationale 
for takeovers or corporate governance which are better explained under neo-classical models.  
 
b. Neo-Classical Models 
The concept of the separation of ownership from control was first recognised in the work of 
Adam Smith (1838). Yet, it was not developed further until 1932 when Berle and Means’ 
thesis, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, illustrated that idea of the owner-
manager does not apply to the majority of large US public companies. Such companies require 
financing from a large number of dispersed investors who do not perform a management role. 
Berle and Means observed that the firm’s owners had little control over their wealth and had 
virtually no method of overseeing how it was managed.  
 
Contractual Theory 
Ronald Coase (1937) considered the nature of operations within the company and suggested 
that relationships inside the company could be thought of as contractual. The ‘nexus of 
contracts’ view of the company is founded on the belief that rational economic actors will 
enter into mutually beneficial transactions. The company, operating in a broader market 
context, serves as an efficient productive entity such that transaction costs are kept to a 
minimum (Williamson, 1979). Theoretically, the separation of ownership from control is 
consistent with the contractual model; in essence, an efficient contractual relationship exists 
between the firm’s owners and its management such that decision-making is divorced from 
risk-bearing. This allows for a specialised division of labour and an extensive diversification 
of risk (Deakin and Slinger, 1997). As suppliers of finance to the company, shareholders are 
afforded property rights (Hart, 1995) which entitles them to legal protection in the event of a 
breach of contract (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The extent of legal protection however varies 
with the country in which the company is located. 
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Agency Problems 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) extend the work of Coase to consider how the company operates 
through joint input and team production. They highlight that contractual relationships within 
the firm are entered into voluntarily and hence authority is absent. Accordingly, employees 
may shirk their responsibilities, creating the need to monitor their activities. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.308) introduce the concept of ‘agency costs’, which are created when a 
principal contracts an agent and their interests diverge. Agency costs are defined as the sum 
of: 
 
 the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
 the bonding expenditures by the agent, 
 the residual loss. 
 
Jensen and Meckling explain that the relationship between the shareholders and managers of a 
company fits the definition of a pure agency relationship. It follows that the issues which arise 
from the separation of ownership from control are associated with the general problem of 
agency. Consequently, agency costs are inherent within the modern diffusely owned 
corporation. 
 Fama and Jensen (1983a) describe how a fundamental agency problem arises in the 
decision making process within companies. The company’s managers who initiate and 
implement important decisions are not the company’s major residual claimants and therefore, 
do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. Unless effective control 
procedures are in place, decision managers may take actions that deviate from the interests of 
the residual claimants. Both external and internal devices have been suggested as methods of 
limiting agency problems. Externally, the market for corporate control provides one potential 
solution; however, it is argued that internal control systems may deal with many of the agency 
problems which exist between shareholders and management in a quicker and less costly 
manner (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Coffee, 1984). Corporate governance is one 
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such system which effectively constrains management’s ability to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Williamson, 1984).  
 As noted above, ‘decision management’ involves initiation and implementation of 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p.304). Initiation entails the creation of proposals for 
resource utilisation and the construction of contracts. Before decisions are implemented, they 
must be ratified; and once ratified and implemented, decisions must be monitored. Monitoring 
involves measuring the performance of the decision agents and rewarding them accordingly. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, p.304) classify the processes of ratification and monitoring under the 
term ‘decision control’. They submit that, because the interests of decision managers may 
deviate from those of the company’s shareholders, decision control should be kept separate 
from decision management. The board of directors serves as the common apex of a decision 
control system and thus, is a primary corporate governance mechanism which operates within 
the company. When the board of directors fails to control management decision making, 
external methods, such as the market for corporate control, must intervene (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a; Coffee, 1984). 
 
c. Managerial Theory 
The managerial theory of the firm converges on the role of the manager and differs from the 
contractual theory to the extent that the company is considered from a behavioural rather than 
a market perspective (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964). The theory 
acknowledges the obligation of management to provide a minimal return to the company’s 
investors but considers management to have considerable discretion in running the company. 
Marris (1964) submits that the size of the company determines manages’ pay, benefits and 
prestige. Hence, their objective is to increase the size of the company rather than to maximise 
profits. Growth of the company is viewed as a means through which managers assure 
themselves of job security (Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964). There are a number of 
inefficiencies associated with the operation of the market for corporate control; one such 
inefficiency arises when the management of a bidding company overpays for a target (Black, 
26  
1989; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah, 2005). The importance 
attributed to growth under the managerial theory provides one suitable explanation for 
overpayment in takeovers.     
 
2.3. Corporate Governance 
A central argument of this thesis is that corporate governance provides a system which serves 
to protect shareholders’ interests and monitor management, thereby reducing the agency costs 
which exist between management and shareholders to an extent (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). The board of directors serves as one mechanism of corporate governance; 
however, companies may be governed through various internal and external methods which 
are not mutually exclusive. These methods include the market for corporate control, which is 
discussed in Section 2.5, the corporate legal system in the country in which the company is 
located and the actions of the company’s shareholders, the character of which largely relies on 
the nature of its ownership structure (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Section 2.4 presents an 
overview of the corporate legal and regulatory infrastructure inherent in the UK system of 
corporate governance. It also outlines the ownership structure characteristic of UK listed 
companies. 
 
2.3.1. Defining Corporate Governance 
A review of the literature by Nerantzidis, Filos and Lazarides (2012) suggests that no one 
definition of corporate governance encompasses all dimensions, which is perhaps not 
surprising given the multifaceted nature of the topic. Generally, one can classify definitions as 
being broad or narrow. Solomon (2007, p.14) proposes a broad definition which accounts for 
all of the company’s stakeholders and acknowledges that governance may be provided both 
through external or internal methods: 
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 “The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a 
socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity”. 
 
The Financial Reporting Council (hereinafter, the FRC) (2014, p.1) also presents a broad 
definition of corporate governance which focuses specifically on internal methods of 
governance:  
 
 “Corporate Governance is …about what the board of a company does and how it sets 
the values of the company”. 
 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007, p.964) appreciate that corporate governance is a means 
of resolving the problems which arise from the separation of ownership from control and offer 
a more narrow definition: 
 
 “The set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers when there is 
a separation of ownership from control”. 
 
Nelson (2005, p.200) also defines corporate governance in a narrow sense, focusing 
exclusively on managers and shareholders: 
 
 “The set of constraints on managers and shareholders as they bargain for the 
distribution of firm value”. 
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The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (hereinafter, 
the Cadbury Report) (1992, para. 2.5) provides a narrow definition which emphasises 
shareholders’ role in ensuring they get a return on their investment: 
 
 “The system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to 
appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate 
governance structure is in place.”  
 
2.3.2. Anglo-American Models of Corporate Governance 
A number of models of corporate governance have been proposed which fit widely-held 
companies typical of Anglo-American countries including the UK, the US, Ireland, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. There is empirical evidence to support aspects of 
each model; however, no one model provides a complete assessment of the Anglo-American 
framework of corporate governance (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Indeed, given that 
there are differences in the legal, regulatory, informational and market frameworks in place in 
Anglo–American countries, the applicability of any of the models will inevitably vary. The 
remainder of this section considers the four main models; these are the simple finance model, 
the stewardship model, the political model and the stakeholder model (Hawley and Williams, 
1996). 
 
a. The Simple Finance Model 
The simple finance model views shareholders as having an explicit agency relationship with 
management. Shareholders are the principal who contracts management, the agent, to run the 
company within their interests such that their wealth is maximised. The prospect of earning a 
return incentivises shareholders to bear risk when investing in the company. Certain risks are 
unavoidable; these include economic conditions, the nature of competition and genuine 
management error. Others may be avoided, such as the risk that management will run the 
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company within their own interests rather than those of the shareholders by shirking their 
responsibilities, extracting excessive remuneration or other prerequisites from the company or 
pursuing strategies so as to enhance their own power and prestige rather than the value of the 
firm (Williamson, 1985).  
 Under the simple finance model, as defined by Hawley and Williams (1996, p.21), 
corporate governance is a system which serves to establish: 
 
 “rules and incentives (that is, implicit or explicit ‘contracts’) to effectively align the 
behaviour of managers (agents) and the desires of principles (owners)”.  
 
As such, it is a mechanism of minimising the risk that management will deviate from the 
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. The model is intrinsically linked to the theory of the 
market for corporate control such that shareholders voluntarily supply finance and may 
withdraw their investment, with the effect that management are incentivised to operate the 
company efficiently to avoid being replaced in a takeover.  
 Internally, management are incentivised by performance-linked pay and stock options 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy and Oyer, 
2003). Rules which exist within the firm govern the composition and activities of the board of 
directors. In particular, they urge that the roles of CEO and chairman be performed by separate 
individuals (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and that information 
asymmetries between shareholders and management are minimised (Bushman and Smith, 
2001). 
 There is good deal of substance behind the simple finance model and agency theory is 
the dominant theoretical perspective applied in research on corporate governance in Anglo-
American countries (Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya, 2003). The occurrence of takeovers 
alone provides robust support for the finance model of corporate governance. Perhaps the 
greatest criticism of the finance model is that it fails to account for the interests other 
stakeholders in the company (Freeman, 1984; Blair and Stout, 2001; Heath and Norman, 
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2004). Stakeholders such as employees and suppliers are acknowledged; however, 
shareholders are given primacy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It has also been argued that rules 
which focus on the strict principal-agent relationship make companies bureaucratic and short-
term oriented (Vermeulen, 2012; McCahery, Vermeulen and Hisatake, 2013). While the 
present thesis is largely based on the simple finance model it accepts the alternative 
viewpoints discussed below. 
 
b. The Stewardship Model 
The stewardship model (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Lorsch, 1995; Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997) takes a sociological, pro-organisational approach to corporate governance 
and strongly contests agency theory (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). Within this 
framework, it is assumed that management, being good stewards are motivated by their 
responsibility to maximise profits and will thus work to earn returns for shareholders 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The stewardship model argues that shareholders’ interests are 
best served through a shared incumbency of managerial and director roles (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) explain that when moving from the agency 
theoretical lens to that of stewardship theory, managerial behaviour is viewed as cooperative 
as opposed to opportunistic; intrinsic motivation replaces extrinsic motivation; the board takes 
on an advisory role rather than one where they are excepted to monitor and discipline 
management; and the market for corporate control curbs psychological commitment instead of 
constraining opportunism.  
 Independent board monitoring of management is strongly advocated as a means of 
governance in both the academic literature (Coffee, 1984; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Bhagat 
and Black, 1999; Harford, 2003; Gordon, 2005) and corporate policy (OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 2004; the UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014). This accounts for 
the low incidence of executive-dominated boards and thus inhibits the model’s full practical 
application. Nevertheless, the stewardship model’s emphasis on trust and co-operation has 
received a good deal of support. Many commentators recommend that elements of stewardship 
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theory may be practiced in harmony with governance approaches devised from the finance, 
political and stakeholder models (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Roberts, McNulty and 
Stiles, 2005; Anderson, Melanson and Maly, 2007; Ward, Brown and Rodiguez, 2009; 
Elsayed, 2007; 2010). Anderson, Melanson and Maly (2007) propose that the board of 
directors may act as a strategic partner to management. Indeed, some evidence exists to 
question whether having a separate CEO and chairman actually does best serve shareholders’ 
interests (Dahya, Garcia and Van Bommel, 2009; Dey, Engel and Liu, 2011). Elsayed (2010) 
concludes that the degree of trust in management varies with contextual variables including 
firm size and ownership structure. It would appear that the stewardship model may be a more 
appropriate fit for smaller companies with high levels of insider ownership. Hence its 
relevance in the context of large, dispersedly owned UK companies may be limited.  
 
c. The Political Model 
The political model evolved from a questioning of the predominantly financial view adopted 
by seminal corporate governance theorists, in line with a drift from individual share ownership 
toward ownership mediated by investment institutions (Hawley and Williams, 1996) including 
pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds (Celik and Isaksson, 2013). The rise 
of fiduciary capitalism marked a movement toward active ownership or shareholder activism 
(Nesbitt, 1994; Smith, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2010), 
whereby control is achieved through non-market approaches such as institutional 
shareholders’ use of lobbying and voting rights (Pound, 1993; Grundfest, 1993), engagement 
with management on occasions such as company meetings (Edkins and Bush, 2002; Becht et 
al., 2010) and co-ordinated shareholder intervention in cases of poor company performance 
(Gillan and Starks, 2000; Edkins and Bush, 2002; Zetzsche, 2005; Becht et al., 2010). There 
are, however, high barriers to the successful implementation of activist strategies, with 
information costs and collective action problems being commonly cited (Black, 1991; Black 
and Coffee, 1994; Lynn, 2007; Lynn and Mulgrew, 2008). Studies have found that by 
conducting their campaigns in a more public manner, the value of strategies of activist 
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investment funds may be increased (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Becht et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, as the Kay Review (2012) notes, the market infrastructure in the UK, which is 
characterised by liquidity and dispersion of ownership, tends to be more conducive to exit than 
to the exercision of voice when shareholders are dissatisfied with management’s performance. 
Consequently, the simple finance model would appear to be a more appropriate fit for the 
framework of corporate governance in place in UK listed plcs than the political model. 
 
d. The Stakeholder Model  
Dodd (1932) put forward the view of the company as an independent entity in society which 
acts through its management as a good citizen with a sense of social responsibility. The 
stakeholder model of corporate governance (Freeman, 1984; Blair, 1995; Heath and Norman, 
2004) extends this argument to consider broader economic and societal interests in the 
company (Slinger and Deakin, 1999). The stakeholder model argues that the company is 
responsible to a range of stakeholders in addition to its shareholders and that socially 
responsible goals may take preference to that of profit-maximization. Freeman (1984, p.46) 
defines a stakeholder quite broadly as: 
 
 “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives”.  
 
Hawley and Williams (1996, p.27) offer a narrow definition of the stakeholder model as one 
based on: 
 
 “the fragmentation or 'stripping' of 'ownership' into capital's equity, idiosyncratic 
equity, debt and other non-equity claims, such that these claimants all have concrete and 
financial stakes as a function of their participation in the firm's activities”.  
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Such claimants include employees, customers, suppliers, peer companies and society in 
general. It follows that a violation of corporate governance may not necessarily be an action 
which affects the pre-eminent stakeholder group, the shareholders, but some other party with 
an interest in the firm (Heath and Norman, 2004). While the market for corporate control and 
internal governance rules protect shareholders’ interests from the effects of management 
opportunism, there are few options open to broader stakeholders when their interests are 
neglected by management. Nevertheless, considering that many of their stakes in the firm are 
financially related, it is likely that by withdrawing their custom, labour or supply of resources, 
stakeholders’ actions will ultimately have consequences for the company’s capital, cash flow, 
revenues, profits or some other element of the balance sheet (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001).  
 The stakeholder model of corporate governance may be considered from the nexus of 
contracts view of the firm (Blair and Stout, 1999) or rather from the perspective of a nexus of 
incomplete contracts (Kim and Mahoney, 2010). The existence of implicit contracts between 
the company and stakeholders, such as its employees and members of the community in which 
it is located, is well accepted within the literature (Coffee, 1988; Shleifer and Summers, 1988; 
Hill and Jones, 1992; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1994; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Slinger and Deakin, 1999; Deakin, 2005; Goergen, O’Sullivan and Wood, 
2011; 2014). As such, stakeholders make significant investments in the firm based upon trust 
and the expectation that the company will remain committed to its stakeholders in the long-
term. However the company cannot honour all of its contracts simultaneously and the interests 
of one party must be prioritised. Since many contracts with stakeholders are incomplete, 
companies face little consequences when they are breached. An implication of the prevalent 
shareholder-centric view of the company is that measures which serve to protect shareholders 
often come at a cost to other stakeholders. A primary example is takeovers which, while 
disciplining management so as to protect shareholders’ wealth, can lead to redundancies 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Slinger and Deakin, 1999; Goergen, O’Sullivan and Wood, 
2014) and reduced product market competition (Kim and Singal, 1993; Singal, 1996).  
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 Defined more broadly, the stakeholder model may encompass public regulators and 
intermediaries such as analysts and the media, who do not have a stake in the company per se 
but invest time and resources in conducting research into the performance of the company and 
its management (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Turnbull, 1997; Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 
2007) and whose perceptions of management are fundamental to their reputations in the 
capital, labour and product markets (Fama, 1980; Diamond, 1989; Dyck, Volchkova and 
Zingales, 2008). As noted in the previous chapter, such parties may have a potentially 
important influence on corporate governance. The role of information intermediaries in 
corporate governance, particularly that of the news media, is considered in Chapter Four. 
 It has been argued that attaching greater importance to the social responsibility of the 
company may come at a cost to effective monitoring of management (Jensen, 2001). 
Nonetheless, it is claimed that organizational development may only be achieved if companies 
ensure a level of accountability to all of their stakeholders (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). The 
stakeholder model provides the basis for the argument that the continued success of the 
company, and hence shareholder wealth, cannot be preserved unless management take some 
responsibility for the interests of broader stakeholders. While the present study is based 
primarily on the financial model and considers the interests of shareholders to take precedence 
in corporate governance, it recognises the concerns of broader stakeholders that the board of 
directors work to promote the long-term success of the company by adeptly monitoring the 
activities and performance of its management. 
 
2.4. Corporate Governance in the UK 
Corporate governance rules are not legally enforced in the UK; nevertheless, company law has 
an important influence on the manner in which companies are governed. The principle source 
of legislation which influences corporate governance in the UK is currently contained in the 
Companies Act 2006. The main corporate governance requirements of the Act are contained in 
Part X, which outlines specific duties and responsibilities which directors must fulfil, and Part 
XIII, which sets out specific rights which shareholders must be afforded. These rights provide 
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shareholders with minimum standards of protection and facilitate them in voting and 
participating in general meetings.  
 The UK corporate governance system is based primarily on a self-regulatory code, the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), which sets out guidelines for best practice in 
corporate governance. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), which is considered in 
detail in the next subsection, is accompanied by the UK Stewardship Code (2012) which aims 
to promote the generation of long-term returns to shareholders. The Listing Rules of the 
London Stock Exchange require Main Market listed companies to adopt the UK Corporate 
Governance Code on a comply-or-explain basis as part of their continuing obligations6. 
Companies are required to include in their annual reports a statement of how they have applied 
the main provisions of the Corporate Governance Code in a manner that would enable 
shareholders to evaluate how the principles have been applied. Companies which have not 
complied with any of the relevant provisions must state those provisions, specify the period of 
non-compliance and provide reasons for non-compliance. Adoption of the Corporate 
Governance Code by companies listed on the AIM is encouraged but not mandated. Neither 
companies listed on the Main Market nor the AIM are required to adopt the Stewardship Code.  
 While the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) leaves regulation of corporate 
governance largely to the discretion of companies, it does so in a highly regulated 
environment. Various supervisory bodies are responsible for supervision of governance of 
companies in the UK. Two bodies which perform key functions with regard to the market’s 
role in protecting shareholders, the Takeover Panel and the FCA, are discussed in Section 2.7. 
In addition, bodies including the Companies House, the FRC and the London Stock Exchange 
set out rules regarding companies’ conduct and require certain information to be published. 
The corporate informational infrastructure in place in the UK is extensive. The disclosure of 
company information, particularly accounting information, is highly regulated by the 
Companies Act 2006, the DTRs, the Listing Rules, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2014) and the AIM Rules for Companies.  
                                                     6 Listing Rule 9.8.6.R (5).  
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 The market infrastructure in the UK, which largely concerns the ownership structures 
of companies and the functioning of the capital markets, has a distinct influence on how UK 
listed companies are governed. As mentioned in Chapter One, ownership of UK listed 
companies is traditionally dispersed (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Barca and Becht, 2001; Short 
and Keasey, 2006). An implication of this is that shareholders may exit underperforming 
companies more readily than actively voicing their concerns with management since, unlike 
blockholders in concentrated ownership structures, they lack the voting control necessary to 
have a meaningful impact. As a result, management discipline may come about through the 
operation of the market for corporate control more quickly than from shareholders directly. As 
Table 2.1 illustrates, shareholders in UK listed companies include investment institutions; 
private individual shareholders, including the company’s directors; other companies; and the 
public sector. The number of blockholders in listed companies is also increasing in line with 
an increase in the proportion of foreign ownership of UK listed plcs (Cheffins, 2013).  
 
Table 2.1: Proportionate Ownership of UK Listed Shares in 2008, 2010 and 2012 Source: Office for National Statistics, 2012; 2013 
 Shareholder %  2008 2010 2012 Individuals 10.2 10.2 10.7     UK Investment Institutions    Insurance Companies 13.4 8.8 6.2 Pension Funds 12.8 5.6 4.7 Unit Trusts 1.8 8.8 9.6 Investment Trusts 1.9 2.1 1.8 Banks 3.5 2.5 1.9 Other Financial Institutions 10.0 12.3 6.6     Overseas Investors 41.5 43.4 53.2 Charities, Church, etc. 0.8 0.8 0.6 Private Non-Financial Companies 3.0 2.3 2.3 Public Sector 1.1 3.1 2.5  
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2.4.1. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) 
Over the past two decades, the standards expected of the boards of UK companies have 
developed considerably through the publication of reports and codes of practice, an overview 
of which is presented in Appendix A. Presently, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) 
sets out guidelines on best practice in corporate governance for UK companies. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code originates from the Cadbury Report (1992), the recommendations 
of which were developed in the Combined Codes of 1998, 2003, 2006 and 2008. In 2010, the 
UK Corporate Governance Code replaced the Combined Code. The current edition, published 
in 2014, consists of 18 main principles and 55 provisions which fall under five categories; 
board leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and relations with shareholders. 
Each main principle is accompanied by a number of supporting principles.  
 As noted above, the UK Corporate Governance Code is adopted on a ‘comply-or 
explain’ basis. The efficacy of the comply-or-explain approach is subject to some contention. 
Mandatory governance requirements, such as those set out under the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 
in the US, have been criticised for restricting managers’ ability to adapt their boards and 
financial control systems to suit the company’s circumstances (Romano, 2005). The UK 
Corporate Governance Code avoids taking a ‘one size fits all’ approach and many of its 
guidelines are set out is quite general terms so as to allow for variations in company size and 
circumstances. While this approach offers considerably more flexibility, the possibility exists 
that companies view compliance as a box-ticking exercise and will provide boiler-plate or 
meaningless explanations for non-compliance (Hahn and Lasfer, 2007; Arcot, Bruno and 
Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Mulgrew, Lynn and Rice, 2014). Such disclosures are discouraged in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014)7; however, since companies do not face any legal 
penalties for poor disclosure, it is arguable that there are little disincentives against providing 
non-descript explanations. The ideal behind the UK Corporate Governance Code is that it will 
become the norm for companies to follow its guidelines since deviations may raise questions 
among investors, leading them to voice their concerns with management or exit the company. 
                                                     7 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), Preface, Para. 7. 
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This of course relies primarily on the readiness with which investors ask questions (Dallas and 
Scott, 2006). In the absence of a designated authority which monitors the veracity of 
explanations for non-compliance, it would appear necessary that shareholders avail of external 
information intermediaries to monitor managers and directors. 
  Table 2.2 outlines the guidelines of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) which 
form the basis of this study’s evaluation of corporate governance quality. Each principle and 
provision, with the exception of Principle D.1, was also included in the 2010 edition which 
was in place at the end of the period in which the study is set. As noted in Chapter One, 
corporate governance quality is measured by evaluating ten different characteristics of sample 
boards. The Corporate Governance Code’s guidelines on these characteristics fall under the 
first four of the five categories listed above.  
 
2.5. The Market for Corporate Control 
This study converges upon the impact of newspaper reporting on the operation and possible 
breakdown of the market for corporate control on corporate governance at the company level. 
As already noted, the theory of the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) suggests that 
takeovers are a market-based method of alleviating agency problems. Specifically, the theory 
submits that when managers and directors make poor decisions, the company’s shareholders 
lose confidence in management and sell their shares. The resulting decline in share price 
signals that the company is a potential takeover target. Manne (1965, p.113) contends that:  
 
 “the lower the stock price relative to what it could be with more efficient management, 
the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe they can manage the company 
more efficiently”. 
 
The company is an attractive takeover target because the decline in its market value makes it 
cheap to acquire. If the management of another company, the prospective bidder, believe they 
can run the target company more efficiently, possibly by introducing new policies (Jensen,  
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Table 2.2: UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) Guidance on the Board of Directors A: LEADERSHIP Board Meetings 
 Provision A.1.1: 
 
Boards ought to meet sufficiently regularly to discharge their duties effectively. 
Provision A.1.2: 
 
The annual report should set out the number of meetings of the board and individual attendance by directors.  
 The Roles of CEO and Chairman 
 Provision A.2.1: The roles should not be exercised by the same individual. The division of their responsibilities should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board. 
 B: EFFECTIVENESS The Balance between Executive and Non-executive Directors 
 Supporting Principle B.1: The board should include an appropriate combination of executive directors and non-executive directors such that no individual or group can dominate the process of decision taking. 
 Provision B.2.3: A particularly rigorous review is necessary in cases where non-executives serve on the board for a period in excess of six years. 
 Provision B.7.1: 
 
Non-executives who have served longer than nine years be subject to annual re-election. Board Size 
 Supporting Principle B.1: The board should be of sufficient size to meet the requirements of the business without becoming so large as to be unwieldy. 
 Additional related rules/guidance: The Companies Act, 2006, s. 154 (2): Boards of public companies must have a minimum of two members. 
 Director Independence 
 Provision B.1.1: The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers independent. It should determine whether the director is independent in character and judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances likely to impair his judgement. If a director is considered independent notwithstanding existing relationships with the company the board should make this known in the annual report. Among other factors, the board should consider if the director participates in the company’s share option scheme and if he has served on the board for longer than nine years. 
 Provision B.1.2: Except for smaller companies8, at least half the board, excluding the chairman should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent. Smaller companies should have at least two independent directors. 
 C: ACCOUNTABILITY Audit Committee Size 
 Provision C.3.1: Audit committees should contain at least three independent members. Those in smaller firms should contain at least two. At least one member should have recent and relevant financial experience. 
 Additional related rules/guidance: DTR 7.1.1.R: Committees must contain at least one independent member and one member who is competent in accounting and/or auditing. These members may or may not be the same person. 
 Audit Committee Independence 
 Provision C.3.1: See guidance above. For larger companies, the board chairman should not be a member of the committee.  
 Additional related rules/guidance: See DTR 7.1.1.R above; FRC Guidance on Audit Committees (2012a), Paragraph 1.3: The committee has a particular role, acting independently from the executive, to ensure that shareholders’ interests are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal control. Paragraph 2.5: Appointments and re-appointments to the committee should be made such that its independence is preserved.                                                      8 One that is below the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the reporting year. 
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Table 2.2 Continued: UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) Guidance on the Board of Directors Audit Committee Meetings 
 No specific guidance offered in the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
 Additional related rules/guidance: FRC Guidance on Audit Committees (2012a), Paragraph, 2.6: The audit committee chairman, in consultation with the company secretary, should decide the frequency and timing of its meetings. There should be as many meetings as the committee’s role and responsibilities require. There should be at least three meetings during the year, held to coincide with key dates9 within the financial reporting cycle. More frequent meetings may be necessary. Paragraph 2.7: The external auditor and finance director should be regularly invited to attend meetings. Paragraph 2.8: There should a sufficient interval between audit committee meetings and meetings of the full board so that any work arising from a meeting of the audit committee may be carried out and reported at the board meeting. Paragraph 2.9: The committee should, at least annually, meet with the external auditor without management being present to discuss matters relating to its remit and any issues arising from the audit. 
 D: REMUNERATION/INCENTIVES Directors’ Remuneration 
 Principle D.1: Executive directors’ remuneration should be designed to promote the long-term success of the company. Performance-related elements should be transparent, stretching and rigorously applied. 
 Supporting Principle D.1: In evaluating corporate performance, the remuneration committee may position the company relative to others but should do so cautiously. 
 Provision D.1.3: Non-executive directors’ remuneration should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of their roles. Only executive directors’ remuneration should include share options and other performance-related elements. 
 Principle D.2: There should be a formal, transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration. No director should be involved in deciding his own remuneration. 
 Provision D.2.2: The remuneration committee should be responsible for setting remuneration for all executive directors and the chairman. 
 Provision D.2.4: Shareholders should be invited specifically to approve all new long-term incentive schemes and significant changes to existing schemes.  
 Additional related rules/guidance: The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), Principle D.1: Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance. The Companies Act, 2006, s. 420; Listing Rule 9.8.6 R (7): Boards of quoted companies must prepare a remuneration report for each financial year. The Companies Act, 2006, s. 439: Report must be approved by the company’s members by ordinary resolution at the accounts meeting. Listing Rule 9.8.8 R: Report must include details of current and former directors’ remuneration for the year, details of long-term incentive schemes offered to directors, an explanation and justification of any elements of directors’ pensionable salary other than their basic salary and details of contributions made to directors’ pension funds. Listing Rule 9.4.1 R and 9.4.2 R: Shareholder approval of long-term incentive schemes must be secured by ordinary resolution in general meeting unless a new scheme is offered on similar terms to existing ones or in certain circumstances where a scheme is offered to facilitate the recruitment or retention of one single director. 
 Directors’ Shareholdings 
 Provisions B.1.1 and D.1.3: The holding of share options by non-executive directors may impair their independence. 
 
                                                     9 When interim statements, preliminary announcements and the full annual report are near completion. 
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1987) or implementing a more diligent board (Mikkelson and Partch, 1997) and improve its 
market value, they can expect to realise rewards from acquiring the company. Accordingly, 
the threat of takeover constantly jeopardises managers’ and directors’ positions, thereby 
aligning their interests with those of shareholders. If this threat does not suffice to incentivise 
management to maximise shareholders’ returns, they are disciplined by being replaced when 
an actual takeover ensues. 
 Manne’s thesis came shortly after Dewey (1961, p.257) acknowledged takeovers as 
“a civilised alternative to bankruptcy”. Manne devotes considerable attention to Dewey’s 
argument and emphasises the benefits of mergers and takeovers relative to wasteful 
bankruptcy procedures. Manne admits that certain losses must be incurred by shareholders in 
order to trigger the market for corporate control; however, he maintains that these losses are 
small relative to those associated with bankruptcy. Another of Manne’s contemporaries, 
Marris (1964), also submits rationale for the manifestation of a takeover when managers 
deviate from the creation of shareholder value. As mentioned in Section 2.2, Marris’s theory 
of managerial capitalism is largely concerned with management’s capacity to exert discretion 
when pursing growth objectives. He maintains that when managers fail to maintain an 
appropriate valuation ratio, which is the ratio of the company’s market to book value, the firm 
will be susceptible to takeover. In his treatment of mergers and takeovers, Manne does not 
conduct an in-depth consideration of motives for growth; the basic proposition he advances is 
that control of corporations constitutes as a valuable asset, which exists independent of any 
interest in economies of scale or monopoly profits.  
 The theory of the market for corporate control has received much support 
(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks 
and Mayer, 1997; Grundmann, 2005) as it proposes a method of alleviating agency problems 
in a manner that can create economic value through the transfer of assets from inefficient to 
efficient management (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
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2.5.1. Pre-conditions of the Market for Corporate Control 
The theory of the market for corporate control relies on a number of pre-conditions. Firstly, it 
assumes that share price and management efficiently are strongly positively correlated. Manne 
(1965, p.113) claims that the stock markets have an exclusive ability to serve as an “objective 
standard of managerial efficiency”. In practice the markets tend not to be strongly efficient, 
that is to say that they do not reflect private information on the company. Instead they exhibit 
a semi-strong form of efficiency, whereby all publically available information about the 
company is impounded into its share price (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 1969), with the 
implication that share price does not indicate the true value of the company in a fully accurate 
manner.  
 Secondly, to operate effectively, the market for corporate control requires the presence 
of bidders who are willing and financially capacitated to purchase the shares of 
underperforming companies and also that the shareholders of these companies will sell their 
shares. Hence, a certain degree of market liquidity and sources of finance are necessary for the 
market for corporate control to function successfully. Takeovers tends to come in waves, 
which usually arise when bidders realise motives for mergers and acquisitions and when they 
gain access to a source of finance which enables them to do so. This is evident in takeover 
waves of the 1980s (Jensen, 1988; Martynova and Renneboog, 2005), the 1990s (Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2001; Martynova and Renneboog, 2005) and in those of the new 
millennium (Martynova and Renneboog, 2005; Harford, 2005; Lipton, 2006; Alexandridis, 
Mavrovitis and Travlos, 2012). 
 Thirdly, the theory expects that the acquirer will be sufficiently rewarded. In order for 
a bidder to achieve some degree of certainty that it can recoup the costs of the takeover and 
eliminate the inefficiencies of the incumbent management so as to realise a reward, it requires 
reliable information on the target. There is no guarantee that the discount in the company’s 
share price accurately reflects managements’ inefficiencies (Coffee, 1984); thus, the bidder 
may need to conduct costly research on the target (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2007).  
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2.5.2. Limitations of the Market for Corporate Control 
One might immediately question the viability of the market for corporate to discipline 
managers of unlisted companies or of companies listed on stagnant stock exchanges. Indeed, 
the literature strongly indicates that such heavy reliance on efficient and liquid capital markets 
renders the market for corporate control particularly susceptible to failure under various 
circumstances. Firstly, its operation may be impeded when market liquidity is reduced as 
financing for takeovers is restricted. A post-financial crisis contraction in corporate lending 
has been associated with a decline in takeover activity in the UK in recent years (Office for 
National Statistics, 2014).  
 Secondly, the activity of the market for corporate control in countries characterised by 
concentrated ownership is lower as blockholders are less willing to sell at a low price than 
smaller dispersed shareholders (Becht, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998; 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Franks and Mayer, 2001; Berglof, 
Burkhart, Boeri and Franks, 2003). Section 2.7 provides an overview of the scale of takeover 
activity in the UK during the time period over which this study is set and in more recent years. 
This analysis suggests that the management and directors of UK listed companies are largely 
exposed to the discipline of the market for corporate control.  
 Finally, the theory of the market for corporate control breaks down in circumstances 
where share price deviates from the fundamental value of the company beyond what is 
expected under semi-strong market efficiency. As an implication, bidders may be unable to 
identify potential targets and even where they can, they may not be able to satisfy themselves 
that they will reap rewards from an acquisition (Coffee, 1984; Franks, Harris and Mayer, 
1988). Certain types of behaviour which may lead to such a situation are considered in Section 
2.6.  
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2.5.3. Other Forms of Market Control 
a. Control by the Labour Markets 
The labour markets are posited to provide a less expensive method of controlling management 
than takeovers (Fama, 1980; Coffee, 1984). The labour markets exert discipline both through 
internal and external methods. Internally, the board of directors is authorised to hire and fire 
management and thus serves to monitor and discipline managers (Fama, 1980). Directors are 
expected to attend to this responsibility in order to maintain reputations as expert monitors 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Reputational capital is important to directors in terms of securing 
future board positions (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Harford 
2003). Thus, labour market control which is implemented internally by the board is in turn 
controlled by the external labour markets. As noted in the previous chapter, the capacity of the 
media to serve a role in corporate governance is believed to rely largely upon its power to 
influence directors’ reputations vis-à-vis the labour markets. 
 Labour market discipline is advantageous as it provides its own system of non-
monetary incentives and thus reduces the proportion of shareholders’ funds which must be 
paid to managers and directors. When management discipline is provided by the labour 
markets, the need to create and implement specialised incentive contracts is reduced as are the 
associated transaction costs. The potential for abuse of the incentive system is also negated. 
Fama (1980) views takeovers as a force which sensitises the operation of the labour markets in 
controlling management. As such, the takeover is considered a court of last resort required 
only in circumstances of extreme management failure which neither the board nor external 
labour market concerns are able to correct (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
 Jensen and Ruback (1983) describe the market for corporate control as an important 
component of the external labour markets. In their view, the market for corporate control is an 
arena in which management teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources. 
Jensen and Ruback reason that, because management teams are constantly in competition, they 
will identify an underperforming company and attempt to acquire it so as to better position 
themselves in the labour markets. The most capable management team should be able to make 
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the highest bid. Shareholders are assumed to possess little detailed knowledge of management 
policies and are believed to be willing to accept the highest offer when a company is targeted. 
Accordingly, competition in the labour markets is considered to drive takeovers in a manner 
that eliminates inefficient use of corporate resources.  
 The consistency of the effectiveness of labour market discipline throughout a 
manager’s or director’s career is subject to some contention; it is argued that future 
employment concerns have a weaker influence on managers and directors who are close to 
retirement age (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Davidson, Xie, Xu and Ning, 2007; Matta and 
Beamish, 2008). However, Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) maintain that post-retirement 
board positions incentivise management to make profitable decisions. Matta and Beamish also 
note that directors may not wish to taint their legacies by underperforming at the end of their 
careers. Parkinson (1994) argues that cohesiveness at board level may be sufficiently robust 
such as to oppose the threat of displacement. He maintains that non-executive directors often 
may not be sufficiently independent from their executive colleagues to effectively monitor and 
discipline them. Furthermore, when career opportunities arise, the CEO may exert his 
influence so that positions are awarded to his allies rather than to the most suitable candidates 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and 
Scholz, 2011). Chan (1996) proposes that in order to incentivise managers to maximise their 
efforts, companies ‘handicap’ outside applicants when executive positions become available. 
Knowing that their opportunities for promotion are greater than those of outsiders, managers 
will work harder in their existing positions. Consistently, Agrawal, Knoeber and Tsoulouhas 
(2006) find that external candidates for the position of CEO are only likely to be chosen if 
they are distinctly more capable of performing the role than the most competent insider. This 
would suggest that while internal career concerns incentivise managers, external concerns may 
be a less effective incentive.   
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b. Control by the Product Markets 
Allen and Gale (1998) maintain that management efficiency is preserved by dynamic 
competition in the product markets where only entrepreneurial managers who make decisions 
and devise policies which account for the company’s strategic direction will survive. Product 
market competition can incentivise managers to maximise the value of the company by 
reducing production costs so that it may compete with rivals to maintain its customer base 
(Hart, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The product markets impose the threat of possible 
insolvency and, under certain conditions, this threat may help to align managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs (Schmidt, 1997). Baags and De 
Bettignies (2007) find that incentive contracts are stronger in competitive product markets. 
This lowers the costs shareholders face in incentivising managers.  
 The reliance of product market control on competition renders it impractical in anti-
competitive and monopolistic industries. Furthermore, markets for new products may serve as 
an unreliable control (Jensen, 1993). The impact of product market competition on managers’ 
incentives is also somewhat ambiguous. While competition may encourage managers to work 
more productively, they may demand a higher wage in return for the greater efforts they 
expend. Otherwise, managerial shirking may increase (Scharfstein, 1988). Raith (2003) shows 
that increased competition enables management to justify greater levels of compensation. This 
may come at a cost to shareholders’ wealth, particularly if the company’s revenues decline due 
to the effects of competition on the price of the company’s products (Hermalin, 1992; 
Schmidt, 1997). Consequently, while the product markets incentivise management to operate 
companies efficiently, they may not be relied upon exclusively as an instrument of control, 
rather they form an element of a more complex system of shareholder protection (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Gillan, Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2011). 
 
  
47  
2.5.4. Alternative Explanations for Takeovers 
The theory of the market for corporate control provides one explanation for takeovers. Under 
the theory, the motivation for a takeover is efficiency; takeovers and the threat thereof serve to 
ensure that corporate resources are in the hands of those who will put them to their most 
efficient use (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The theory of the market for corporate control 
predicts that all parties to a takeover will gain; the offeree shareholders receive either a 
takeover premium or the opportunity to share with the offeror shareholders in the benefits of 
the acquired or merged entity (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981). 
 Another efficiency explanation for takeovers is the synergies which may be created by 
combining the operations of the offeree company with those of the offeror. Bradley, Desai and 
Kim (1983) maintain that takeover offers are an attempt by the bidding company to optimise 
some specialised resource by gaining control of the target and implementing a revised 
operating strategy which may involve more efficient management, economies of scale, 
improved production techniques, the combination of complementary resources, increased 
market power, the redeployment of assets to more profitable uses or some other mechanism of 
creating corporate synergy. From this perspective, the gains created by takeovers are manifest 
in the increase in the value derived from the transfer of control of the target’s resources and 
their reallocation subsequent to the acquisition.  
 Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) report that a significant proportion of the gains 
from hostile takeovers arise from the reallocation of the offeree’s assets to the offeror 
company. Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) and Serveas (1991) find that the synergies created 
by takeovers increase with an increasing Tobin’s Q in the offeror company and a decreasing 
Tobin’s Q in the offeree company. This indicates that synergies arise from the acquisition of 
an underperforming company by one with superior performance. Evidence has also been 
found, however, to indicate a negative relationship between the value of the offeror and the 
extent of synergies realised from the takeover (Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah, 2005; 
Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh, 2006). This might indicate that underperforming 
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companies may pursue takeovers in order to improve their own performance through the 
creation of synergies.  
 Other explanations for takeovers suggest that they may have inefficient motives. An 
offeror can gain from a takeover if it can exploit a mispricing of the offeree company; in 
which case, the offeree shareholders may not receive a real premium. A further manner in 
which the offeree shareholders might be exploited is in a two-tier or front-loaded offer. A two-
tiered offer occurs via a partial offer at a superior, first tier price for a sufficient number of 
shares to gain control, followed by an offer to acquire the remaining shares at a lower, second-
tier price. A partial offer is one made to shareholders of a certain class to acquire only a 
proportion of their shares. Appendix B outlines how partial offers are regulated in the UK. The 
tactic of front-loaded offers is viewed as a means of trapping the offeree shareholders into a 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (Lowenstein, 1983; Bebchuk, 1985; Coates, 2000). In effect, target 
shareholders are coerced into tendering their shares at a certain price since collective action 
problems leave them uncertain as to whether or not the other shareholders will tender at that 
price.  
 
2.5.5. The Nature of the Offer and Management Discipline 
A ‘friendly’ takeover offer refers to one which is supported by target management, while a 
hostile offer is one that is opposed by target management (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988). 
As discussed, the theory of the market for corporate control suggests that takeovers are the 
market’s mechanism of disciplining underperforming managers and directors. Disciplinary 
takeovers are often characterised as being hostile in nature (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1988a; Jensen, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a) find 
that hostile takeover targets tend to have lower Tobin’s Q values, more debt and slower 
growth than friendly targets. They interpret this evidence to indicate that since hostile targets 
appear to be managed less efficiently than friendly targets, a hostile takeover serves to 
discipline management. Due to their superior performance, friendly targets attract bidders who 
wish to achieve synergies by combining the target’s operations with their own.  
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 This distinction between hostile and friendly takeovers may not be so clear cut. A 
takeover bid may be what Hart (1988, p.132) describes as “an iron fist in the velvet glove”, in 
other words it may appear friendly but in fact be hostile. Consequently, some of the synergies 
detected by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny may actually be the outcome of hostile takeovers. 
Hart also points out that in order to create synergies, it may be inevitable that least some of the 
targets managers will lose their jobs, thus it is difficult to clearly identify if the motives of a 
takeover are to discipline management, create synergies or both.  
 Certain empirical evidence also challenges the findings of Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny. Lang, Stultz and Walking (1989) find no significant difference in the Tobin’s Q 
values of hostile and friendly targets. Martin and McConnell (1991) find that both friendly and 
hostile takeover targets underperform prior to a takeover bid being made. Furthermore, they 
find management turnover increases following both hostile and friendly takeovers. Franks and 
Mayer (1996) compare the pre-bid performance of a sample of hostile takeover targets with 
that of a random sample of targets and a sample of non-merging companies. They find that 
hostile takeover targets do not significantly underperform in terms of share price returns, 
dividends per share or cash flow rate of return on assets employed. However, when 
performance is measured using Tobin’s Q, hostile targets are found to significantly 
underperform. While the latter finding supports that of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, the 
collective findings provided by Franks and Mayer demonstrate little evidence that hostile 
takeover targets underperform prior to the bid. This would indicate that not all hostile 
takeovers can be explained by disciplinary motives. Schwert (2000) compares hostile and 
friendly targets on the basis of a range of accounting and stock market based performance 
measures and concludes that hostile and friendly takeover targets are indistinguishable. He 
proposes that it is the negotiation strategy employed by bidder which determines whether the 
takeover becomes hostile or friendly.  
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2.6. Behaviour which May Lead to the Breakdown of the Market for Corporate 
Control 
Certain types of behaviour by stock market participants may cause share price to deviate from 
the intrinsic value of the company and hence can lead to the breakdown of the market for 
corporate control. One such situation may arise when investors discount the value of a 
company’s shares because they do not trust managers to put the company’s free cash flow, the 
cash which remains once all of the company’s projects are funded, to its optimal use. Free 
cash flow has associated agency costs as management may waste it in the pursuit of self-
serving objectives (Jensen, 1986). As such, unless management return free cash flow to 
shareholders, they may yield excessive power. Because investors assume that management 
will retain free cash flow and use it to further their personal objectives, they discount the value 
of the company regardless of how the cash is used. As a consequence, the shares of efficiently 
managed companies may be mispriced.  
 Another such situation may be created by irrational behaviour in the stock markets. In 
an efficient market, the effects of irrational trading should be eliminated by rational arbitrage 
such that share price reflects the fundamental value of the firm. However, historically, the 
markets have not behaved in such a manner and prices may reflect noise in the market (Black, 
1986; Trueman, 1988). Large scale noise trading occurs during stock market bubbles (De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1989; 1990a; 1990b) where a sharp rise in share 
prices leads investors to anticipate further increases causing a high demand for the shares. As a 
result, the price of shares continues to increase until they move so far from the fundamental 
value of the firm that investors stop buying and start selling the stocks resulting in a crash 
(Barnes, 2009). During a bubble, the capacity of share price to indicate managerial efficiency 
is greatly impeded, leading to the possible breakdown of the operation of the market for 
corporate control.  
 Both of the aforementioned types of behaviour are unintentional. In contrast, 
behaviour which constitutes as market abuse is deliberate and is legally prohibited in the UK. 
Since the potential for market abuse to occur may be controlled by statutory regulators, and by 
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the board to a certain extent, the attention of this thesis rests on this issue in its consideration 
of behaviour which may hinder the effective operation of the market for corporate control. The 
remainder of this section considers how market abuse can obstruct the disciplinary operation 
of the market for corporate control and adversely affect shareholders’ interests both within and 
outside the context of takeovers. 
 
2.6.1. Market Abuse 
The term market abuse refers to insider dealing10, improper disclosure11 and misuse12 of price 
sensitive inside information and market manipulation13. Market abuse can reduce pricing 
accuracy (Kraakman, 1991) and hence impair the capacity of a bidder to identify a takeover 
target. It is also considered to impair market fairness and damage investor confidence in 
market integrity (Lee, 2002; Barns, 2009; Cumming, Johan and Lee, 2011), leading to reduced 
liquidity (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Aususbel, 1990; Leland, 1992) and thus a 
reduced pool of potential acquirers.  
 
Inside Information and Insider Dealing 
Broadly speaking, insider dealing occurs when an insider buys or sells securities on the basis 
of material, non-public information (Ausubel, 1990). In the UK, anyone who is in possession 
of such information and could reasonably be expected to know that it is inside information 
may be considered an insider under the law14. As mentioned above, a full acceptance of the 
theory of the market for corporate control would require that the stock markets exhibit strong-
form efficiency; however, private information on companies tends not to be impounded into 
their share prices. Insider dealing has been argued to serve as a means through which private 
information about the performance of a company’s management may be immediately priced 
into its securities, thereby strengthening the correlation between share price and management 
                                                     10 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 118 (2). 11 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 118 (3). 12 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 118 (4). 13 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 118 (5)-(8). 14 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 118B. 
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efficiency (Manne, 1966). This argument is, however, strongly undermined by a number of 
aspects of insider dealing which have negative implications both at the company and market 
level.  
 
Company Level Implications of Insider Dealing 
Unregulated, insider dealing can create a significant moral hazard problem whereby managers 
make short-term decisions, contrary to shareholders’ best interests, in order to make trading 
profits (Easterbrook, 1985). It may also increase information asymmetries between 
shareholders and management as it can create incentives for management to report misleading 
information in an effort to prolong the opportunity to make trading gains before news is 
eventually released to the market (Park and Park, 2004; McVay, Nagar and Tang, 2006; 
Beneish, Press and Vargus, 2012). Alternatively, it may encourage premature disclosures 
possibly reducing the value of the company’s projects (Bainbridge, 1986).  
 Insider dealing in a company’s shares is associated with poor internal governance. 
Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) find evidence to suggest that when directors already 
have a large stake in the company, insider dealing raises concerns among shareholders 
regarding entrenchment. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) show that greater insider dealing profits 
are earned in companies with poorer shareholder rights. Liu and Yermack (2012) find that 
when CEOs sell large amounts of their companies’ shares, company performance deteriorates 
and the CEOs often use the profits to invest in property for personal use. Cohen, Malloy and 
Pomorski (2012) find that informative opportunistic insider dealing tends to be performed 
mostly by non-executive directors who may be affiliated with management. Beneish, Marshall 
and Yang (2013) find that non-executive directors who fail to replace the CEO following 
intentional earnings misstatements and who ratify value destroying mergers are more likely to 
collude with each other to opportunistically sell their shares prior to the announcement of the 
merger in a manner which emulates the trading behaviour of the CEO.  
 Although it would appear that insider dealing is undesirable from a governance 
perspective, a major argument put forward in support of insider dealing is that insiders’ 
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trading profits may serve as a substitute for high salaries and therefore significantly reduce the 
amount of shareholders’ funds which must be paid out to managers and directors (Manne, 
1966; 2005; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Ayres and Choi, 2002). Indeed, executive 
compensation has been found to increase when insider dealing is prohibited as the amount of 
profits management can make from trading is reduced (Roulstone, 2003; Denis and Xu, 2013). 
Cziraki, De Goeij and Renneboog (2014) show that when companies face more stringent 
corporate governance regulations, such that managers’ power to influence their compensation 
is reduced, they use insider dealing as a substitute for the lost private benefits of control.  
 There are a number of fundamental issues which restrict the viability of using insider 
dealing as a compensation method; Cox (1986) notes three. Firstly, since insider dealing 
profits can be earned from both good and bad news, they are not adequately tied to 
organisational performance and serve as a noisy indicator of managements’ efforts to 
maximise shareholder wealth. Secondly, compensation through insider dealing may not be 
fully disclosed or authorised by shareholders. Thirdly, insider dealing incentivises 
management to prioritise their own interests over shareholders’. Moreover, because the 
potential profits which may be earned from insider dealing increase with share price volatility, 
managers may face incentives to accept riskier projects which increase the volatility of share 
price (Carlton and Fischel, 1983) but may ultimately damage shareholders’ wealth 
(Bainbridge, 1986; Manove, 1989; Kraakman, 1991). Finally, as Bainbridge (2001) points out, 
managers may not have sufficient personal wealth to purchase shares in advance of increases 
in share price.  
 
Market-Level Implications of Insider Dealing 
Although information may be instantaneously impounded into share price through insider 
dealing, it can also have the opposite effect. Insider dealing may harm market efficiency as it 
can lead to delayed disclosures of company information (Scott, 1980; Haft, 1982; Fried, 
1997). Furthermore, were insiders freely permitted to trade on the basis of their superior 
knowledge, outside investors would see little reason to conduct research on external factors 
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which might impact the value of shares, further reducing the flow of information in the market 
(Fishman and Hagerty, 1992).  
 Insider dealing places certain investors at an advantage over others in their ability to 
make trading profits (Schotland, 1967; Brudney, 1979; Lee, 2002). The associated lack of 
transparency may deter investment from a market, resulting in lower liquidity (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Aususbel, 1990; Leland, 1992). Accordingly, by mandating 
insiders to accurately disclose information prior to trading, the markets may be considered to 
be a more level playing field (Maug, 2002). Maug argues that insider dealing regulation which 
requires such disclosures is a prerequisite for dispersed ownership and liquid public markets, 
which as noted above are two of the conditions necessary for an active market for corporate 
control. 
 Haft (1982) questions the reliability of share price as a benchmark of management 
performance when insider dealing is permitted as management may trade in a manner aimed at 
camouflaging the extent of their inefficiencies. Since the amount and value of inside 
information is particularly high prior to the announcement of a takeover offer, there is 
considerable potential for improper disclosures and insider dealing to occur (Bhattacharya and 
Marshall, 2012). Bainbridge (1986; 1993) posits that the possibility of earning profits from 
insider dealing can create incentives to disclose a possible takeover offer prematurely, 
attracting competing bidders and leading the original bidder to demand costly exclusivity 
protections. Insider dealing on information of a possible bid may create an impression of an 
artificially high demand for shares in the target (Meulbroek, 1992), increasing the cost to the 
potential offeror of acquiring the company and possibly leading it to abandon the bid 
(Meulbroek and Hart, 1997). Thus, there are strong grounds on which to argue that insider 
dealing interferes with the effective functioning of the market for corporate control such that 
regulation of disclosure and use of price sensitive inside information is an essential element of 
a system of shareholder protection.  
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Market Manipulation 
The term market manipulation refers to behaviour aimed at creating a false or misleading 
impression as to the supply or demand for securities. There are three forms of market 
manipulation; action-based, information-based and trade-based manipulation (Allen and Gale, 
1990). Action-based manipulation is that based on actions that change the actual or perceived 
value of a stock. This may involve creating the impression that the company faces an 
impending event which is likely to have a substantial impact on its value such as a takeover 
(Villa, 1989). Information-based manipulation may involve releasing false information or 
spreading false rumours to the market so as to affect the price of an investment. Examples 
include ‘bear raids’, where traders short sell shares before sending negative signals to depress 
their price and then buy them back at a discount, and ‘bulling’ stocks, where traders buy 
stocks and spread favourable rumours about the company so as to sell out at a profit (Allen 
and Gale, 1990). Finally, trade-based manipulation occurs when a trader attempts to 
manipulate a stock simply by buying and then selling, without taking any observable actions 
to alter the value of the firm or releasing false information to change the price. This may occur 
when there is sufficient price momentum generated by speculation caused by trading (Jarrow, 
1992). While there are academic arguments in favour of insider dealing, scholars tend to 
oppose market manipulation.  
 
The Implications of Market Manipulation  
Market manipulation has a distinct negative impact on levels of market transparency. 
Information-based manipulation may involve silent insider dealing where insiders make 
strategic announcements or refrain from making announcements so as to throw investors off 
the scent of an impending development in the company (Benabou and Laroque, 1992). As a 
result, investors are unable ascertain the authenticity of announcements made by insiders. 
Trade-based manipulation also reduces market transparency; by trading in a manner contrary 
to the nature of the information he possesses, an insider can create uncertainty among 
investors as to the true nature of his private information. This enables him to maintain an 
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informational advantage over the market for a period of time so that he makes a profit when he 
eventually trades in the right direction (John and Naryanan, 1997). An uninformed insider may 
also manipulate the market by creating the impression of being informed and disclosing his 
trades such that outsiders are induced to mimic his trading behaviour. The uninformed insider 
can then exploit the opacity he has created and turn around to make a profit from trading in the 
opposite direction (Fishman and Hagerty, 1995). A market where manipulation may occur is 
unlikely to appear an attractive setting in which to invest as the lack of transparency means 
that investors cannot be certain of the extent to which the current price reflects the true value 
of the company. 
 Fischel and Ross (1991) identify three negative implications of market manipulation 
for the efficiency and integrity of the markets. Firstly, it interferes with the forces of supply of 
and demand for shares; secondly, it induces investors to trade under false pretences; and 
thirdly, it pushes share prices to artificial levels and thus can reduce the accuracy of share 
price as an indicator of firm value. Allen, Litov and Mei (2006) find that effective arbitrage is 
less likely to correct mispricings in stocks where there is a possibility of manipulation, with 
the effect that share prices do not reflect their values as accurately as they would if there were 
no manipulators. Allen, Litov and Mei also show that manipulation tends to increase share 
price volatility and can have an adverse impact on the prices of other assets. Nelemans (2008) 
argues that the increased volatility and aggravated information asymmetries which arise from 
market manipulation can deter liquidity traders from markets on which manipulation is likely. 
Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) contend that intentional manipulations make share prices less 
accurate as signals for efficient resource allocation and make the markets less liquid for risk 
transfer and hence undermine both the informational and transactional role of financial 
markets. Furthermore, as Cumming, Zhan and Aiken (2013) point out, manipulations such as 
pump and dump schemes can impede the detection of insider dealing as they have the effect of 
distorting market prices. 
 Market manipulation may well impede the efficacy of the market for corporate control 
by impairing the detection of targets for takeover where share prices are artificially high. 
57  
When a company’s share price eventually crashes, it may be in such a poor state that no bidder 
will be willing to take on its problems. Moreover, where a false impression of the demand for 
shares in a takeover target is created, bidders may incur losses by paying unnecessarily large 
premia. They may even be forced to abandon the bid as company appears too expensive to 
acquire. While such manipulations are theoretically possible, empirical evidence of such 
practices is lacking (Eckbo, 2009). This is most likely due to the high risks of being 
discovered by regulators.  
 Market manipulation may also lead to a false impression of a possible takeover such 
that a manipulator can exploit the increase in share price caused by the market’s reaction to the 
suggested bid and profit on selling out before the market realises that the bid may not 
materialise. One such model put forward by Allen and Gale (1990) depicts how takeover 
specialists can make substantial profits from engaging in trade-based manipulation of the 
shares of companies that they do not subsequently acquire. Trade-based manipulation is 
possible when there is incomplete information in the market such that investors are uncertain 
as to whether a raider who purchases shares in the possible target does so because he knows it 
is undervalued or because he intends to manipulate the price of the shares. Bagnoli and 
Lipman (1996) illustrate how a manipulator may profit by actually announcing an intention to 
make a bid for the firm rather than creating signals through his trades. When the price has 
reached a certain level, the manipulator sells his holding at the higher price, makes a profit and 
abandons the bid. While such manipulations may be possible in theory, one might question the 
likelihood of such a strategy being pursued in practice since the manipulator-offeror would 
need to secure financing for the offer, incur further significant expenses in launching it and 
possibly be subject to regulatory supervision in doing so. 
 
In sum, insider dealing, improper disclosure and misuse of inside information and market 
manipulation may all potentially damage market efficiency, transparency, fairness, integrity, 
investor confidence and liquidity. Aside from hindering the effective functioning of the market 
for corporate control, companies whose shares may be implicated in market abuse face a 
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higher cost of capital as information asymmetries between the firm and its investors become 
more acute (Read, 2008).  
 
2.7. Takeover Offers and Market Abuse in the UK 
In order to assess the potential for the broadsheet newspaper media to report on the operation 
and possible breakdown of the market for corporate control in the UK, one must consider the 
frameworks of takeover and market abuse regulation and evaluate the scale of takeover 
activity and market abuse in the UK. Further detail on regulation of takeovers and market 
abuse in the UK may be found in Appendices B and C respectively. 
 
2.7.1. Takeover Offers 
Presently in the UK, control may be transferred through either a takeover offer or through a 
scheme of arrangement, both of which are subject to the supervision of the Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers (the Panel). A takeover offer is defined under Section 974 of the Companies Act 
2006 as an offer to acquire all the shares, or all the shares of one class, in a company on the 
same terms. A scheme of arrangement is defined under Section 895 as a compromise or 
arrangement between the company and (i) its creditors, or any class of them, or (ii) its 
members, or any class of them. With respect to the transfer of control, the arrangement 
involves an agreement by shareholders of the target company to the cancellation of their 
shares in the target. The resulting reserve of shares is then used by the target to pay for new 
shares which are issued to the bidder. The target shareholders receive cash or shares in the 
bidder company in return for their cancelled shares. This may be referred to as a reduction 
scheme as it involves a reduction of capital in the target company. Reduction schemes require 
75% shareholder approval15 and court approval16. An alternative to a reduction scheme is a 
transfer scheme, whereby all shares in the target not already owned by the bidder are 
transferred to the bidder (Payne, 2011).  
                                                     15 Companies Act 2006, s. 899. 16 Companies Act 2006, s. 645-649. 
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 This study focuses on takeover offers for UK listed plcs regulated by the Panel over 
the years surrounding the implementation of the Takeover Directive in May 2006. Pursuant to 
the Takeover Directive, the Panel is empowered on a statutory basis to make and enforce the 
Rules of the Code17. The Code applies to takeover bids and merger transactions, however 
affected, for companies registered and traded in the UK, the Channel Islands or the Isle of 
Man and certain public and private companies registered and traded elsewhere with registered 
offices in these jurisdictions. The Code sets out 38 detailed Rules which govern the conduct of 
all parties to takeover and merger offers and potential offers. These rules are underpinned by 
six General Principles contained under Article Three of the Takeover Directive. The General 
Principles contained in the Takeover Directive, which are modelled upon those originally 
established by the Panel, promote offeree shareholder protection and encourage board 
neutrality in takeover offers. As a consequence, the Rules of the Code leave the decision as to 
whether or not to accept the offer largely with the offeree shareholders and greatly restrict 
target boards from taking actions to frustrate offers. Appendix B presents an overview of 
selected aspects of the Code which have a particular influence on the manner in which the 
market for corporate control operates in the UK on the implications for target shareholders and 
other stakeholders.  
 
The Scale of Takeover Activity  
According to the UK Office for National Statistics (hereinafter, the ONS) (2014), between 
April 2013 and March 2014, there were 225 domestic mergers and takeovers in the UK; 142 
mergers and takeovers of UK companies by foreign companies; and 57 mergers and takeovers 
of foreign companies by UK companies. As can be seen in Table 2.3, the Panel supervised 33 
successful takeovers over the same period.  
 Takeover activity in the UK has declined consistently since 2007. This is mainly 
attributable to the global financial crisis of 2008, which led to a significant reduction in the 
amount of financing available for takeovers (ONS, 2014). It is forecasted that 2014 will see an  
                                                     17 Companies Act 2006, Part 28, Chapter 1.  
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Table 2.3: Regulated Takeover and Merger Activity in the UK, 2001-2014 
 
 Source: Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Annual Reports, year ending March 2002-2014 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Published takeover or merger proposals 198 107 108 136 114 151 144 134 104 90 94 80 60 43 
Targets concerned 
 
186 104 105 127 109 143 140 128 99 87 91 80 55 42 
Proposals which proceeded to the issuing of offer documents 193 106 106 134 112 147 143 130 101 88 91 80 58 43 
Offers not recommended 
 
22 10 12 25 11 17 13 13 21 25 16 13 9 9 
Successful Proposals Involving Control 161 96 85 110 99 123 127 109 88 74 71 68 48 33 
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increase in both domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions as the UK and 
international economy improves (Grant Thornton, 2013). 
 As can be seen from Table 2.4, the involvement of UK companies in both announced 
and completed merger and takeover deals in 2013 was high by international standards. 
Involvement by US companies was higher; however, if one considers the greater extent of 
corporate activity in the US, merger and takeover activity involving UK companies is 
relatively higher. The value of both announced and completed mergers and takeovers 
involving UK companies as proportions of the total market capitalisation of UK stock markets 
(10.99% and 8.61% respectively) are higher than the same proportions in the US context 
(6.70% and 5.63% respectively). While Table 2.4 illustrates that UK companies are active 
participants in mergers and takeovers, it does not distinguish the deals in which UK companies 
are the offeror from those in which they are the offeree. Of the 3,484 announced deals 
involving UK companies in 2013, 2,129 (61.11%) targeted a UK company. Of the 2,945 
completed deals, 1,876 (63.70%) targeted a UK company (Thomson Reuters, 2014). This 
indicates that the threat of takeover which UK companies face is meaningful. 
 
2.7.2. Market Abuse  
In the UK, market abuse constitutes a civil offence under Part VIII of FSMA. The main 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing are contained under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993 (hereinafter, the CJA). The criminal offence of market manipulation is contained under 
Section 397 of FSMA. Prior to the implementation of FSMA in December 2001, the law 
recognised market abuse as a criminal offence only. Because it is notoriously difficult to prove 
intent to commit market abuse, market participants could engage in insider dealing or 
manipulate the market without facing a serious threat of being reprimanded. Part VIII of 
FSMA introduced the civil offence of market abuse. This offense need only be proven on the 
balance of probabilities and as a consequence, it is easier to establish liability for market 
abuse. Part I of FSMA created the FSA and conferred responsibility upon it to regulate 
activities on recognised investment exchanges and other regulated markets in the UK. The  
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Table 2.4: Worldwide Takeover and Merger Activity Source: Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions Review,  Full Year 2013 World Bank Stock Market Indicators, 2013 Country  (Any Involvement) 
 
Announced Completed Market Capitalisation  
 No. Deals Value ($m) No. Deals  
Value ($m) 
US 11,305 1,250,383.7 9,485 1,051,145.3 18,668,333 
Canada 2,470 142,619.8 1,844 143,085.8 2,016,117 
Japan 2,876 134,915.9 1,848 131,960.0 3,680,982 
Australia & New 
Zealand 
1,812 109,578.2 1,280 64,354.1 1,366,240 
UK 3,484 331,850.4 2,945 259,882.5 3,019,467 
France 2,103 136,096.9 1,842 99,135.3 1,823,339 
Spain 914 67,779.1 770 50,804.1 995.095 
Germany 2,027 131,326.0 1,603 74,933.7 1,486,315 
Italy 771 54,238.8 568 54,611.8 480,453 
Nordic Countries 2,179 88,045.7 1,575 68,296.2 1,199,844 
Benelux Countries 1,453 146,420.5 1,176 127,633.4 1,021,401 
 
focus of the present study rests on civil cases of market abuse dealt with by the FSA over the 
first decade of FSMA. The FSA served as the UK’s single regulator of financial services and 
markets from the implementation of FSMA in December 2001 until April 2013. The Financial 
Services Act 2012, which took effect in April 2013, assigned the functions previously 
performed by the FSA with respect to market abuse to a new body, the FCA18. Accordingly, it 
should be noted that the functions of the FCA discussed in this section were assumed by the 
FSA over the timeframe of the present study which ceases in December 2010. 
 Under Section 119 of FSMA, the FCA must prepare and issue the Code of Market 
Conduct (hereinafter, MAR 1) which gives appropriate guidance on what behaviour 
constitutes as the civil offence of market abuse19. If the FCA is satisfied that a person has 
engaged in market abuse or has encouraged another to engage in market abuse, it has the 
power to impose on that person a financial penalty of such amount as it considers appropriate20 
                                                     18 The Financial Services Act 2012, Part 1A. 19 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 119. 20 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 123 (1). 
63  
or publish a statement to the effect that the person has engaged in market abuse21. Under Part 
VI of FSMA, the FCA is identified as the UKLA. The general functions of the UKLA include 
making the Listing Rules, the Prospectus Rules and the DTRs22. Applications for admission to 
the Official List must be made to the UKLA23 and the UKLA may discontinue or suspend 
listings if it deems it appropriate24.  
 In July 2005, FSMA was amended by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(Regulations) 2005 (SI No. 381 of 2005) in order to implement MAD in the UK. MAD 
requires Member States to designate a competent authority to ensure that the provisions 
adopted pursuant to MAD are applied25; this role has been held by the FSA and subsequently 
by the FCA in the UK. MAD is an outcome of the European Financial Services Action Plan 
which involved a consideration by the ‘Committee of Wise Men’, chaired by Alexandre 
Lamfalussy of how to achieve an effective approach towards transposition and implementation 
of financial markets regulation in Europe26. MAD is a ‘Lamfalussy Directive’ which follows a 
four level regulatory approach, referred to as the ‘Lamfalussy format’. Consistent with this 
format, MAD sets out framework principles at Level One. At Level Two, the European 
Commission has implemented a number of second level directives and regulations which 
stipulate more technical details, a summary of which is provided in Table 2.5. The European 
Securities Regulators Committee (hereinafter, the CESR) has released guidance on Level 
Three common operation of MAD. At Level Four, the Commission ensures compliance with 
MAD. In September 2013, a new European Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation No. 
596/2014) was endorsed by the European Parliament and published in the Official Journal of 
the EU in June 2014. An overview of the Regulation is provided in Appendix D.  
   
   
                                                     21 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 123 (3). 22 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 73. 23 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 75. 24 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 77. 25 Directive 2003/6/EC, Article 11. 26 The final report of the Committee of Wise Men on the regulation of European securities markets (2001), Annex 1. 
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Table 2.5: Second Level Directives Implementing the European Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC) European Commission Directive/Regulation 
 
Implementing MAD regarding: 
Directive 2003/124/EC The definition of public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation. 
 Directive 2003/125/EC The fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest. 
 Directive 2004/72/EC Accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of insider lists, the notification of managers’ transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions. 
 Regulation 2273/2003 Exemptions for buy-back programs and stabilization of financial instruments.  
 Presently, under Section 118 of FSMA, market abuse is defined as behaviour, by one 
person, or two or more persons acting jointly or in concert, which occurs in relation to 
qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market27 or those for which a 
request for admission to trading on such a market has been made, and falls within at least one 
of the four broad categories of (i) insider dealing, (ii) improper disclosure, (iii) misuse of 
information or (iv) market manipulation. Each of these types of behaviour, with the exception 
of misuse of information, is dealt with in MAD. Under Sections 118 (5) to (8) of FSMA, 
market manipulation can take four forms; these are (i) manipulating transactions, (ii) 
manipulating devices, (iii) dissemination and (iv) misleading behaviour and distortion; MAD 
acknowledges only the first three of these forms of market manipulation. Definitions and 
descriptions of these types of behaviour as set out under FSMA and in MAR 1 are provided in 
Appendix C. 
  
                                                     27 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments) (Amendment) Order 2001, the term ‘prescribed market’ refers to all markets established under the rules of a UK recognised investment exchange. 
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The Scale of Market Abuse  
The number of criminal and civil market abuse cases which have dealt with by the FSA and 
FCA between 2001 and 2013 is depicted in Table 2.6, which has been adapted from Barnes 
(2011) and updated to reflect more recent cases. As is evident, the number of criminal cases 
investigated is lower than the number of civil cases, reflecting the higher probability of 
securing a civil prosecution. It is important to bear in mind when considering the scale of 
market abuse in the UK that the number of cases which have been dealt with by the regulatory 
authorities may only represent a proportion of instances of market abuse. One cannot comment 
with certainty on the extent to which market abuse occurs in a given environment since, due to 
its illegitimate nature, those who engage in it will endeavour to conceal their actions (Allen, 
Litov and Mei, 2006). A measure devised by Dubow and Monterio (2006), and developed by 
Monterio, Zaman and Leitterstorf (2007), has been employed to evaluate the performance of 
the FSA, and subsequently the FCA, in curbing market abuse. This measure of market 
cleanliness is based on the extent to which share price moves ahead of regulatory 
announcements, which may reflect insider dealing and misuse of information. According to 
the FCA (2013), market cleanliness has remained stable between 2005 and 2009 and has 
improved between 2009 and 2012. 
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Table 2.6: Criminal and Civil Cases of Market Abuse 2001-2013 
Sources: Criminal and civil cases, 2001-2010: Barnes (2011); Criminal cases 2011-2013: FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account for 2011/2012 and 2012/2013; Civil cases 2011-2013: FSA/FCA Final Enforcement Notices 2011-2013  Year Criminal 
Cases  
Insider 
Dealing 
Market 
Manipulation 
Civil 
Cases  
Insider 
Dealing 
Improper 
Disclosure 
Misuse of 
Information 
Manipulating 
Transactions 
Manipulating 
Devices 
Dissemination Distortion and 
Misleading 
Behaviour 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2004 2 2 0 7 3 1 0 0 0 2 1 
2005 2 0 2 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 2 2 0 6 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 2 2 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 
2011 3 3 0 6 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 
2012 4 4 0 6 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 
2013 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Total 17 15 2 46 22 8 0 9 0 4 3 
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2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has considered how, as a consequence of agency problems manifest in 
dispersedly owned companies, corporate governance mechanisms are necessary to limit 
management opportunism and to afford shareholders a certain level of assurance that their 
interests are protected from expropriation. While the market for corporate control is an 
effective method of disciplining underperforming management, it is a costly means of doing 
so and is susceptible to failure when behaviour such as market abuse occurs. The corporate 
takeover tends to be viewed as an instrument best saved for cases of extreme management 
failure and the board of directors may serve as a less expensive and more discriminatory 
means of monitoring management’s behaviour. This chapter has noted that boards of UK 
listed companies operate in a highly regulated environment; yet, in the absence of specific 
legislation on board structure and conduct, the standard of governance they provide is largely 
left to their own discretion. The next chapter considers academic commentary on the role of 
the board in corporate governance and evaluates its capacity to hold management to account 
and protect shareholders’ interests, paying particular attention to the UK context.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS A CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE DEVICE 
3.1. Introduction 
Building upon the introduction to corporate governance presented in Chapter Two, this 
chapter further considers the role of the board of directors which, as noted in Chapter One, is 
the focus of the evaluation of corporate governance quality conducted in this study. The 
previous chapter has considered the current guidance offered to boards on best practice in 
corporate governance in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014). This chapter reviews the 
academic literature on the board and considers certain guidelines of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code in the context of this literature so that the board’s capacity to serve as a 
corporate governance device may be assessed, with a specific focus on the ten characteristics 
of the board considered in the present study.  
 
3.2. The Board of Directors 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, p.311) maintain that: 
 
 “The common apex of the decision control systems of organisations, large and small, 
in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions is 
some form of board of directors”. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the delegation of decision control from shareholders to the 
board of directors empowers the board to hire, fire and determine the compensation of 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). In order to arrive at decisions regarding management 
replacement and compensation, the board must attend to a range of responsibilities and 
perform numerous monitoring tasks. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) identify three key roles for the 
board; (i) evaluating and reviewing the CEO, (ii) approving corporate strategy and (iii) 
assuring compliance with the law and standards of ethics. The effectiveness of the board as a 
corporate governance device relies largely on its composition and the diligence with which it 
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performs its overall role as a monitor of management (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998). The board must contain specific provisions for aligning information 
asymmetries between shareholders and management (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, 
while the stock market and the labour market provide incentives for the board to monitor, 
these incentives must be structured so as to be effective (Fama, 1980; Murphy, 1985; Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). 
 It has been argued that boards are often composed of members who may appear to be 
suitable monitors but are essentially passive when management discipline becomes necessary 
(Holmstrom, 1999). That is to say that companies establish boards of directors as a matter of 
procedure but select members who are likely to be lenient on self-serving management and 
thus are of little benefit to shareholders. Indeed, the board has considerable discretion in 
making decisions regarding its own design. However, much of the decisions it makes 
concerning its composition and remuneration are subject to the approval of shareholders, who 
in turn are guided by relevant corporate legislation and guidelines on best practice in corporate 
governance.  
 There now follows a discussion of prior research which focuses on the key corporate 
governance mechanisms examined in this study and the role these serve in protecting 
shareholders’ interests. 
   
3.2.1. Board Leadership 
Board Meetings 
Boards which function as effective corporate governance devices actively monitor 
management and pursue shareholder wealth objectives (MacAvoy and Millstein, 1999; Kaplan 
and Minton, 2006). One primary indicator of board activity is the frequency with which the 
board meets (MacAvoy and Millstein, 1999). Board meetings provide the opportunity for 
executive directors to communicate information regarding the company’s operations and 
performance to non-executive directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985); enable non-executive 
directors to challenge the CEO on various issues (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989); and facilitate 
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the development of the board as a monitoring device (Conger, Finegold and Lawler, 1998). 
Agrawal and Chanda (2005) note that there are fundamental issues on the agendas for board 
meetings, including the appointment, dismissal and compensation of the CEO, oversight of the 
company’s overall business strategy and evaluation of the company’s activity in the market for 
corporate control. Brown and Caylor (2006) find that directors’ attendance at and participation 
in board meetings has a positive impact on the value of the firm.  
  In spite of the merits of regular board meetings in maintaining an effective system of 
corporate governance, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) is quite vague in 
recommending the frequency with which boards should meet. Recent studies suggest that the 
boards of companies listed on the FTSE 150 typically meet nine times per annum, while those 
on the FTSE 350 meet between six and ten times per annum (Grant Thornton, 2013; the 
Spencer Stuart UK Board Index, 2013).   
 A study of the frequency of board meetings in UK listed companies by Hahn and 
Lasfer (2007) shows firstly, that the numbers of meetings held by boards of UK companies 
declined between 1998 and 2004; secondly, that the frequency of board meetings in listed 
companies became more uniform over this period and thirdly, that as the numbers of meetings 
decline, the remuneration awarded to chairmen increases. They attribute the reduced 
frequency of meetings to an increase in the international diversity of board members and the 
increase in chairmen’s remuneration to a reduced opportunity for the full board to review the 
work of the remuneration committee at board meetings. The greater uniformity of the number 
of meetings toward the end of the sample period is argued to be an outcome of standardisation 
of best practice in the UK. Hahn and Lasfer thus conclude that as a result of recruiting 
members with international experience and taking a box-ticking approach to governance, the 
flexibility of UK boards to act as monitors of management is reduced.  
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The Roles of the CEO and the Board Chairman  
Fama and Jensen (1983b) contend that a CEO who is also the chairman is likely to wield 
excessive power over decision-making, possibly to the detriment of shareholders’ welfare. 
Consistent with this argument, Dahya, Lonie and Power (1996) show that the stock market 
reacts favourably when the roles of CEO and chairman are separated in large UK companies. 
Empirical evidence indicates that duality has a negative impact on shareholders’ wealth; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) report that CEOs who are also board chairmen receive higher 
levels of compensation and Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance is lower in companies where the CEO chairs the board. 
 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that CEO-chairman duality leads to 
entrenchment. Consistent with this view, O’Sullivan and Wong (1999) show that likelihood of 
takeover is reduced when the CEO is also the chairman. Although O’Sullivan and Wong note 
this takeover deterrent effect is only significant when the CEO has a substantial ownership 
stake in the company, it indicates that the duality may serve to entrench to CEO, thereby 
enabling him to avoid takeover market discipline. Where takeovers are successful, CEOs who 
are also the chairman tend to be replaced by two separate individuals (Kini, Krakaw and Mian, 
2004).  
 Although there are commonly cited weaknesses associated with CEO-chairman 
duality, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) argue that benefits may be somewhat exaggerated 
since the majority of chairmen are not truly independent. Brickley, Coles and Jarrell contend 
that agency costs increase when the roles of CEO and chairman are separated as the behaviour 
of two individuals must be controlled. A study of UK companies by Dahya, Garcia and 
Bommel (2009) casts further doubt on the advantages to shareholders of having a separate 
CEO and chairman in that companies which conform to the best-practice recommendations to 
split the roles are found not to experience any performance enhancements. These results are 
supported by Dey, Engel and Liu (2011) who report that companies which concede to investor 
pressure to split the roles of CEO and chairman experience lower subsequent market 
performance. Moreover, in these companies, the CEO’s compensation becomes less sensitive 
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to his performance. These results lead Dey, Engel and Liu to question if splitting the roles 
produces the most efficient outcome. 
 Up to 2012, studies suggest a consistent decline in CEO-chairman duality in UK listed 
companies from 28% in 1992 to 3% in 2012 (Laing and Weir, 1999; McKnight and Weir, 
2009; FRC/Grant Thornton/Manifest, 2012). More recent results on FTSE 350 companies 
show that the percentage of boards on which the roles of CEO and chairman are combined has 
increased slightly in 2013 to 6% (Grant Thornton, 2013).   
 
3.2.2. Board Effectiveness 
The Balance between Executive and Non-executive Directors 
Fama (1980) considers that the close relationship executive directors have with management 
limits their ability to monitor. As a result, a non-executive presence is required on boards in 
order to provide enhanced protection to shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983a) contend that, 
as non-executive directors wish to achieve and maintain reputations as specialists in decision-
control, they have incentives to monitor managers. Thus the capacity of the board to serve as a 
corporate governance device is strengthened when there are non-executive members on the 
board.  
 Empirically, non-executive board membership has been found to be associated with 
higher shareholder returns (Baysinger and Butler, 1985); fewer financial reporting problems 
(Beasley, 1996); lower incidences of earnings management (Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003); 
and superior company performance (Pearse and Zahra, 1992; Mura, 2007). Coles and Hoi 
(2003) show that non-executive directors who restrict executives’ ability to implement 
takeover defences are rewarded with additional directorships in the future. This evidence 
indicates that the market for corporate control may operate more freely when there are non-
executive members on boards. It also strongly supports Fama and Jensen’s (1983a) argument 
that maintenance of a reputation as an expert monitor incentivises non-executives to limit self-
serving actions by executives. 
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 Companies have been found to appoint more non-executives to the board following 
periods of poor performance (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) and during times of change (Peng, 
2004) so as to ensure management are sufficiently monitored. Similarly, the proportion of 
non-executive members on boards tends to increase in response to pressures imposed by 
institutional investors (Fich, 2005) and regulatory requirements (Dahya and McConnell, 2007; 
Linck, Netter and Yang, 2009). This would suggest that appointment of non-executives to the 
board represents an endeavour to improve the governance of a company.  
 It is, however, disputable as to whether non-executive board membership leads to 
performance enhancements. Vance (1978) finds that company performance is positively 
associated with the number of executive directors on the board, while Kesner (1987) reports a 
significantly positive link between executive board membership and shareholder returns. 
Nevertheless, executive appointments to the board tend to be associated with CEO dominance 
over the nomination process (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; 
Carcello et al., 2011). Executive appointments are thus often assumed to have a negative 
impact on governance as they may be made in in pursuit of the CEO’s objectives instead of 
those of shareholders. 
 A number of studies find an insignificant or no relationship between board 
composition, in terms of executive and non-executive representation, and company 
performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) account for this by claiming that board 
composition and company performance are endogenously linked, in that performance is both a 
cause and effect of board composition.  
 It is contended that non-executive directors alone are insufficiently experienced to 
effectively monitor management performance and thus need to gain insight from executives 
(Williamson, 1984; Patton and Baker, 1987). This would indicate that, in spite of the 
advantages of non-executives being less inclined to collude with management, it is possible to 
have too many non-executive directors on the board (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). There are problems inherent in monitoring by executive directors, not least 
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the potential for the CEO to wield too much power (Weisbach, 1988; Raheja, 2005) and for 
executive directors to make private gains from management opportunism (Bebchuk, Fried and 
Walker, 2002). Nevertheless, due to their superior firm-specific knowledge and experience, 
the contribution executives make to the board is important in order for responsible ratification 
of decisions (Williamson, 1984) and evaluation of management performance (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990). This is particularly pertinent in companies which perform complex business 
processes (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter 
and Yang, 2008; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009) and in environments where information costs 
are high (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010). 
Consequently, boards should achieve an optimal balance of executive and non-executive 
directors in order to function as a suitable corporate governance device (Raheja, 2005).  
 Evidence indicates that UK listed boards tend to exhibit an equal balance between 
executive and non-executive directors; Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) report that in 2004, 
the percentage representation of non-executive directors on FTSE 350 boards was 54%. More 
recent studies suggest that the average percentage of non-executive directors of companies 
listed on the FTSE 100 and AIM is 51% and 45% respectively (Gregg, Jewell and Tonks, 
2012; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). 
 
Board Size 
The board of directors should be of a suitable size such that it comprises a sufficient number 
of members who have links to the company’s external environment (Pfeffer, 1972) and 
possess a range of skills and expertise (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Zahra and Pearse, 1989, 
Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). Board size should not, however, become 
excessive. Lipton and Lorsch, (1992) maintain that boards which grow too large become risk 
averse, take longer to reach decisions and lack focus in performing their duties; they opine that 
board size should be limited to ten members. Jensen (1993) contends that large boards are 
dysfunctional and are thus more susceptible to manipulation by the CEO.  
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 Yermack (1996) finds that companies with smaller boards have a higher market 
valuation. Yermack argues that smaller boards are better monitors and exert a greater threat of 
dismissal over the CEO. As a result, the CEO is more incentivised to operate the company in 
shareholders’ interests. Eisenberg, Sundgren, Wells and Martin (1998) and Loderer and Peyer 
(2002) also report that large boards have a negative impact on firm value. Core, Holthausen 
and Larcker (1999) and Petra and Dorata (2008) find that CEO compensation increases with 
increasing board size. Faleye (2003) shows that, in companies with large boards, CEO 
turnover is lower and there is a lower likelihood of a departing CEO being replaced by an 
outsider.  
 It also appears that large boards may impede the efficiency of the market for corporate 
control; Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) find that board size is positively associated 
with the implementation of takeover defences aimed at insulating management from 
replacement. Korczak, Korckzak and Lasfer (2010) find insider trading is more prevalent in 
companies with larger boards, which they attribute to the reduced ability of the board to 
monitor as it increases in size. 
 Notwithstanding this body of research, a number of studies show that shareholders 
may benefit from the presence of a larger board which comprises suitably experienced 
members. Xie, Davidson and DaDahlt (2003) report a lower incidence of manipulation of 
financial accounts in companies with large boards, which they believe may indicate that on 
large boards, there are more experienced members to oversee the financial reporting process. 
Boone et al. (2007) suggest that companies which operate in competitive environments require 
larger boards which are better equipped to deal with external constraints. In a similar manner, 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) report that companies which perform complex business 
processes and have large boards, with a high proportion of members from outside the firm, 
experience enhanced performance. Cheng (2008) finds that companies with large boards 
perform more consistently. Cheng argues that on large boards, directors must make more 
compromises in order to reach a consensus and hence their decisions tend to be less extreme.  
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 It would appear that it is important for board size to be maintained at such a level that 
it comprises an adequate number of directors to be fit for purpose while avoiding unnecessary 
membership. However, neither the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) nor the Companies 
Act 2006 offer specific guidance on a suitable board size or maximum board membership. The 
Higgs Review (2003) did however praise smaller boards of approximately seven members 
(Section 4.9). A study by Gregory-Smith, Main and O’Reilly (2012) identifies the average 
number of directors on a FTSE 350 board between 1996 and 2010 as eight. Mallin and Ow-
Yong (2012) find that between 2005 and 2006 the average board size for a company listed on 
the AIM was six members. 
 
Director Independence 
Even if boards strike an appropriate balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
non-executive directors may be affiliated to the company in some way and thus not strictly 
independent from management. A non-executive director may assume his position as a result 
of having ties to the CEO or other members of senior management (Mace, 1971). Many non-
executive directors are connected to executives or have had significant business dealings with 
the company in their capacity as lawyers, bankers, consultants or former employees (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1988; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Mulgrew and Lynn, 2013; Mulgrew, Lynn and 
Rice, 2014). The interests of a non-executive director might also be closely aligned to those of 
the executives if he is a relative of one or a number of executives on the board (Bhagat and 
Black, 1999). The ability of such directors to provide effective oversight may be reduced due 
to their being influenced by the CEO or other executives in the company (Weisbach, 1988; 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  
 Non-executive directors may have pre-existing relationships with executives if they 
serve, or have served, on boards of other companies with which the company is affiliated. 
Such a relationship is referred to an interlocking directorate (Mizruchi, 1996). As noted above, 
the importance of reputation in the market for directors’ services is argued to play an 
important role in incentivising non-executive directors to monitor management (Fama, 1980). 
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However, acceptance of this argument, leads to acknowledgement that as directors build 
reputations as monitors they also form relationships with members of boards of other 
companies which results in a web of interlocking boards (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). While 
the existence of interlocking relationships between boards is argued to facilitate a diffusion of 
expertise (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1997), such networks may compromise the 
independence of directors (Fich and White, 2003; Larcker, Seary, Richardson and Tuna, 2005) 
since a director who has a pre-existing link with a board to which he is appointed as a non-
executive director cannot be considered truly independent (the Higgs Review, 2003). 
 Non-executive directors may be independent from the company when they initially 
assume their positions on the board but, over the course of their tenure, develop relationships 
with the company’s executives. Although non-executives may become more proficient in 
performing their duties over time, their interests may eventually become more aligned with 
those of the CEO and other executive board colleagues than with those of the shareholder. 
Bhagat and Black (1999, p.922) remark that in such cases “independent directors often turn 
out to be lapdogs rather than watchdogs”. For this reason it is suggested that term-limits be 
placed on directors’ contracts (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), particularly with respect to those of 
non-executives (Vafeas, 2003). 
 An over-reliance on affiliated directors to monitor management may have negative 
effects on shareholders’ wealth. Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that in takeover situations, 
bidding companies with a majority of unaffiliated non-executive directors experience higher 
announcement-date abnormal returns. These results are however lost when the analysis is 
repeated on the basis of the proportion of all non-executives on the board. Although, Daily, 
Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998) find non-executive directors’ affiliations to the company 
do not lead to higher levels of CEO compensation, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find 
that non-executive directors’ lack of independence is associated with higher CEO pay.  
 The presence of independent directors on the board has been found to benefit 
shareholders in takeover situations. Takeover defences may be implemented in the interests of 
shareholders (Lipton, 1979); consistent with this view, Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) 
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find that when the board of a target company is independent, directors use takeover defences 
so as to generate a higher premium for shareholders. Harford (2003) reports that independent 
directors of acquired companies who complete takeover deals for the benefit of shareholders 
are more likely to secure further board positions than those who do not; this evidence is 
consistent with the argument that independent non-executive directors are incentivised by the 
need to maintain reputations as expert monitors due to their career concerns.  
 It may however be argued that the need for the intervention of the market for 
corporate control should be lower if independent directors are fulfilling their monitoring roles 
competently. Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provide evidence which suggests that the need 
for market based control declines with increasing board independence in that companies with 
greater board independence are less exposed to takeovers. Board independence may also serve 
to preserve the efficacy of the market for corporate control to the extent that that the presence 
of independent members on the board has been associated with a lower incidence of insider 
dealing (Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer, 2010).  
 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that independence declines toward the end of a 
CEO’s tenure as insiders are recruited to the board to facilitate the CEO succession process. 
Hermalin and Weisbach also contend that as the CEO becomes more influential and 
entrenched he is better capacitated to negotiate with non-executive directors for the 
appointment of his executive colleagues to the board. Consistently, Boone et al. (2007) find 
that board independence decreases as the CEO’s tenure and ownership stake in the company 
increase and that board independence increases as greater constraints are placed on the CEO’s 
influence. They also find that board independence increases as the company grows in size. 
This finding substantiates the argument that as companies grow and diversify managers must 
make more complex decisions and thus a robust and expert monitoring system is required 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
 Affiliated non-executives are not unserviceable; there may be roles on the board to 
which affiliated non-executives are best suited (Bhagat and Black, 1999) and the value of 
independent board members may depend on their levels of relevant expertise (Agrawal and 
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Chanda, 2005, Brown and Caylor, 2006). Thus, it appears that the quality of the board as a 
corporate governance device relies, to at least some extent, on its independence from 
management; however, the balance between independence and experience is essential to the 
company’s success and hence shareholders’ wealth. 
  The FRC reports that in 2012, 81% of FTSE 350 companies and 94% of smaller 
companies met the minimum requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code in relation 
to director independence (the FRC/Grant Thornton/Manifest, 2012). In 2013, 87% of FTSE 
350 boards comprised at least 50% independent members (Grant Thornton, 2013). It is 
important to note, however, that the UK Corporate Governance Code’s guidelines on 
independence are very much open to interpretation and it is largely left at the discretion of the 
board to determine if a director is independent in character and judgement (Mulgrew, Lynn 
and Rice, 2014).  
 
3.2.3. Accountability: the Role of the Audit Committee  
The audit committee is integral in ensuring management accountability (Carcello and Neal, 
2000) and an essential element of a company’s internal control structure (Krishnan, 2005). 
The capacity of the audit committee to perform its monitoring role thus contributes 
considerably to the quality of governance provided by the board of directors. As such, the 
establishment by the board of an audit committee may help alleviate agency problems by 
facilitating the timely release of unbiased accounting information to shareholders, thereby 
lowering information asymmetries (Klein, 1998). A number of attributes of the audit 
committee therefore require due consideration when discussing corporate governance from the 
perspective of the board of directors. 
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Audit Committee Size 
Audit committees should comprise a range of members who possess various skills and 
perspectives to guarantee effective internal control (Beasley and Salterio, 2001, Abbott, Parker 
and Peters, 2004). However, its capacity to function successfully may diminish upon reaching 
a certain size (Vafeas, 2005; Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2008). The vast 
majority of researchers define a small audit committee as one comprising less than three 
members, while larger committees are considered to have between three and five members 
(Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri, 2003; Abbott, Parker and 
Peters, 2004; Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004). Such definitions tend to evolve from 
regulatory guidelines that audit committees contain a minimum of three members (Report of 
the Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; the Combined Code, 2003; 2006; 2008).  
 Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) contend that there is more scope for management 
misconduct with respect to the financial reporting process when there is a small number of 
members on the audit committee. Consistently, they find that companies with smaller audit 
committees have a greater propensity to switch external auditors under suspicious 
circumstances. In a similar manner, Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) find that overall 
financial reporting quality improves with increasing audit committee size. Anderson, Mansi 
and Reeb (2004) maintain that smaller audit committees have less time to oversee the hiring of 
auditors, to question management and to meet with internal control system personnel. They 
find that by recruiting additional members to its audit committee, the cost of a company’s debt 
financing is lowered. In spite of this, audit committee size is found to have an insignificant 
relationship with the likelihood of a company engaging in earnings management (Xie, 
Davidson and DaDahlt, 2003) or issuing financial restatements (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 
2004).  
 Cohen et al. (2008) posit that audit committees comprising between three and four 
members possess an optimal level of authority over the company’s financial reporting process. 
Commentators note that beyond this size, audit committees may become dysfunctional as 
coordination problems arise (Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Vafeas, 2005; Cohen et al., 
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2008). Given that few studies identify audit committees containing more than five members 
(Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri, 2003), there is little 
empirical evidence to substantiate this view. 
  Current guidance provided under the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) implies 
that audit committees should comprise a minimum of three members in large companies and a 
minimum of two in smaller companies; yet, without any specific guidance on whether or not 
the committee ought to contain non-independent members, it is difficult to distinguish a point 
at which committee membership reaches saturation. Empirical results indicate that, on 
average, audit committees in UK listed companies contain between three and four members 
(Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; Avison and Cowton, 2012). Those of smaller companies 
tend to consist of three members (Avison and Cowton, 2012). 
 
Audit Committee Independence  
Agency theory suggests that the monitoring ability of the audit committee relies upon its 
independence from management. Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) posit that the desire to build 
a reputation for successful audit committee service motivates independent directors to monitor 
the integrity of financial reporting procedures. Klein (2002a) finds that audit committee 
independence increases with board size and independence as the supply of potential 
independent audit committee members increases. She also finds audit committee 
independence to be lower in companies with poor growth opportunities and in companies 
which have recently reported financial losses, indicating that there is less scrutiny of a 
company’s accounts when audit committee independence is low.   
 Companies with independent audit committees are less likely to be sanctioned for 
fraudulent or misleading reporting (Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000) or to produce financial 
restatements (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004; Carcello et al., 2011). Audit committee 
independence has also been argued to serve to deter executives from engaging in illegal 
insider trading (Enriques and Volpin, 2007). Independent audit committees are more likely to 
engage a high quality external auditor (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Archambeault and DeZoort, 
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2001; Chen and Zhaou, 2007) which does not have a pre-existing affiliation to the company 
(Lennox and Park, 2007). Moreover, when affiliated directors dominate the audit committee, 
management have greater freedom to manipulate the external auditor into producing a biased 
report (Carcello and Neal, 2000; 2003). Such findings are consistent with the contention that 
independent directors are less concerned with audit scrutiny and thus facilitate a more rigorous 
audit of the company (Chen and Zhaou, 2007). 
 Klein (2002b) finds that companies with audit committees which comprise a 
proportion of independent members are significantly less likely to engage in earnings 
manipulation; however, the significance of this relationship is lost when the audit committee 
consists solely of independent members. Similarly, Brown and Caylor (2006) report that an 
audit committee compose solely of independent members has no impact on firm value. Cohen 
et al. (2008) posit that while independent audit committees command authority as monitors of 
financial reporting, they may not necessarily provide the most vigilant oversight.  
 It appears that independence is a crucial element of the audit committee’s ability to 
monitor the financial reporting process and the integrity of the company’s accounts; however, 
relevant experience also contributes strongly to the successful functioning of the audit 
committee (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004; Chen and Zhaou, 2007; Carcello et al., 2011). 
Thus it might be argued that, under optimal conditions, audit committees should maintain a 
certain level of independence while also ensuring that there is an appropriate amount of 
suitably experienced members on the committee. 
 The vast majority of the audit committees of UK listed companies studied by Avison 
and Cowton (2012) are found to consist solely of independent members; however, in 25% of 
companies, the board chairman serves on the committee. Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa’s study 
of FTSE 350 companies shows that the percentage of companies with fully independent audit 
committees increased from 94% in 2001 to 99% in 2004. Nevertheless, a report by Grant 
Thornton indicates that figure has returned to 94% in 2013 (Grant Thornton, 2013).  
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Audit Committee Meetings 
In order to actively fulfil its corporate governance duties, an audit committee must meet as 
regularly as is necessary (Menon and Williams, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1999; Xie, 
Davidson and DaDahlt, 2003). Studies suggest that a sufficiently active audit committee 
would meet at least twice per year (Menon and Williams, 1994; Abbott and Parker, 2000; 
Abbott, Park and Parker, 2000; Xie, Davidson and DaDahlt, 2003; Song and Windram, 2004). 
Agrawal and Chanda (2005, p.375) claim that two meetings per year are not enough; they 
argue that: 
 
 “…audit committees of corporate boards are typically not very active. They usually 
meet just a few (two or three) times a year. Therefore, even if the committee is comprised of 
independent directors, it may be hard for a small group of outsiders to detect fraud or 
accounting irregularities in a large, complex corporation in such a short time.” 
 
Members may, however, be unwilling to commit to attending audit committee meetings unless 
they perceive such meetings to be necessary, such as in times of poor performance (Song and 
Windram, 2004). 
 Collier and Gregory (1999) find that audit committees of UK listed companies meet 
more frequently in companies where the roles of the CEO and chairman are separated and 
where there is a majority of outside members on the audit committee. Higher audit committee 
activity thus appears consistent with other aspects of best practice in corporate governance. 
Song and Windram (2004) find evidence to suggest that the frequency of audit committee 
meetings has a positive effect on a company’s compliance with UK accounting regulations. 
More recent empirical evidence suggests that the average audit committee of a FTSE 350 
company meets between three and four times per year while most smaller companies meet at 
least twice (Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; Avison and Cowton, 2012). 
 Sharma, Naiker and Lee (2009) produce a number of interesting findings regarding 
the determinants of audit committee meeting frequency. Firstly, audit committees meet more 
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frequently when management have high ownership stakes in the company, as the perceived 
agency costs associated with greater managerial power are higher. Secondly, audit committee 
meetings are more frequent in companies with higher institutional ownership, as powerful 
shareholders require more active oversight of financial reporting and internal control. Thirdly, 
audit committees meet more frequently when management engage in aggressive accounting 
practices, but only if board independence is high and if there is an accounting expert on the 
audit committee. Finally and contrary to the findings of much prior research, majority 
independent audit committees are found to meet less often. While the third finding supports 
the argument that independence and expertise are elements of effective oversight of the 
financial reporting process, the fourth suggests a shirking of responsibilities by independent 
directors. On the other hand, it may be explained by a lower demand for regular meetings to 
be held by independent directors who are considered to be more competent monitors. 
 
3.2.4. Directors’ Remuneration and Incentives  
Central to agency theory is the incentive problem created by the separation of ownership from 
control. Externally, managers’ and directors’ incentives come from the market for corporate 
control and the labour markets. Internally, performance-linked compensation serves to 
incentivise directors to ensure that the company is managed in a manner consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximisation (Fama, 1980; Demsetz, 1983). 
 Fama (1980) contends that internal policies must incentivise directors to bear risk and 
to adhere to their responsibilities, compensating them for their efforts in accordance with the 
wage revision process. Fama argues that the labour market imposes a method of wage 
revaluation through the process of ex-post settling up. This argument assumes that a director’s 
past and current performance conveys information regarding his on-the-job consumption of 
perquisites to the labour market. The labour market uses this information to revise the 
director’s future wages both in his current and future positions. Since directors are aware that 
this process is in operation, it provides a mechanism of neutralising directors’ deviations from 
their contracts.  
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 Fama (1980) cautions that full ex-post settling up may not occur and as shareholders 
cannot directly observe the amount of effort directors expend on maximising their wealth. 
Accordingly, directors’ compensation must be tied to the performance of the company 
(Murphy, 1985; Benston, 1985). Fama (1980, p.293) maintains that if executives are aware 
that their positions are secure only as long as the healthy performance of the company is 
maintained they should be “the most informed and responsive critics of the firm’s 
performance”. 
 Notwithstanding this, it is contended that directors’ compensation cannot rely solely 
on the performance of the company, which may at times suffer for reasons beyond directors’ 
control. Compensation contracts must be structured so as to attract and retain managerial talent 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Rosen, 1990). The demand for talent is argued to increase with the 
size and of the company and the complexity of its business; thus, larger companies which 
operate in competitive and risky environments may compensate their directors more 
generously (Conyon, 1997; 1998). 
 The link between pay and performance is tenuous; measuring performance using 
shareholder returns is subject to the caveat that stock returns are extremely sensitive to 
external shocks (Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Leech, 1994; Conyon, 
1997). Company performance may also be assessed in terms of sales (Cosh, 1975; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990) and profitability (Meeks and Whittington, 1975; Cosh, 1975; Cosh and 
Hughes, 1997) or using industry benchmarks (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Core and Larcker, 
2002). Empirically, the sensitivity of directors’ pay to company performance is often 
examined by assessing annual changes in the pay awarded to directors, or to the CEO, relative 
to changes in the wealth of the company’s shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 
1996; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2014). Measures of changes in shareholder wealth tend to 
incorporate both stock returns and the value of the firm. 
 In practice, the determination of remuneration packages for directors as individuals is 
problematic since the contribution made by each board member is only observable as the total 
output of their work as a team (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981; Murphy and Oyer, 2003). 
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Murphy and Oyer (2003) vindicate that since no suitably objective measure exists, subjective 
methods of evaluating managers’ and directors’ contributions must be used. The remuneration 
committee provides one means of achieving such an appraisal (Main and Johnston, 1992; 
1993; Conyon, 1997; Gregory-Smith, 2012).  
 Effective oversight by the remuneration committee is argued to rely on its 
independence from management (Williamson, 1985) as independent directors are more likely 
to constrain the inflation of emoluments, particularly when their own compensation is fixed. 
However, it is not uncommon for a number of executives to serve on the remuneration 
committee (Main and Johnston, 1992; Gregory-Smith, 2012). The power which management 
may wield in negotiating compensation contracts may result in remuneration packages 
exacerbating agency problems rather than reducing them (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). It is, 
however, argued that the potential for disproportionate remuneration packages is limited by 
lobbyist and market forces (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk, John and Guhan 2002; 
Holmstrom, 2005).  
 
Directors’ Pay 
In the short-term, managers and directors are compensated with basic payments of fees and 
salaries. Annual cash bonuses may also be awarded to executive directors as a short-term 
incentive (Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995; Murphy 1999). Executives may also be entitled 
to other benefits such as pension contributions as part of their long-term contract with the 
company (Murphy, 1999). While there tends to be a going-rate for basic pay and benefit 
entitlements, bonuses are largely subject to the discretion of the remuneration committee 
(Murphy and Oyer, 2003). Thus, bonuses may serve as one method of compensating directors 
for their individual contributions, provided that individual contributions are fairly assessed. 
Empirical results show that the relationship between such direct compensation and the 
performance of the company is weak (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gregg, Machin and 
Szymanski, 1993; Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995). Consequently, shareholders’ wealth 
relies largely on the efficiency of long-term incentive contracts. 
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Directors’ Share Ownership 
Incorporation of stock-based income into executive compensation packages is believed to 
serve as means of aligning the interests of executive directors with those of shareholders 
(Demsetz, 1983). By granting stock and stock options to directors, risk-bearing may be more 
uniformly allocated between directors and shareholders and decision-making by the board is 
apt to be controlled with greater prudence (Jensen, 1993). In effect, directors will be more 
likely to work toward the long-term maximisation of firm value if they own, or have the 
option to own, a stake in the firm.  
 Shivdasani (1993) shows that a company’s likelihood of being targeted for takeover is 
lower when its non-executive directors have an ownership stake in the company. This suggests 
that monitoring by incentivised non-executive directors reduces the need for takeover market 
discipline. Nevertheless, since contracts with non-executive directors are only established on a 
short-term basis, equity based compensation, such as share options, tends not to be awarded to 
non-executive directors as it might impair their independence or affiliate them more closely to 
the firm. 
  O’Sullivan and Wong (1998) show the likelihood of a hostile response to a takeover 
decreases with increasing levels of executive ownership. Moreover, the likelihood of such bids 
being successful increases with increasing levels director ownership. These findings indicate 
that when directors have a substantial stake in the company, takeover bids are only made after 
the bidder secures the approval of directors and that bids made when this approval has been 
given are more likely to succeed. While this suggests that the costs of a takeover may be lower 
for companies with higher levels of executive ownership, it also implies that directors with 
high ownership interests have considerable power to determine whether or not bids are made 
for the company. If such directors refuse to approve bids, the effectiveness of the market for 
corporate control may be impaired. Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) show that as directors’ 
equity stakes in the company increase, they exert greater control over managerial 
compensation. Cyert, Kang and Kumar also find that such enhanced monitoring reduces the 
need for disciplinary takeovers.  
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 As discussed in Chapter Two, it may be argued that profits from insider dealing 
constitute as an element of executive compensation (Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983). 
Executives who engage in insider trading are argued to have greater incentives to bear risk 
(Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994). Since insider dealing may be legally prohibited, equity-based 
compensation may offer a substitute. Denis and Xu (2013) find that executive compensation is 
significantly higher and contains a greater fraction of equity in countries with stronger insider 
trading restrictions. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) show that granting equity may be effective 
in encouraging CEOs to bear risk; however, it may also result in the company suffering large 
scale losses. 
 
The Balance between Interest Alignment and Entrenchment 
Stock ownership may have an incentivising effect on directors and effectively align their 
interests with those of shareholders. It is, however, argued that such effects are limited to low 
levels of ownership (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) since at high levels of director ownership, 
entrenchment effects may outweigh the benefits of interest alignment.  
 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b) study the relationship between directors’ 
ownership stakes in US firms and the market valuation of those firms and find that as board 
ownership increases from 0% to 5% of the company’s equity, the market valuation of 
companies improves. At board ownership levels between 5% and 25%, the relationship 
inverts. Market valuation continues to decrease at ownership levels beyond 25%; however, the 
decline is much slower. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny interpret these findings to indicate that as 
boards’ ownership stakes grow toward 5%, they are incentivised to enhance the value of the 
firm. As their stake increases further, the value of the firm suffers as directors become 
entrenched and avoid risk-taking. When the board owns more than 25% of the company, 
entrenchment effects tend not to become any more pronounced.  
 A study on UK data by Short and Keasey (1999) reveals a relationship between the 
proportion of board ownership and (i) market valuation and (ii) shareholders’ returns which is 
comparable to that reported by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, with the exception that the turning 
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points occur at much higher ownership levels. Shareholder returns and market valuation 
increase as board ownership increases to 15% and 13% respectively. Entrenchment effects are 
observed to increase as board ownership rises to 42% of the company’s equity. The higher 
ownership levels at which the relationships invert are believed to be a characteristic of the UK 
regulatory and ownership infrastructure where takeover defences are more strictly prohibited 
and the monitoring activity of institutional shareholders is more strongly co-ordinated. These 
factors make it difficult for directors to insulate themselves from the intervention of the both 
market for corporate control and activist shareholders. 
 A further UK study by Mura (2007) also shows that the entrenchment effects of board 
ownership are stronger than the incentivising effects once the board owns more than 15% and 
entrenchment effects increase between ownership levels of 15% and 45%. Mura also studies 
the effect of share ownership on non-executive directors alone and finds no evidence of an 
incentivising effect. While this may indicate that there is a lesser need to incentivise non-
executives, Mura notes that the results may be due to the low proportions of shares held by 
non-executives in the UK, reflecting the view held in UK corporate governance guidelines that 
the shareholdings of non-executive directors may compromise their independence and 
impartiality.  
 In light of this evidence, one might reasonably argue that directors’ shareholdings 
ought to be at a sufficient level so as to align their interests with those of shareholders without 
reaching the extent at which they accumulate excessive control over the company and become 
entrenched, compromising the performance of the board in its capacity as a corporate 
governance device and potentially inhibiting the effective operation of the market for 
corporate control.  
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3.3. The Board of Directors and Corporate Governance Quality 
A central tenet of this study is that each of the areas of corporate governance discussed in the 
previous section serves as primary means of protecting shareholders’ interests. More 
specifically, through careful implementation and monitoring of each area, agency costs arising 
from the separation of ownership from control may be reduced. Thus, a key focus of this thesis 
is corporate governance quality (CGQ). CGQ is defined as the extent to which the corporate 
governance mechanisms examined in this thesis lower the agency costs borne by the 
company’s shareholders. Much of the research discussed in this chapter has employed a 
variety of variables to measure board efficacy and corporate governance effectiveness. A 
summary of this research is provided in Table 3.1. This study will measure CGQ in each area 
through a series of variables defined in Chapter Five. This thesis posits that collective 
assessment of the facets of corporate governance discussed in the previous section should 
provide for an effective indicator of CGQ. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified that the board of directors is a mechanism of corporate governance 
which serves both as a substitute and a complement to the market for corporate control in 
limiting agency costs in companies. Independence is a crucial element of an effective board of 
directors (Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998); however, true independence from 
management may be difficult to achieve (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Fich and White, 2003; 
Larcker, Seary, Richardson and Tuna, 2005). This chapter has highlighted the opportunity for 
the board’s independence to be impaired when its CEO holds the position of board chairman 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Dahya, Lonie and Power, 1996). It has also discussed how, in the 
absence of unambiguous guidelines on board size, a board may lack sufficient members so as 
to fully discharge all of its duties (Baysigner and Butler, 1985) or grow to size at which it 
becomes dysfunctional (Jensen, 1993). In addition, where the holding of meetings is viewed 
by boards merely as a box-ticking exercise, meetings may not be held at short notice when 
problems and crises arise (Hahn and Lasfer, 2007).  
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Table 3.1: Variables Employed in Prior Research to Measure Board Characteristics Characteristic Variable Definition Researchers Board Leadership Board meetings No. meetings in the year Vafeas (1999), Xie, Davidson and DaDahlt (2003), Hahn and Lasfer (2007), Joe, Louis and Robinson (2009), Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011). 
 CEO-chairman duality 1 if the CEO chairs the board, 0 if otherwise 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Laing and Weir (1999), O’Sullivan and Wong (1999), O’Sullivan (2000), Beasley and Salterio (2001), Goyal and Park (2002), Faleye (2003), Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004), Boone et al. (2007), Raheja (2007), McKnight and Weir (2009), Carcello et al. (2011), Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) Board Effectiveness Proportion of executive directors on the board 
% executives on the board Yermack (1996), McWilliams and Sen (1997), Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Harford (2003), Xie, Davidson and DeDahlt (2003), Armstrong, Ittner and Larcker (2012). 
 Board size No. directors on the board Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, Wells and Martin (1998), Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Vafeas (1999), Beasley and Salterio (2001), Loderer and Peyer (2002), Faleye (2003), Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Xie, Davidson and DaDahlt (2003), Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), Song and Windram (2004), Boone et al.(2007), Chen and Zhaou (2007), Hahn and Lasfer (2007), Guest (2009), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012).  
 Director independence % independent directors on the board 
Yermack (1996), McWilliams and Sen (1997), Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Harford (2003), Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), Chen and Zhaou (2007), Hahn and Lasfer (2007), Joe Louis and Robinson (2009), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012). The Audit Committee  Audit committee size No. members on the audit committee Archambeault and DeZoort (2001), Beasley and Salterio (2001), Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003), Xie, Davidson and DaDahlt (2003), Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), Chen and Zhaou (2007), Barua, Rama and Sharma (2010), Avison and Cowton (2012). 
 Audit committee independence 1 if the audit committee is composed of a majority of independent members, 0 if otherwise 
Klein (2002b). 
Audit committee meetings No. audit committee meetings in the year Menon and Williams (1994), Collier and Greggory (1999), Archambeault and DeZoort (2001), Xie, Davidson and DaDahlt (2003), Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), Song and Windram (2004), Chen and Zhaou (2007), Lennox and Park (2007). Directors’ Remuneration and Incentives CEO pay to performance sensitivity 
Annual change in CEO pay: Annual change in shareholder wealth 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), Yermack (1996). 
Board shareholding % equity owned by all directors Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b), McWilliams and Sen (1997), Klein (1998), Short and Keasey (1999), Boone et al. (2007), Mura (2007), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012). 
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 A suitably experienced, independent and active audit committee should serve to 
monitor the financial integrity of the company (Carcello and Neal, 2000) and to align 
information asymmetries between shareholders and managers (Klein, 1998). However, there 
are apparent difficulties in achieving a balance of independence and financial expertise (Klein, 
2002b; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). Thus, asymmetries may well exist 
between shareholders and management with respect to information on the company’s financial 
soundness. These asymmetries coupled with the difficulties associated with incentivising 
directors appropriately (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995) imply 
that, although the board performs an essential role as an internal control device, it is by no 
means a perfect solution to agency problems.   
 The board of directors often serves as a less costly alternative to the market for 
corporate control; yet, it is not always fully effective in safeguarding shareholders’ interests. 
Shareholders in UK listed companies may make use of the rights afforded to them under the 
legal system to actively monitor and voice their concerns with management. However, both 
academic and policy-level research has found that shareholders in the UK tend to take a 
passive approach to governance (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; 
Myners, 2001; Goergen, Renneboog and Zhang, 2008; the Kay Review, 2012). As a 
consequence, external intermediaries appear to have an important role to perform in exposing 
the shortcomings of managers and directors, potentially reducing agency costs in dispersedly 
owned companies. Chapter Four considers how one specific intermediary, the news media 
may perform such a role. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE NEWSPAPER MEDIA IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
4.1. Introduction 
Agency costs exist largely because of information asymmetries which exist between 
shareholders and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Disclosure of company 
information is, therefore, a central element of an effective system of corporate governance. 
Disclosure is also essential for the effective functioning of the capital markets (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Healy and Palepu note three ways through which information is disclosed to 
shareholders: (i) the financial reporting process which companies in the UK must follow by 
law, (ii) voluntary company disclosures and (iii) disclosure by external information 
intermediaries such as analysts, industry experts and the financial news media.   
 Bushee et al. (2010) define an information intermediary as an actor which provides 
information which is new and useful to other parties. Many information intermediaries in the 
company environment are also referred to as gatekeepers of company information. Coffee 
(2001) expounds that corporate governance relies on gatekeepers to protect shareholders’ 
interests by providing accurate and unbiased reports of the company’s financial performance 
such that an objective assessment of the value of the firm can be made.  
 Certain intermediaries are not independent from management and those contracted by 
the company may well prioritise the interests of managers over those of shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; Dyck, Morse and Zingales 2010). Among these 
parties are PR and Investor Relations (hereinafter, IR) agents. While one might expect 
intermediaries such as auditors and analysts to act as agents of shareholders, there are 
considerable opportunities for their loyalties to become misplaced as they often provide 
further services to the company and receive fees from management in return (Black, 2001a; 
Coffee, 2001, 2002; 2004; Borden, 2007).  
 Kothari, Li and Short (2009) argue that the news media’s incentives to be unduly 
optimistic are muted because of its independence from the companies on which it reports. 
Auditors, analysts, PR and IR agents are apt to possess more specialised knowledge of 
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business, management and finance than journalists; however they lack the ability to 
communicate to a variety of audiences simultaneously. Bushee et al. (2010, p.2) assert that:
  
 “The business press is perhaps the broadest and most widely disseminated of all 
potential information intermediaries, reaching both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors as well as managers, regulators and other market participants”. 
 
The news media is viewed as a more accessible information intermediary which consolidates 
information, often collected from other intermediaries, and repackages it in a format which its 
audiences can easily digest (Deephouse, 2000), thereby lowering the information costs faced 
by certain parties (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008).    
 
4.2. The Newspaper Media and Corporate Governance  
The past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of corporate governance issues and 
matters of management accountability in the news media (Carroll and McCombs, 2003, 
Borden, 2007; Brickley, 2008) and the publicity surrounding many corporate governance 
‘scandals’ has been associated with developments in corporate governance policy both in the 
UK (Jones and Pollitt, 2001; Dyck and Zingales, 2002a) and internationally (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2002a; Melis, 2005; Borden, 2007; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). In some 
instances, the news media also appears to have a direct effect on corporate governance 
behaviour within companies (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 
2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009). 
 Dyck, Moss and Zingales (2008) point out that certain issues lend themselves better to 
certain media vehicles. For instance, natural disasters are best covered on television, given that 
the appeal of such stories to audiences may be visually and audibly augmented. News stories 
regarding companies and the stock markets, on the other hand, tend not to require a high 
degree of graphical or audio enhancement and can be presented in more detail through the 
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written word. Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2008) show that broadsheet newspapers are 
particularly effective in this respect.  
 
4.2.1. The UK Broadsheet Newspaper Media 
In the UK, newspapers fall into the category of either broadsheets or tabloids. The former 
refers to newspapers which target an elite audience of generally upper to middle class readers. 
The editorial and presentational style of broadsheets is characterised by serious journalism 
with an emphasis on politics and economics. The latter category caters more for audiences of 
lower social classes and is characterised by populist and sensationalist journalism (Chandler 
and Munday, 2011). Specialist business, financial and economic broadsheet newspapers 
provide very specific information, commentary and analysis on companies, the stock markets 
and the economy (Davis, 2005; 2006; Doyle, 2006); however, as is illustrated in Chapter One, 
the number of widely circulated specialist publications in the UK is limited.  
 Online access to news is customary in the contemporary corporate and market 
environment (the Financial Times, 2010). Newswire services have, for many years, reported 
news on companies almost instantaneously; however, they do not offer the news coverage 
provided by newspapers. UK newspapers are developing a growing presence on the internet 
(the Reuters Institute, 2014). Nevertheless, alternative online media vehicles often provide 
coverage in a timelier and more accessible manner. Increasingly, online news aggregators and 
real-time news websites present a challenge to newspapers and the role of professional 
journalists is being assumed, to a growing extent, by citizen journalists reporting via social 
media websites and blogs (the Reuters Institute, 2014). In spite of this, legacy newspaper titles 
have earned the trust of their readers and a reputation for credibility which has not yet been 
achieved by internet news sources (Deloitte, 2014). Trust in UK newspapers has declined in 
recent years (Edelman, 2013; Deloitte, 2014), following the exposure of ethical failures by UK 
journalists in the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press of 2012 
(hereinafter, the Leveson Inquiry) (see Appendix E). It is important to bear in mind, however, 
that the Leveson Inquiry was predominantly a response to ethical lapses by journalists 
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reporting for tabloid publications and the quality and reliability of broadsheet journalism is in 
fact commended at various points throughout the Report of the Inquiry (hereinafter, the 
Leveson Report).  
 Maintaining the trust and loyalty of readers in the shadow of the doubt cast over 
journalistic principles, in an increasingly competitive environment, is thus a current challenge 
facing the broadsheet newspaper media, which is considered in detail in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis. Notwithstanding this, newspapers are regarded a main source of news coverage in the 
UK. According to Ofcom28 (2013), newspapers are the second most accessed news platform in 
the UK, with television being accessed most.  
 
4.3. The Roles of the Newspaper Media in Corporate Governance 
The newspaper media, the broadsheet newspaper media in particular, may serve a number of 
roles in the corporate environment; these include its role as an information intermediary, a 
corporate watchdog and an influence on managers’ and directors’ reputations.  
 
4.3.1. The Newspaper Media as an Information Intermediary 
Bushee et al. (2010) maintain that the newspaper media is an intermediary which can shape 
companies’ information environments by creating new information through journalism 
activities, by packaging information from many sources, and by disseminating it, not only to 
shareholders, but also to managers, directors and corporate regulators.  
 Press scrutiny of corporate governance standards has a discernible impact on both the 
actions of investors and directors. Johnson et al. (2005) and Joe, Louis and Robinson (2009) 
investigate shareholders’ responses to BusinessWeek’s publication of its ‘Best and Worst 
Performing Boards’ list. The list is the result of a survey of institutional investors’ assessments 
of board effectiveness based on best practice guidelines articulated by governance experts 
(Johnson et al., 2005). Both studies find that companies included on both the best board and 
worst board lists enjoy post-publication positive abnormal returns. Johnson et al. propose that 
                                                     28 Ofcom is the independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industry. 
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the positive returns experienced in companies with underperforming boards indicates that 
investors expect boards to improve their performance in response to media criticism. Joe, 
Louis and Robinson (2009) provide more insight by identifying differences in investors’ 
responses. Individual investors exit companies on the worst board list while more 
sophisticated institutional investors buy their shares, anticipating board reform in response to 
negative media coverage. Consistently, Joe, Louis and Robinson show that BusinessWeek’s 
scrutiny of boards’ observance of corporate governance standards leads to replacements of 
CEOs and chairmen; increases in independence and a reduction in the number of staggered 
boards.  
 It is important to clarify that, in the context of business and finance, broadsheet 
newspapers often do not communicate news, rather they report, comment and analyse news 
which is usually released by other sources such as newswires and press releases. Accordingly, 
it must be acknowledged that the extent of information which mainstream broadsheet 
newspapers provide to professional investors, who tend to access real-time specialist news 
sources, is limited. Notwithstanding this, the mainstream news media have a unique ability to 
generate publicity around issues and events in companies such that they take greater priority 
on the public agenda (Carroll and McCombs, 20003). In effect, the actions of boards are 
subject to greater scrutiny by a variety of product and labour market participants as well as 
corporate regulators and the policymakers who appoint them. 
 Stories about corporate governance problems carried by general broadsheet 
newspapers may well create significant implications for the board in terms of the company’s 
relationship with its broader stakeholders. For instance if the company loses customers due to 
negative newspaper reports, its profits may suffer which may impact directors’ performance-
linked remuneration (Wade, Porac, Pollock and Graffin, 2006; Liu and Taylor, 2008). 
Newspaper coverage of management opportunism and director underperformance is believed 
to increase the voting public’s awareness of the need for the construction and enforcement of 
effective corporate governance rules, causing policymakers to surrender to populist sentiment 
(Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Bebchuk and Neeman, 2010). Traditionally viewed as 
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the Fourth Estate of the Government (Carlyle, 1841; Baron, 2003; Davis, 2009; Brand, 2010), 
broadsheet newspapers were thought of as a vehicle for political oversight which informed the 
voting public on national issues that required regulation and intervention. News media 
coverage has been cited as a contributing factor to the development and adoption of codes of 
best practice in corporate governance in the UK during the 1990s and 2000s (Jones and Pollitt, 
2001; 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2002a). More recently, Ferri and Maber (2013) posit that the 
prevalence of disparaging newspaper headlines concerning the levels of remuneration awarded 
to executives in UK companies may have been a driving factor behind the construction of the 
Directors’ Remuneration Regulations, 2002 (hereinafter, the DRRs), which are currently 
implemented under Section 439 of the Companies Act 2006. The DRRs require that, in quoted 
companies, the directors’ remuneration report for every financial year must be approved by 
shareholders, granting shareholders an effective ‘say on pay’. 
 In sum, by functioning as an information intermediary between the company, its 
shareholders and its broader stakeholders, the newspaper media can create significant 
ramifications for the company’s share price, its relationship with corporate regulators and the 
remuneration and career prospects of its managers and directors such that newspaper reporting 
may have a meaningful impact on the board’s efforts to protect shareholders’ wealth.   
 
4.3.2. The Newspaper Media as a Corporate Watchdog 
A number of commentators on the role of the board of directors in corporate governance have 
posed the question ‘who monitors the monitors?’ (Scott, 1983; John and Senebet, 1998). Scott 
considers responsibility for executive oversight to lie with outside board members, while John 
and Senebet maintain that the market for corporate control ultimately monitors the board as a 
whole. The previous chapters have identified imperfections in each of these methods and an 
effective corporate governance system appears to depend on an appropriate interaction 
between these systems. This thesis proposes that this interaction may be enhanced in the 
presence of an additional external watchdog such as the newspaper media. 
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 Journalists observe and investigate company environments and make stakeholders 
aware of deviations from norms (Shoemacker, 1996). Thus, where shareholder protection is 
accepted best practice, newspaper coverage should alert shareholders and other stakeholders of 
instances where boards fail to perform their duties as monitors of management. Miller (2006) 
finds that the news media may perform a corporate watchdog role either through investigative 
journalism or by rebroadcasting information. While investigative journalism aids early 
detection of corporate malpractice, the effects of rebroadcasting information, such as annual 
and interim results and merger and takeover announcements, should not be underestimated. 
Publishing information subsequent to it being released by another source is vital for raising 
awareness of problems or concerns regarding the performance of a company or its board.  
 There are a number of factors which may discourage investigative journalism in 
instances of corporate fraud and malpractice. Firstly, newspapers may face conflicts of 
interests if they have affiliations or advertising contracts with companies in which 
malfeasances have occurred (Miller, 2006). Secondly, journalists may be accused of inducing 
market panic (Lloyd and Watson, 1999; Miller, 2006); for example, a considerable amount of 
blame was placed with a prominent journalist at the British Broadcasting Company 
(hereinafter, the BBC) who reported on liquidity problems at the UK bank, Northern Rock, 
prior to its collapse in 2007. While the report was solidly grounded, it is argued that it 
triggered a run on the bank which led to its demise (Tambini, 2008). Thirdly, journalists who 
reveal corporate misconduct may face problems in accessing company information in future 
(Miller, 2006; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). Fourthly, since frauds and malfeasances, by 
nature, are concealed by the parties involved, they are difficult to detect. Because there is no 
certainty that investigate journalism will produce results, it tends only to be supported by news 
agencies on an occasional basis (Doyle, 2006; Lewis, Williams, Franklin, Thomas and 
Mosdell, 2010). Finally, the possibility of breaching libel and defamation laws may stifle the 
incentives of the newspaper media to report on possible instances of self-dealing by 
management, unless the malfeasance can be confirmed (Lloyd and Watson, 1999; Black, 
2001a).  
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  The news media’s support of Enron prior to its collapse has brought its success as a 
monitor into question (Sherman, 2002; Doyle, 2006). Dyck and Zingales (2002b) note that the 
media were too consumed in the stock market euphoria of the time to cast doubt over Enron’s 
strong performance indicators, which were the product of illegitimate financial engineering. It 
may be argued that if media watchdogs did bark earlier in the Enron case, few would have 
listened. The economist J.K. Galbraith (1990) noted that in times of market prosperity, only an 
exceptionally courageous journalist will challenge financial euphoria since neither the market 
nor the public mentality is willing to accept any misgivings about their wealth. 
 The news media may serve as a watchdog for minority shareholders. Lauterbach and 
Pajuste (2014) show that negative broadsheet newspaper sentiment creates hostile public 
opinion on dual class share structures in Continental European companies. Dual class share 
structures may render minority shareholders vulnerable to expropriation by controlling 
shareholders and serve to insulate management from the threat of takeover (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Triantis, 2000; Nenova, 2003). Such negative public opinion puts pressure on 
controlling shareholders in Western European companies to unify dual class shares into a 
single one share-one vote class. Lauterbach and Pajuste discern that, after the unifications, the 
newspapers continue to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders in such companies in 
that persistent newspaper scrutiny drives sustained governance improvements and reduced 
extraction of private benefits by dominant shareholders. Braggion and Giannetti (2013) 
observe that UK broadsheet newspapers in the 1950s also adopted a similar negative view of 
dual class share structures which influenced investors’ preferences for voting shares, limiting 
London listed companies’ ability to use dual class structures. Braggion and Giannetti, 
however, note that such coverage may not have created any benefits for shareholders in terms 
of enhanced profitability or performance.  
 Journalists’ skills in monitoring certain basic governance issues such as board 
composition have received some criticism. Bednar (2012) argues that once boards adhere to 
formal independence standards, journalists may be insufficiently skilled to detect grey areas 
such as social ties between directors. He argues the media can even legitimate boards which 
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are not suitably composed to provide adequate oversight of executives. Thus, there are 
considerable limitations to the newspaper media’s ability to act as a corporate watchdog. 
Nevertheless, by rebroadcasting information, it may make key parties aware of problems in 
companies such that remedial action may ensue. 
 
4.3.3. The Newspaper Media’s Power to Shape Reputation 
Much regard is given to newspapers for their influence over reputation, both that of the 
company and its directors. By reporting on managers and directors, the newspaper media 
increases the number of people who learn about their behaviour (Dyck, Volchkova and 
Zingales, 2008). Since directors are believed to be incentivised by the desire to uphold 
reputations as expert monitors in order to secure future board appointments (Fama, 1980; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1996) and to access finance from the capital markets (Diamond, 1989; 
Gomes, 2000), they seek to avoid bad press. Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann and Hambrick (2008) 
illustrate how corporate failure leads to stigmatization and devaluation of the actors 
responsible for the failure which causes downward settling up in the labour markets. 
Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann and Hambrick portray the news media as an arbiter which explains 
the causes and consequences of corporate failure to outside observers and attributes blame to 
those actors responsible. The board of directors stands to bear most of this blame as it is their 
responsibility to oversee the management of the company. As a result, the news media 
penalises directors for their negligence by devaluing their reputations with potential employers 
and impairing their ability to secure future board positions.  
 Westphal and Deephouse (2011) acknowledge the potential of the newspaper media to 
impose reputational costs on directors. However, they note that directors, particularly CEOs, 
are powerful individuals who are often established or even entrenched within the firm with an 
array of corporate resources at their disposal which they may use to protect their reputations. 
Hence, executives are often in a position to challenge journalists in response to newspaper 
criticism which they describe as ‘negative reciprocity’. In fact, negative reports may even go 
unpublished because directors may ingratiate journalists with tangible and intangible favours. 
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As a consequence of this power, CEOs often appear as celebrities in the media (Hayward, 
Rindova and Pollock, 2004); however, ‘superstar CEOs’ are not necessarily better leaders or 
guardians of shareholder wealth (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Malmendier and Tate show 
that CEOs who achieve celebrity status in the media are often excessively compensated and 
are more likely to manipulate earnings. Thus, like traditional methods of corporate oversight 
and control, the ability of the news media to constrain and discipline managers and directors 
relies on it remaining independent from the influence of dominant self-interested executives 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2002b; Westphal and Deephouse, 2011). 
 The newspaper media may also have an impact on directors’ actions through its 
influence over the company’s reputation in the product markets (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
Reputation is a valuable firm asset and reputation management is critical to the success of a 
company in terms of profitability and its positioning within an industry (Itami and Roehl, 
1987). Hall (1992, p.143) notes that:  
 
 “Reputation, which is usually the product of years of demonstrated superior 
competence, is a fragile resource; it takes time to create, it cannot be bought and it can be 
damaged easily”. 
 
Deephouse (2000) argues that newspaper coverage contributes more to a company’s 
reputation than exposure by other forms of media. This is because the newspaper media is a 
more trusted source of information for corporate stakeholders who do not directly engage with 
the company. Moreover, audiences recall information they learn from newspapers more 
readily than they do from other sources of news such as television or radio.  
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4.4. The Suitability of the Broadsheet Newspaper Media 
A number of characteristics of the broadsheet newspaper media must be assessed in order to 
evaluate its capacity to serve a meaningful role in corporate governance. These are its 
credibility, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility and independence. 
 
4.4.1. Credibility 
The media has been accused of sensationalising issues in order to sell papers (Jensen, 1979). 
This view assumes that audiences prefer entertainment over factual information and that, as a 
consequence, newspapers do not always tell the full truth. For the broadsheet newspaper 
media to effectively perform a role in corporate governance, reports must be credible. If 
newspaper reports are not credited by investors, regulators and the broader public, 
underperforming or self-serving managers and directors are unlikely to incur regulatory or 
reputational penalties (Dyck and Zingales, 2002a; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008).  
 Dyck and Zingales (2002a) claim that the more newspapers that circulate throughout a 
country, the greater the level of competition to acquire a reputation for credibility. Young 
(2000) argues that the competition necessary to promote accurate and objective reporting may 
not be present in the UK media industry, where considerable barriers to entry are created by 
tight ownership links, existing levels of concentration and high price structures. Such 
conditions are not conducive to the provision of a plurality of views. The ownership of the UK 
media industry is discussed further in Section 4.4.5.  
 Journalists may need to directly engage with companies to effectively monitor the 
activities of their management and provide a full account of an event or issue. While inclusion 
of direct quotations of comments made by key executives may enhance the perceived 
credibility of a newspaper report, executives may only offer information if it paints them in a 
positive light (Westphal and Deephouse, 2011). Thus, information acquired directly from a 
company, or from its PR agents, can reduce the credibility of a newspaper story. Dyck and 
Zingales (2002b) note that the most credible newspapers refrain from engaging in quid-pro-
quo relationships with companies as this ultimately damages their reputations. 
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 In recent years, budgetary pressures at many UK broadsheet newspapers have left 
many journalists with no other option than to acquire information at little or no cost from PR 
agents (Lewis et al., 2010). Although not all PR efforts are intended to distort the truth, it is 
considered good journalistic practice to verify PR material with a third party (Tambini, 2008). 
As UK newspapers face increasing competition from online real-time news providers, 
journalists may be forced to forsake such veracity so as to cover the news in a timelier manner 
than they have done traditionally (Lewis et al., 2010). This creates the risk that broadsheet 
newspaper reports of the future will be based more on the pre-packaged news provided by PR 
agents. This risk is assessed further in Chapters Eight and Nine.  
 
4.4.2. Accuracy 
Lloyd and Watson (1999) contend that if newspapers report facts accurately, the question of 
credibility does not arise. It is expected that broadsheet journalists aim to produce accurate 
reports since to do otherwise would create a risk of being accused of getting a story wrong, 
thereby injuring the newspaper’s reputation and costing it readers (Deephouse, 2000). 
Zingales (2000) argues that readers will only form opinions based on newspaper reports when 
they believe the information they contain to be accurate and reliable.  
 Lloyd and Watson (1999) note that the financial press in the UK traditionally took an 
entirely objective approach to journalism, reporting only precise facts without comment or 
opinion. Such strict objectivity has become uncommon and is in fact undesirable. Within the 
mainstream newspaper media, comment and opinion is required by those who are not fully 
educated in complex topics, such as developments in the world of business and finance 
(Deephouse, 2000). Even within the contemporary specialist financial press, analysis is 
expected by investors who wish to evaluate a range of opinions before making the decision to 
trade shares (Doyle, 2006). 
 It is possible for newspapers to adopt an optimistic or sceptical tone while remaining 
accurate; however, it is perhaps inevitable that the tenor of newspaper reports will influence 
audiences’ perceptions of issues, whether or not this is the intention of the reporter (Tetlock, 
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2007). Brickley (2008) recounts how Kenneth Lay, the former CEO and chairman of Enron, 
accused the Wall Street Journal of inducing market panic in its coverage of his trial, causing 
Enron’s stock price to plummet. Because of the accuracy with which the Journal reported the 
facts on Enron’s performance, Lay could not pursue this claim any further in court (Brickley, 
2008). This would indicate that journalists have incentives to remain accurate as it serves as a 
type of insurance policy against being held liable for damages to a company’s reputation.  
 Since newspaper reporters are specialists in journalism rather than accounting or 
finance, they may fail to provide an accurate assessment of all decisions taken by 
management. Tambini (2008) testifies that journalists find it difficult to interpret novel 
financial engineering processes let alone explain these processes to their more mainstream 
audiences. Doyle (2006) observes that it is common for business journalists in the UK to rely 
on experts to explain and interpret developments in companies. This, she explains, may 
position the news media lower in the informational hierarchy than what might be necessary to 
reveal executive malpractice. This indicates that, in terms of accuracy, the newspaper media 
may perform a more reliable role in corporate governance by repackaging and republishing 
information from other sources than it would through uncovering information obtained from 
direct investigation of the activities of managers, directors and other insiders.   
 
4.4.3. Timeliness 
In order to make a valuable contribution to corporate governance, newspapers must report 
information in a timely manner. Information reported in newspapers may be as much as 24 
hours old. Accordingly, Tetlock (2011) describes newspaper content as ‘stale information’. 
Tetlock explains that in an efficient market, where companies’ share prices rapidly incorporate 
all value-relevant signals, new information becomes stale almost instantly. The speed with 
which developments occur in companies has also increased and reporting these in a timely 
manner poses a considerable process challenge to business journalists (Tambini, 2008). 
 These facts notwithstanding, newspaper coverage possesses much potential to trigger 
actions by investors. Tetlock (2007) finds that the tone of financial newspaper reports has an 
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impact on market sentiment in the days following publication. In effect, a newspaper report 
which is critical of the performance of a company or its board may exert downward pressure 
on its share price over the following trading days. This is because investment decisions are 
often based both on available news and investors’ knowledge of the past performance of 
individual stocks. Negative newspaper commentary reinforces negative perceptions of firms 
about which there has been bad news in the past days. It is unlikely that this sentiment is due 
to the reports of other intermediaries such as analysts, which are argued to be less timely than 
those released by business and financial journalists (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009). Thus, while 
the information reported in newspapers may not be sufficiently timely to inform investors’ 
immediate trading decisions, it may affect their perceptions of the company’s board in the 
longer term.  
 
4.4.4. Accessibility 
One characteristic of newspapers which make them particularly suitable as an information 
intermediary in the context of corporate governance is that they make information readily 
accessible, thereby reducing the costs which interested parties face in learning about 
developments in companies. Unlike other information intermediaries, newspapers are a 
commercial product and a key objective of newspaper companies is to enhance their product 
offering. Accordingly, when journalists acquire vital information on a company, the 
newspaper outlet will not attempt to restrict their audiences’ access to this information; rather 
it will sell it to them at an affordable price, possibly even advertising the story to increase 
sales. In contrast, other information intermediaries such as analysts, realising the value of the 
information they produce, may charge investors a high price for their reports (Borden, 2007). 
Furthermore, intermediaries whose interests may be more closely aligned with those of the 
company in question may create barriers to prevent investors from learning about 
developments and problems in the company. The potential for the interests of newspapers to 
be aligned with those of the companies on which they report is evaluated in the next 
subsection. 
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 By rebroadcasting information released by specialist sources, newspapers make 
information more accessible to the public at large (Dyck and Zingales, 2002a; Miller, 2006). 
Business sections in mainstream newspapers are intended to be accessible to lay audiences. By 
avoiding the use of highly technical language, journalists at mainstream broadsheets can grant 
the general public access to the world of business and finance and provide them with insight 
into the broader implications of governance failures (Doyle, 2006). Although this may require 
journalists to put an entertaining spin on a story so as to capture and maintain the public’s 
attention, it can increase society’s awareness of the misconduct, dishonesty and failures of the 
managers and directors of companies they might otherwise consider reputable. Such coverage 
need not be restricted to the business sections of newspapers, reports which appear in the main 
sections of newspaper also have considerable potential to impact on the governance behaviour 
of the firm (Dyck and Zingales, 2002a).   
 The accessibility of broadsheet newspapers as information intermediaries means that 
not only do they make information accessible but they also serve as accessible platforms from 
which interested parties may communicate messages. This has both advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of corporate governance. In a positive sense, newspapers provide 
vehicles through which activist shareholders can conduct campaigns aimed at publically 
shaming management, directors and regulators so that they implement reform or even resign 
(Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Becht et al., 2010). At times of corporate wrongdoings, 
newspapers also provide an outlet through which insiders can blow the whistle (Borden, 2007; 
Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). UK journalists have a moral obligation to protect 
confidential sources of information (the Press Complaints Commission Editors’ Code, 2012, 
Provision 14); this provides whistleblowers with some assurance that they may remain 
anonymous.  
 There is, however, a darker side to the accessibility of the newspaper media. As noted 
in Subsection 4.3.3, newspapers may be exploited as channels through which PR campaigns 
can be conducted by or on behalf of powerful executives concerned with building and 
108  
maintaining positive reputations (Westphal and Deephouse, 2011). While this is well and good 
when a positive reputation is merited, it is often not the case (Malmendier and Tate, 2009).  
 As discussed in Subsection 4.2.1, it is now customary for business and financial news 
to be accessed online. Search costs may be avoided almost entirely as news stories are shared 
among social networks on the internet. On the one hand, increased news access via online 
news aggregators and social media websites may come at a cost to a newspaper’s readership. 
On the other, it can work to the advantage of newspapers. Journalists at UK broadsheets have 
exploited social media vehicles such as Twitter and Facebook to disseminate a certain amount 
of the newspaper’s content and hence divert internet traffic to its website (Newman, 2011). 
Consequently, a company’s stakeholders are more exposed to broadsheet newspaper coverage 
on issues in the company than ever before. Newspaper reports may be shared and discussed 
such that reading the newspaper becomes more of a social experience as readers help each 
other make sense of the news (Pew Research Centre, 2010; 2012; Reuters Institute, 2014). As 
a result, small private shareholders and broader stakeholders in the company who lack direct 
experience with its management may develop an understanding of the potential consequences 
of events and issues facing the company. 
  
4.4.5. Independence 
The capacity of a newspaper to effectively perform a corporate governance role depends 
largely on the degree to which it is independent from the companies on which it reports 
(Miller, 2006). If the newspaper’s owner has ties to other companies, this may create bias in 
the newspaper’s reports on affiliated companies. Doyle (2006) finds that financial journalists 
at UK broadsheets endeavour to maintain an arms-length relationship with the companies they 
report on and verify all information received from insiders with sources from outside the firm. 
As noted above, there is a risk that such veracity may suffer as the digital age places 
journalists under increasing time pressure, with the implication that newspaper reports may 
reflect a PR bias.  
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 For a newspaper to objectively present the facts and serve as an unimpeded monitor of 
management and boards, it should also be free from government control. Djankov, McLiesh, 
Nenova and Shleifer (2001) believe that government censorship and libel laws reduce the 
credibility of information presented in newspaper reports, particularly where the government 
are permissive of collusion and corruption at the corporate level. Such governments may 
pressurise journalists to mislead readers as to the quality of governance in companies in that 
country or as to the integrity of its markets. They find that government control of the print 
media is less common than that of broadcasters. The UK has consistently ranked highly by 
international standards in terms of media freedom (Djankov et al., 2001; Freedom House, 
2013). While the government does not strictly control any newspapers in the UK, broadsheets 
do harbour informal allegiances to various political parties (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; the 
Leveson Report, 2012). Djankov et al. opine that such affiliations may also weaken the 
objectivity of reporting on various topics. For instance, when a party is in government, a 
supporting newspaper may be less likely to criticise a weakness in its policies. Thus, when the 
need arises for a strengthening of corporate governance standards, not all newspapers might 
highlight this equally. Perotti and Volpin (2012) find that in countries characterised by high 
circulation of an independent and credible newspaper media, investor protection policies are 
more readily implemented. They believe that this is because the voting population becomes 
informed and educated and consider investor protection to be of importance. This constrains 
the potential for policymakers to be influenced by private interests.  
 The independence of newspaper companies may also be hampered by virtue of their 
ownership structures. Djankov et al. (2001) show that where media companies are not under 
government control, they are often owned by private families. Such owners can prevent 
journalists from reporting objectively and publishing critical commentary on companies with 
which the media company is affiliated through cross-shareholdings and pyramids (Besley and 
Pratt, 2006). Cross-shareholdings and pyramids are methods of concentrating voting control in 
the hands of certain shareholders who do not necessarily own a substantial amount of the 
company’s equity (Becht, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000; 
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La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002). The broader media industry 
in the UK is quite concentrated. While the UK Office of Fair Trading (hereinafter, the OFT) 
has a legal responsibility to examine large newspaper and cross-media mergers and 
takeovers29, the Leveson Report airs caution regarding concentrated ownership of the UK 
media, especially with regard to the power held by the Murdoch family. This issue is 
considered in Appendix E. 
 It is also possible that the reporting journalist may have a personal ownership interest 
in a company on which he reports, which may leave him reluctant to report negative 
information on the company for fear of damaging its share price (Tambini, 2008). This may 
create incentives for rogue journalists to make trading profits on the basis of information they 
acquire on companies in the process of their work or to exploit their positions to manipulate a 
company’s share price. Tambini notes one example of the latter which occurred in the UK in 
2000, when two journalists at the tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror, employed their ‘City 
Slickers’ column in a share ramping scheme. A subsequent criminal investigation found them 
guilty of market abuse (Barnes, 2009). There are rules and guidelines on how journalists’ 
should conduct their professional duties in a manner that remains independent from any 
interests they may have in shares. A summary of these regulations is provided in Appendix F. 
 
While none of these features constitute the broadsheet newspaper media as a perfect 
information intermediary, it is proposed that the information it provides is sufficiently 
credible, accurate, timely, accessible and independently reported to compromise directors’ 
reputations and increase shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ awareness and understanding of 
issues which may affect their interests. By virtue of their broad reach across society on a daily 
basis, broadsheet newspapers have unique incentives to maintain reputations for credibility, 
accuracy and independence such that they may serve a role in corporate governance in a 
manner unachievable by more traditional intermediaries, including auditors, analysts and PR 
agents, which in the past have failed to signal board underperformance (Black, 2001a; Coffee, 
                                                     29 The Enterprise Act 2002, s. 26. 
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2001; 2002; 2004; Agrawal and Chanda, 2005; Borden, 2007; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 
2010). 
 
4.5. The Determinants of News Media Reporting on Companies 
The news media’s selection of a story, and the amount of resources journalists devote to 
reporting it, is largely governed by the expectation that the target audience will find it 
newsworthy. Wolf (2003 cited in De Mendonca-Jorge, 2008, p.54) defines newsworthiness as 
the “characteristics which events should have in order to be turned into news”. Jamieson and 
Campbell (2001 cited in Miller, 2006, p.1007) claim that there are five characteristics of a 
newsworthy event; (i) it can be personalised, (ii) it is dramatic, violent or conflict-filled, (iii) it 
is actual and concrete, (iv) it involves novelty or deviance and (v) it involves an issue of on-
going concern. According to De Mendonca-Jorge (2008), the newsworthiness of events 
depends on their timing, proximity to the news audience, the degree to which they deviate 
from the status quo and their implications for the audience. More recent evidence indicates 
that, as newspapers develop an online presence, the newsworthiness of stories is greatly 
determined by the rating it is likely to receive from readers and the extent to which it is likely 
to be recommended by one reader to others (Singer, 2014).   
 Irrespective of the medium or manner through which news stories reach audiences, it 
is important to ask what intrinsic characteristics of companies, and events and issues 
concerning them, endow related news stories with ex-ante elements of interest to audiences. 
The literature indicates that the newsworthiness of a story about a company may be attributed 
to numerous characteristics of the company, including its size (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Miller, 2006; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010), age 
(Carroll, 2004), whether or not it is listed on a major stock exchange (Kadlec and McConnell, 
1994), its location within a particular industry (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008) and the 
extent of recognition of the brand of the product or service which it produces (Hatch and 
Schultz, 2003). It has also been observed that certain executives, CEOs in particular, increase 
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the visibility of their firms in the media (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2009).  
 Events, particularly crises, in companies are particularly newsworthy when they have 
legal, economic and environmental implications (Dyer, Miller and Boone, 1991). Miller 
(2006, p.1004) opines that cases of corporate fraud easily lend themselves to a “controversial 
spin”, leading the press to regard these cases as newsworthy. Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales 
(2008) argue that the newsworthiness of corporate governance violations increases with the 
degree of management negligence, the size of losses incurred by shareholders and the severity 
of the implications. Core, Guay and Larcker (2008) posit that the newspaper media may 
consider remuneration levels and related issues, such as stock option backdating, newsworthy, 
particularly since such issues may call for regulatory attention. Liu and McConnell (2013) 
observe that the actions of parties involved in the process of a takeover command much 
attention from the media and its audiences.  
 Mainstream UK broadsheet newspapers have audiences composed of investors and 
‘city people’, who are educated, informed and literate on business and economic issues, along 
with a broader lay readership. Consequently, the main determinants of company related news 
in mainstream broadsheets depend largely on whether the lay audience will recognise the 
companies or the key actors involved in the news story and whether the scale of the financial 
events involved will capture their attention (Doyle, 2006). The following subsections discuss 
five possible determinants of newspaper reporting on corporate governance and governance 
related issues in UK listed plcs.  
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4.5.1. Company Size 
Merton (1987) argues that there is a greater diffusion of information in the capital markets 
about larger, more widely held companies. As a company grows and its shareholder base 
expands, there is a greater demand for information, which the company must either disclose or 
bear a higher cost of capital. Miller (2006) presents this argument in a more general sense; he 
maintains that larger companies have more stakeholders who demand more information on the 
company’s activities. As a consequence, larger firms have richer information environments. 
This reduces the effort journalists must make in reporting on large companies and increases 
the public’s awareness of and interest in them. As such, larger companies are more visible 
both to the newspaper media and its audiences. Larger companies have more valuable assets 
(Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008) and higher market capitalisations (Green, Hand and 
Penn, 2011). Thus, transactions involving large companies often involve greater transfers or 
misappropriations of wealth, which also attracts more news attention (Dyck, Morse and 
Zingales, 2010).  
 
4.5.2. Company Age 
The amount of information available about a company increases with its age and with the 
length of time it has been listed on a stock exchange (Barry and Brown, 1985; Zhang, 2006). 
Barry and Brown note that while the accuracy of this information is likely to reduce over time, 
it increases the market’s awareness of a company. Zhang finds that stock returns surrounding 
news about older companies are less volatile since investors are more informed and less 
uncertain about older companies. Younger, newly listed companies face considerable 
pressures to gain visibility and legitimacy so as to attract a sufficient following by analysts, the 
media and ultimately investors and hence lower their cost of capital and reduce volatility in 
their share price (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Mehran and Peristiani, 2010).  
 Since older companies have had longer to build a reputation with the public 
(Deephouse, 2000) and their CEOs may have had more time to create a public profile 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2009), events and issues involving older companies may be considered 
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more newsworthy. Thus, while the age of a company alone may not constitute its activities as 
newsworthy, it may contribute to the amount of news media coverage it receives, particularly 
when a news story concerns a failure by its board or a contest over its control. 
 
4.5.3. The Industry in which a Company Operates 
The activities of a company may receive more news media coverage if it is in a high-profile 
industry. Roberts (1992) defines high-profile industries as those with high consumer visibility, 
a high level of political risk and concentrated, intense competition. For example, consumer 
goods and services industries invest highly in marketing and, consequently, are visible both to 
the media and the general public (Brammer and Millington, 2006). Hou (2007) argues that 
information diffuses more rapidly in competitive industries; this increases the amount of 
information available to investors, the media and the public in general. As a consequence, the 
media faces fewer costs in reporting on companies in competitive industries and audiences are 
more likely to be aware of these firms.  
 Companies in industries which generate substantial employment and income for the 
national economy may receive more news coverage, particularly if they encounter problems or 
crises. In their study of newspaper coverage of corporate governance violations in Russian 
firms, Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2008) argue that companies in the oil and gas industry 
are more visible to the news media not only because of their significance in the national and 
international economy, but also because of corruption by oligarchs in Russian oil and gas 
companies. The banking sectors in many countries provide contemporary illustrations both of 
how economic dependence on an industry and an industry-wide culture or trend of 
management opportunism can attract considerable interest from the news media. Although the 
news media has been criticised for being complacent during the sub-prime lending bubble and 
economic boom years (Schecter, 2009; Starkman, 2009), the marked increase in coverage, 
particularly within the mainstream news media, of banking practices since the crisis emerged 
has been noted (Schecter, 2009; Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010; Stromback, Jenssen and 
Aalberg, 2011).  
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4.5.4. The Economic Environment 
A change in economic conditions may affect the landscape for investment in a country, which 
may lead to a demand for news on the performance of boards and the quality of governance in 
listed companies (Doyle, 2006). As mentioned above, the news media has been criticised due 
to its complacency in times of economic prosperity. Nonetheless, media scrutiny of board 
conduct, particularly of directors’ remuneration, may increase when the economy is in 
recession (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). When the national or international economy is in 
decline, and society in general are experiencing financial pressures, news stories concerning 
disenfranchisement of shareholders by well-paid management and directors may provoke 
thought and discussion among audiences. Extreme management failures may have more far-
reaching implications, beyond those for shareholder wealth. When a company becomes a 
takeover target, there are potential consequences for employees, creditors and customers 
(Slinger and Deakin, 1999). The extremity of these implications may rely on the overall flow 
of wealth within the economy.  
 
4.5.5. The Type of Issue or Event Involving the Company 
It is possible that a particular issue or event may be considered newsworthy, regardless of the 
company involved. Issues and events which involve inappropriate behaviour by managers, 
directors or certain shareholders, or those which give rise to conflicts between these parties, 
may be considered as compelling news stories (Miller, 2006). Certain issues may be deemed 
more serious than others or considered to have more significant implications for a company’s 
board, its shareholders or its broader stakeholders (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). This 
thesis proposes that takeover offers and instances of market abuse are potentially newsworthy 
events from the perspective of investors, managers, directors and many broader stakeholders, 
as both events may have substantial effects on their wealth. Furthermore, both takeover offers 
and market abuse cases possess characteristics which may constitute them as interesting news 
stories irrespective of the extent to which such issues affect the newspaper’s audience. 
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4.6. Newspaper Coverage of the Operation of the Market for Corporate Control and 
Market Abuse 
Since the stock markets serve as an important safeguard to shareholders, newspaper reports on 
market developments may perform an important corporate governance role by providing 
commentary and analysis on the actions of and decisions made by the parties involved. In 
particular, the light in which such reports present management and the board may have an 
important impact on their future careers. By reducing information asymmetries (Buehlmaier, 
2013) and by encouraging boards and managers to act within shareholders’ interests (Liu and 
McConnell, 2013), the news media may well complement the operation of the market for 
corporate control and possibly lead to governance improvements.  
 
4.6.1. Takeover Offers 
Under the theory of the market for corporate control, takeovers and the threat thereof serve to 
discipline underperforming management and boards (Manne, 1965). Managers’ and directors’ 
responses to takeover bids do not always serve shareholders’ best interests; they may demand 
higher pay or extract private benefits from the company (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998; Gillan, 
Hartzell and Parrino, 2009), make poor, short-term oriented decisions (Stein, 1988; Bebchuk 
and Stole, 2003) or take actions to frustrate the bid at a cost to shareholders’ wealth (Ruback, 
1988; Lowry, 1992; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009). 
The information communicated to shareholders by the board over the course of a takeover 
offer may not be entirely objective; directors have been found to attempt to influence 
shareholders to reject offers through communications documents (Clarke, 2009; Brennan, 
Daily and Harrington, 2010). It follows that an intermediary which can serve as a watchdog 
for opportunistic behaviour by management and directors, impose reputational costs on these 
parties and provide shareholders and other stakeholders with access to information on takeover 
offers may serve to enhance the efficacy with which the market for corporate control operates.   
 Takeover offers may prove newsworthy as they often involve conflict. Schwert (1996) 
observes that both hostile takeovers and takeovers with multiple bidders receive more news 
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coverage. Hostile takeover offers may involve conflict between the managers and directors of 
the target and the bidding companies. If the bidding process becomes competitive, conflict 
may also emerge between bidders. Issues which arise in relation to offers for listed companies, 
particularly those which require the intervention of the Panel, may well attract the attention of 
the media. For instance, where target shareholders are unfairly treated or dealings by certain 
shareholders create concern, the Panel’s intervention might signal to the newspaper media that 
the takeover case is a newsworthy story. Given the strong emphasis placed by the Code on 
target minority shareholder protection (Armour and Skeel, 2006; Fitzgibbon, 2010), actions by 
management or large shareholders which conflict with the interests of minority shareholders 
may attract the interest of the broadsheet press and its audiences.  
 While takeovers may be newsworthy in the mainstream newspaper media because 
they involve conflict and power, they also have economic implications for many mainstream 
audience segments. Takeovers can affect the welfare of small shareholders (Buehlmaier, 
2013), the target’s employees (Coffee, 1988; Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Slinger and 
Deakin, 1999; Deakin, Hobbs, Nash and Slinger, 2003; Deakin, 2005; Goergen, O’Sullivan 
and Wood, 2014), small suppliers (Coffee, 1988; Daniels, 1993) and customers (Kim and 
Singal, 1993; Singal, 1996). While the interests of these parties may not necessarily be aligned 
with those of the target’s shareholders, it may be within their interests for the board to improve 
the vigilance with which it monitors management such that the company may avoid an 
effective takeover. 
 
a. Newspaper Coverage Prior to a Takeover Bid 
Takeovers are significant events both at a company and market level. The mere speculation of 
a bid may suffice to raise concerns among managers, directors, shareholders and broader 
stakeholders. Accordingly, these parties demand information on potential takeovers. This 
creates incentives for journalists to speculate on the possible takeover bids by conducting 
investigations or by rebroadcasting information produced by other intermediaries. Newspaper 
speculation of takeovers may be based on legitimate information signals or on tips and leaks 
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from insiders (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). The latter is of obvious concern since information 
which is not already publically known might be released in an attempt to manipulate the 
market. Nevertheless, where journalists are sufficiently perceptive, legitimately circulated 
information such as regulatory announcements of substantial share transactions can serve to 
indicate a potential takeover attempt (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008). Journalists are apt 
to be more sensitive to these signals when a particular industry is experiencing a takeover 
wave or when there has already been public discussion of deteriorating company performance, 
of disputes on boards, or of a family releasing some of its control over the company (Jarrell 
and Poulsen, 1989).  
 Newspaper reports signalling takeover bids may be of limited benefit to shareholders 
in terms of informing them of management and board underperformance. If company 
performance is sufficiently poor to render it vulnerable to takeover, it is likely that investors 
are aware of this. Nevertheless, newspaper reports may enable an enhanced assessment of the 
situation. Borden (2007) argues that financial journalists may work in harmony with other 
mechanisms of corporate control to protect shareholders’ interests. He proposes that since 
company disclosures may suffer from inaccuracies, there may be a role for journalists to make 
shareholders more aware of performance problems and in doing so catalyse the market’s 
response to management and board failure. 
 Investors might also already be aware, from observing the trading of other market 
participants and from following regulatory announcements, that there may be a prospective 
challenge to the control of a company. However, newspaper reports may provide investors 
with an indication of the extent of the gains or losses they stand to make from trading shares in 
the prospective takeover target. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) study how the market for 
information operates to anticipate takeover offers. Their findings show that news media 
speculation is the most important determinant of pre-bid trading of tender offer stocks. Similar 
results have been found by Pound and Zeckhuser (1990), Borges and Gairifo (2013) and 
Aspris, Foley and Frino (2014). 
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 It is also possible that newspaper coverage speculating a bid for a company might 
induce management and board reform before a bid is made. Lowenstein (1999) posits that 
since newspaper reports which criticise the board’s performance may contribute to an 
investor’s decision to sell his shares, such commentary has the potential to encourage board 
reform. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, press exposure of the board underperformance can lead 
some shareholders to exit the company; however, institutional shareholders may remain loyal 
to the company if they believe there is potential for management to reform (Joe, Louis and 
Robinson, 2009). Thus, when a company is flagged as a potential target for takeover, the 
threat of further exit can induce its management and directors to take measures to enhance the 
value of shareholder wealth (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009). Indeed, where 
shareholders have the capacity to lobby for reform, they may choose to actively voice their 
dissatisfaction with management rather than resorting to the market for corporate control to 
exert discipline (Nesbitt, 1994; Smith, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Becht et al., 2010). 
Since management and directors are aware that their positions are in jeopardy, they are likely 
to conform to demands made by shareholder activists. Along with limiting the extent to which 
shareholders exit the company and bring down its share price, management who meet 
shareholders’ requests may gain their approval to defend the takeover bid if it ensues 
(Bebchuk, 2007).  
 
b. Newspaper Coverage during the Offer Period  
One characteristic of takeovers which makes related stories newsworthy is that they involve an 
element of change for a wide audience, including the target’s investors, managers, directors 
and border stakeholders including employees, creditors, customers and suppliers. If a takeover 
offer is announced, it is likely that there will be a considerable demand for newspaper 
coverage about the offer since at least some of the aforementioned parties stand to face 
potential economic implications. Thus, journalists may consider it necessary to provide 
coverage of the developments which occur over the course of a takeover offer. There appear to 
be few impediments to doing so in cases of offers for UK companies. The Takeover Code 
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requires offers to be publically announced in a timely and unambiguous manner30 and all 
information publicised during the course of the offer to be carefully, accurately and fairly 
presented31. While the Code forbids parties from disclosing new information on the 
development of a bid in media interviews32, journalists are not prohibited from investigating 
such developments. In fact, parties to an offer are instructed not to mislead the media over the 
course of a bid33.  
 As discussed in Section 4.4, to be of value in corporate governance, the newspaper 
media must remain independent and provide unbiased reports. Journalists should decide on 
how best to present a balanced account of a takeover situation; however, this may be a 
difficult task to achieve. Ohl, Pincus, Rimmer and Harrison (1995) argue that the company 
whose directors advocate their interests most strongly via press releases are likely to gain the 
support of the media. Tambini (2008) reports that UK listed companies are investing more and 
more in PR agents when involved in mergers and acquisitions; both the bidding and the target 
companies use PR agents to strategically leak information so as to impact the offer price.  
 Brennan, Daily and Harrington (2010) find evidence that the managers and directors 
of UK listed hostile takeover targets take deliberate measures to convince shareholders to 
reject bids by emphasising the potential negative consequences of acceptance. Specifically, 
managers pursue strategies of impression management when producing annual reports, press 
releases and regulatory circulars. Many of these documents are supposedly meant to align 
information asymmetries between target management and shareholders; however, Brennan, 
Daily and Harrington argue that management exploit such communications as opportunities to 
influence shareholders to behave within their interests. While such tactics may be damaging to 
shareholders’ wealth in a direct sense, they may also serve to bias newspaper reports published 
during an offer period. Thus, it is important that journalists gather information on possible bids 
from a variety of sources. 
                                                     30 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 2.4. 31 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 19.1. 32 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 20.1. 33 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 2.8. 
121  
 Ahern and Sosyura (2014) illustrate how, in fixed exchange ratio stock mergers, 
acquiring companies engage in active media management. In fixed exchange mergers, a fixed 
number of the acquirer’s shares are used as payment. The higher the acquirer can raise its 
share price prior to making an offer, the fewer shares it must pay for the target. To increase 
their share prices, acquiring companies release more positive information to the news media 
during the private negotiation period. Ahern and Sosyura find that the positive tone is retained 
in newswires but not in newspaper articles, indicating that newspaper journalists are more 
inclined to use their own discretion when reporting on the acquiring company. Nevertheless, 
the increased news media attention on the acquiring company is found to have a significantly 
positive effect on its stock returns. A reversal in share price is observed once the merger 
negotiations are made public, as investors become aware of the media management strategy 
being employed by the acquirer.  
 Evidence provided by Buehlmaier (2013) indicates that news media coverage can 
overcome takeover market failure by co-ordinating dispersed shareholders in the target 
company and convincing them of the merits of the bid. This reduces the likelihood that 
shareholders will reject the bid due to free rider problems. Free rider problems refer to target 
shareholders’ tendency to hold out on selling their shares in the expectation that the bidder 
will increase its offer (Grossman and Hart, 1980). This can push the offer price to a level at 
which the bidder can no longer afford to pay. Free rider problems are prevalent in dispersedly 
owned takeover targets since shareholders cannot co-ordinate to achieve a realistic assessment 
of the price the bidder is willing to pay. By virtue of its broad reach, the news media may 
reduce free rider problems by informing shareholders’ decisions as to whether or not to sell. 
Even when target shareholders suspect that the bidding company is pursuing a strategy of 
media management, they can have confidence that the bid is being made with value-enhancing 
intentions. This is because management who engage in acquisitions for private gains are 
unwilling to incur the sunk costs associated with embarking on a media campaign. 
 The news media also appears to have some influence on the decisions made by the 
acquiring management during the offer period; however, this does not necessarily translate 
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into more efficient takeovers. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) show that CEOs who have 
recently achieved recognition and praise in national newspapers and magazines become 
susceptible to hubris. Hubris arises when management make mistakes in their valuations of 
companies, but proceed with acquisitions presuming their valuations are correct (Roll, 1986). 
The greater the number of flattering newspaper and magazine articles published about a CEO, 
the more he will overpay for a target in a takeover and the greater will be the damage caused 
to the wealth of shareholders in the acquiring firm. Hayward and Hambrick show that hubris is 
more extreme where there are poor pre-existing governance characteristics in the bidding 
company, namely a lack of outsiders on the board and CEO-chairman duality. 
 Liu and McConnell (2013) however show how the newspaper media, through its 
influence over the decisions made by the bidding company’s managers, can prevent the 
execution of value reducing acquisitions. They explain that when making a capital allocation 
decision, a manager puts his reputation at risk. If a proposed acquisition generates a negative 
market reaction, the future wages and employment opportunities of the bidding firm’s board 
may be damaged. This is more likely when the poor investment decision is publicised in 
newspapers. Managers and directors can reduce this damage if they abandon the acquisition. 
Doing so is also likely to limit the damage caused to the wealth of the bidding firm’s 
shareholders. Liu and McConnell illustrate that abandonment is less likely when news media 
criticism is low and hence the reputational penalties are lower. They also show that 
abandonment is less likely as the CEO reaches retirement age and has less to lose in terms of 
future wages and employment opportunities such that his reputation is of less importance to 
him. Liu and McConnell conclude that by virtue of its influence over managers’ and directors’ 
reputations, the news media can align the bidding company’s managers’ interests with those of 
its shareholders.  
 Although Hambrick and Hayward show that newspaper coverage can adversely distort 
managers’ decisions when the potential for acquisitions arises, Liu and McConnell’s findings 
show that newspaper coverage at the time of the bid can lead managers to realise that they 
have made poor decisions. Thus, while the press may be criticised for inducing irrational 
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management behaviour in takeover situations, it may also play a role in restoring rationality. 
Liu and McConnell’s findings, together with those of Buehlmaier, demonstrate that by 
providing commentary on the decisions made by managers and directors in takeover 
situations, the news media keeps both shareholders and other stakeholders informed 
throughout the offer period in a manner that is arguably more constant and accessible than 
updates provided by other intermediaries. 
 
c. Newspaper Coverage Following the Success or Failure of a Takeover Offer 
The newsworthiness of takeovers may diminish once a bid is accepted or abandoned; however, 
there is likely to be practical matters for journalists to report on. Journalists may analyse the 
reasons for the success or failure of the bid and the implications for shareholders, managers, 
directors and broader shareholders (Tambini, 2008). Financial journalists, in particular, may 
provide an assessment of the final offer price and present an opinion as to whether the target 
shareholders received a fair premium or if the acquirer may have overpaid.  
 Journalistic analyses may be affected by the overall market sentiment; Auster and 
Sirower (2002) argue that tone of media reports concerning takeovers varies over the course of 
a takeover wave. They contend that at the peak of a wave, takeovers are presented in a positive 
light and failed bids are justified; however, toward the end of the wave, journalists are 
sceptical about bids and criticise bidders who fail. This is consistent with the view that 
journalists adopt a herd mentality (Galbraith, 1990; Dyck and Zingales, 2002b).  
 Newspaper coverage may also concern how companies’ performances have changed 
as a result of the takeover or takeover attempt. In the case of successful offers, this may 
concern the efficacy of the integration period (Vaara and Tienari, 2002). In unsuccessful 
takeovers, the attempt may leave the performance of the target’s managers and directors 
particularly susceptible to media scrutiny. As such, newspapers can provide coverage of the 
success of the market for corporate control by reporting on whether or not the threat of 
takeover has encouraged management and board reform. It may also evaluate the extent to 
which the board acted within shareholders’ interests by accepting or opposing the takeover 
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offer. In effect, the extent of praise or criticism will determine the reputational rewards or 
penalties accruing to directors. 
 In a broader sense, newspapers may analyse the implications of a takeover for the 
target’s wider stakeholder base. Takeovers of UK companies are unlikely to have significant 
implications for customers generally since competition law serves to ensure that mergers and 
acquisitions do not give rise to dramatic price increases or reductions in the choice of products 
and services available to consumers. From an employee’s perspective, the consequences of a 
takeover may be much greater. The job losses which follow takeovers of large companies, 
while within the interests of efficiency, may come at the detriment to local economies. The 
takeover of Cadbury plc in 2010 provides one example of such an occasion which gave rise to 
considerable criticism in the media (Barone, Ranamager and Solomon, 2013). As is outlined in 
Appendix B, the subsequent amended Takeover Code of 2011 is considered to accommodate 
more for the interests of a wider range of stakeholders as a result of public criticisms of the 
bid, albeit at the potential expense of shareholder wealth (Patrone, 2011). 
 
4.6.2. Market Abuse 
In addition to reporting on the disciplinary workings of the stock market, the newspaper media 
may also publicise its abuse. Market abuse is both a civil and a criminal offence in the UK. In 
countries where adherence to company and market law is an accepted social norm, corporate 
governance issues such as fraud and insider dealing may well occupy news headlines (Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004a; 2004b; Miller, 2006). Under such circumstances market abuse may be 
viewed as unjust (Lee, 2002) and even as the moral equivalent of theft (Fisch, 1991; 
Bainbridge, 1999; 2001) and the investigations and court proceedings which follow may well 
capture the attention of newspaper readers, both within corporate circles and throughout 
society in general. While the UK system of market abuse regulation has been found to be one 
of the most stringent in Europe (CESR/07-69; CESR/08-099), abuses have not been absent 
from UK regulated markets. Coffee (1999) observes that when market transparency is 
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substandard and when investors prioritise trading profits over corporate reform, insider dealing 
scandals will continue to fuel media reports. 
 Newspaper coverage of instances of market abuse and associated investigations and 
prosecutions may lead to an increased awareness of the extent to which shareholders have 
been disadvantaged by the misuse of private company information by insiders, by the creation 
of false or misleading impressions about the value of their shares, or by the release of false 
information on the companies in which they invest. Furthermore, newspaper coverage of 
market abuse investigations and court proceedings may provide an indication of regulators’ 
success in bringing the offending parties to account (Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer, 2010).  
 Market abuse cases also have an associated element of conflict, which may constitute 
them as newsworthy even if they do not have direct implications for the audience. The 
newspaper media may depict instances of market abuse as cases of conflict between privileged 
investors, with access to insider knowledge, and those other law-abiding market participants 
who have been placed at a disadvantage. Abuses such as insider dealing present an 
opportunity for the mainstream media to conform to audiences’ distaste for corporate greed 
and excess among executives and corrupt investors, as Langevoort (1990, p.1048) notes: 
 
 “The attention given by the media to the insider trading issue suggests a level of 
fascination with the issue that is deeper than the question of investor protection. If a 
significant segment of the public finds insider trading by those with substantial economic 
status in society unseemly (a manifestation of greed by the already well off), a political 
reaction promising greater regulation should hardly be surprising.” 
 
 Although journalistic interest in market abuse may possibly be driven in part by an 
anti-corporate bias and a desire to satisfy audience demands for sensational and entertaining 
news stories, UK regulators are aware that their efforts to bring offenders to account are taken 
in the spotlight of the media (Wheatley, 2013).  
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 Market abuse cases may be considered to have macroeconomic implications for 
society in general. Borden (2007, p.327) notes a change in the public’s interest in the corporate 
environment. Product and labour market issues no longer attract audiences’ attention to the 
extent that they used to; instead, an “equity culture” has emerged, which has resulted in large 
shareholders and leading securities analysts receiving much more air time and page space 
within mainstream news media. At European level, stock market integrity is considered as a 
prerequisite for economic wealth34. Ongoing policy review in the UK emphasises the 
important role market abuse regulation has to play in promoting macroeconomic development 
and success (HM Treasury, 2014). Accordingly, the voting public may seek information on 
how effectively regulators reprimand those who engage in market abuse and deter its future 
occurrence. 
       
a. The Newspaper Media as a Watchdog for Market Abuse 
In spite of its potential newsworthiness, the ability of the newspaper media to serve as a 
watchdog for market abuse may be limited by a number of factors. Firstly, since market abuse 
is prohibited by law in the UK, those who engage in it will do so discreetly. Inside 
information, by definition, is not known to the public. Although insiders may strategically 
release information in order to make trading profits, they are unlikely to make it known that 
this is their objective. As such, unless a journalist is particularly perceptive, experienced and 
skilled, market abuse may well go undetected by the media. While evidence exists to suggest 
that journalists do endeavour to uncover cases of fraud and market abuse, training and 
resource constraints limit these efforts considerably (Doyle, 2006; Tambini, 2008). 
 A second impediment to investigation of market abuse by the UK newspaper media is 
the concern of possibly causing defamation of character if suspicions are incorrect (Lloyd and 
Watson, 1999; Black, 2001a). Market abuse is notoriously difficult to prove, even for those 
with relevant expertise (Alexander, 2001), and an unsubstantiated allegation might be seen to 
defame the character of a given insider or investor. UK journalists are protected to a 
                                                     34 Directive 2003/6/EC, Recital 2; Regulation No. 596/2014, Recital 1. 
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considerable extent by the Defamation Act 2013 (see Appendix F); however, they may also be 
held liable under the Act. The greatest impediment to investigative journalism in the context 
of market abuse may be found under Section One of the Act, which introduces a serious harm 
threshold. This imposes a requirement on a party taking action against the media to provide a 
statement that a publication caused serious harm to their reputation. Such a statement might be 
made quite easily by a party wrongly accused by a journalist of having engaged in market 
abuse. Nevertheless, if a journalist can prove that the information published was true35, that 
commentary was made with honesty36 and that the publication was intended to serve the 
public interest37, there may be a strong case for defence. Even if a journalist is found to have 
defamed the character of an individual or company, the newspaper itself may remain immune 
from liability under the defence of innocent dissemination38. 
 In addition, there are regulatory restrictions on the extent to which journalists can 
express an opinion on developments in the stock market. Appendix F also outlines how 
journalists must adhere to guidelines issued by the FCA when reporting on stock market 
developments. These guidelines, while in the interests of preserving an orderly flow of 
information in the markets, may discourage journalists from expressing opinions as to the 
reasons for unusual movements in share prices, particularly where they own shares in the 
companies in question. 
 Indeed, the danger exists that rather than exposing the abuse, newspapers may become 
implicated in its incidence. The media is a particularly attractive vehicle through which the 
market may be manipulated or inside information may be leaked prior to its official 
announcement (the FSA, 2010). When alerted to a takeover bid or an extraordinary event 
through tips or leaks by insiders, journalists ought to be cautious as it may be communicated 
for reasons of self-interest. Journalists have an ethical responsibility to protect their sources39. 
This responsibility may, however, create conflicts of interest when a source of information 
                                                     35 The Defamation Act 2013, s. 2. 36 The Defamation Act 2013, s. 3. 37 The Defamation Act 2013, s. 4. 38 The Defamation Act 2013, s. 10. 39 PCC Code (2012), Provision 14. 
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may be used as evidence in an official investigation or a court case. Under Section 10 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981, journalists have a right to refuse to disclose the source of 
information contained in a news report, unless it can be established to the satisfaction of the 
court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the 
prevention of disorder or crime40.  
 These factors considered, it appears quite difficult for journalists to investigate the 
illegitimate communication of price-sensitive information and signal possible market abuse in 
a timely manner. Thus, the capacity of the media to effectively serve as a watchdog for market 
abuse by exposing the offenders is uncertain.  
 
b. Newspaper Coverage of Regulatory Intervention in Market Abuse Cases 
While the newspaper media may face barriers to uncovering market abuse, there are 
opportunities for journalists to report on developments which regulators make in establishing 
liability for market abuse and in bringing the offending parties to account. The FCA issues 
press releases, enforcement notices and decision notices over the course of its investigations. 
In its capacity as an information intermediary, the newspaper media can repackage regulatory 
reports into a more accessible format, such that investors and the public in general may remain 
updated on the progress of regulators.  
 There are also limitations on the extent to which the newspaper media can perform a 
function in this respect. Since official investigations into market abuse may potentially result 
in criminal convictions, a regulator’s work may need to remain confidential. Moreover, 
establishing liability may take a considerable amount of time, particularly in criminal cases 
(Alexander, 2001). As a result, the newspaper media may not be able to provide regular 
information on the progress with which the course of justice is prevailing.  
 Post-event news media coverage of corporate wrongdoings is of considerably less 
tangible value to investors than investigative reports as it comes after the damage has been 
done (Sherman, 2002). Nevertheless, newspaper coverage of market abuse cases may well 
                                                     40 Financial Times Ltd and Others v. The United Kingdom. 
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impose reputational costs on directors who fail to oversee that price-sensitive information is 
dealt with appropriately (Bainbridge, 1995; Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer, 2010). Newspaper 
reports on the incidence of market abuse, and the regulatory investigations and penalties which 
follow, may then create opportunities for a strengthening of internal controls. This may come 
about through voluntary actions taken by directors (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Dyck, 
Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009) or through increased scrutiny 
and lobbying by shareholders (Becht et al., 2010), regulators (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 
2008) or through the disciplinary forces of the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965). 
 
4.7. Alternative Information Intermediaries and Gatekeepers of Company 
Information 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, various parties serve as intermediaries between the 
company and its current and potential investors. Having considered the capacity of the 
newspaper media to serve a corporate governance role in detail, Table 4.1 presents a 
comparison between the newspaper media and a number of alternative information 
intermediaries or gatekeepers of company information in terms of their potential value in 
corporate governance. 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
As an accessible and relatively timely information intermediary, the newspaper media 
possesses much potential value to a range of corporate stakeholders who have the capacity and 
motivation to take actions which impact upon corporate governance behaviour on multiple 
levels. This chapter has identified a number of factors which make issues concerning 
management accountability and shareholder protection newsworthy. Both anecdotal and 
empirical evidence indicates that the news media devotes considerable focus to matters of 
corporate governance (Borden, 2007; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and 
Robinson, 2009). While there is limited empirical evidence of the corporate governance role 
performed by the UK news media in contrast to that performed in the US, it would appear that  
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Table 4.1: Information Intermediaries and Gatekeepers of Company Information  Newspaper Media 
 
Auditors Analysts PR IR Whistleblowers 
Role Provide commentary, analysis and opinion on news in companies. 
Statutory duty to perform an inspection so as to form an opinion as to whether adequate accounting records have been kept by the company41.  
Research company performance and industry conditions and communicate it to the market.  
 Make ‘buy’, ‘sell’ or ‘hold’ recommendations. 
 
Positively influence the public’s perception of the company. 
Manage the company’s communications with investors, the media and analysts. 
Disclose corporate misconduct.  
Access to company information 
May face barriers. Statutory entitlements42. 
 Further access through the provision of non-audit services.  
 Management may withhold information. 
Analyst presentations; however, information may be biased.  
 Further access through the provision of investment banking and underwriting services. 
 
Regular interaction with company. 
Willingness to provide access to information 
Provides regular and inexpensive access to a broad range of stakeholders. 
No responsibility to express their opinions outside of the company’s financial reporting framework. 
Can make greater profits from selling reports to selected investors (Borden, 2007). 
Selective and positively biased (Doyle, 2006; Tambini, 2008; Lewis et al., 2010). 
Provide further details regarding disclosures made by company (Bushee and Miller, 2012); however, such details may be positively biased and selectively disclosed (Solomon, 2012). 
 
The prospect of dismissal and other penalties, in terms of career progression, may discourage whistleblowers (Borden, 2007; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). 
  
                                                     41 The Companies Act 2006, s. 498. 42 The Companies Act 2006, s. 499. 
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Table 4.1 Continued: Information Intermediaries and Gatekeepers of Company Information  Newspaper Media 
 
Auditors Analysts PR IR Whistleblowers 
Incentives to serve shareholders’ interests 
Maintenance of reputation for credible and accurate reporting (Deephouse, 2000).  
 Incentives greater where investor protection is an accepted social norm (Dyck and Zingales, 2004a; 2004b; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). 
 
Career progression (Black, 2001a).  
 Collapse of big five auditor, Arthur Andersen, has set an example of the consequences of acquiescence (Dyck, Morse and Zingales 2010). 
Maintenance of reputation for accurate assessments (Ljungqvist, Marsten, Starks, Wei and Yan, 2007).  
 May only benefit from uncovering major failures (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010).  
Few. IR strategies found to be more within shareholders’ interests than PR strategies (Bushee and Miller, 2012); however, may spin information in a manner which misleads investors (Solomon, 2012). 
May have financial incentives or face liability for withholding information (Bowen, Call and Rajgopal, 2010; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). 
Incentives to serve management’s interests 
Use of PR generated information which is positively biased toward management (Tambini, 2008; Lewis et al., 2010). 
 Newspaper or journalist may be affiliated with management or have ownership interests in company (Tambini, 2008). 
 
The provision of non-audit services to companies (Coffee, 2001; 2004).  
 Auditors who blow the whistle on accounting frauds more likely to lose accounts (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). 
May optimistically skew forecasts and recommendations on underwriting and investment banking clients.  
 Incentives heightened due to a lack of competition between audit firms (Coffee, 2002). 
 Need to maintain relationship with management to gain access to the company in the future (Borden, 2007). 
 
Agents of management. 
 Serve a distinct role in preserving the good reputation of the company, its managers and directors. 
Similar to those of PR agents, although may not be as strong (Bushee and Miller, 2012).  
Job retention and career progression. 
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Table 4.1 Continued: Information Intermediaries and Gatekeepers of Company Information  Newspaper Media 
 
Auditors Analysts PR IR Whistleblowers 
Regulation or controls over relationship with management 
The Press Complaints Commission Editors’ Code (2012)/ forthcoming reformed regime of media regulation.  
 The Defamation Act 2013.  
 FCA Perimeter Guidance Manual.  
The audit committee.  
 Companies Act 2006, Part 16.  
 EU Regulation No. 537/2014 limits the provision of non-audit services by auditors to public interest entities and discourages the dominance of a small number of auditing firms in the market for audit services. 
 
Sophisticated investors may be aware of biases (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2007). 
Few. Few. Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, s. 1 provides protection. 
Limitations to performing a corporate governance role 
Lack of formal financial and business skills (Sherman, 2002; Bednar, 2012).  
 Resource constraints (Tambini, 2008). More inclined to report on newsworthy companies (Miller, 2006; De Mendonca-Jorge, 2008; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). 
 
The auditor is an evaluator as distinct from a detective- it can only work with the information it is presented with (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). 
Susceptible to acquiescence when there is positive market sentiment (Coffee, 2002; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010).  
 May make an incorrect assessment.  
 Tendency to follow large companies listed on major stock exchanges (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Bushee and Miller, 2012). 
Misalignment of incentives with those of shareholders. 
Since their objective is to attract investors to the company, the information they provide may well be positively biased and potentially mislead shareholders (Solomon, 2012). 
Lack of incentives. 
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journalists in the UK endeavour to provide accurate, objective and comprehensible 
information on the successes and failures of corporate management (Doyle, 2006).  
 There are limitations to each potential solution to agency problems reviewed in 
Chapters Two and Three. Thus, an external intermediary may make a valuable contribution to 
corporate governance. There are evident shortcomings in the ability of UK broadsheets to 
provide an unimpeded timely flow of information to shareholders and other stakeholders in 
UK listed plcs, not least the 24 hour time lag characteristic of the newspaper media (Tetlock, 
2011), the potential for its independence to be impaired (Tambini, 2008; the Leveson Report, 
2012) and the resource constraints which limit investigative journalism (Doyle, 2006; 
Tambini, 2008). Nevertheless, many of these flaws are more acute in traditional information 
intermediaries in the corporate environment (Black, 2001a; Coffee, 2001; 2002; 2004).     
 It must be acknowledged that, due to barriers to investigative journalism, the potential 
for the newspaper media to serve as a corporate watchdog is limited (Doyle, 2006; Miller, 
2006; Lewis et al., 2010). However, in a country where there is an active and suitably 
regulated market for corporate control, the newspaper media may serve an important role in 
collecting information on directors’ actions from various sources and delivering it to interested 
parties in a digestible format. In doing so, the newspaper media may help shareholders and 
other stakeholders to appreciate how events such as takeover offers and instances of market 
abuse may affect their interests (Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer, 2010; Buehlmaier, 2013). The 
public scrutiny boards may receive over the course of a takeover attempt may incentivise them 
to monitor management to a greater extent. Moreover, when a company’s shares are 
implicated in market abuse, the press coverage surrounding the event may well encourage 
directors to implement more robust policies on the control of inside information and on the 
actions which insiders take in the markets.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Introduction 
The central aim of this study is to demonstrate the impact of news media coverage on the 
corporate governance quality of the companies on which it reports. Specifically, it is proposed 
that broadsheet newspaper reporting on market-based corporate governance issues is 
associated with changes which occur on the board of directors over the course of reporting. 
The market-based corporate governance issues in question are (i) takeover offers and (ii) 
market abuse. Based on the theory of the market for corporate control, it is envisaged that (i) 
newspaper coverage of instances where companies are targeted for takeover publicises boards’ 
possible underperformance and (ii) newspaper coverage of market abuse informs interested 
parties that certain investors may have been unfairly disadvantaged due to misuse of inside 
information and the release of misleading signals to the market. As noted in Chapter Four, 
takeover offers and instances of market abuse are potentially newsworthy events. The 
literature reviewed in Chapter Four indicates that newspaper reporting on these issues may 
publically signal that the boards of companies concerned have failed to adequately protect 
shareholders’ interests and thus impose reputational costs on directors. In order to minimise 
these costs, boards may take actions to improve the quality of corporate governance within 
their companies. This chapter discusses the methodology employed to examine how 
newspaper reporting on takeover offers for UK listed companies and market abuse cases 
involving the securities of UK listed companies is associated with changes in corporate 
governance quality. 
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5.2. Research Objectives 
This study investigates the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Changes in corporate governance quality are associated with volumes of newspaper 
reporting on takeover offers and instances of market abuse. 
 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, the present methodology is concerned with the 
measurement of volumes of broadsheet newspaper reports on (i) takeover offers which are 
regulated by the Takeover Panel and (ii) instances of market abuse for which penalties are 
imposed by the FSA. Associations between newspaper reporting and changes in the quality of 
corporate governance provided by the boards of those companies targeted for takeover and 
those whose securities are implicated in market abuse are then investigated. By doing so, this 
study tests for evidence which may indicate that the newspaper media performs a role in 
corporate governance by propelling actions to be taken by the board of directors.  
 
5.3. Research Sample 
This study examines UK listed plcs, focusing specifically on companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange’s Official List or AIM at any time between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 
2010. As noted in Chapter Four, companies listed on major stock exchanges are particularly 
visible to the media and its audiences. As a major international stock exchange, the London 
Stock Exchange attracts extensive media and analyst interest (London Stock Exchange, 2010) 
and thus presents an ideal environment in which to examine media forces at play in an active 
market for corporate control. As discussed in Chapter One, the Rules of the Code apply to all 
companies listed on the Exchange. The legislative requirements of FSMA also apply to 
companies listed on both markets and suspected market abuse involving the securities of listed 
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companies are subject to investigation by the FCA43. Accordingly, statements issued by the 
Panel44 and final enforcement notices issued by the FCA’s predecessor, the FSA,45 enable a 
sample of (i) regulated takeover offers for UK plcs and (ii) market abuse cases involving the 
securities of UK plcs to be identified for use in the present study.  
 The sample of Takeover and Market Abuse cases is hereinafter collectively referred to 
as ‘TMA cases’. In the context of this research, a TMA case is defined as the series of events 
and transactions surrounding:  
 
(i) takeover offers for UK listed plcs supervised by the Takeover Panel; or 
(ii) instances of market abuse as defined under Section 118 of FSMA, involving the 
securities of UK plcs for which penalties were imposed by the FSA. 
 
5.4. Newspaper Reporting 
This study places its specific focus on general broadsheet newspapers firstly, because they are 
considered more accurate and credible than so-called ‘tabloid’ or ’red-top’ publications and 
are thus preferred by individuals who hold non-manual professional and managerial 
occupations (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007). This makes it more probable that the reports 
studied herein are accessed and credited by those stakeholders who play key governance roles, 
not only in terms of the board and shareholders but also policymakers, regulators and industry 
peers. Secondly, general broadsheet newspapers reach a broader base of stakeholders than 
business-specific publications (Doyle, 2006) and hence possess considerable potential to 
publicise issues surrounding takeover and market abuse cases and possibly have an impact on 
both on the company’s reputation (Deephouse, 2000) and the professional reputations of those 
who sit on its board (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann and 
                                                     43 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 286. 44 http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/panel-statements [Accessed 10 December 2014]. 45 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/what/financial_crime/market_abuse/library/notices/index.shtml [Accessed 10 December 2014]. 
137      
Hambrick, 2008). Consequently, by reaching a suitably wide but targeted audience, broadsheet 
newspaper reporting on the issues and events associated with takeover and market abuse cases 
may affect the size of any reputational costs which may be imposed on directors and create 
awareness of the potential gains and losses which shareholders and other stakeholders may 
realise as a consequence of the case.  
 
Measuring Newspaper Reporting 
Newspaper reporting is measured using data obtained from the archives of the eight UK 
broadsheet newspapers listed in Table 5.1 over the period between 1 January 2001 and 31 
December 2010. Table 5.1 lists the circulation and readership of each newspaper as measured 
by the NRS for the year 2010. As is evident, broadsheet newspapers are read predominantly 
by the ABC1 social class. As noted in Chapter One, members of this social class are more 
likely to perform corporate governance roles or be affected by how companies are governed 
than members of the C2DE class. The method used in isolating and collecting the newspaper 
data is described in the next chapter.  
 
Timeframes Studied 
Newspaper reporting is measured over timeframes assigned specifically to the individual 
takeover and market abuse cases. Timeframes consist of an ex-ante phase (measured using the 
variable NPRex-ante), an event phase (measured using the variable NPRevent) and an ex-post 
phase (measured using the variable NPRex-post).  
 The event phase is the time period during which the principle transactions and 
dealings occur. For takeover cases, the event phase begins on the date on which a possible 
offer is announced, according to the Panel’s statements. The event phase ends on the date on 
which the company is acquired or the offer is withdrawn, as reported by the Panel. On a 
number of occasions, the acquisition date is not included in the Panel statements; in such  
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Table 5.1: UK National Broadsheet Newspaper Print Readership and Circulation (2010) 
Source: The Audit Bureau of Circulations and The National Readership Survey (2010) 
Newspaper Publication Newspaper Group Circulation (000’s) Total Readership (000’s) 
ABC1 Readership (000’s) 
ABC1 Readership as a Percentage of Overall Readership 
Readership as a Percentage of Population in ABC1 Social Grade 
The Daily Telegraph Telegraph Media Group Ltd. 
631 1,680 1,445 86.0% 5.3% 
 
The Times    Times Newspapers Ltd. 
448 1,565 1,364 87.2% 5.0% 
 
The Guardian Guardian News and Media Ltd. 
265 
 
1,103 980 88.8% 3.6% 
The Independent Independent Print Ltd. 175 532 449 84.4% 1.6%  
The Sunday Telegraph   
  
Telegraph Media Group Ltd. 
528 1,442 1,243 86.2% 4.5% 
The Sunday Times   Times Newspapers Ltd. 
1,145 2,952 2,560 86.7% 9.3% 
 
The Observer    Guardian News and Media Ltd. 
355 1,030 920 89.3% 3.4% 
 
The Independent on Sunday     
Independent Print Ltd. 151 548 433 79.0% 1.6% 
 
instances the required date is obtained from deal reports included in the Zephyr M&A 
database. For market abuse cases, the event phase begins on the date on which prohibited 
behaviour begins, as indicated in the FSA’s final enforcement notices. This may be the date of 
the first illegal trade, the date on which the first false or misleading signal is released to the 
market or the date on which price sensitive inside information is disclosed or used 
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illegitimately. The event phase ends on the date on which the final penalty is imposed on the 
offender(s) by the FSA, as officially reported in the final enforcement notice. 
 The ex-ante phase is defined as the six month period immediately prior to the first day 
of the event phase. Ex-ante or pre-event time periods of various lengths are employed in prior 
studies which detect early news coverage of major company events. With regard to takeovers, 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) study reports over 120 trading days prior to the date on which 
merger negations begin, while Liu and McConnell (2013) study reports over a 12 month 
period prior to the announcement of an acquisition. With regard to the present study, pilot 
analysis of broadsheet newspaper reports on takeovers and instances of market abuse in the 
UK indicates that perceptible levels of speculative media commentary typically occur no 
earlier than six months prior to their official announcement. 
 The ex-post phase is defined as the six month period immediately following the last 
day of the event phase. Vaara and Tienari (2002) study media coverage published over the 
year following a takeover, however preliminary assessment of reporting by the UK newspaper 
media indicates that retrospective commentary on attempted and successful takeovers and 
market abuse cases diminishes to a negligible level or ceases within six months of their 
conclusion.  
 In addition, newspaper reporting over the three time periods combined is measured 
using the variable NPRfull. Each of the four variables is defined specifically in Table 5.2 at the 
end of the Section 5.6. 
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5.5. Corporate Governance Quality 
CGQ is examined from the perspective of the board of directors over the three annual 
reporting years surrounding each case and changes in CGQ during this period are assessed. 
The three year period encompasses the annual reporting year in which the main events of 
takeover or market abuse cases occur (hereinafter, the event year) and the years before and 
after it (hereinafter, the pre-event year and the post-event year respectively). For takeover 
cases, the event year is the year in which the company is acquired or the offer is withdrawn 
and for market abuse cases, the event year is the year in which the behaviour which constitutes 
as market abuse occurs.  
 
In order to effectually examine possible associations between newspaper reporting and 
changes in CGQ, it is necessary to measure newspaper reporting in a manner consistent with 
the annual reporting dates of sample companies. Accordingly, the numbers of reports 
published in the pre-event year, the event year and the post-event year are computed from the 
initial aggregate volume of reports measured for each case. The amount of newspaper reports 
published in the pre-event, event and post-event years are measured using the variables NPRt-1, 
NPRt and NPRt+1 respectively. Each of these three variables, together with those employed to 
measure newspaper reporting initially, is defined specifically in Table 5.2 at the end of the 
next section.  
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5.6. Research Model 
In testing H1, it is the intention of the researcher to examine if newspaper reporting on cases 
where companies are subject to market discipline or where their shares are implicated in 
market abuse leads directors to take actions to limit any damage caused to their reputations as 
guardians of shareholders’ interests. The study will investigate whether such actions result in a 
change in corporate governance quality. Before examining this hypothesis, it is essential to (i) 
establish a benchmark of corporate governance quality so as to reduce any potential biased 
results being derived, (ii) establish causality in the sample and (iii) address possible issues of 
endogeneity in the sample which arise due to the potential for various factors to 
simultaneously influence both the amount of newspaper coverage companies receive and the 
extent of changes in their corporate governance quality. 
 A benchmark of corporate governance quality is established by constructing a control 
sample, matched to the main research sample by company size and industry. All companies in 
the control sample have also been listed on the Main Market or the AIM of the London Stock 
Exchange and were also targeted for takeover between 2001 and 2010; however, these offers 
have not required the intervention of the Panel or the FSA. The corporate governance quality 
of companies in the control sample is assessed and measured and this measure is used to adjust 
measures of corporate governance quality in the main research sample.  
 Causality is established by conducting statistical tests for difference in corporate 
governance quality change between the cases which receive the most newspaper coverage and 
those which receive the least.  
 Finally, the issue of endogeneity is addressed by accounting for a number of factors 
which may simultaneously determine both newspaper reporting and changes in corporate 
governance quality. The influence of these factors, company age, size and industrial location, 
the regulatory issues arising in cases and the economic environment on newspaper reporting 
has been discussed in Chapter Four and is considered in the context of the present research in 
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Section 5.10. The influence of these factors on corporate governance quality change is also 
discussed in Section 5.10. To ensure that any relationship detected between newspaper 
reporting and corporate governance quality change is exogenous, the measure of newspaper 
reporting employed in testing for associations between newspaper reporting and corporate 
governance quality change must not reflect the influence of these factors. Thus, the main 
research model is devised in two stages whereby the determinants of newspaper reporting are 
analysed before proceeding to examine the determinants of corporate governance quality 
change.  
 
Stage One 
The determinants of newspaper reporting are examined using the following OLS regression 
model: 
 
NPRt = α1 + α2AGEt-1+ α3CSIZEt-1+ α4INDGENt-1 + α5ISSt + α6ECONt-1 + εt   (5.1) 
 
Where: 
NPRt  = Newspaper Reporting in a given year, t, of a TMA case.  
t   = (i) the pre-event year or (ii) the event year of a TMA case. 
AGEt-1  = company age in the pre-event year.  
CSIZEt-1 = company size in the pre-event year.  
INDGENt-1 = the general industry in which a company operates in the pre-event year.  
ISSt  = the primary reason for regulation of takeover or market abuse case as  
  reported in the event year. 
ECONt-1 = the economic environment in the pre-event year. 
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To isolate a measure of newspaper reporting which does not reflect the influence of these five 
determinants, the residual values for NPR are determined from the regression model. These 
values, which represent the difference between the observed values of newspaper reporting 
and those predicted by the model, serve as a measure of newspaper reporting which is 
independent of the five determinants. The residual values are then employed in the second 
stage of the regression analysis.  
 
Stage Two 
Stage two examines changes in corporate governance quality between the pre-event and event 
years and between the event and post-event years and effectively tests H1 using the following 
second stage OLS regression model:  
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ΔCGQt→t+1(ad) = α1 + α2RESNPRt + α3AGEt-1 + α4CSIZEt-1 + α5INDGENt-1 + α6ISSt +  
α7ECONt-1 + α8CGQt(ad) + α9BLAMEt + α10PERFt + α11INSTt-1 + εt  (5.2) 
 Where: 
ΔCGQt→t+1(ad)  = the benchmark-adjusted change in the Corporate Governance Quality in a 
  company between two consecutive years, t and t+1, of a TMA case. 
t   = (i) the pre-event year or (ii) the event year. 
t+1   = (i) the event year or (ii) the post-event year. 
RESNPRt = Newspaper Reporting in the first of the two years, t, measured using the 
  residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model presented 
  in Equation 5.1.  
AGEt-1  = company age in the pre-event year.  
CSIZEt-1 = company size in the pre-event year.  
INDGENt-1 = the general industry in which a company operates in the pre-event year.  
ISSt  = the primary reason for regulation of takeover or market abuse case as  
  reported in the event year. 
ECONt-1 = the economic environment in the pre-event year.  
BLAMEt  = a binary variable which assumes a value of 1 if the company is responsible 
  for regulatory intervention in the TMA case and 0 if otherwise, as reported in 
  the event year. 
CGQt(ad) = benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the first of the two 
  years, t. 
PERFt   = industry-adjusted company performance in the first of the two years, t. 
INSTt-1  = the proportion of company shares owned by investment institutions in the 
  pre-event year. 
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An overview of the timeframes and research samples employed in analysing the determinants 
of ΔCGQ is presented in Figure 5.1. The rationale for inclusion of all explanatory variables 
included in both the first and second stage models is discussed in Sections 5.10 and 5.11.  
 
Figure 5.1: Analysis of ∆CGQ  
 
 
Associations between the pre-event to event year change in corporate governance quality and 
pre-event year newspaper reporting are examined for the full sample and for the individual 
takeover subset. Associations between the event to post-event year change in corporate 
governance quality and event year newspaper reporting are examined in the full sample and in 
both subsets. As will become apparent in Chapter Seven, the association between the pre-
event to event year change in CGQ and pre-event year newspaper reporting cannot be 
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examined in the market abuse subset in isolation due to low levels of pre-event year 
newspaper reporting on market abuse cases. 
 
5.7. Measuring Corporate Governance Quality 
Black (2001b) contends that minimum standards of corporate governance are set out in 
legislation, regulation and behavioural norms. As mentioned above, this study focuses on the 
board of directors in its examination of internal corporate governance quality and changes 
therein. Certain aspects of the board are considered pertinent in measuring CGQ; these are (i) 
board leadership, (ii) board effectiveness, (iii) accountability and the role of the audit 
committee and (iv) directors’ remuneration and incentives. The focus on these aspects of 
governance is motivated by the key principles of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), 
Table 5.2: Summary of Newspaper Reporting Variables  
Variable Definition 
 Initial measurement 
 NPRfull Newspaper reporting over the full case timeframe, measured as ln(1+total no. newspaper reports on case) NPRex-ante Ex-ante phase newspaper reporting, measured as ln(1+no. newspaper reports in the ex-ante phase) NPRevent Event phase newspaper reporting, measured as ln(1+no. newspaper reports in the event phase) NPRex-post Ex-post phase newspaper reporting, measured as ln(1+no. newspaper reports in the ex-post phase) 
 First stage model: the determinants of newspaper reporting 
 NPRt-1 Pre-event year newspaper reporting, measured as ln(1+no. newspaper reports in the pre-event year) NPRt Event year newspaper reporting, measured as ln(1+no. newspaper reports in the event year) NPRt+1 Post-event year newspaper reporting, measured as ln(1+no. newspaper reports in the post-event year) 
 Second stage model: analysis of associations between corporate governance quality change and newspaper reporting 
 RESNPRt-1 Adjusted pre-event year newspaper reporting, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage model RESNPRt Adjusted event year newspaper reporting, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage model RESNPRt+1 Adjusted post-event year newspaper reporting, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage model 
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relevant sections of the Companies Act 2006 and theoretical and empirical implications of 
selected academic literature on the behaviour and efficacy of boards.  
 In order to evaluate these aspects of corporate governance quality, ten characteristics 
of the board of directors are measured using selected variables and relevant data extracted 
from the annual reports of sample companies from the years over which newspaper reporting 
on takeover and market abuse cases occur. Collectively, the resulting measures may be 
computed to provide an overall measure of annual corporate governance quality. The ten 
characteristics, or corporate governance variables, can be deemed to be the ‘components’ or 
‘elements’ of CGQ. Annual changes in CGQ and annual changes in each of its components are 
determined so that the research hypothesis may be investigated and for inferences to be made 
regarding the role of the newspaper media in motivating boards to take actions when their 
companies are targeted for takeover or when the companies’ shares are implicated in market 
abuse. Each corporate governance variable used in the study is now defined. The motivation 
for each variable as a key indicator of CGQ is provided in Chapter Three. 
 
a. Board Leadership  
Board Meetings  
The variable MEET measures board activity and is defined as the number of meetings held by 
the board in a given annual reporting year. 
 Prior research contends that boards which actively monitor management function as 
effective corporate governance devices and the frequency of board meetings is commonly 
employed to measure board activity. Bearing in mind that the current appraisal of CGQ 
focuses on a sample of companies publicised by the press due to their being targeted for 
takeover or due to their shares being implicated in market abuse, the necessity for board 
meetings at such times is apt to be even greater than in normal periods. Consequently, it is 
believed that the frequency of board meetings is indicative of CGQ. 
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The Roles of the CEO and the Board Chairman 
CEOCH measures CEO-chairman duality and is defined as a binary variable which assumes a 
value of 1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are combined and 0 if otherwise. 
 Both policy guidelines and the literature reviewed in Chapter Three strongly maintain 
that in order for the board to serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism, the roles 
of its leaders must be clearly defined with an unambiguous distinction between the functions 
performed by the CEO and chairman.  
 
b. Board Effectiveness  
The Balance between Executive and Non-executive Directors 
The variable ED measures board balance by determining the ratio of executive to non-
executive directors on the board and is defined as: 
 
The number of executive directors on the board  x 100% Board size  
Based on prior literature, this study posits that an optimally composed board comprises equal 
proportions of executive and non-executive directors and that an equally balanced board 
represents high CGQ; departures from this balance indicate a deterioration in quality. Should 
newspaper reporting on takeover and market abuse cases instigate membership changes on the 
board, it is possible that the balance between executive and non-executive directors may be 
adjusted, thereby resulting in enhanced or reduced CGQ. The present appraisal of CGQ 
evaluates the degree to which board balance is accomplished so as to achieve a more accurate 
indication of CGQ in terms of board composition.  
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Board Size 
The variable SIZE measures board size and is defined as the number of directors on the board 
in a given annual reporting year. Board size is often viewed as being indicative of board 
quality and therefore corporate governance quality. The board of directors should be of a 
sufficient size without becoming too large.  
 
Director Independence 
The variable INED measures the percentage of non-executive directors on the board who are 
identified as being independent from management in sample companies’ annual reports and is 
defined as: 
   
 The number of independent non-executive directors on the board  x100%   The number of non-executive directors on the board  
Prior studies argue that the greater the percentage of non-executive directors who are 
independent from management, the higher the standards of corporate governance in place 
within the company.  
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c. Accountability: the Role of the Audit Committee  
The audit committee is integral in ensuring accountability (Carcello and Neal, 2000) and an 
essential element of a company’s internal control structure (Krishnan, 2005). The capacity of 
the audit committee to perform its monitoring role is therefore deemed to be an essential factor 
to consider in evaluating CGQ. Three aspects of the audit committee are considered in 
evaluating CGQ. 
 
Audit Committee Size  
The variable ACS measures audit committee size and is defined as the number of members on 
the audit committee in a given annual reporting year. Hence, it may be evaluated if the 
committee is of an appropriate size to efficaciously monitor the integrity of the company’s 
financial reporting procedures and assure shareholder protection.  
 
Audit Committee Independence  
ACI measures audit committee independence and is defined as a binary variable which 
assumes a value of 1 if the majority of members are independent and 0 if otherwise. Since, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the monitoring ability of the audit committee is regarded to rely 
upon its independence from management, measurements made using the variable ACI shed 
additional insight into the quality of corporate governance provided by the audit committee. 
 
Audit Committee Meetings  
The variable ACM measures the frequency of audit committee meetings and is defined as the 
number of audit committee meetings held in a given annual reporting year. The resulting 
measure provides an indication of the propensity of the audit committee to meet with 
sufficient regularity so as to provide adequate CGQ. 
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d. Directors’ Remuneration and Incentives  
Prior literature has clarified that managers’ and directors’ incentives are provided through both 
external and internal means. Internally, the performance-linked pay and ownership interests in 
the company serve to incentivise directors to ensure that the company is managed in a manner 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation (Fama, 1980; Demsetz, 1983). 
 
CEO Pay to Performance Sensitivity 
The variable PPS measures the annual change in the remuneration received by the CEO 
relative to annual changes in shareholders’ wealth. PPS, or CEO pay to performance 
sensitivity, is defined as: 
 
Annual change in CEO pay Annual change in shareholders’ wealth  
Following Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1996), CEO pay is defined as the sum of 
CEO’s salary and bonus for the fiscal year. The annual change in shareholder wealth is 
defined as rate of return on common stock realised in the fiscal year multiplied by the market 
capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal year. As outlined in Table 2.2, it is 
recommended under Principle D.1. of the Corporate Governance Code (2010) that directors’ 
remuneration be linked to company performance. The sensitivity of CEO pay to company 
performance is evaluated in isolation so as to achieve a measure which is consistent across the 
sample since the remuneration awarded to the board as a whole will inevitably vary with board 
size and with the proportion of executive directors on the board. In evaluating CEO pay to 
performance sensitivity, all monetary values are inflation-adjusted to 2010 values46. 
  
                                                     46 Adjustments are made using the Consumer Price Inflation Index, July 2015, Available from: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-323649 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. 
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Directors’ Share Ownership 
The variable SHARE measures the percentage of common shares outstanding in the company 
owned by all directors on the board and is defined as: 
 
    Total shareholding of all board members  x 100% Common shares outstanding  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the proportion of company shares owned by directors should 
be at such a level where they are incentivised to monitor the maximisation of shareholder 
wealth without becoming risk-averse or entrenched. Accordingly, it is examined if directors’ 
ownership interests are at an appropriate level to serve as an incentive to monitor over the 
course of newspaper reporting of takeover and market abuse cases.   
 
Scoring Methodology 
A scoring methodology is devised herein with the purpose of evaluating CGQ. Scores are a 
commonly applied method of evaluating the efficacy of companies’ systems of corporate 
governance since they provide a perceptible indicator of quality. However, prior research has 
tended to employ corporate governance scoring systems devised by commercial ratings 
agencies (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal, 2006; Bhagat 
and Bolton, 2008). Because such systems simultaneously assess a large number of board 
attributes, they have an associated caveat that they are susceptible to measurement error 
(Daines, Gow and Larcker, 2010). The current methodology endeavours to reduce the 
opportunity for such error to arise by concentrating upon ten key specific areas of corporate 
governance deemed fundamental to shareholder protection in the present sample. This 
methodology evaluates the measurements made using the ten variables discussed above, in 
terms of the degree to which they are consistent with what is legally required and what is 
recommended under with best practice guidelines and by academic commentators. Each of the 
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ten components previously discussed are considered to have an equal bearing on CGQ, 
however as the ten measurements are of dissimilar magnitudes, they must be computed to 
comparable scales such that they may be combined to yield an overall evaluation of CGQ for 
each sample company.  
 Consequently, ten individual scoring scales are constructed, each with a range of 0 to 
10, where 0 represents low CGQ and 10 represents high CGQ. Relevant corporate governance 
regulatory policy and company legislation is used to guide construction of each scale, so that it 
is appropriately calibrated for evaluation of each element of CGQ. Where possible, the 
corporate governance standards set out in the Corporate Governance Code (2010) and the 
Companies Act 2006 are used to determine how each scale is graduated, such that the pillars 
of quality are defined by the primary regulatory and legislative framework within which 
sample companies operate. In instances where neither the Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
nor the Companies Act 2006 specifically prescribe standards of best practice or legislative 
guidelines pertaining to the characteristic under evaluation, guidance is taken from 
international sources and from extant reports from which the Combined Codes of 1998, 2003 
and 2006 and the Corporate Governance Code (2010) evolved. Theoretical and empirical 
implications from relevant academic literature provide further grounding for development of 
each individual scale. The scoring scales are presented and rationalised in Table 5.3, with 
specific reference to the policy and literature upon which each is founded.  
 Each characteristic measured is scored using the appropriate scale to yield ten 
measures for the relevant years over which the newspaper media reports on each takeover or 
market abuse case involving sample companies. In effect, the scoring procedure yields annual 
measures of the ten individual board characteristics on similar scales, common to all 
companies in the research sample. Collectively, the ten scores enable annual aggregate 
measures of CGQ to be computed and annual changes in CGQ (∆CGQ) to be acutely assessed 
over the course of newspaper reporting on TMA cases.  
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Table 5.3: Development of Scoring Methodology for CGQ: Board Leadership Component of CGQ 
 
Board Meetings The Roles of the CEO and the Board Chairman 
Measurement Variable 
 
MEET CEOCH 
Description Number of board meetings in the year 1 if the roles of CEO and chairman are combined; 0 if otherwise 
 Rationale for Score It is argued that an active board is an element of an effective internal system of corporate governance (MacAvoy and Millstein, 1999). Activity may be assessed by measuring the frequency of board meetings (MacAvoy and Millstein, 1999). Provision A.1.1. of the Corporate Governance Code (2010) recommends that boards meet with sufficient regularity so as to discharge their duties. The Spencer Stuart UK Board Index (2013) reports that the boards of FTSE 150 companies meet 6-10 times per annum but it is noted that additional meetings may be necessary in crisis situations. In the present sample of companies, additional board meetings may be necessary in order to address issues arising from takeovers and takeover attempts and instances of market abuse so that shareholder losses may be avoided. Consequently, it is considered appropriate that sample companies meet monthly or more frequently if necessary. 
 
Based upon Provision A.2.1 of the Corporate Governance Code (2010) which states that the roles of chairman and chief executive should not be performed by the same individual such that the CEO does not have unfettered decision-making power over the running of the board. A board on which the roles are split is thus regarded to be of high CGQ while one on which they are combined is considered to be of low CGQ. 
Scoring Method Measure Score Measure Score No. meetings in the year x 10 12 0→10 Roles of CEO and Chairman Combined (1) 
 
0 
  Roles of CEO and Chairman Split (0) 
 
10 
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Table 5.3 Continued: Development of Scoring Methodology for CGQ: Board Effectiveness Component of CGQ Board Balance Board Size Director Independence Measurement Variable ED SIZE INED Description Percentage of executive directors on the board Number of directors on the board Percentage non-executive directors on the board deemed independent Rationale for Score Founded on the principle that the quality of the board as a corporate governance device relies on a balanced composition of executive and non-executive directors (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010; Principle B1). An equal balance, whereby 50% of the board consists of executive directors, is deemed optimum. CGQ is indicated by the degree of deviation from this composition. 
Based upon Principle B1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), a supporting principle of which advises that the board be of sufficient size to be fit for purpose. A minimum size of two directors is set out under Section 154 (2) of the Companies Act 2006, a maximum of 13 members is deduced from the guidance provided by the Higgs Review (2003) and a range of between six and eight members is inferred from the Higgs Review as an appropriate board size. 
Academic commentary cautions that, unless non-executive directors are truly independent, the board may be dominated by the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Bhagat and Black, 1999). Consistently, Principle B.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) recommends that there should be appropriate independent representation on the board. The quality of board independence in this study is indicated by the percentage of non-executive directors who are independent where full independence denotes the highest potential quality, i.e. where 100% of non-executive directors and 50% of the board are independent. Scoring Method Measure (% Executives) Score Measure (No. Directors) Score Measure (%Non-Executives Deemed Independent) Score Low High  Low High    0-4 96-100 0 0-1 13+ 0 0 0 5-9 91-95 1    1-10 1 10-14 86-90 2 2 12 2 11-20 2 15-19 81-85 3    21-30 3 20-24 76-80 4 3 11 4 31-40 4 25-29 71-75 5    41-50 5 30-34 66-70 6 4 10 6 51-60 6 35-39 61-65 7    61-70 7 40-44 56-60 8 5 9 8 71-80 8 45-49 51-55 9    81-90 9 50 50 10 6 8 10 91-100 10 
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Table 5.3 Continued: Development of Scoring Methodology for CGQ: Accountability and the Role of the Audit Committee Component of CGQ 
 
Audit Committee Size Audit Committee Independence Audit Committee Meetings 
Measurement Variable 
 
ACS ACI ACM 
Description Number of directors on the audit committee 1 if majority audit committee members are independent; 0 if otherwise 
 
Number of audit committee meetings in the year 
Rationale for Score Paragraph 2.3 of the FRC’s Guidance on Audit Committees (2012a) recommends that companies establish an audit committee of two to three members. A committee of three members is likely to contain sufficient skills and knowledge to function effectively (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004). At double the recommended size, the audit committee is considered to be of lesser value to the company’s system of corporate governance as it becomes too large to function effectively. Consequently, in the present evaluation, an audit committee size of between three and five is regarded to indicate optimal CGQ and quality is believed to decline with deviations from this size as is shown in the following scoring scheme. 
 
Paragraph 2.3 of the FRC’s Guidance on Audit Committees (2012a) recommends that at least two members of the audit committees in small companies and three in larger firms be independent. In light of the guidance that audit committees in small companies consist of at least two members and three in larger firms (Paragraph 2.1), a majority of independent members are expected to be observed on audit committees which serve as part of an effective system of corporate governance. Accordingly, ACI is used to evaluate CGQ where a majority of independent members indicates high CGQ and a minority indicates low CGQ. 
An active audit committee which meets when necessary plays a central role in assuring accountability and internal control (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Krishnan, 2005). Audit committee meeting frequency thus contributes to CGQ. Paragraph 2.6 of the FRC’s Guidance on Audit Committees (2012a) recommends that audit committees meet at least three times per year and encourages committees to meet at important dates in the financial reporting calendar. Accordingly, audit committee effectiveness, as an element of CGQ, is assessed on the basis of the degree to which committees adhere to this guideline. 
Scoring Method Measure (No. Audit Committee Members) 
 
Score Measure Score Measure (No. Meetings) Score 
Low  High  Minority of audit committee members independent (0) 0   0 - 0 0 0 
1 10+ 3   1 3 
2 6-9 6 Majority of audit committee members independent (1)  
10 2 6 
3 5 10 3+ 10 
157  
Table 5.3 Continued: Development of Scoring Methodology for CGQ: Remuneration and Incentives Component of CGQ CEO Pay to Performance Sensitivity Directors’ Shareholdings Measurement Variable PPS SHARE Description Change in (CEO Salary + Bonus) from the Previous Fiscal Year  Rate of Return on Common Stock for Fiscal Year x Market Capitalisation at Beginning of Fiscal Year 
Total Directors’ Shareholdings  Common Shares Outstanding 
 
x 100% 
Rationale for Score Founded on Principle D.1 of the Corporate Governance Code (2010) which recommends that a significant proportion of directors’ remuneration be linked to performance. To assess if changes in CEO pay are sensitive to changes in shareholder wealth, the variable PPS measures the ratio of the former to the later for each fiscal surrounding a TMA case. Prior studies report CEO PPS ratios of 0.00015 (Yermack, 1996) to 0.00325 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), indicating that CEO pay tends to increase by £0.15 to £3.25 per £1,000 increase in shareholder wealth. Accordingly, a sensitivity ratio of between 0.0001 and 0.005 is presently considered to reflect good CGQ as CEO pay may increase by between £0.01 and £5 per £1,000 increase in shareholder wealth. At intermediate levels of CGQ, CEO pay may continue to increase as shareholder wealth increases. At lower levels, there is a negative or no relationship between changes in CEO pay and shareholder wealth, indicating that CEO pay is insensitive to performance. Scores of 3 and 2 are assigned for PPS ratios of between 0 and -0.01. A score of 3 is assigned where the negative relationship is due to a decrease in CEO pay as shareholders’ wealth increases and a score of 2 is assigned where the negative relationship is due to an increase in CEO pay as shareholders’ wealth decreases. Scores of 1 and 0 are assigned where CEO pay is further out of proportion with performance (PPS: -0.01 and lower). A score of 1 (0) is assigned where the negative relationship is due to a decrease (increase) in CEO pay as shareholder wealth increases (decreases).  
The proportion of company shares owned by directors should be at such a level where directors are incentivised to monitor the maximisation of shareholder wealth without becoming risk-averse (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) or entrenched (Short and Keasey, 1999; Mura, 2007). Based on existing research (Short and Keasey, 1999; Mura, 2007), a 10% equity shareholding is considered sufficient to align the interests of directors with those of shareholders, 0% is deemed as inadequate, while 30% is regarded as excessive. The mandatory bid threshold is used to guide selection of a level at which total directors’ ownership interests reach excess. Although this threshold is defined under Rule 9.1 (a) of the Takeover Code as 30% of voting rights in the company, a 30% equity shareholding is deemed as an appropriate proportion in the present context to infer that directors possess the potential to exert control over the company. Scoring Method Measure Score Measure Score PPS Ratio Conditions  Low High  
-0.01 and lower Increasing CEO pay, decreasing shareholder wealth 0 0% 30% + 0 -0.01 and lower Decreasing CEO pay, increasing shareholder wealth 1 0% - 0.5% 25% - 30% 1 0 → -0.01 Increasing CEO pay, decreasing shareholder wealth 2 0.5% - 1% 20% - 25% 2 0 → -0.01 Decreasing CEO pay, increasing shareholder wealth 3 1% - 2% 18% - 20% 3 0.1 and higher  4 2% - 3% 16% - 18% 4 0.05→0.1  5 3% - 4% 15% - 16% 5 0.025→0.05  6 4% - 5% 14% - 15% 6 0.015→ 0.025  7 5% - 6% 13% - 14% 7 0.01→ 0.015  8 6% - 7% 12% - 13% 8 0.005→ 0.01  9 7% - 8% 10% - 12% 9 0.0001→0.005  10 8%           10%  10 
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Measurements of CGQ in each year are examined for the full sample and also for the 
individual takeover and market abuse subsets such that any potential differences in the quality 
of governance between companies involved in takeover cases and those involved in market 
abuse cases may be identified and investigated. In a similar manner, CGQ is also assessed for 
the control sample of companies which is introduced in Section 5.8. The average CGQ and 
∆CGQ in the control sample is employed to adjust CGQ and ∆CGQ for the main sample of 
companies so as to achieve a standardised measure of CGQ which may be employed in testing 
the research hypothesis, H1. This process is described in Section 5.8. Since no companies in 
the control sample encountered direct intervention by the FSA, it is not possible to identify 
any instances of market abuse in which the shares of control sample companies are implicated. 
Hence, the control sample is not divided into subsets. Due to the nature of both the main 
research sample and the control sample, 47% of companies in the main sample and 50% of 
companies in the control sample are acquired in the event year; in these companies, CGQ is 
measured and evaluated only for the year prior to the takeover. CGQ is not evaluated for a 
further 7% of the main sample and 10% of the control sample in the post-event year for 
reasons outlined in Table 5.4 at the end of this section.  
 
Calculating Corporate Governance Quality and Corporate Governance Quality Change 
Calculating Annual CGQ 
Having assigned a score to each of the board characteristics which indicate CGQ for the 
relevant years over which the newspaper media reports on takeover and market abuse cases, 
annual aggregate measures of CGQ are obtained by calculating the sum of the ten component 
scores for each year. As each component score has a potential minimum value of 0 and a 
potential maximum value of 10, the annual aggregate scores are achieved on a scale of 0 to 
100. The annual summative scores for the pre-event, event and post-event years are measured 
by the variables CGQt-1, CGQt and CGQt+1 respectively. These variables provide measures of 
internal CGQ for each year on a scale common to the entire research sample, allowing annual 
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CGQ and annual changes in CGQ to be assessed relative to best practice in corporate 
governance for each sample company. 
 
Calculating ΔCGQ  
In order to assess ΔCGQ, the annual aggregate scores and component scores determined for 
each sample company are computed in the following equations: 
 
 ΔCGQt-1→t = CGQt – CGQt-1  (5.3 a) 
 ΔCGQt→t+1 = CGQt+1 – CGQt  (5.3 b)  
 
Where:   
∆CGQ  = the change in total CGQ score, or the change in a component of the total 
  CGQ score, between two consecutive annual reporting years 
CGQ  = total CGQ score, or a component of the total CGQ score, for a given annual 
  reporting year,  t-1(the pre-event year), t (the event year) or t+1(the post event 
  year).  
 
In order to address any concerns that application of the scoring methodology may have 
reduced the accuracy of measures of CGQ, changes in the original measures of the ten board 
characteristics are also assessed. Accordingly, annual changes in the total CGQ score and in its 
components, both before and after application of the scoring methodology, are evaluated. 
Statistics pertaining to changes in the original measures of the ten board characteristics are not 
reported in Chapter Seven, but are available from the author upon request. 
 It should be clarified that ΔCGQ between the pre-event and event years is determined 
only for 53% of companies in the main research sample and 50% of companies in the control 
sample. ΔCGQ between the event year and post-event year is determined for 46% of the main 
sample and 40% of the control sample. This is due to the prevalence of acquisitions and a 
number of liquidations which occur among sample companies as outlined in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4: CGQ Scoring Methodology: Sample Breakdown   Main Sample n 
 
Control Sample n 
Full sample size 
 
136 136 
Less companies not listed in the year prior to the main case events: (1) 
 
0 
Sample size for the year prior to the main case events: 
 
135 
 
136 
Less companies acquired in the year of the main case events: (64) 
 
(68) 
Plus companies admitted to listing in the year of the main case events: 1 
 
0 
Sample size for the year of the main case events: 
 
72 
 
68 
Less companies acquired in the year following the main case events:  (8) 
 
(14) 
Less receiverships/liquidations in the year following the main case events: (2) 
 
0 
Sample size for the year following the main case events: 
 
62 
 
54 
Companies for which ΔCGQt→t+1 may be measured: (where t= year prior to the main case events and t+1= year of the main case events) 
 
71 68 
Companies for which ΔCGQt→t+1 may be measured: (where t= year of the main case events and t+1= the year after the main case events) 
 
62 54 
 
5.8. Establishing a Benchmark of Corporate Governance Quality 
The main sample of companies employed in this study have been involved in takeover offers 
requiring the intervention of the Takeover Panel or their shares have been implicated in market 
abuse, calling for the intervention of the FSA. It is possible that sample companies’ 
involvement in matters entailing such close regulatory oversight and intervention is associated 
with their corporate governance quality. As such, companies in the research sample may have 
different governance characteristics to companies which are not involved in issues which 
require direct regulatory supervision or intervention. It may be the case that companies which 
encounter regulatory issues have poor pre-existing governance standards, particularly where 
the board, or one of its members, is responsible for the infringement of a Rule of the Takeover 
Code or a provision of Section 118 of FSMA. Alternatively, the intense regulatory scrutiny to 
which the board is exposed may positively influence the company’s governance over the 
course of the case such that is higher than that of companies which are not so closely involved 
with regulatory authorities. This potential difference is a concern in the present research as it 
may lead to biased results of low generalisability. 
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 This issue is addressed by constructing a control sample of companies which are 
targets in takeover offers and similar control transactions that do not require direct regulatory 
intervention. These companies are also listed on the Official List or on the AIM of the London 
Stock Exchange and hence, are also required or encouraged to adopt the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. While offers for these companies are also subject to the oversight of both 
the Takeover Panel and the FSA, they do not involve breaches of either the Rules of the 
Takeover Code or FSMA and hence, there is a minimum level of regulatory involvement in 
these offers. The sample is matched by industry and size and the CGQ of each company in the 
sample is assessed for the pre-event, event and post-event years of the transactions in which 
they are involved. Annual changes in CGQ are also assessed. The average annual CGQ and 
ΔCGQ of these companies serves as a benchmark which may be used to adjust CGQ and 
ΔCGQ in the main research sample.  
 
The Nearest Neighbour Matching Procedure 
The strategy used to identify the control sample is the nearest neighbour matching procedure 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006; 2011; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). While the potential 
governance differences between companies in the research sample and those which are not as 
closely involved with regulators cannot be directly observed, the matching procedure enables 
this difference to be assessed and accounted for using the observable characteristics of 
company size and industry.  
 The control sample is constructed as follows. Firstly, a sample of 617 UK listed plcs 
which were targeted for takeover or other relevant corporate control transaction47 between 
2001 and 2010 is identified from the Zephyr M&A database. All companies included in the 
main research sample are removed and for the remaining 481companies, both the database and 
the regulatory reports issued by the Takeover Panel and the FSA are consulted in order to 
                                                     47 The Zephyr M&A database offers data on successful and failed mergers, acquisitions, buyouts, IPOs and venture capital and private equity deals. In generating the control sample, the search of the database is limited to transactions involving major transfers of control, specifically mergers, acquisitions, management buyouts and institutional buyouts. A full description of the procedure employed to generate the control sample is provided in Chapter Six. 
162  
determine if regulatory intervention was required in any of the offers for these companies. 
This analysis indicates that all of the companies involved in transactions which required 
regulatory intervention are included in the main research sample. Accordingly, companies in 
the main research sample are assigned a code of 1 to indicate their involvement with market 
regulators and the remaining companies are assigned a code of 0 to indicate that the takeover 
offers and control transactions in which they were targets proceeded without regulatory 
intervention.  
 Following this, the codes are used to operationalise the binary dependent variable 
REGULATEt in the following binary logistic regression model: 
 
REGULATEt = α1 + α2CSIZEt-1 + α3INDSPt-1 + εt  (5.4) 
 
Where: 
REGULATEt  = a binary variable which assumes a value of 1 if the takeover offer or other 
  relevant corporate control transaction requires regulatory intervention and 0 if 
  otherwise. 
CSIZEt-1  = company size in the pre-event year. 
INDSPt-1 = the specific industry in which a company operates in the pre-event year. 
 
This regression model is employed to predict companies’ involvement with market regulators 
based on company size and industrial location. Company size is measured by the variable 
CSIZEt-1, defined as the natural logarithm of total fixed assets in the pre-event year. CSIZEt-1 
is introduced in more detail in Section 5.10. Industrial location is measured by the variable 
INDSPt-1. INDSPt-1 indicates the specific industrial location of each company using ten 
industry codes derived from the ten Industry Classification Benchmark (hereinafter, ICB) 
industry codes (ICB, 2011). The industrial locations of companies are identified from the 
London Stock Exchange’s historical records which include monthly sectorial classification of 
companies listed since January 1999. These classifications employ the ICB System. The 
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industry in which each company is situated is determined from the Exchange’s industrial 
classifications as recorded in the first month of the pre-event year. The coding system 
employed to indicate companies’ industrial locations is presented in Table 5.5. As can be seen, 
the values of the codes are rearranged slightly so that the consumer services industry is 
classified next to the consumer goods industry and that the technologies industry is classified 
next to the telecommunications industry. This step is taken to aid the creation of broader 
industry categories later in the study.  
 
Table 5.5: Industry Classification Industry Code Employed ICB Industry Code Industry 0 0 Oil and Gas 1 1 Basic Materials 2 2 Industrials 3 3 Consumer Goods  4 5 Consumer Services 5 4 Health Care  6 6 Telecommunications 7 9 Technology 8 7 Utilities 9 8 Financials  
Accordingly, REGULATEt is regressed on company size and industrial location. The 
predicted probability values from this logit regression serve as propensity scores (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin. 1983). Based on the observable characteristics of company size and industrial 
location, the propensity scores provide an estimation of the probability that a company will 
become involved in an issue which requires regulatory intervention by the Takeover Panel or 
the FSA.  
 The results of the logit regression, presented in Table 5.6, indicate that smaller 
companies are significantly more likely to be involved in issues which call for the direct 
intervention of the market regulatory authorities. Larger companies, listed on the Main Market 
of the London Stock Exchange, are subject to more stringent regulatory requirements than are 
smaller, AIM listed companies. For instance, neither the DTRs nor the UK Corporate 
Governance Code are mandatory for AIM listed companies. Thus, it may be the case that 
regulatory infringements are more prevalent in transactions involving smaller companies 
because such companies are less visible to regulators in general and hence, offenders may  
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Table 5.6: Logit Regression of Regulatory Intervention on Company Size and Industry 
Below are the estimation results of the logit regression of Regulatory Intervention (REGULATEt) upon Company Size and Industry for the full sample of UK listed plcs targeted for takeover or other relevant corporate control transaction between 2001 and 2010. The codes employed to operationalise the categorical variable INDSPt-1, which measures the specific industry in which companies operate, are presented in Table 5.5. For the purposes of this analysis, the oil and gas industry (industry code: 0) is used as the reference category. 
 Dependent Variable: REGULATEt 
 n=617 
 B  Std. Error 
 
 t-prob 
 Constant 4.559 0.663 0.001 CSIZEt-1 -0.407 0.042 0.001*** INDSPt-1_1 (Basic Materials) 0.880 0.518 0.089* INDSPt-1_2 (Industrials) 0.599 0.489 0.220 INDSPt-1_3 (Consumer Goods) 0.626 0.372 0.093* INDSPt-1_4 (Consumer Services) 0.357 0.598 0.550 INDSPt-1_5 (Health Care) 1.002 0.355 0.005*** INDSPt-1_6 (Telecommunications) -2.237 1.086 0.039** INDSPt-1_7 (Technology) -0.238 0.753 0.752 INDSPt-1_8 (Utilities) -3.651 1.023 0.001*** INDSPt-1_9 (Financials) 1.814 0.989 0.067*  Log-likelihood: 442.801 (p-value): 0.001*** Cox and Snell R
2: 0.286 % Correct: 84.6  
Likelihood Ratio (df = 10): 208.061 
 Nagelkerke R2: 0.439   
Variable Definitions: REGULATEt: 1 if the takeover offer or other relevant corporate control transaction requires regulatory intervention, 0 if otherwise; CSIZEt-1: company size in the pre-event year; INDSPt-1: the specific industry in which a company operates in the pre-event year. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level   
believe that they are less likely to be detected. Moreover, smaller companies may be more 
likely to be involved in market abuse as their securities are more susceptible to insider dealing 
and manipulation since pricing efficiency reduces with company size (Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001). Relative to the oil and gas industry, companies in the basic materials, consumer goods, 
health care and financial industries are significantly more likely to be involved in such issues, 
while companies in the telecommunications and utilities industries are significantly less likely 
to be involved in such issues. While it is difficult to offer a concrete explanation for this trend, 
it may be the case that companies in certain industries attract additional regulatory scrutiny 
due to the nature of their business; it is certainly plausible to expect a high level of regulatory 
involvement when relevant issues arise in financial services companies which are subject to 
additional requirements set out, over the sample timeframe, by the FSA. Furthermore, since 
takeover waves tend to converge on certain industries (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, 
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Mitchell and Stafford, 2001; Martynova and Renneboog, 2005), it may be the case that 
breaches of the Takeover Code are more likely in certain industries at a particular point in time 
because takeovers are more common in those industries at that time.  
 The propensity scores derived from this regression are used in the nearest neighbour 
matching procedure. The procedure matches to each company in the main research sample 
(the treated sample) a nearest neighbour from the sample of companies which have not been 
closely involved with the regulatory authorities when targeted for takeover (the untreated 
sample). In effect, each company in the treated sample is matched to a company in the 
untreated sample with the closest propensity score (its nearest neighbour). 
 To perform this procedure, the combined treated and untreated sample is organised by 
the event year of the transactions in which they are involved. For each year, a nearest 
neighbour from the untreated sample is selected for each company in the treated sample. 
Where there are an insufficient number of companies in the untreated sample for a given year 
and certain companies in the treated sample remain unmatched, a nearest neighbour is selected 
from the previous or following year, depending on which potential neighbour has the closest 
propensity score. These companies are not matched until the end of the procedure when all 
possible matches within each given year have been made so as to maximise the number of 
matches made within a one year timeframe. This procedure yields a control sample of 136 
companies which have been targets in takeover offers, or similar control transactions, which 
proceeded without any need for regulatory intervention. Table 5.7 provides an overview of the 
main research sample and control sample in terms of the event years of the transactions in 
which they are involved. As can be seen, there are fewer control sample companies which 
were targeted for takeover, or other similar transaction, in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2010 
and slightly more in 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2009.  
 Descriptive statistics for, and the results of statistical tests for differences in, company 
size in the main research sample and the control sample are provided in Chapter Seven. The 
results indicate that companies in both samples are, on average, of a similar size and there is 
no statistically significant difference in the size between the two samples. A breakdown of  
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Table 5.7: Analysis of Main Research Sample and Control Sample Per Annum 
 Main Research Sample 
 
Control Sample 
Year (t) 
 
n n 
2001 
 
2 5 
2002 
 
8 5 
2003 
 
18 15 
2004 
 
16 19 
2005 
 
12 9 
2006 
 
16 19 
2007 
 
18 21 
2008 
 
20 17 
2009 
 
15 16 
2010 
 
11 10 
Total 
 
136 136 
 
both samples on the basis of industry location is also provided in Chapter Seven. This 
illustrates that the industry distribution of the main research sample and the control sample is 
quite similar. Collectively, these statistics indicate that identification of a control sample of 
nearest neighbours has been successful. 
 
Corporate Governance Quality in the Control Sample 
CGQ in the control sample is measured in the same manner as in the main research sample. 
The same characteristics of the board are assessed over the pre-event, event and post-event 
years of each offer, or relevant transaction, and annual changes in CGQ over this period are 
assessed. The mean and standard deviation of both annual CGQ and annual changes in CGQ 
in the control sample are determined and these values are employed to adjust annual CGQ and 
annual changes in CGQ for each company in the main research sample using the following 
formula: 
 
Adjusted CGQ = CGQ of Main Research Sample Company – Mean CGQ for Control Sample  Standard Deviation of CGQ for Control Sample 
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Descriptive statistics for CGQ in both the main research sample and the control sample are 
presented in Chapter Seven along with those for benchmark-adjusted CGQ in the main 
research sample.  
 
5.9. Initial Tests for Causality  
Before the research model is considered in more detail, it is necessary to establish that a causal 
relationship exists between ΔCGQ and newspaper reporting. This is achieved by ranking the 
ΔCGQ datasets in terms of the amount of newspaper reporting in the first of the two 
consecutive years over which ΔCGQ is measured. This is performed for both the pre-event to 
event year change and the event to post-event year change in CGQ. For each dataset, the 
ranked data is divided into quartiles. In each instance, the quartiles with the highest volume of 
newspaper reports, ‘the high media quartile’ and the quartile with lowest volumes of 
newspaper reports, ‘the low media quartile’, are identified. The ΔCGQ data from the high 
media quartile is compared with that from the low media quartile using statistical tests for 
differences. In instances where there are two quartiles for which no newspaper reporting is 
observed, the ΔCGQ data from the highest quartile is compared with a randomly selected 
quartile for which there is no media reporting. This procedure is performed for the full 
research sample and the takeover and market abuse subsets thereof. 
 
5.10. Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
While the univariate tests described above serve to provide an initial indication of causality, 
they do not eliminate the possibility of endogeneity in the research sample. It is crucial to 
consider the issue of endogeneity in any study of boards or any aspect of corporate governance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Endogeneity occurs where some of the explanatory variables 
are correlated with the error term in a regression model (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Roberts 
and Whited, 2012). It can lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make 
reliable inference difficult (Roberts and Whited, 2012). Much corporate financial research is 
complicated by the endogenous relationship between the control forces operating on the firm 
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and its decisions (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). Endogeneity presents a considerable 
challenge to scholars in areas of finance because it is not possible to directly observe many of 
the relationships which exist in a firm’s environment in a natural laboratory setting. Thus, the 
dynamics of these relationships may not be fully investigated and causality may not be 
correctly established. 
 
Sources of Endogeneity 
Endogeneity can arise from a number of sources. Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) note three. 
One source is unobservable heterogeneity, which arises if there are unobservable factors that 
affect both the dependent and explanatory variables. For example, where a researcher 
endeavours to examine a relationship between a governance characteristic and a potential 
determinant of that characteristic, it may be the case that both are influenced by a factor which 
is not accounted for by the researcher. Another is simultaneity, which arises if the independent 
variables and the dependent variable may be simultaneously determined. If a researcher 
endeavours to examine a relationship between a governance characteristic and a potential 
determinant of that characteristic, it may be the case that both the characteristic and the 
determinant of that characteristic are determined simultaneously by the same or similar 
factors. This form of endogeneity is particularly prevalent in corporate governance research 
(McKnight and Weir, 2009). A third is joint endogeneity, which arises where the dependent 
variable is affected by an explanatory variable at a different point in time. For example, a 
company’s past performance may affect its current governance structures which in turn may 
affect its future performance. 
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The Issue of Endogeneity in Corporate Governance Research 
At a broad level, endogeneity is a significant concern when studying the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value. Denis (2001) explains that many variables potentially 
influence firm performance and hence, firm value, and there may also be correlations within 
this set of variables. Consequently, evidence to suggest that a particular governance 
mechanism influences firm value may actually arise because the mechanism is more prevalent 
in firms of a certain type which tend, on average, to be more highly valued. Moreover, as 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) note, certain characteristics of the board such as its 
independence and size can influence its members’ actions which can influence the value of the 
firm. However, the value of the firm may be a determinant of the board’s characteristics. For 
instance, companies which have performed poorly and are of a lower value may take measures 
to improve their governance in an endeavour to raise the company’s value. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to determine whether corporate governance is a cause or an effect of firm value.  
 One area of corporate governance research where the issue of endogeneity proves 
particularly problematic is the relationship between ownership structure and company 
performance as both are influenced by the environment in which the company is situated. 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership structure may be 
considered an endogenous outcome of decisions aimed at maximising shareholders’ wealth. 
The most appropriate ownership structure will vary from company to company, depending on 
factors such as its size, age and the industry and country in which it is located. Such factors 
also influence company performance. As such, ownership structure is endogenous to the 
environment which influences its performance and hence, its value. It follows that the optimal 
level of management ownership for one company may not necessarily be appropriate for 
another. 
 A number of studies discussed in Chapter Three, provide evidence to suggest that the 
value of a company is influenced by the level of management ownership (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988b; Short and Keasey, 1999; Mura, 2007). However, as Holderness (2003) points 
out, this relationship may run in the opposite direction. For instance, if the company has 
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performed well, management may be rewarded with share-based payments, resulting in an 
increase in the level of management ownership. Alternatively, based on insider knowledge, 
management may expect the value of the company to increase and thus, increase their holding 
in the company (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) 
acknowledge that the inverted-U pattern in the data detected by Morck Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988b) and in subsequent studies represents a relationship between two endogenous 
variables. They provide evidence to indicate that the ownership-firm value relationship may be 
explained by three factors, value-maximising contract choice, firm size and firm performance, 
which are jointly determined in equilibrium. 
 
Methods Employed to Address the Issue of Endogeneity in Prior Research 
Various methods of overcoming the issue of endogeneity have been employed in corporate 
governance research. One method is to take a simultaneous equations approach to specifying 
the research model. This method has been employed in a number of studies of the relationship 
between ownership and firm value. Loderer and Martin (1997) use firm performance and a 
number of other explanatory variables to predict insider ownership and then use insider 
ownership along with other explanatory variables to predict firm performance. Their results 
indicate that insider ownership does not predict firm performance but firm performance does 
predict insider ownership. Cho (1998) considers that investment in the company (its capital 
expenditure and its R&D expenditure) may intermediate in the relationship between 
ownership and firm value. He employs simultaneous equations to examine this. Cho uses three 
equations to simultaneously determine ownership structure, firm value and investment. Using 
a two-stage least squares regression, he finds that investment is significantly associated with 
firm value and that firm value is, in turn, significantly associated with ownership structure. 
The association between ownership structure and firm value is, however, found to be 
insignificant. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) use both an ordinary least squares regression and 
a two-stage least squares regression to examine the relationship between ownership and firm 
value. In addition, they treat ownership as a multi-dimensional, endogenous variable by 
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considering the proportion of shares owned by management and that owned by outside 
shareholders. While the results of their ordinary least squares regression indicate that 
ownership predicts company performance, the results of the two-stage least squares regression 
provide no evidence that ownership is a significant predictor. 
 A further remedy involves the use of longitudinal or panel data while controlling for 
fixed effects. Controlling for fixed effects reduces both observed and unobserved variation in 
the sample (Palia, 2001; Coles, Lemmon and Meschke, 2012). An additional measure, a 
Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator, may be applied to the panel data 
(Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). GMM is a statistical method that combines observed data 
with information in population moment conditions to create estimates of unknown parameters 
of the model. With these parameters, it is possible to make inferences about the relationship 
under investigation.  
 Another potential solution to the endogeneity problem is the use of an instrumental 
variable as an explanatory variable (McKnight and Weir, 2009). An instrumental variable is 
one which is only related to the dependent variable and not correlated with any of the other 
explanatory variables (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2010; Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). In 
their study of the influence of the newspaper media on corporate governance, Dyck, 
Volchkova and Zingales (2008) take such an approach. Specifically, they instrument the 
variable measuring newspaper coverage in their regression model with a measure of the size of 
the stake held by a particular investment fund in their sample of companies. This fund is 
known to attract media attention to their investments. They believe that the presence of this 
investment fund is an exogenous component of newspaper coverage. Accordingly, they 
interpret their results which show a significant positive association between the instrumental 
variable and reversal of corporate governance violations to indicate a causal link between 
newspaper coverage of governance violations and their resolution. It may, however, be 
difficult to derive a variable which is completely independent from all of the other explanatory 
variables in the research model (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) and Dyck, Volchkova and 
Zingales acknowledge that while they have sought to ensure the validity of their instrument, 
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more research is needed to ascertain that a causal relationship exists between news media 
coverage and corporate governance reform. 
 
Opportunities for Endogeneity to Arise in the Relationship between Changes in Corporate 
Governance Quality and Newspaper Reporting 
A significant endogeneity concern in the present research is the possibility that changes in 
corporate governance quality are influenced by forces which may also determine newspaper 
reporting. Chapter Four has discussed five factors which may influence the amount of 
newspaper coverage companies receive. These are company size, company age, the industrial 
location of the company, the economic environment and issues associated with the takeover or 
market abuse case. These factors may also, to some extent, explain the incidence and nature of 
changes in corporate governance quality in companies. The remainder of this section discusses 
why these factors may provide some explanation for changes in corporate governance quality. 
It also describes variables which are included in the research model to account for their 
influence. Following this, the approach taken to address endogeneity in the sample which may 
arise from the simultaneous influence of these factors on both corporate governance quality 
change and newspaper reporting is explained and described. 
 
Factors Influencing both Corporate Governance Quality Change and Newspaper Reporting 
Company Size  
Company size may partially explain corporate governance quality change in the present 
research sample as it is argued that larger companies tend to be more compliant with 
regulatory guidelines (Laing and Weir, 1999). As main listed companies are required by the 
London Stock Exchange to comply with the Corporate Governance Code, while compliance 
by smaller AIM listed firms is not as strictly mandated, changes in corporate governance 
quality may occur more readily in sample companies of a certain size. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, the amount of newspaper coverage a company receives may also depend on its size as 
larger companies tend to be more visible both to the newspaper media and its audiences 
173  
(Miller, 2006; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). Thus, both changes in CGQ in 
companies and the amount of newspaper reporting they receive may both be influenced by 
their size.  
 In examining the relationship between corporate governance quality change and 
newspaper reporting, the influence of company size on the two variables must be accounted 
for. As will be described in more detail below, this is achieved by employing the explanatory 
variable CSIZEt-1, which measures company size, in both the first and second stage regression 
models (Equations 5.1 and 5.2). CSIZEt-1 is defined as the natural logarithm of total fixed 
assets48 in the pre-event year. Company size is measured in the pre-event year in the interest of 
consistency as a number of companies are acquired or delisted in the subsequent years. 
 
Company Age 
It is argued that the level of protection shareholders require changes over the course of the 
company’s life cycle (Filatochev, Toms and Wright, 2006). As a company’s pool of resources 
expands over time, it must become more accountable to its shareholders (Aguilera, Filatochev, 
Gospel and Jackson, 2008). Consequently, a company’s age may influence the extent to which 
changes in corporate governance quality are necessary. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, older companies are often more visible to the news media and its audiences as there 
tends to be a greater availability of information on them (Barry and Brown, 1985; Zhang, 
2006) and because they have had longer to build a reputation with the public (Deephouse, 
2000). 
 For these reasons, company age, which is measured by the variable AGEt-1, is 
considered as a potential explanator of both corporate governance quality change and the 
amount of newspaper reporting on companies. AGEt-1 is also employed in both the first and 
second stage regression models and is defined as the number of years from the date on which 
the company’s ordinary shares were first admitted to the listing on the relevant stock markets 
to the date on which newspaper reporting begins. Company age is measured up to this date, as 
                                                     48 Source: Datastream Code WC02999. 
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opposed to the date on which newspaper reporting ceases, for reasons of consistency since 
those companies which are acquired over the course of newspaper reporting are delisted 
before newspaper reporting ceases. 
 
Industry 
Changes in certain components of CGQ may arise because of developments within the 
industries in which companies are situated. Directors’ pay may vary with the performance of 
industry in which the firm is situated (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999). Gillan, Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) report that industry influences explain variations in board structure. Lehn, 
Patro and Zhao (2009) find that board size declines following industry shocks. Perhaps most 
pertinent in the present sample is the possibility that an industry may be experiencing a 
takeover wave. Aware of the threat of takeover, boards in such industries may make greater 
efforts to protect shareholders’ interests; alternatively, they may be reluctant to risk making 
changes to make board changes (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Furthermore, Chapter 
Four has discussed how companies may receive more media attention if they are in high-
profile, competitive or economically significant industries or industries with a history of 
corruption (Brammer and Millington, 2006; Hou, 2007; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 
2008). Hence, the industrial location of sample companies may go some way to explaining 
both corporate governance quality change in companies and the level of newspaper coverage 
these companies receive. 
 The variable INDGENt-1 indicates the general industry location of a company involved 
in a takeover or market abuse case in the year prior to the main events of the case. INDGENt-1 
differs to the variable INDSPt-1, introduced in Section 5.8, to the extent that it classifies 
companies into one of six broad industry categories, rather than one of ten49. As explained in 
Section 5.8, the specific industry in which each company is situated is determined from the 
London Stock Exchange’s industrial classifications for the pre-event year. Industries are 
                                                     49 While a specific industry location is preferable in identifying the control sample in order to ensure the closest possible industry matches, employing a categorical variable with ten categories in the main research model may reduce the model fit unnecessarily, particularly since there is a small number of companies in certain industries. 
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further grouped in accordance with the nature of business they concern, thereby creating six 
broad industrial categories. Accordingly, sample companies are assigned a code with a value 
between 1 and 6 in accordance with the general industry in which they are situated. Each 
industry is listed together with the relevant code in Table 5.8. As a large proportion of sample 
companies are acquired or delisted over the course of cases, the industry location of sample 
companies is measured at the beginning of the pre-event year as all sectorial locations are 
available for this date. As a potential explanator of both corporate governance quality change 
and newspaper reporting, INDGENt-1 is also employed as an explanatory variable in both 
stages of the research model. 
 
Table 5.8: General Industry Locations of Sample Companies Code General Industry Subsectors 1 Oil, Gas, Materials and Industrials Mining and Drilling     Engineering and Machinery   Transportation   Construction   Other 
 2 Consumer Goods and Services  Retail   Food and Beverage   Logistics   Media and Publishing   Leisure and Tourism    
3 Health Care   Biotechnology   
4 Telecommunications and Technology Telecommunications   Software and Computer Services 
5 Utilities Water   Electricity 
6 Financials Real Estate   Insurance   Banking and Investment   Other 
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Takeover/Market Abuse Issue  
Changes in corporate governance quality may arise as a response to specific issues associated 
with the takeover and market abuse cases. Certain issues may represent a greater risk to 
shareholders’ wealth than others or have more significant implications for the board (Dyck, 
Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). The amount of newspaper reporting on companies may also 
rely upon specific issues in the TMA cases in which they are involved. Chapter Four has 
outlined how issues concerning inappropriate behaviour or conflicts of interests may be 
considered interesting news stories (Miller, 2006). More coverage may be devoted to issues 
which are deemed more serious than others or expected to have more significant implications 
for the directors, shareholders or broader stakeholders of companies involved (Dyck, 
Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). 
 The variable ISSt measures the primary issue in each takeover or market abuse case 
which leads to the intervention of the Panel or the FSA in order to ensure shareholder 
protection. This is determined on the basis of: 
 
(i) the rule of the Takeover Code principally applied in the case or  
(ii) the type of market abuse principally involved, based on the definition of 
behaviour which constitutes as market abuse under Subsections 2 to 8 of Section 
118 of FSMA.  
 
The primary issue in takeover cases is identified from the Panel statements and the primary 
issue in market abuse cases is identified from the final enforcement notices issued by the FSA. 
The issues identified are categorised on the basis of the extent to which the takeover rule or 
aspect of the law applied is regarded by the present researcher to serve to protect shareholders. 
Each category of issue identified is assigned a code, the numerical value of which increases 
with the extent of neglect of shareholders’ interests caused by a failure to observe the Rule of 
the Code or subsection of Section 118 of FSMA. The codes are used to operationalise the 
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variable ISSt. In effect, the value of ISSt indicates the degree to which an issue arising in a 
case represents an injustice to shareholders or a threat to shareholders’ interests. 
 Seven categories of takeover and market abuse issues are created. Four categories 
pertain to takeover cases and three to market abuse cases. ISSt is measured in the year of the 
main events of each case as the primary takeover rule applied or type of market abuse may not 
be reported by the relevant regulatory authorities until this time. The seven categories of issues 
are listed in Table 5.9 along with their respective codes and the Rules of the Code and 
subsections of Section 118 of FSMA pertaining to each category. As can be seen from Table 
5.9, market abuse issues are assigned codes of a higher numerical value than takeover issues 
since they represent a threat to shareholders’ wealth which is prohibited by law. ISSt is also 
employed as an explanatory variable in both stages of the research model.  
 
Economic Environment 
The quality of corporate governance provided by directors may be associated with the 
economic environment as the overall economic performance of the country in which the 
company is listed may influence the efforts which boards make to protect shareholders’ 
interests (Leung and Horowitz, 2010). The economic environment may also have an influence 
on the amount of newspaper coverage that a company involved in a TMA case receives, as the 
public’s interest in matters of corporate control and investor protection may vary with 
economic sentiment (Doyle, 2006). 
 Accordingly, the variable ECONt-1, which measures the economic environment in the 
year in which newspaper reporting begins, is employed as an explanatory variable in both 
stages of the research model. ECONt-1 is defined as the natural logarithm of the Gross 
Domestic Product (hereinafter, GDP)50 for the UK at the first quarter of that year. 
 
  
                                                     50 Source: OECD Q1 Main Economic Indicators (2000-2010). 
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Table 5.9: Takeover and Market Abuse Issues  
Listed below are the takeover and market abuse issues encountered in this study. Panel A presents those issues pertaining to takeover cases and Panel B presents those issues pertaining to market abuse cases. In each panel, the first column lists the codes assigned to each category of issue, these values are employed to operationalise the variable ISSt, The second column lists the descriptions of the categories of issues, The last two columns list the relevant Rules of the Code or subsection of Section 118 of FSMA applied or breached. 
Panel A: Takeovers: This list is based on the 10th edition of the UK Takeover Code (January 2011). As the cases concerned in this study occurred between January 2001 and December 2010, it should be noted that each case is based on a breach or application of a rule from the relevant edition of the Code at that time. 
 Code Description Rule breached or applied 
Description 
1 Timing 31 Timing of the offer 35 Restrictions following offers 
2 Information, disclosure and transparency  
8 Disclosure of dealings and positions  19 Information 
3 Treatment of shareholders 2 Secrecy before announcements; the timing and contents of announcements 6 Acquisitions resulting in an obligation to offer a minimum level of consideration 9 Mandatory offers 13 Pre-conditions in firm offer announcements and offer conditions 14 Provisions applicable to offers where there is more than one class of share capital 32 Revision of offers 
4 Restrictions on dealings 4 Restrictions on dealings- parties acting in concert 5 Timing restrictions on acquisitions 38 Dealings by connected exempt principal traders 
Panel B: Market Abuse: This list is based on the definition of behaviour which constitutes as market abuse under subsections 2-8 of Section 118 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
 Code Description Relevant Subsection of FSMA 
Description 
5 Improper disclosure/misuse of information   
3 Improper Disclosure 
4 Misuse of information 
6 Insider dealing 2 Insider dealing 
7 Market manipulation 5 Manipulating transactions 6 Manipulating devices 7 Dissemination of information which gives a false or misleading impression to the market 8 Distortion and misleading behaviour 
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Addressing the Issue of Endogeneity in the Relationship between Corporate Governance 
Quality Change and Newspaper Reporting 
It is possible that an endogenous relationship exists between corporate governance quality 
change and newspaper reporting in the present research sample since corporate governance 
quality change in a company and newspaper reporting on that company may both be 
influenced by the five factors just discussed. The simultaneous influence of these factors on 
the two main variables of interest must be accounted for in order to avoid introducing biased 
estimates into the model which will be used to investigate the relationship between the two 
variables. Accordingly, a measure of either newspaper reporting or corporate governance 
quality change must be derived which does not reflect the influence of these five factors. 
 As noted above, endogeneity arises where some of the explanatory variables in a 
regression model are correlated with the error term in the model. Thus, in a one-stage OLS 
regression model where corporate governance quality is regressed upon newspaper reporting 
together with variables capturing the five factors mentioned above, newspaper reporting may 
be correlated with the other explanatory variables and with the error term in the regression 
model.  
 In order to avoid such issues, the research model is devised in two stages as outlined 
in Section 5.6. By employing the residual values derived from the first stage model as the 
newspaper reporting variable in the second stage, the results for the second stage model may 
be interpreted with certainty that they are not driven by correlations between newspaper 
reporting and the five explanatory variables, company size, age and general industrial location, 
the nature of regulatory issue in question and the economic environment. The next section 
defines the four additional explanatory variables employed in the second stage model and 
discusses the rationale for their inclusion. 
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5.11. Other Explanatory Variables 
The present study recognises a number of factors other than those discussed in the previous 
section which may also, to some extent, explain the incidence and nature of changes in 
corporate governance quality in companies. These factors are the extent to which the company 
is responsible for regulatory intervention in the TMA case in which it is involved, its corporate 
governance quality in the past year, its performance in the past year and the proportion of its 
shares which are owned by institutional investors. This section discusses why these factors 
may provide some explanation for changes in corporate governance quality. It also describes 
variables which are included in the second stage model to account for their influence.  
 
Responsibility for Regulatory Intervention 
Corporate governance quality change in the present research sample may be partially 
influenced by whether or not the company is responsible for the intervention of the Takeover 
Panel or the FSA. Both the Takeover Code and Section 118 of FSMA are in place to protect 
the interests of investors. If the board has taken actions which are contrary to the Rules of the 
Takeover Code or if its members have engaged in market abuse, the efficacy of the board as a 
corporate governance device may be brought into question. Accordingly, changes may be 
made to the board so that it appears to serve as a better quality governance instrument. 
Alternatively, if the bidding company has created cause for regulatory intervention or if the 
offence of market abuse has been committed by a party who is not a member of the board, no 
blame should lie with the board. In such cases, the pressure it faces to make governance may 
not be as great.   
 The variable BLAMEt, which indicates responsibility for regulatory intervention in the 
TMA case, is defined as a binary variable which assumes a value of 1 if the company is 
responsible and 0 if otherwise. BLAMEt is measured in the year of the main events of each 
case as the details of cases may not be reported by the relevant regulatory authorities until this 
time. 
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Corporate Governance Quality in the Previous Year 
Not all companies have the same potential to experience governance changes of the same 
magnitude since the extent to which corporate governance quality may improve or deteriorate 
depends on the existing quality of governance in the company. As such, the board of a 
company with very good quality governance cannot make the same extent of improvements as 
one with very poor governance quality. However, its governance quality could deteriorate to a 
greater extent than could that of a company with poor existing governance quality. 
 Accordingly, when assessing the relationship between newspaper reporting and 
changes in corporate governance quality between two consecutive years, it is necessary to 
control for corporate governance quality in the first of those two years. This is achieved by 
including, as an explanatory variable, companies’ benchmark-adjusted corporate governance 
quality scores for the first of the two years. This ensures that changes in corporate governance 
quality are assessed relative to existing governance quality in each company. 
 
Performance 
Given that shareholder wealth depends on company performance, the need to improve 
corporate governance quality may be greater in underperforming companies than in companies 
which are performing well. Consequently, the extent of changes in corporate governance 
quality in a company may be influenced by its performance over the past year relative to its 
industry peers.  
 Accordingly, when examining changes in corporate governance quality between two 
consecutive years, t and t+1, of a TMA case, industry-adjusted performance in the first of 
those two years, t, is included as an additional explanatory variable. Industry-adjusted sales51 
is used to approximate for industry-adjusted performance. This is measured by the variable 
PERFt, which is defined as: 
 
                                                     51 Annual sales figures for each industry are sourced from Datastream (Code WC01001) and the average is determined for each industry for each year from 2000 to 2010. Company sales for a given year are adjusted by subtracting the industry average for that year from company sales and dividing this figure by the standard deviation of industry sales. 
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Company Sales in t – Average Industry Sales in t Standard Deviation of Industry Sales in t 
 
When examining the pre-event to event year change in CGQ, ‘t’ is defined as the pre-event 
year and when examining the event to post-event year change, ‘t’ is defined as the event year. 
 
Institutional Ownership 
Monitoring by institutional investors serves as a mechanism of corporate governance (Nesbitt, 
1994; Smith, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2010). Activist 
shareholders may lobby the board for changes in corporate governance quality through voting 
(Pound, 1993; Grundfest, 1993; Smith, 1996), engagement with the board (Edkins and Bush, 
2002; Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2010) and co-ordinated intervention (Edkins and Bush, 
2002; Zetzsche, 2005). Thus, changes in a company’s corporate governance quality may be 
influenced by the proportion of its shares which are owned by institutional investors.  
 The variable INSTt-1, which measures the proportion of institutional shareholdings in a 
company, is defined as the percentage of a company’s ordinary shares owned by institutional 
investors in the pre-event year. Institutional ownership is measured in the pre-event year in the 
interest of consistency as a number of companies are acquired or delisted in the subsequent 
years. 
 
It might be argued that these four additional potential determinants of corporate governance 
quality change may also influence levels of newspaper reporting to some extent. This issue is 
addressed in Chapter Seven using correlation analysis to test for significant links between 
these variables and the newspaper reporting variables employed. 
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5.12. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methodology employed in this study to investigate possible 
associations between broadsheet newspaper reporting on the operation and potential failure of 
the market for corporate control and changes in corporate governance quality in companies 
concerned. The research hypothesis has been set out and the approaches taken to examine it 
have been explained. Having introduced the research sample and the variables used to measure 
the data, the next chapter will specify the sources of each dataset, describe the manner in 
which data is collected, discuss the problems and issues encountered in collecting the data and 
explain how these issues are mitigated. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA COLLECTION 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the rationale for the selection of the sample of takeover and market 
abuse cases for use in the present study and describes the manner in which sample cases are 
identified. The process through which the sample is refined is presented. This chapter also 
describes the method of selection of the untreated sample from which the control sample is 
identified. The strategy employed to generate the newspaper data sample is discussed. The 
sources of, and methods used to collect, the corporate governance quality data are described 
along with the process of data collection for the explanatory variables. This chapter also 
addresses a number of issues encountered in collecting the data for the present study. 
 
6.2. Sample Details 
Each sample case in this study concerns an instance where an issue concerning a takeover 
offer is regulated by the Panel or an instance where a penalty is imposed by the FSA for 
market abuse. To compile a sample of cases, instances of potential and actual takeovers are 
identified from the statements issued by the Panel in the course of its supervision and 
regulation of takeover offers and instances of market abuse are identified from the final 
enforcement notices issued by the FSA following its investigation of market abuse cases. All 
statements and notices are published over the period extending from 1 January 2001 to 31 
December 2010. The study’s specific focus on this time period is discussed in Chapter One. 
These documents are obtained from the websites of the Panel52 and the FSA53.  
 From these reports, 114 takeover cases and 47 market abuse cases are identified. 
Excluding cases that fall outside the requisite time period and for which key data is missing 
yields a final sample of 136 cases (111 takeover cases and 25 market abuse cases). A 
breakdown of the research sample is provided in Table 6.1. 
  
                                                     52 http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/panel-statements [Accessed 10 December 2014]. 53 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/what/financial_crime/market_abuse/library/notices/index.shtml [Accessed 10 December 2014]. 
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Table 6.1: Takeover and Market Abuse Case Sample Refinement and Sample Breakdown  All Cases Takeover Cases Market Abuse Cases Initial sample size 154 114 40 
 Less cases commenced prior to 1 January 2001: (1) (1) (0) 
 Refined sample size: 153 113 40 
 Less companies not listed on the Main Market or the AIM of the London Stock Exchange: 
 
(17) (2) (15) 
Final sample size: 136 111 25 
   
 Only takeover and market abuse cases involving companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange’s Official List or AIM are included in the present research sample. An 
implication of the decision to focus exclusively on companies listed on these markets of the 
Exchange is that the sample of market abuse cases studied is undesirably small such that the 
validity of findings relating to market abuse cases in isolation may be impaired. While 
including companies not listed on the Main Market or the AIM of the Exchange may have 
mitigated this issue to some degree, the availability of data for such companies is limited to 
the extent that measurement of changes in corporate governance quality would not have been 
possible in all cases. Accordingly, caution is aired in inferences drawn from the findings of 
analysis of the market abuse sample in isolation.  
 
6.3. Identification of Control Sample 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the control sample is isolated from a sample of 617 UK 
listed plcs which were targeted for takeover or similar control transaction between 2001 and 
2010. This sample is identified from the Zephyr M&A database, which contains a 
comprehensive range of information on successful and failed mergers, acquisitions, 
management buyouts, institutional buyouts, initial public offerings, venture capital and private 
equity deals involving companies listed on all major international stock exchanges. It provides 
data on mergers, acquisitions and buyouts for the full ten years over which the study is set. 
The database offers an advanced search function which enables various search criteria to be 
set, including timeframe, transaction type and the exchange on which the target and bidder are 
listed.  
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 In generating a sample of takeovers and other similar control transitions from which to 
identify the control sample, a number of parameters are established before searching the 
database. The search is limited to transactions involving major transfers of control, specifically 
mergers, acquisitions, management buyouts and institutional buyouts. The search timeframe is 
set so that only deals which commenced and were completed or ultimately failed between 1 
January 2001 and 31 December 2010 are included in the search results. Finally, the search is 
limited to targets listed on the Main Market or the AIM of the London Stock Exchange.  
 The search returns a raw sample of 709 transactions. The sample is then organised by 
target company. Where the same company is the target in a number of transactions, the 
transaction of the greatest value is selected and the remaining transactions are removed from 
the sample. This step is taken in order to ensure that no company is included more than once 
in the final sample. This procedure yields a sample of 617 companies. All companies included 
in the main research sample are then removed to yield a refined sample of 481 companies. As 
noted in the previous chapter, both the Zephyr M&A database and the regulatory reports 
issued by the Takeover Panel and the FSA are consulted to ensure that all of the 481 
companies were targets in transactions which were conducted without the need for regulatory 
intervention. This analysis confirms that the final untreated sample comprises 481 companies 
which were listed on the London Stock Exchange at some point between 2001 and 2010 and 
were targets in takeover offers and other relevant control transactions that did not necessitate 
regulatory intervention. 
 Both the main research sample (the treated sample) and the untreated sample are 
combined. Companies in the main research sample are assigned a code of 1 to indicate their 
involvement with market regulators and the remaining companies are assigned a code of 0 to 
indicate that the takeover offers in which they were targets proceeded without regulatory 
intervention. As outlined in the previous chapter, these codes are used to operationalise the 
binary dependent variable REGULATEt in the binary logistic regression model presented in 
Equation 5.4. The data sources for the explanatory variables CSIZEt-1, which measures 
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company size, and INDSPt-1, which indicates the specific industrial location of companies, are 
described in Section 6.6. 
 As explained in the previous chapter, the logit regression predicts the probability of 
regulatory intervention on the basis of company size and industrial location and yields 
predicted probability or propensity scores for each company. These scores enable the nearest 
neighbour matching procedure to be executed whereby each company in the main research 
sample is matched to the company in the untreated sample which has the closest propensity 
score. This procedure yields a control sample of 136 companies which have been targets in 
takeover offers which proceeded without any need for regulatory intervention. 
 
6.4. Newspaper Data Collection 
Newspaper data collected for each case consists of reports published in the eight sample 
broadsheet newspapers between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2010. A small amount of 
reports published in 2000, which contain speculation on 2001 takeover offers, are also 
collected. Reports are sourced from the Lexis-Nexis (News and Business) database. Lexis-
Nexis provides all data published in sample newspapers over the full ten years over which the 
study is set.  
 
Search Strategy for Newspaper Reports on Takeover and Market Abuse Cases 
The Lexis-Nexis news search form is employed to search for newspaper reports for each 
sample case. The news search option enables searches to be easily executed by selecting 
appropriate combinations of search terms, newspaper sources and publication dates. The news 
search form allows five search terms to be employed at once. Various connectors may be 
chosen to link the search terms appropriately. The desired location of each search term may be 
selected, enabling searches for certain words to be restricted to specific parts of the newspaper 
report such as the headline or the lead paragraph. Searches can be limited to certain news 
topics. The range of publication dates searched may be customised by selecting a start and end 
date. Inclusion of newswires and non-business articles in the search results is optional. The 
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search form also offers ‘duplicate options’; this similarity analysis facility may be employed to 
test either for ‘highly similar’ or ‘moderately similar’ reports such that only one copy is 
returned in the results. Lexis-Nexis describes highly similar reports as those which are almost 
identical in content, while moderately similar reports are described as being relatively similar. 
The results page generated by Lexis-Nexis provides a tagging facility, whereby reports may be 
selected for inclusion in a refined result sample which may then be saved. Using this facility it 
is possible to simultaneously create and refine a sample of newspaper reports for each case. 
This section outlines the procedure followed to yield the final sample of newspaper reports, a 
map illustrating this process is provided in Figure 6.1.  
 
Stage 1: Selection of Potential Search Terms 
In order to generate newspaper reports pertaining to sample cases, keywords are extracted 
from the academic literature on the market for corporate control and from the Panel statements 
and the FSA final enforcement notices. Broadsheet newspaper reports on takeover and market 
abuse cases are generated from two separate general searches of the archives of sample 
publications over the sample timeframe using the Lexis-Nexis database. For each general 
search, just one search term is employed; the search term ‘takeover’ is employed to generate 
reports on takeovers, while the search term ‘market abuse’ is employed to generate reports on 
market abuse. Search results are organised by decreasing relevance54 and the 50 most relevant 
reports from each search are examined in order to assess the prevalence with which the key-
words extracted from the literature appear. Words and phrases commonly used in newspaper 
reporting are isolated and assembled in a database of potential terms which may be used to 
search for newspaper reports on sample cases. Search terms employed in the study are listed in 
Table 6.2.  
 
  
                                                     54 Lexis-Nexis ranks search results in terms of their relevance to the search terms entered.    
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Stage 2: Allocation of Search Terms to Cases 
For each case, the eight most appropriate search terms are selected and employed in 
conjunction with the official name of the relevant company, or a known abbreviation thereof, 
to acquire a raw sample of newspaper reports over the full course of the timeframe assigned to 
each case. The name of the company is identified from the regulatory reports. In instances 
where the company name changed over the course of the case, both names are included as 
search terms. When employing the name of the company as a search term the ‘plc’ suffix is 
excluded in order to avoid missing reports which refer to the company informally. 
 
Stage 3: Execution of Searches for Each Case 
Two separate rounds of searches are run for each case such that the company name and four 
case-specific terms are entered on each occasion. The eight newspaper publications are 
selected from the list of the available news sources. Chapter Four considers the view that 
reports which appear anywhere in a newspaper have the potential to impact on the governance 
behaviour of the firm; for this reason both business and non-business articles are studied 
herein, however newswires, which are not originally generated by the broadsheet newspaper 
media, are not considered. Consequently, in the source options, non-business articles are 
selected while newswires are not55. 
 The company name is linked to the other four search terms using the AND connector, 
while the OR connector is selected to link the remaining search terms to each other such that 
all reports contain the company name and at least one of the case-specific terms. In cases 
where an abbreviation of the company name is commonly used, the abbreviated name is also 
included as a search term, this is connected to the official name using the OR connector and 
connected to the case-specific search terms with the AND connector. On occasions where two 
forms of the company name are required as search terms a third round of searches is run so 
that all eight case-specific search terms are employed. In selecting locations in which terms  
                                                     55 It is acknowledged that many broadsheet newspaper reports are based on newswires; by choosing not to include newswires, reports which originate from newswire information are not excluded from the search results. Such reports are included in the present analysis as they contain commentary and information included by broadsheet newspaper journalists. 
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Table 6.2: Keywords Employed as Search Terms Listed below are the keywords extracted from the academic literature, regulatory reports and selected broadsheet newspaper reports on takeovers and market abuse. For each search, four appropriate terms are employed together with the official company name or a common abbreviation thereof to generate the initial newspaper reporting sample using the Lexis-Nexis news search page. Search terms are combined using the connectors ’AND’ or ‘OR’ which are provided within the search engine. 
Takeover Cases General Terms Acquire Acquisition  Attempt  Auction Battle  Bid  Break up  Buyout  Concert  Condition Consortium  Contest  Control  Deal  Director  Disclose  Friendly  Golden Handshake  Golden Parachute  Holding  Intention  LBO Leveraged Management MBO  Merge Offer  Price  Private  Privatise  Proposal  Reverse Rival Scheme of Arrangement  Share  Shareholder Statement  Suitor Takeover  Target Tender  Terms War  The Approach Approach  Bid interest  Proposal Propose Stake  Stake build 
Hostile Takeovers and Defences Block  Buyback Defence  Defend  Disposal Freeze Out Frustrate Greenmail Hostile  Knight  Oppose Poison Pill  Predator  Raid  Rebel Repurchase Tactic  Unsuccessful Takeovers Fail Lapse  Rebuff  Reject Revoke  Walk Away  Withdraw   Successful Takeovers Accept  Agree Recommend  Success   Regulation and Supervision Appeal  Deadline Jurisdiction Mandatory  Panel  Put Up or Shut Up  Stock Exchange  Threshold  Ultimatum Whitewash  Trading and Investment Terms Contracts for Difference Conversion CFD Derivative    
Incidental Terms EGM  Restructure  Restructuring  Market Abuse Cases General Terms Abuse  Analyst  Behaviour  Bet  CFD  Contracts for Difference Deal  Dealer  Dealing  Director  Disclose  Disclosure Distort  Executive  False   Founder  Holding Information  Inside  Manipulate  Manipulation  Market  Mislead  Non Public  Sensitive Share Ramping  Shares  Short Sell  Spread  Stake Tip  Trade  Trader Trading  Investigation and Regulation Financial Services Authority FSA  Investigate  Suspicion  Suspicious 
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are required to appear, the ‘anywhere’ option is chosen, such that search terms may appear 
anywhere in the report. While prior researchers have required that the company name or 
certain keywords appear in the headline (Chan, 2003) or within the first 25 words (Liu and 
McConnell, 2013) of the article, this study sets no such requirements due to concerns that 
relevant reports may be missed. For the same reason, the option to restrict searches to specific 
news topics is also not selected. 
 To avoid the occurrence of duplicate reports in the sample, the ‘high similarity’ option 
is selected. In order to avoid missing reports, those which are moderately similar are manually 
studied and the researcher’s judgement is used in deciding whether or not to include both 
reports in the refined sample.  
 Searches are run for each month of the overall case timeframe beginning on the first 
month of the ex-ante phase and ending on the last month of the ex-post phase; the appropriate 
dates defining the start and end of each month are selected using the custom date option. 
Searches are run on a monthly basis in order to ease management of results and to 
accommodate for the fact that Lexis-Nexis can return no more than 2,000 reports for each 
search.  
 For each month of the case timeframe, a search is run to yield a raw sample of 
newspaper reports which is immediately refined before proceeding to the next month. In 
refining the initial raw monthly sample, each report is read; reports which explicitly refer to 
the company’s implication in the takeover or market abuse case are tagged while those reports 
which match the search criteria for spurious reasons are excluded. The refined sample is saved 
in a file for that month of the case in question. This procedure is repeated for each month of 
the case such that a set of monthly files of reports are created for each case. 
 A second round of searches is then conducted in a similar manner using the remaining 
case-specific search terms in conjunction with the company name and any abbreviations 
thereof. In refining the second raw sample, the refined sample generated in the first round is 
consulted in order to ensure that no one report is saved twice.   
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Figure 6.1: Process of Newspaper Data Collection 
  
 
 For each month, the numbers of reports in the two refined sample sets are counted and 
the total number of relevant reports for each month recorded, these numbers are then added to 
achieve a measure of newspaper reporting for each case. For cases in which a third search is 
required to ensure all eight case-specific search terms are employed, the third result sample-set 
is treated in the same manner as the second. Systematic employment of specific and relevant 
search terms, selection of appropriate search parameters and extensive manual analysis and 
refinement of the sample yields a final sample of 14,574 newspaper reports. Table 6.3 presents 
a breakdown from the initial sample of newspaper reports to the final research sample. 
 While prior researchers have employed content analysis software packages to generate 
samples of relevant news reports (Tetlock, 2007; Caretta, Farina, Martelli, Fiordelisi and 
Schwizer, 2011), this study contends that manually reading each report offers greater certainty 
that the final sample of newspaper reports represents the majority of coverage on sample cases 
by the eight sample newspapers. 
Selection of potential search terms Allocation of 8 search terms to each case
For each case:
Search Round 1:1. 4 search terms + company name2. Conducted for each month of case3. Refinement: only relevant reports selected4. Yields set of monthly files5. Number of reports selected for each month calculated
Search Round 2:6. 4 different search terms + company name7. Steps 2-4 repeated8. Refinement: reports already selected in round 1 excluded9. Yields second set of monthly files10. Number of reports selected for each month calculated
11. Monthly measures from rounds 1 and 2 added to yield total monthly measures 12. Monthly measures added to yield a total measure for case
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Table 6.3: Newspaper Report Sample Refinement   Full Timeframe Ex-ante Phase Event Phase Ex-post Phase Initial sample size- search 1 31,740 5,449 18,636 7,655 
 Less unrelated reports (17,822) (2,752) (9,210) (5,860) 
 Refined sample size- search 1: 13,918 2,697 9,426 1,795 
 Initial sample size- search 2: 30,243 6,068 18,092 6,083 
 Less reports previously recorded (12,593) (2,476) (8,446) (1,671) 
 Less unrelated reports (17,090) (3,497) (9,279) (4,314) 
 Refined sample size- search 2: 560 95 367 98 
 Initial sample size- search 3: 2,226 296 1,659 271 
 Less reports previously counted: (1,995) (281) (1,508) (206) 
 Less unrelated reports (135) (15) (74) (46) 
 Refined sample size- search 3 96 0 77 19 
 Total refined sample size: 14,574 2,792 9,870 1,912 
  
6.5. CGQ Data Collection 
Data required to calculate the CGQ variables defined in Chapter Five for both the main 
research sample and the control sample of companies is extracted from their annual reports 
from the pre-event, event and post-event years and via Datastream. In cases where companies 
are acquired, and no longer have a website, and in cases which occur at the beginning of the 
sample period, and annual reports are no longer available on the company’s website, annual 
reports are procured from the Companies House. 
 
Final CGQ Sample 
As discussed in the previous chapter, due to the nature of both the main research sample and 
the control sample, 64 companies in the main research sample and 68 in the control sample are 
acquired in the event year and hence, do not produce annual reports for that year or the 
following year. One company in the main sample does not publish an annual report in the year 
prior to the main events as it is not admitted to listing on the London Stock Exchange until late 
in that year. Furthermore, 10 companies in the main sample and 14 in the control sample, 
which are acquired or liquidated in the year following the main events, do not produce annual 
reports for that year. Table 5.4 in the previous chapter provides a breakdown of both samples 
on the basis of the years in which CGQ data is available. 
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CGQ Data Collection Issues 
A number of issues arise in collecting the CGQ data, the first of which relates to data 
availability. As AIM companies are not strictly mandated by the London Stock Exchange to 
comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and therefore are not required to 
include a detailed corporate governance report in their annual reports, some of the CGQ data 
cannot be collected for AIM firms either due to the company’s failure to implement some of 
the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code (or, where appropriate, the Combined Code) 
or due to its decision not to disclose whether the provision has been applied.  
 Although the problem of missing CGQ data for AIM companies cannot be mitigated 
or remedied, it does not create a significant obstruction in the present study; partly due to the 
fact that there are relatively fewer AIM companies in the sample than main listed companies56 
and partly due to the prevalence of voluntary adoption of the Corporate Governance Code 
(2010) or the version of the Combined Code in place at the time. On occasions where 
companies did not include a corporate governance section in their annual reports, all possible 
efforts are made to locate the required data elsewhere in the annual reports. In such cases that 
companies simply did not report implementation or practice of one of the components of 
CGQ, it is assumed that the relevant provision is not in place and a score of zero is assigned 
for that component when evaluating CGQ. This issue arises mainly in relation to the audit 
committee components of CGQ in that a number of AIM listed companies did not establish an 
audit committee or failed to hold audit committee meetings. In the main research sample, 
scores of zero for the variables ACS and ACI are assigned to six companies in each year due 
to a failure to establish an audit committee, while scores of zero for the variable ACM are 
assigned to nine companies in the pre-event year, seven companies in the event year and seven 
companies in the post-event year due to a failure to hold audit committee meetings. In the 
control sample, scores of zero for the variables ACS and ACI are assigned to 15 companies in 
the pre-event year, seven companies in the event year and four companies in the post-event 
year due to a failure to establish an audit committee and scores of zero for the variable ACM 
                                                     56 24% of the full sample, 19% of the takeover subset and 44% of the market abuse subset is composed of AIM listed companies. 26% of the control sample is composed of AIM listed companies. 
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are assigned to 13 companies in the pre-event year, nine companies in the event year and four 
companies in the post-event year due to a failure to hold audit committee meetings. 
 A second issue, less commonly experienced in the present sample, arises on such 
occasions that companies changed their annual reporting dates over the course of the case, 
resulting in a given annual reporting year being shorter or longer than 12 months. In such 
instances, CGQ data for the event year is collected from the annual report for the time period 
during which the principle transaction occurs57 and CGQ data for the pre-event and post-event 
years is collected from the most recent annual reports published before and after this report. 
As a consequence, certain measurements of CGQ are made over time periods slightly longer 
and shorter than a year. This issue arises on two occasions, both takeover cases in the main 
sample. In the first of these two cases, the report from which the CGQ data for the pre-event 
year is collected covers a 16 month period while in the other case, the report from which the 
pre-event year CGQ data is collected covers only a six month period. In both cases, the reports 
from which the data for the event and post-event years is collected cover 12 month periods. 
While this raises concerns regarding the consistency of measures throughout the sample, it 
was deemed to be the best possible remedy for the problem which would otherwise result in 
missing observations and thus a lower generalisability of results.  
 The final issue encountered in collecting the CGQ data arises in instances where the 
main events of the TMA case occur over two annual reporting years. In such cases, the event 
year is defined as the year in which the principle TMA case transaction58 occurs.  
  
                                                     57 Defined as the year in which the takeover is completed or the offer is withdrawn or the year in which market abuse occurs. 58 The principle transaction is defined as the transaction or action which determines the outcome of the takeover or market abuse case. In takeover cases, the principle transaction is the acquisition of a company or the ultimate withdrawal of a takeover offer. In market abuse cases, the principle transaction is the final trade, signal or action which constitutes as market abuse. For takeover cases, the date of the principle transaction is identified from the statements of the Panel or from the Zephyr M&A database. For market abuse cases, it is identified from the final enforcement notices published by the FSA. 
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6.6. Data Collection for Explanatory Variables 
Data required for all additional explanatory variables included in the research model is 
obtained from the following sources:  
 
 Data required to calculate ‘Company Size’ (CSIZEt-1) 59 and ‘Industry-adjusted 
Performance’ (PERFt)60 is obtained from Datastream. 
 Information needed to operationalise the ‘Industry’ variables (INDSPt-1 and INDGENt-
1) and to calculate ‘Company Age’ (AGEt-1) is extracted from the London Stock 
Exchange historical records of listed companies via its website61. In the case of 
‘Industry’, classifications are based on the ICB System; this system is employed to 
identify the specific industry in which each sample company operates and to identify 
their general industry locations, such that sample companies may be assigned both a 
specific and a broad industry code which are used to operationalise the variables 
INDSPt-1 and INDGENt-1. 
 The data required for the classification of the ‘Takeover/Market Abuse Issue’ (ISSt) 
and to indicate ‘Responsibility for Regulatory Intervention’ (BLAMEt) is extracted 
from the same regulatory reports used to identify the sample of TMA cases. 
 The variable ‘Economic Environment’ (ECONt-1) is operationalised by extracting the 
UK GDP from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(hereinafter, the OECD) Main Economic Indicators for the first quarter of each year of 
the sample period. 
 Data required to calculate ‘Institutional Ownership’ (INSTt-1) is acquired from 
companies’ annual reports for the pre-event year. 
 
                                                     59 Datastream Code: WC02999. 60 Datastream Code: WC01001.  61 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/company-files/company-files.htm [Accessed 10 December 2014].  
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6.7. Conclusion 
Having described the research methodology in Chapter Five, this chapter has explained the 
rationale for selection of sample data and the approach taken to gather the data. It has also 
identified and addressed the issues which arise in data collection. The next chapter presents 
the results of analysis of this data and those achieved from investigating the research 
hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings when the research methodology defined in Chapters Five 
and Six is applied to the data. More specifically, results from descriptive statistical testing and 
multivariate analysis for the research model employed in the study, which includes hypothesis 
testing, are presented. Further tests of robustness and sensitivity are also presented as a means 
of triangulation of findings and yielding further insights from the data.  
 
7.2. Descriptive Statistics 
7.2.1. Sample Demographics 
Table 7.1 presents an analysis of sample takeover and market abuse cases and the issues which 
they involve for each year of the sample period. The data reports that the vast majority of the 
sample comprises takeover cases (111 cases of a total of 136). This is to be expected since 
market abuse is legally prohibited. Findings report the highest amount of takeover cases occur 
from 2006 to 2008 and the fewest in 200162. A plausible explanation for this increase is the 
assumption of statutory powers by the Panel in 2006.  
 In terms of market abuse cases, Table 7.1 identifies that the highest number occurs in 
2002 and 2003, the initial years of FSMA, and become less prevalent thereafter. It may be 
reasonable to assume that this decline could be attributed to a growing recognition of the 
potential penalties associated with market abuse as the sanctions associated with FSMA began 
to serve as a deterrent from 2004 onwards, possibly even more so with the implementation of 
MAD in 2005. As outlined in Table 7.1, there are fewer than four market abuse cases per year 
from 2005 onward, consistent with the improvement in market cleanliness from 2005 reported 
by the FCA (2013) as noted in Chapter Two. 
                                                     62 It should be noted that the frequency of cases at beginning of the sample period is lower as cases which have already commenced prior to 1 January 2001 are excluded from the research sample.  
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Table 7.1: Analysis of Takeover and Market Abuse Issues Per Annum 
The variable ISSt identifies the primary issue which necessitates regulatory intervention in takeover and market abuse cases. The years listed below refer to the year of the takeover, the year in which the offer is withdrawn, or the year in which market abuse takes place. 
 Takeover Issues Market Abuse Issues  ISSt: 1 2 3 4  5 6 7  Year (t) Timing Information, disclosure and transparency 
Treatment of shareholders Restrictions on dealings Total Takeover Cases 
Improper disclosure/misuse of information 
Insider Dealing Market Manipulation Total Market Abuse Cases 
Total TMA Cases 
2001 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
2002 2 0 1 0 3 0 4 1 5 8 
2003 1 2 8 1 12 2 3 1 6 18 
2004 2 2 8 0 12 0 3 1 4 16 
2005 1 0 9 0 10 0 2 0 2 12 
2006 1 2 11 1 15 0 1 0 1 16 
2007 0 0 16 0 16 1 1 0 2 18 
2008 1 5 11 0 17 0 2 1 3 20 
2009 2 2 9 0 13 0 2 0 2 15 
2010 1 1 8 1 11 0 0 0 0 11 
Total 11 14 83 3 111 3 18 4 25 136 
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 Table 7.2 provides details of the takeover offers included in the main research sample. 
There are a number of notable observations. Firstly, the sample is almost equally split between 
successful and unsuccessful offers. Secondly, around 25% of the sample consists of hostile 
offers. Thirdly, of the companies that have survived the takeover attempt, the vast majority 
remained independent for two years. Fourthly, the average percentage premium offered is just 
over 27% which is in line with prior UK research (Barnes, 1998; Martynova and Renneboog, 
2011) and roughly at the same level reported for the 1990s (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 
2001). Finally, the majority of cases in the sample involve all-cash offers while only 10 
involve all-share offers, two of which are successful. This perhaps reflects the requirements of 
the mandatory bid rule and the squeeze and sell-out rules that offers be made in cash or 
accompanied by a cash alternative. 
                                                     63 Any combination of cash, equity or debt. 
Table 7.2: Takeover Sample Overview Presented below are characteristics of the sample of takeover offers studied (n = 111). Data is extracted from the Zephyr M&A database. For cases where the offer premium and method of payment is not available from the Zephyr M&A database, the relevant data is obtained from selected sample newspaper reports. 
  (n) (%) Outcome of offers 
 Successful offers 57 51.40 Unsuccessful offers 54 48.60 
 Nature of offers 
 Hostile offers 27 24.32 Friendly offers 84 75.68 
 Fate of targets of unsuccessful offers 
 Remain independent for 2 years following offer 45 83.33 Acquired/dissolved within two years of offer 9 16.67 
 Offer premium (%) 
  Successful offers 
 
Unsuccessful offers All offers 
Mean 35.29 19.55 27.35 Std. dev. 44.41 48.49 46.97 Min. -34.66 -97.54 -97.54 Max. 233.33 268.26 268.26 
 Method of payment 
  Effective method of payment (successful offers) 
Proposed/anticipated method of payment (unsuccessful offers) 
 
Effective/proposed/anticipated method of payment (all offers) 
 (n) (%) (n) (%) (n) (%) 
 Cash 35 61.40 31 57.41 66 59.50 Equity 2 3.51 8 14.81 10 9.00 Mixed63 19 33.33 9 16.67 28 25.20 Not Disclosed 1 1.76 6 11.11 7 6.30 
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 Table 7.3 presents an analysis of the Rules of the Code and subsections of FSMA 
applied in the present research sample. The vast majority of takeover cases (74.78%) concern 
the application by the Panel of rules which concern the treatment of target shareholders. A 
small proportion of takeover cases (2.70%) involve regulation of restricted dealings64. The 
findings in Table 7.3 also report that within the market abuse subset, 72% of cases concern 
insider dealing, 12% concern improper disclosures and misuse of information and the 
remaining 16% concern market manipulation. The relatively higher number of insider dealing 
cases may be an indication that insider dealing may be justified more readily by the offender. 
Alternatively, it may be because it is easier to regulate in comparison to market manipulation, 
which due to its complex nature (Siems, 2008), can be difficult to detect and prove.  
 An analysis is also performed in order to assess the extent to which responsibility for 
these issues lies with the boards of sample companies. The results, presented in the last six 
columns of Table 7.3, reveal that responsibility tends not to lie with the boards of companies 
in the present research sample. In the majority of cases, the bidding company or, in market 
abuse cases, a stock market participant who is not a member of management or the board has 
created the need for regulatory intervention. In terms of the takeover subset, relatively fewer 
issues concerning timing or treatment of shareholders have arisen due to the actions of the 
target company. Relatively more issues concerning information, disclosure and transparency 
and restricted dealings are attributable to the target board. More blame for market abuse cases 
lies with the boards of sample companies which are responsible for two thirds of improper 
disclosure cases, one half of market manipulation cases and almost 40% of insider dealing 
cases. 
  
                                                     64 It is possible that cases where Rule 4 of the Takeover Code is applied may also require investigation and regulation by the FSA; however, in the present sample, the takeover cases which involved the application of Rule 4 were not restricted under Section 118 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  
202  
Table 7.3: Analysis of the Sample by Takeover and Market Abuse Issue   
Presented below is an analysis of (A) the Rules of the Code and subsections of FSMA applied in the present research sample and (B) the extent to which responsibility for application of these rules and provisions lies with the boards of sample companies. Part A lists (i) the number of cases where each rule or provision is applied, (ii) the proportion of the full sample of cases which these figures account for and (ii) the proportions of each sample subset which these figures account for. Part B lists, for each rule or provision, (i) the number and percentage of cases where responsibility for application of the rule or provision lies with the board of a company in the research sample, together with the percentage of the full sample of cases this figure accounts for and (ii) the number and percentage of cases where responsibility for application of the rule or provision lies with the bidding company or another party, together with the percentage of the full sample of cases this figure accounts for.  A: Regulatory Issues (ISSt)   B: Responsibility for Issue (BLAMEt)         Target Board/Management   Bidder/Other Party  ISSt Description n % % Subset   n % Issue  % Total    n % Issue 
 
% Total  
Takeover Issues 111 81.62     25 22.50 18.38   86 77.50 63.24 1 Timing 11 8.09 9.91   3 27.27 2.21   8 72.73 5.88 
2 Information, disclosure and transparency 14 10.29 12.61   8 57.14 5.88   6 42.86 4.41 
3 Treatment of shareholders 83 61.03 74.78   12 14.46 8.82   71 85.54 52.21 
4 Restrictions on dealings 3 2.21 2.70 
 
  2 66.67 1.47   1 33.33 0.74 
Market Abuse Issues 25 18.38    11 44.00 8.09   14 56.00  10.29 5 Improper disclosure/misuse of information 3 2.20 12.00   2 66.67 1.47   1 33.33 0.74 
6 Insider dealing 18 13.24 72.00   7 38.89 5.15   11 61.11 8.09 
7 Market manipulation 4 2.94 16.00   2 50.00 1.47   2 50.00 
 
1.47 
Total: 136     36  26.50   100  73.50  
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 Table 7.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the age, size and percentage 
institutional ownership of companies in the whole sample and the takeover and market abuse 
subsets. Results illustrate that companies involved in takeover cases are significantly larger 
and older than those involved in market abuse cases. The greater average age of companies in 
the takeover sample is consistent with the conjecture that older firms are more vulnerable to 
takeover, as their businesses decline (Davis and Stout, 1992; Loderer, Neusser and Waelchili, 
2009). The smaller size of companies in the market abuse subset reflects the greater 
proportionate representation of AIM listed companies in the market abuse subset. As 
mentioned previously, the securities of smaller companies may be more susceptible to market 
abuse as pricing efficiency reduces with company size (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The 
results also show that the percentage of institutional ownership of companies involved in 
takeover cases is significantly larger. The smaller average institutional shareholdings in the 
market abuse subset is consistent with the argument that forms of market abuse such as 
opportunistic insider dealing are more likely to occur when there is a lack of strong internal 
monitoring by parties such as institutional investors (Dai, Fu, Kang and Lee, 2013). 
 
Table 7.4: Sample Demographics: Age (AGEt-1), Size (CSIZEt-1) and Institutional Ownership (INSTt-1) 
 Descriptive Statistics 
  Whole Sample (n=136) Takeovers (n=111) Market Abuse (n=25) 
 CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 INSTt-1 CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 INSTt-1 CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 
 
INSTt-1 
Mean  12.65 15.50 33.64 13.02 16.54 35.45 11.02 10.90 25.63 Std.Dev. 2.20 17.33 17.24 2.07 17.70 16.85 2.08 15.04 16.96 Min  5.31 0.00 0.00 7.96 0.00 0.00 5.31 0.50 0.00 Max 18.00 66.75 73.67 18.00 66.75 73.67 14.27 51.67 
 
69.20 
Tests for differences between Takeover and Market Abuse Sample Subsets 
  CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 
 
INSTt-1 
Independent Samples t 4.37 - -2.63 Significance (0.000)*** - (0.010)** Mann-Whitney Z - 2.28 - Significance - (0.023)** 
 
- 
Variable Definitions 
 AGEt-1: Company age, measured as the number of years from the date on which the company’s ordinary shares were first admitted to the listing on the relevant stock markets to the date on which newspaper reporting begins CSIZEt-1: Company size, measured as ln (total fixed assets in the pre-event year) INSTt-1: Proportion of institutional ownership of the company, measured as the percentage of a company’s ordinary shares owned by institutional investors in the pre-event year 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level 
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 Table 7.5 presents the descriptive statistics for and the results of statistical tests for 
differences in company size in the main research sample and the control sample. These results 
illustrate the success of the nearest neighbour matching procedure. Companies in both samples 
are, on average, of a similar size and the results of a Mann-Whitney test indicate that there is 
no statistically significant difference in the sizes of companies in the two samples.  
 
Table 7.5: Company Size (CSIZEt-1) in the Main Research Sample and in the Control Sample 
 Descriptive Statistics   Main Research Sample (n=136)  Control Sample  (n=136) 
 Mean  12.65  12.19 Std. dev. 2.20  2.50 Min  5.31  4.15 Max 18.00  18.43 
 Tests for differences in Company Size between Main Research and Control Samples 
 Mann-Whitney Z -0.77 Significance (0.441) 
 Definition for CSIZEt-1: Company size, measured as ln (total fixed assets in the pre-event year)  
 Table 7.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the industry-adjusted performance, as 
measured by industry-adjusted sales, for the main research sample and for the individual 
takeover and market abuse subsets thereof. Results illustrate that, by industry standards, the 
performance of companies involved in takeover cases is significantly better than that of 
companies involved in market abuse cases. The superior performance observed in the takeover 
subset may be attributable to the larger average size of companies in this subset. As noted, a 
greater proportion of companies in the market abuse subset are listed on the AIM and hence, it 
might be expected that the annual sales of these smaller, growing companies would be below 
the industry average. While the performance of the average company in the takeover subset 
improves each year, that of the average company in the market abuse subset deteriorates. It is 
possible that the deteriorating performance of companies in the market abuse subset may 
trigger changes in board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) or an increase in board 
activity (Vafeas, 1999) and hence, lead to an improvement in corporate governance quality. 
This possibility is investigated in Section 7.4. 
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Table 7.6: Industry-adjusted Performance for the Pre-event, Event and Post-event Years (PERFt-1, PERFt and PERFt+1) 
  Descriptive Statistics  Full Sample   Takeovers  Market Abuse  PERFt-1  
 
PERFt  PERFt+1   PERFt-1  PERFt  PERFt +1  PERFt-1  PERFt  PERFt +1 
n = 135  
 
n = 72  n = 62   n = 110  n = 54 n = 46  n = 25  n = 18 n = 16 
Mean  0.44 0.38 0.57  0.60 0.61 0.89  -0.28 -0.30 -0.37 Std.Dev. 2.66 2.45 2.75  2.92 2.79 3.13  0.23 0.18 0.10 Min  -0.96 -1.01 -0.63  -0.96 -1.01 -0.63  -0.52 -0.47 -0.54 Max 22.58 13.94 15.06  22.58 13.94 15.06  0.37 
 
0.28 0.22 
Tests for Differences  Full Sample   Takeovers   Market Abuse  Pre-Event vs. Event Year      Wilcoxon’s Z 1.08  1.25  -0.50 Significance (0.280) 
 
 (0.215)  (0.617) 
Event vs. Post-Event Year      Wilcoxon’s Z 0.36  1.16  -0.36 Significance (0.718) 
 
 (0.246)  (0.718) 
Pre-Event vs. Post-Event Year      Wilcoxon’s Z -1.24  -1.15  -1.27 Significance (0.215) 
 
 (0.250)  (0.212) 
Takeover vs. Market Abuse Subset 
 
PERFt-1  PERFt   PERFt+1 
Mann-Whitney Z 2.83  4.21   4.48 Significance (0.005)***   (0.001)***   (0.001)*** 
Variable Definitions: PERFt-1: Industry-adjusted performance in the pre-event year, measured as: (Company Sales in Pre-Event Year – Average Industry Sales in Pre-Event Year)/Standard Deviation of Industry Sales in Pre-Event Year; PERFt: Industry-adjusted performance in the event year, measured as: (Company Sales in Event Year – Average Industry Sales in Event Year)/Standard Deviation of Industry Sales in Event Year; PERFt+1: Industry-adjusted performance in the post-event year, measured as: (Company Sales in Post-Event Year – Average Industry Sales in Post-Event Year)/Standard Deviation of Industry Sales in Post-Event Year 
 *** Significant at the 1% level 
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 Table 7.7 presents an overview of sample companies categorised by general industry 
code. The oil, gas, materials and industrials industries and the consumer goods and services 
industries account for the vast majority of sample firms comprising 39% and 36.8% of the 
sample respectively. Consumer goods and services companies are most strongly represented in 
the takeover subset of the sample, with almost 38% of takeover cases involving companies 
located in this general industry. The apparent vulnerability of consumer goods and services 
companies to takeover over the sample period may reflect challenges within the industry in the 
UK due to a trend of high imports of consumer goods into the UK in the years prior to 2008 
(UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012). The high proportion of takeover 
cases which involve oil, gas, materials and industrials companies may be due to fluctuating 
values of companies in these industries caused by changes in the prices of oil, gas and other 
commodities being reflected in share price (Sadorsky, 2001). No companies from the health 
care industry occur in the takeover subset of the sample; this may be explained by the growth 
experienced and sustained in the UK life sciences industry in the past decade (UK Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010).  
 Sixty per cent of market abuse cases involve companies from the oil, gas, materials 
and industrials industries. Since market abuse, such as insider dealing, can occur at times of 
high share price volatility (Meulbroek, 1992), it might be expected that a high proportion of 
market abuse cases occur in the oil and gas industries where share price fluctuations arise 
quite regularly as explained above. No instances of market abuse are observed in the 
technology, telecommunications or financial services industries. While reasons for this may be 
spurious, the low incidence of market abuse involving securities of financial services 
companies might be attributed to the specific regulatory focus on financial services companies 
in the UK as a consequence of FSMA. 
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Table 7.7: Analysis of Sample by General Industry (INDGENt-1) and Subsector 
  Whole Sample Takeovers Market Abuse 
  n=136 n=111 n=25 
   n (%)  n (%)  n (%) 
INDGENt-1: Oil, Gas, Materials and Industrials  53 (39.0)  38 (34.2)  15 (60.0) 
 Subsectors: Mining and Drilling    18 (13.2)  11 (9.9)  7 (28.0)  Engineering and Machinery  12 (8.8)  10 (9.0)  2 (8.0)  Transportation  5 (3.7)  4 (3.6)  1 (4.0)  Construction  5 (3.7)  4 (3.6)  1 (1.0)  Other  13 (9.6)  9 (8.1)  4 (16.0) 
 INDGENt-1: Consumer Goods and Services    50 (36.8)  42 (37.8)  8 (32.0)  Subsectors: Retail  14 (10.3)  12 (10.8)  2 (8.0)  Food and Beverage  11 (8.1)  9 (8.1)  2 (8.0)  Logistics  2 (1.5)  2 (1.8)  0 (0.0)  Media and Publishing  16 (11.8)  14 (12.6)  2 (8.0)  Leisure and Tourism     7 (5.1)  5 (4.5)  2 (8.0)  INDGENt-1: Health Care    1 (0.7)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.0) 
 Subsectors: Biotechnology     1 (0.7)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.0) 
 INDGENt-1: Telecommunications and Technology  8 (5.9)  8 (7.2)  0 (0.0)  Subsectors: Telecommunications  3 (2.2)  3 (2.7)  0 (0.0)  Software and Computer Services  5 (3.7)  5 (4.5)  0 (0.0) 
 INDGENt-1: Utilities  4 (2.9)  3 (2.7)  1 (4.0) 
 Subsectors: Water  3 (2.2)  2 (1.8)  1 (4.0)  Electricity  1 (0.7)  1 (0.9)  0 (0.0) 
 INDGENt-1: Financials  20 (14.7)  20 (18.8)  0 (0.0) 
 Subsectors: Real Estate  9 (6.6)  9 (8.1)  0 (0.0)  Insurance  4 (2.9)  4 (3.6)  0 (0.0)  Banking and Investment  5 (3.7)  5 (4.5)  0 (0.0)  Other  2 (1.5)  2 (1.8)  0 (0.0) 
  
 Table 7.8 provides a breakdown of the main research sample and the control sample 
of companies on the basis of their broad and specific industry locations, as measured by the 
variables INDGENt-1 and INDSPt-1 respectively. This breakdown also illustrates that the 
nearest neighbour matching technique has been successfully applied to the extent that the 
industry distribution of the main sample and the control sample is quite similar. There are 
fewer control sample companies in certain industries particularly in the consumer services 
industry and slightly more in others such as the financial industry; however, manual analysis 
of companies which are not matched with companies from the same industry reveals that their 
matches are located in neighbouring industries. 
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 The application of variables which gauge economic environment in the sample yields 
results which are presented in Table 7.9. As this table reports, the GDP for the UK increased 
steadily from 2001 to 2008. GDP declined in 2009, consistent with global trends (OECD, 
2010). This is followed by an increase in 2010. Chapter Four considers the view that a change 
in economic conditions may affect the landscape for investment in a country and place 
corporate performance and the concerns of shareholders and broader stakeholders higher on 
the public agenda (Doyle, 2006). Thus, it is possible that the economic contraction toward the 
end of the sample period may have led to increased newspaper scrutiny on directors’ 
behaviour and investor protection. 
 
  
Table 7.8: Overview of the Main Research Sample and the Control Sample by Industry     Main Research Sample (n=136) 
 Control Sample (n=136) 
    n (%)  n (%) INDGENt-1: Oil, Gas Materials and Industrials  53 (39.1)  55 (40.5) INDSPt-1: Oil and Gas  13 (9.7)  10 (7.4)  Basic Materials  10 (7.4)  15 (11.0)  Industrials  30 (22.1)  30 (22.1) 
 INDGENt-1: Consumer Goods and Services  50 (36.7)  45 (33.1) INDSPt-1: Consumer Goods   7 (5.1)  7 (5.1)  Consumer Services  43 (31.6)  38 (28.0) 
 INDGENt-1: Health Care  1 (0.7)  1 (0.7) INDSPt-1: Health Care   1 (0.7)  1 (0.7) 
 INDGENt-1: Telecommunications and Technology  8 (5.8)  8 (5.8) INDSPt-1: Telecommunications  5 (3.7)  4 (2.9)  Technology  3 (2.1)  4 (2.9) 
 INDGENt-1: Utilities  4 (2.9)  1 (0.7) INDSPt-1: Utilities  4 (2.9)  1 (0.7) 
 INDGENt-1: Financials  20 (14.7)  26 (19.2) INDSPt-1: Financials  20 (14.7)  26 (19.2) 
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Table 7.9: Analysis of Sample by Economic Environment (ECONt-1) 
 Year GDP (£billions) ECONt-1 [Ln(GDP)] Total TMA Cases  Takeover Cases  Market Abuse Cases 
  (n= 136)  (n= 111)  (n= 25) 
    n %  n %  n % 
 2001 990.70 27.62 10 7.35  5 4.53  5 20.00 
2002 1,037.30 27.67 18 13.24  12 10.81  6 24.00 
2003 1,100.50 27.73 16 11.76  12 10.81  4 16.00 
2004 1,158.00 27.78 12 8.82  10 9.00  2 8.00 
2005 1,211.20 27.82 16 11.76  15 13.51  1 4.00 
2006 1,288.20 27.88 18 13.24  16 14.41  2 8.00 
2007 1,385.10 27.96 20 14.71  17 15.32  3 12.00 
2008 1,445.10 28.00 15 11.03  13 11.70  2 8.00 
2009 1,396.50 27.96 7 5.15  7 6.31  0 0.00 
2010 1,456.30 28.01 4 2.94  4 3.60  0 0.00 
  
7.2.2. Newspaper Reporting 
Table 7.10 presents a breakdown of newspaper reporting on sample cases over the ten year 
period studied. As noted in Chapter Six, a small amount of reports published in 2000, which 
contain speculation on 2001 takeover offers, are also collected. Clearly, takeover cases receive 
remarkably more newspaper coverage than market abuse cases in each year. It is likely that 
this difference is most attributable to the greater public availability of information on 
takeovers than on instances of market abuse as discussed in Chapter Four.  
 There is a marked increase in newspaper reporting on both takeover cases and market 
abuse cases in 2003. The amount of coverage on takeover cases continues to increase over the 
following two years while reporting on market abuse cases declines, consistent with the 
decline in market abuse activity reported in Table 7.1. It is interesting to note the high level of 
coverage devoted to takeover cases in 2007. This may indicate that the granting of statutory 
powers to the Panel in 2006 resulted in takeover offers being considered an issue of greater 
public importance.  
 In contrast, newspaper reporting on market abuse cases increases consistently from 
2008 despite the decline in the incidence of market abuse indicated in Table 7.1. This 
deviation arises due to the more dispersed nature of newspaper reporting on market abuse  
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Table 7.10: Newspaper Reporting on Takeover and Market Abuse Cases 2000-2010 
Year No. Newspaper Reports on Sample Cases 
No. Reports on Takeover Cases 
Average No. Reports per Takeover Case 
No. Reports on Market Abuse Cases 
Average No. Reports per Market Abuse Case 
2000 33 33 33.00 0 0 2001 414 414 138.00 0 0 2002 313 286 20.43 27 6.75 2003 1,305 1,193 62.63 112 11.20 2004 1,525 1,443 80.17 82 8.20 2005 2,189 2,128 92.52 61 5.55 2006 1,526 1,515 65.70 11 2.75 2007 2,462 2,457 111.68 5 1.67 2008 2,142 2,107 81.04 35 2.92 2009 1,335 1,282 61.05 53 4.42 2010 1,330 1,263 84.20 67 5.58 
Full Sample Period 14,574 14,121 127.22 453 18.12  
cases. Unlike takeover cases which tend to reach a conclusion within a number of months, the 
investigations which follow the incidence of market abuse may take some years to complete 
such that the offenders are often not penalised until a number of years later. Consequently, 
newspaper reporting on market abuse cases often extends for a number of years, with the 
effect that many of those reports published in later years of the sample period pertain to cases 
where the actual abuses take place in earlier years. 
 As alluded to above, it is possible that the contraction in the national economy in 2009 
may have led to an increase in newspaper attention on issues of corporate performance and the 
interests of investors and broader company stakeholders. At the aggregate level, this does not 
appear to be the case as newspaper reporting on both types of cases begins to decline in 2007. 
Newspaper reporting on market abuse cases does increase in 2009 and again in 2010; 
however, this coverage focuses on cases from earlier years. With regard to takeover cases, the 
average number of reports per case is lower in 2009 than in 2008. It does however increase in 
2010. In fact, Table 7.10 may not reflect the full level of newspaper reports regarding takeover 
offers published in 2010, as reports which may speculate 2011 offers are not considered 
herein. Thus, economic performance may have somewhat of a delayed impact on the extent of 
newspaper reporting on issues and events in the corporate environment, specifically, the 
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operation and breakdown of the market for corporate control and the associated implications 
for shareholders and more peripheral stakeholders. On the other hand, given that economic 
performance does not suffer dramatically in 2009, it may be the case that there is little effect 
on levels of newspaper reporting. The degree to which macroeconomic performance explains 
newspaper reporting on takeover and market abuse cases is examined further in Section 7.4. 
 
a. Newspaper Reporting over Individual Case Timeframes 
Table 7.11 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed to measure newspaper 
reporting over the individual timeframes assigned to sample cases. Results show that in both 
takeover and market abuse cases, there is significantly more newspaper reporting over the 
event phase65 than over the ex-ante66 and ex-post phases67. For takeover cases, there is 
significantly more newspaper reporting over the ex-ante phase of cases than that over the ex-
post phase. In contrast, there is significantly more newspaper reporting over the ex-post phase 
of market abuse cases than over the ex-ante phase. In fact, there is no newspaper reporting on 
market abuse cases over the ex-ante phase. These initial results are perhaps not surprising 
given that market abuse cannot be predicted or speculated upon while rumours often precede 
takeover offers (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989).   
 Table 7.11 also reveals that newspaper reporting on takeover cases is significantly 
greater than that on market abuse cases over the full course of the case and over each phase 
thereof. As noted, the absence of coverage observed over the ex-ante phase of market abuse 
cases is attributed to the likelihood that there is no indication of the intention to commit 
market abuse. The smaller amount of coverage of market abuse cases over the event phase is 
likely to be due to the tendency for corporate crime to be concealed by the parties involved, 
making it difficult to detect (Miller, 2006). In contrast, in the event phase of takeovers, the  
 
                                                     65 Defined in takeover cases as the time period from the date on which a possible offer is announced to the date on which the takeover is completed or the offer is withdrawn and in market abuse cases as the period from the date on which prohibited behaviour begins to the date on which the final penalty is imposed on the offenders by the FSA. 66 Defined as the six month period prior to the event phase. 67 Defined as the six month period following the event phase. 
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Table 7.11: Newspaper Reporting over Individual Case Timeframes: Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Tests for Differences 
 Descriptive statistics for the variables employed to measure newspaper reporting over the full timeframes of sample cases (NPRfull) and over the ex-ante (NPRex-ante), event (NPRevent) and ex-post (NPRex-post) phases.  
   NPRfull NPRex-ante NPRevent NPRex-post  Full Sample (n= 136) 
 
Mean 3.60 1.45 3.26 1.43 
Std. Dev. 1.60 1.72 1.54 1.46 
Takeover Subset (n= 111) Mean 3.84 1.78 3.45 1.59 
Std. Dev. 1.64 1.75 1.59 1.52 
Market Abuse Subset  
(n= 25) 
Mean 2.52 0.00 2.39 0.69 
Std. Dev. 0.84 0.00 0.87 0.81 
Comparisons of the volumes of reports published in each phase of cases.  
  Full Sample Takeovers  Market Abuse  
 NPRex-ante vs. NPRevent 
 
Wilcoxon Z - 7.97 4.37 
Significance - (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Paired Samples t -13.67 - - 
Significance (0.001)*** - - 
NPRevent vs. NPRex-post 
 
Wilcoxon Z - 8.59 4.30 
Significance - (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Paired Samples t 17.26 - - 
Significance (0.001)*** - - 
 NPRex-ante vs. NPRex-post 
 
Wilcoxon Z - 1.38 -3.16 
Significance - (0.168) (0.002)*** 
Paired Samples t 0.29 - - 
Significance (0.770) - - 
Comparisons of the newspaper reporting between the takeover and market abuse sample subsets.    NPRfull NPRex-ante NPRevent NPRex-post  Mann-Whitney Z  4.21 4.48 - 2.60 
Significance (0.001)*** (0.001)*** - (0.009)*** 
Independent Samples t - - 3.22 - 
Significance - - (0.001)*** - 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
identity and intentions of offerors must be disclosed at the beginning of the offer period under 
Rule 2 of the Code.  
 The difference in the amount of newspaper reporting between takeover and market 
abuse cases is smallest in the ex-post phase. At this stage in market abuse cases, some 
information on the incidence of the abuse will be publically available, as regulatory 
investigations take place. Nonetheless, it may be the case that certain information will remain 
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confidential until penalties are imposed on the perpetrators. In takeover cases, the actions of 
the management and directors of the offeror and offeree companies are publically observable 
over the ex-post phase. The greater amount of coverage of takeover cases in the ex-post phase 
might also be because the post-event developments in takeover cases may be considered more 
newsworthy by the mainstream newspaper media. Although market abuse represents an 
injustice to shareholders and may be considered to have real consequences for the investment 
community and possibly macro-economic development, takeovers, particularly successful 
takeovers, have direct implications for members of the general public such as the offeree’s 
employees and customers (Coffee, 1988; Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Slinger and Deakin, 
1999; Deakin, 2005). While takeover cases clearly receive more newspaper coverage than 
market abuse cases, un-tabulated results of a frequency analysis on the variable NPRfull shows 
that while all market abuse cases appear in the newspaper media on at least one occasion, four 
takeover cases (3.6%) receive no coverage at all. Thus, while some takeover offers may not be 
considered newsworthy, possibly due to the low visibility of the target company or because 
the offer went unopposed or did not involve a large premium, all market abuse cases are 
deemed to be of sufficient import to make it into the press. 
 
b. Annual Newspaper Reporting 
To facilitate statistical testing, newspaper data requires annualization. Results presented in 
Table 7.12, shed some further insight into the nature of newspaper reporting on takeover and 
market abuse cases by focusing on the specific three years over which corporate governance 
quality is measured. Results show that newspaper reporting on takeover cases is significantly 
greater than that on market abuse cases in the pre-event and event years. Consistent with 
observations made above, there is almost no newspaper coverage on market abuse cases in the 
pre-event year68. The relatively larger mean value reported for the takeover subset indicates 
that there is considerable media speculation on takeovers in the pre-event year. The greatest  
  
                                                     68 Defined as the year prior to the completion of a takeover or withdrawal of the offer or the year prior to the incidence of market abuse. 
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Table 7.12: Newspaper Reporting by Year: Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Tests for Differences Descriptive statistics on newspaper reports published in the pre-event year (NPRt-1), the event year (NPRt) and the post-event year (NPRt+1).  
  NPRt-1 NPRt NPRt+1  Full Sample (n= 136) Mean 0.97 2.99 0.90 
Std. Dev. 1.61 1.86 1.37 
Takeover Subset (n= 111) Mean 1.18 3.45 0.84 
Std. Dev. 1.72 1.72 1.42 
Market Abuse Subset  (n= 25) Mean 0.07 0.95 1.17 Std. Dev. 0.25 0.85 1.13 
Comparisons of the volumes of reports published in each year of cases.  
  Full Sample Takeovers  Market Abuse  
 NPRt-1 vs. NPRt Wilcoxon Z -8.14 -7.52 -3.47 
Significance (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
NPRt vs. NPRt+1 Wilcoxon Z 8.51 8.65 -0.58 
Significance (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.562) 
NPRt-1 vs. NPRt+1 Wilcoxon Z 0.52 -1.64 3.54 
Significance (0.603) (0.101) (0.001)***  
Comparisons of the newspaper reporting for each year between the takeover and market abuse sample subsets.  
  NPRt-1 NPRt NPRt+1  Mann-Whitney Z  2.61 -5.92 -2.20 
Significance (0.009)*** (0.001)*** (0.028)** 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level   
amount of newspaper reporting on takeover cases is observed in the event year69. This again 
illustrates the ease with which the newspaper media can report on takeovers in a timely 
manner. The most coverage on market abuse cases is observed in the post-event year70. This 
may be explained by the difficulties experienced by business journalists in the UK in 
conducting investigations (Doyle, 2006; Tambini, 2008). The barriers to investigative 
journalism, discussed in Chapter Four, may mean that even if journalists harbour suspicions 
regarding market abuse, they may be reluctant to publish these suspicions until they are 
confirmed, for example, by the commencement of regulatory investigations. Indeed, it may 
take a number of years before the identity of those parties who engage in market abuse is 
                                                     69 Defined as the year in which the takeover is completed or the offer is withdrawn or the year in which market abuse occurs. 70 Defined as the year following the completion of a takeover or withdrawal of the offer or the year following the incidence of market abuse. 
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reported in the newspaper media due to the confidential nature of investigations and the risk 
facing journalists that legal action may be taken against them for defamation. 
 
7.2.3. Corporate Governance Quality  
Analysis of corporate governance quality is performed in five stages. Figure 5.1 in Chapter 
Five presents a general outline of the process of analysis. Figure 7.1 depicts this process in 
greater detail. 
 
Figure 7.1: Analysis of Corporate Governance Quality 
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Presented below are the findings of both descriptive statistics and tests for differences in the 
data when examining corporate governance quality. To allow for a more meaningful 
assessment of CGQ in the sample, both forms of analysis are conducted for both the total 
CGQ scores and each of the ten components thereof. By approaching the analysis in this 
manner, it is possible to shed insight into the specific aspects of the board deemed to be of 
high and low quality and to identify where the biggest changes in quality occur.  
 As discussed in Chapter Five, the control sample of companies which are targeted for 
takeover, but do not encounter direct regulatory intervention over the course of the offer, is 
employed to facilitate analysis of CGQ in the present study. The quality of corporate 
governance in the control sample, which is matched to the main research sample by company 
size and industry, is also measured in order to establish a benchmark of CGQ. The CGQ 
scores assigned to companies in the main research sample are benchmark-adjusted so that any 
influence their involvement with the regulatory authorities may have on their CGQ scores is 
accounted for. This procedure seeks to ensure that the scores assigned to sample companies 
provide an accurate indication of the quality of their governance which is reflective of their 
size and the industries in which they are situated. Accordingly, this section also evaluates 
CGQ in the control sample and examines differences in CGQ between the control sample and 
the main sample. Descriptive statistics for, and the results of statistical tests for differences in, 
both the unadjusted and adjusted CGQ scores of sample companies are considered.  
 Tables 7.13 to 7.19 present the descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics for the 
unadjusted CGQ scores and changes therein are presented in Tables 7.13, 7.14 and 7.15 for the 
main research sample and the individual takeover and market abuse subsets respectively. 
Table 7.14 also presents separate pre-event year statistics for the individual segments of the 
takeover subset which (i) are acquired and (ii) survive the takeover attempt so as to facilitate 
an enhanced understanding of how CGQ scores differ between the two segments and how 
scores in companies which overcome the threat of takeover change over the following years. 
Table 7.16 presents the descriptive statistics for the total and component CGQ scores and 
changes therein in the control sample. Finally, descriptive statistics for the benchmark-
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adjusted CGQ scores and changes therein are presented in Tables 7.17, 7.18 and 7.19 for full 
research sample and the takeover and market abuse subsets respectively.    
 Tables 7.20 to 7.24 present the results of statistical tests for differences. Tables 7.20 
and 7.21 present the results of statistical tests for differences in CGQ scores between each year 
studied for the main research sample and the control sample respectively. Table 7.22 presents 
the results of statistical tests for differences in the benchmark-adjusted scores between each 
year for the main sample. Following this, Table 7.23 presents the results of statistical tests for 
differences in scores between the takeover and market abuse subsets of the main research 
sample; these comparisons pertain to both the unadjusted and adjusted scores. A summary of 
the CGQ scores in the main sample and in the control sample, together with the results of 
statistical tests for differences in scores between the two samples is presented in Table 7.24. 
 The remainder of this section discusses these results. In order to facilitate a more 
insightful understanding of the level of corporate governance quality in the sample and 
changes therein, some reference is made to the initial raw measures of the components of 
CGQ. An overview of the average values of the ten components of CGQ, as measured prior to 
the application of the scoring methodology, is presented in Table 7.25.      
 
Total CGQ Score 
Results presented in Table 7.13 show that, on average, total CGQ scores assigned to 
companies in the main research sample range between 66.62 to 68.08 out of a possible 
maximum of 100 and the highest average scores are observed in the event year. While the 
average CGQ score of sample companies decreases from 68.08 in the event year to 67.76 in 
the post-event year, it remains above the pre-event level of 66.62. Although the average 
changes in CGQ may appear small, it is important to note that large changes do occur within 
sample companies. Minimum and maximum values reported for the changes in total CGQ 
score indicate that increases and decreases of over 40% occur over the years studied.   
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Table 7.13: Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample: Unadjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators Below are the descriptive statistics for the total and component CGQ scores and changes therein in sample companies. The first part of the table presents those statistics for the pre-event, event and post-event years. The second part presents those statistics for changes between the pre-event and event years and between the event and post-event years. Definitions for each of the ten components as initially measured are provided at the bottom of this table. Scores are assigned for each component as described in Chapter Five.   Continuous Variables 
 
 Discrete Variables 
  CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE  CEOCH ACI 
 CGQ in Individual Years Pre-event year (n= 135) Mean 66.62 6.06 6.87 7.84 4.36 8.38 7.51 5.97 2.66 Yes (1) % 7.40 77.80 Std. dev. 15.51 3.57 2.48 2.65 2.39 2.92 3.79 3.78 2.76 No (0) % 92.60 22.20 Min 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 90.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Event year  (n= 72) Mean 68.08 6.38 6.38 7.83 4.65 8.50 7.53 5.77 2.96 Yes (1) % 2.80 84.70 Std. dev. 13.99 3.40 2.52 2.68 2.42 2.98 3.59 3.96 2.96 No (0) % 97.20 15.30 Min 24.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 83.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Post-event year (n= 62) Mean 67.76 6.44 6.63 7.65 4.42 8.24 7.74 6.55 2.68 Yes (1) % 1.60 77.40 Std. dev. 14.84 3.21 2.68 2.91 2.52 3.35 3.45 3.68 2.53 No (0) % 98.40 22.60 Min 27.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 86.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
CGQ Change Pre-event to event year change  (n= 71) 
Mean 1.70 0.46 -0.35 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.29  0.14 0.42 Std. dev. 9.64 2.48 2.00 1.13 1.08 1.65 2.23 2.52 2.21 2.07 2.03 Min -14.00 -5.00 -6.00 -3.00 -3.00 -6.00 -6.00 -9.00 -9.00 -10.00 0.00 Max 38.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 
Event to post-event year change (n= 62) 
Mean -0.48 0.23 0.08 -0.11 -0.19 -0.18 0.39 -0.27 -0.39  0.16 -0.65 Std. dev. 11.52 2.70 1.74 2.07 1.65 2.14 2.70 2.79 1.72 1.27 3.07 Min -42.00 -10.00 -4.00 -8.00 -7.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -7.00 0.00 -10.00 Max 48.00 10.00 4.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 10.00 8.00 4.00 10.00 10.00 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise. 
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Table 7.14: Descriptive Statistics: Takeover Subset: Unadjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators   Continuous Variables 
 
 Discrete Variables 
   CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE 
 
 CEOCH ACI 
CGQ in Individual Years 
 Pre-event year (n= 110) Mean 68.54 6.31 6.81 7.80 4.72 8.54 7.83 6.31 2.76 Yes (1) % 8.20 82.70 Std. dev. 14.01 3.46 2.32 2.69 2.18 2.79 3.61 3.71 2.74 No (0) % 91.80 17.30 Min 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 90.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Event year  (n= 54) Mean 72.17 7.19 6.20 7.70 5.31 9.07 8.33 6.20 2.89 Yes (1) % 1.90 96.30 Std. dev. 9.01 2.86 2.51 2.84 1.88 2.01 3.05 3.83 2.74 No (0) % 98.10 3.70 Min 42.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 83.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Post-event year (n= 46) Mean 70.76 6.91 6.41 7.48 4.93 8.67 8.48 7.04 2.57 Yes (1) % 2.20 84.80 Std. dev. 10.47 2.61 2.70 3.11 2.18 2.84 2.80 3.45 2.32 No (0) % 97.80 15.20 Min 39.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 86.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
CGQ Change 
 Pre-event to event year change  (n= 53) 
Mean 1.92 0.66 -0.60 0.25 0.06 0.28 0.32 0.08 0.17  0.19 0.57 Std. dev. 9.95 2.65 1.69 1.19 1.20 1.28 2.42 1.92 1.34 2.39 2.33 Min -13.00 -5.00 -6.00 -3.00 -3.00 -4.00 -6.00 -4.00 -4.00 -10.00 0.00 Max 38.00 10.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 10.00 10.00 
Event to post-event year change (n= 46) 
Mean -1.48 -0.02 0.13 -0.26 -0.35 -0.24 0.35 -0.07 -0.33  0.22 -1.09 Std. dev. 10.10 2.43 1.48 1.87 1.61 1.97 2.57 2.43 1.80 1.47 3.15 Min -42.00 -10.00 -4.00 -8.00 -7.00 -10.00 -10.00 -8.00 -7.00 0.00 -10.00 Max 25.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 10.00 8.00 4.00 10.00 0.00 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise.   
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Table 7.14 Continued: Descriptive Statistics: Takeover Subset: Pre-event Year Unadjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators for Targets of Successful and Unsuccessful Offers  
 Below are the descriptive statistics for the total and component pre-event year CGQ scores in takeover targets for which offers are (i) successful and (ii) unsuccessful     
 Continuous Variables    Discrete Variables 
  CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE   CEOCH ACI 
 Successful Offers (n= 57)  
 Mean  66.51  6.00  6.81  7.89  4.22  8.25  7.51  6.58  2.77  Yes (1) %  10.50  75.40 
Std. dev. 16.21 3.81 1.90 2.68 2.23 3.23 3.95 3.61 2.85 No (0) % 89.50 24.60 
 Unsuccessful Offers (n= 53)  
 Mean  70.72  6.64  6.83  7.70  5.26  8.85  8.17  6.02  2.75  Yes (1) %  5.70  90.60 
Std. dev. 10.92 3.03 2.71 7.23 1.99 2.21 3.20 3.82 2.65 No (0) % 94.30 9.40 
 Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise.  
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Table 7.15: Descriptive Statistics: Market Abuse Subset: Unadjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators   Continuous Variables 
 
 Discrete Variables 
   CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE  CEOCH ACI 
 CGQ in Individual Years 
 Pre-event year (n= 25) Mean 58.20 4.96 7.12 8.00 2.80 7.68 6.12 4.48 2.24 Yes (1) % 8.00 56.00 Std. dev. 19.01 3.94 3.17 2.52 2.71 3.40 4.34 3.82 2.85 No (0) % 92.00 44.00 Min 20.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 82.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.00    
Event year  (n= 18) Mean 55.83 3.94 6.89 8.22 2.67 6.78 5.11 4.61 3.17 Yes (1) % 5.60 50.00 Std. dev. 18.78 3.81 2.56 2.16 2.81 4.51 4.07 4.29 3.60 No (0) % 94.40 50.00 Min 24.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 81.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Post-event year  (n= 16) Mean 59.13 5.06 7.25 8.13 2.94 7.00 5.63 5.13 3.00 Yes (1) % 6.30 56.30 Std. dev. 21.43 4.33 2.62 2.25 2.89 4.38 4.27 4.06 3.14 No (0) % 93.70 43.70 Min 27.00 0.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 82.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.00    
CGQ Change 
 Pre-event to event year change  (n= 18) 
Mean 1.06 -0.11 0.39 0.06 0.06 -0.22 -0.28 0.56 0.61  0.00 0.00 Std. dev. 8.87 1.88 2.64 0.94 0.64 2.46 1.53 3.81 3.78 0.00 0.00 Min -14.00 -5.00 -5.00 -2.00 -1.00 -6.00 -4.00 -9.00 -9.00 0.00 0.00 Max 13.00 4.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 0.00 0.00 
Event to post-event year change (n= 16) 
Mean 2.38 0.94 -0.06 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.50 -0.88 -0.56  0.00 0.63 Std. dev. 14.91 3.36 2.38 2.57 1.73 2.63 3.14 3.67 1.50 0.00 2.50 Min -23.00 -5.00 -3.00 -4.00 -2.00 -6.00 -6.00 -10.00 -5.00 0.00 0.00 Max 48.00 10.00 4.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 10.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 10.00 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise.  
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Table 7.16: Descriptive Statistics: Control Sample: Corporate Governance Quality Indicators Below are the descriptive statistics for the CGQ scores and changes therein in control sample companies. The first part of the table presents those statistics for the pre-event, event and post-event years. The second part presents those statistics for changes between the pre-event and event years and between the event and post-event years. Definitions for each of the ten components as initially measured are provided at the bottom of this table. Scores are assigned for each component as described in Chapter Five.   Continuous Variables 
 
 Discrete Variables 
  CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE  CEOCH ACI 
 CGQ in Individual Years Pre-event year  (n= 136) Mean 56.90 5.23 6.86 7.46 4.28 6.53 5.43 4.90 3.29 Yes (1) % 16.20 54.40 Std. dev. 19.11 3.28 2.62 2.54 4.32 3.71 3.67 3.67 3.16 No (0) % 83.80 45.60 Min 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 96.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Event year  (n= 68) Mean 57.33 5.00 6.91 7.13 5.04 6.51 5.40 4.25 3.45 Yes (1) % 16.40 52.70 Std. dev. 20.28 3.05 2.44 2.82 4.68 3.80 3.64 3.52 2.96 No (0) % 83.60 47.30 Min 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 85.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
Post-event year  (n= 54) Mean 57.90 4.59 7.30 7.23 5.36 6.38 5.31 4.10 3.26 Yes (1) % 12.80 56.40 Std. dev. 18.41 2.70 2.24 3.03 4.72 3.54 3.40 3.05 3.18 No (0) % 87.20 43.60 Min 19.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     Max 89.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00    
CGQ Change Pre-event to event year change  (n= 68) 
Mean 0.91 0.09 -0.09 -0.33 0.27 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.22  0.18 0.18 Std. dev. 16.54 2.42 2.61 2.27 2.25 3.35 2.20 4.52 2.45 2.35 2.35 Min -88.00 -9.00 -10.00 -8.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -8.00 -5.00 -10.00 -10.00 Max 49.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 10.00 10.00 6.00 10.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 
Event to post-event year change (n= 54) Mean -1.23 -0.41 0.15 0.15 -0.08 -0.23 -0.28 0.00 -0.28  -0.26 0.00 Std. dev. 7.75 1.89 1.66 1.25 2.32 1.80 1.85 4.49 1.93 1.60 2.29 Min -14.00 -7.00 -4.00 -2.00 -10.00 -4.00 -7.00 -8.00 -7.00 -10.00 -10.00 Max 27.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 7.00 4.00 0.00 10.00 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise. 
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Table 7.17: Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample: Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators Below are the descriptive statistics for the benchmark-adjusted total and component CGQ scores and changes therein in sample companies. The first part of the table presents those statistics for the pre-event, event and post-event years. The second part presents those statistics for changes between the pre-event and event years and between the event and post-event years. Definitions for each of the ten components as initially measured are provided at the bottom of this table. Scores are adjusted as described in Chapter Five.   Continuous Variables  Discrete Variables   CGQad MEETad EDad SIZEad INEDad ACSad ACMad PPSad SHAREad  CEOCHad ACIad CGQ in Individual Years Pre-event year  (n= 135) 
Mean 0.50 0.25 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.50 0.57 0.29 -0.20 Yes (Score) -2.26 0.91 Std. dev. 0.81 1.09 0.95 1.05 0.55 0.79 1.03 0.81 0.87 % 7.40 77.80 Min -1.94 -1.59 -2.62 -2.94 -0.99 -1.76 -1.48 -1.34 -1.04 No (Score) 0.44 -1.09  Max 1.73 1.45 1.20 1.00 1.32 0.94 1.25 1.39 2.12 % 92.60 22.20 
Event year  (n= 72) 
Mean 0.54 0.45 -0.22 0.25 -0.08 0.52 0.58 0.44 -0.17 Yes (Score) -2.24 0.94 Std. dev. 0.69 1.11 1.03 0.95 0.52 0.78 0.99 1.13 1.00 % 2.80 84.70 Min -1.63 -1.64 -2.83 -2.53 -1.08 -1.71 -1.48 -1.21 -1.17 No (Score) 0.44 -1.05  Max 1.28 1.64 1.27 1.02 1.06 0.92 1.26 1.63 2.21 % 97.20 15.30 
Post-event year  (n= 62) 
Mean 0.54 0.68 -0.30 0.14 -0.20 0.53 0.72 0.80 -0.18 Yes (Score) -2.57 0.87 Std. dev. 0.81 1.19 1.20 0.96 0.53 0.95 1.01 1.21 0.80 % 1.60 77.40 Min -1.68 -1.70 -3.26 -2.39 -1.14 -1.80 -1.56 -1.34 -1.03 No (Score) 0.38 -1.12  Max 1.53 2.00 1.21 0.91 0.98 1.02 1.38 1.93 2.12 % 98.40 22.60 
CGQ Change Pre-event to event year change (n= 71) 
Mean 0.04 0.15 -0.10 0.23 -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.03  -0.02 0.10 Std. dev. 0.58 1.03 0.77 0.50 0.48 0.49 1.01 0.56 0.90  0.88 0.86 Min -0.91 -2.10 -2.26 -1.18 -1.45 -1.79 -2.77 -2.06 -3.76  -4.33 -0.08 Max 2.24 4.10 2.23 1.91 2.10 1.19 4.50 1.71 3.18  4.18 4.18 
Event to post-event year change (n= 62) 
Mean 0.10 0.34 -0.04 -0.21 -0.05 0.03 0.36 -0.06 -0.06  0.26 -0.28 Std. dev. 1.49 1.43 1.05 1.65 0.71 1.19 1.46 0.62 0.89  0.79 1.34 Min -5.26 -5.07 -2.50 -6.52 -2.98 -5.43 -5.25 -2.67 -3.48  0.16 -4.37 Max 6.35 5.51 2.32 5.48 2.62 3.46 5.56 1.78 2.22  6.41 4.37 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise. 
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Table 7.18: Descriptive Statistics: Takeover Subset: Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators   Continuous Variables  Discrete Variables   CGQad MEETad EDad SIZEad INEDad ACSad ACMad PPSad SHAREad  CEOCHad ACIad 
 CGQ in Individual Years Pre-event year  (n= 110) Mean 0.60 0.33 -0.02 0.13 0.10 0.54 0.65 0.38 -0.17 Yes (Score) 
-2.26 0.91 
Std. dev. 0.73 1.05 0.88 1.06 0.50 0.75 0.98 1.01 0.87 % 8.20 82.70 Min -1.88 -1.59 -2.62 -2.94 -0.99 -1.76 -1.48 -1.34 -1.04 No (Score) 0.44 -1.09  Max 1.73 1.45 1.20 1.00 1.32 0.94 1.25 1.39 2.12 % 91.80 17.30 
Event year  (n= 54) Mean 0.74 0.72 -0.29 0.20 0.06 0.67 0.81 0.56 -0.19 Yes (Score) 
-2.24 0.94 
Std. dev. 0.44 0.94 1.03 1.01 0.40 0.53 0.84 1.09 0.93 % 1.90 96.30 Min -0.74 -1.64 -2.83 -2.53 -1.08 -1.71 -1.48 -1.21 -1.17 No (Score) 0.44 -1.05  Max 1.28 1.64 1.27 1.02 1.06 0.92 1.26 1.63 2.21 % 98.10 3.70 
Post-event year  (n= 46)  
Mean 0.70 0.86 -0.40 0.08 -0.09 0.65 0.93 0.97 -0.22 Yes (Score) -2.57 0.87 Std. dev. 0.57 0.97 1.20 1.03 0.46 0.80 0.82 1.13 0.73 % 2.20 84.80 Min -1.03 -1.70 -3.26 -2.39 -1.14 -1.80 -1.56 -1.34 -1.03 No (Score) 0.38 -1.12  Max 1.53 2.00 1.21 0.91 0.98 1.02 1.38 1.93 2.12 % 97.80 15.20 
CGQ Change Pre-event to  event year  change (n= 53) 
Mean 0.06 0.24 -0.20 0.25 -0.09 0.08 0.10 -0.05 -0.02  0.01 0.16 Std. dev. 0.60 1.09 0.65 0.52 0.53 0.38 1.10 0.42 0.55  1.02 0.99 Min -0.85 -2.10 -2.26 -1.18 -1.45 -1.19 -2.77 -1.39 -1.72  -4.33 -0.08 Max 2.24 4.10 1.18 1.91 2.10 1.19 4.50 0.82 1.54  4.18 4.18 
Event to post- event year change (n= 46) 
Mean -0.03 0.21 -0.01 -0.33 -0.12 -0.01 0.34 -0.01 -0.02  0.30 -0.47 Std. dev. 1.30 1.28 0.89 1.49 0.69 1.09 1.39 0.54 0.93  0.91 1.37 Min -5.26 -5.07 -2.50 -6.52 -2.98 -5.43 -5.25 -1.78 -3.48  0.16 -4.37 Max 3.38 3.39 2.32 3.08 0.90 2.35 5.56 1.78 2.22  6.41 0.00 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise.   
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Table 7.19: Descriptive Statistics: Market Abuse Subset: Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicators   Continuous Variables  Discrete Variables   CGQad MEETad EDad SIZEad INEDad ACSad ACMad PPSad SHAREad  CEOCHad ACIad 
 CGQ in Individual Years Pre-event year  (n= 25) Mean 0.06 -0.08 0.10 0.21 -0.34 0.31 0.19 -0.11 -0.33 Yes (Score) 
-2.26 0.91 
Std. dev. 0.99 1.20 1.21 0.99 0.63 0.92 1.18 1.04 0.90 % 8.00 56.00 Min -1.94 -1.59 -2.62 -2.15 -0.99 -1.76 -1.48 -1.34 -1.04 No (Score) 0.44 -1.09  Max 1.31 1.45 1.20 1.00 0.63 0.94 1.25 1.39 1.81 % 92.00 44.00 
Event year  (n= 18) Mean -0.06 -0.35 -0.01 0.39 -0.51 0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.10 Yes (Score) 
-2.24 0.94 
Std. dev. 0.93 1.25 1.05 0.76 0.60 1.19 1.12 1.22 1.22 % 5.60 50.00 Min -1.63 -1.64 -1.60 -1.11 -1.08 -1.71 -1.48 -1.21 -1.17 No (Score) 0.44 -1.05  Max 1.18 1.64 1.27 1.02 0.42 0.92 1.26 1.63 2.21 % 94.40 50.00 
Post-event year  (n= 16) Mean 0.07 0.18 -0.02 0.30 -0.51 0.18 0.09 0.34 -0.08 Yes (Score) 
-2.57 0.87 
Std. dev. 1.16 1.60 1.17 0.74 0.61 1.24 1.26 1.33 0.99 % 6.30 56.30 Min -1.68 -1.70 -1.92 -1.73 -1.14 -1.80 -1.56 -1.34 -1.03 No (Score) 0.38 -1.12  Max 1.31 2.00 1.21 0.91 0.56 1.02 1.38 1.93 1.81 % 93.70 43.70 
CGQ Change Pre-event to  event year change (n= 18) 
Mean 0.01 -0.08 0.18 0.17 -0.10 -0.07 -0.17 0.06 0.16  -0.08 -0.08 Std. dev. 0.54 0.77 1.01 0.41 0.28 0.74 0.69 0.84 1.54  0.00 0.00 Min -0.91 -2.10 -1.88 -0.74 -0.56 -1.79 -1.86 -2.06 -3.76  -0.08 -0.08 Max 0.73 1.62 2.23 0.59 0.77 1.19 1.32 1.71 3.18  -0.08 -0.08 
Event to post- event year change (n= 16) 
Mean 0.46 0.71 -0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.42 -0.19 -0.15  0.16 0.27 Std. dev. 1.92 1.78 1.43 2.06 0.75 1.46 1.70 0.82 0.80  0.00 1.09 Min -2.81 -2.43 -1.90 -3.32 -0.83 -3.21 -3.09 -2.67 -2.45  0.16 0.00 Max 6.35 5.51 2.32 5.48 2.62 3.46 5.56 0.89 1.18  0.16 4.37 
Variable Definitions: CGQ: Total CGQ score; MEET: No. board meetings in the year; ED: % Executive directors on the board; SIZE: No. directors on the board; INED: % Non-executive directors on the board who are independent; ACS: No. members on the audit committee; ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year; PPS: CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio; SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board; CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise; ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise.   
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Table 7.20: Unadjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicator Variable Comparisons between Pre-event, Event and Post-event Years 
Below are comparisons in CGQ and the components thereof between each year. Wilcoxon signed rank tests are conducted to test for differences in the continuous variables and 
McNemar’s chi-squared tests are conducted to test for differences in the discrete variables. Values for Wilcoxon’s Z and 2 are reported in bold and the statistical significance of the difference in each variable is reported below in brackets.  Continuous Variables 
 
Discrete Variables 
 CGQ ED SIZE MEET INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE CEOCH ACI 
 Pre-event vs. event year Full Sample -0.94 1.71 -0.72 -1.22 -0.22 -0.33 -0.16 -0.46 -1.26 0.00 1.30  (0.347) (0.087)* (0.472) (0.223) (0.826) (0.741) (0.873) (0.646) (0.208) (1.000) (0.248) Takeover Subset -0.81 2.41 -0.24 -1.43 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.56 -1.08 0.00 1.33  (0.418) (0.016)** (0.810) (0.153) (0.936) (1.000) (1.000) (0.576) (0.280) (1.000) (0.248) 
Market Abuse Subset -0.56 -0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.54 0.00 0.00 (0.576) (0.589) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.952) (0.589) (1.000) (1.000) 
Event vs. post-event year Full Sample 0.39 -0.32 0.64 -0.43 0.79 0.00 -0.96 -0.93 1.65 0.00 1.50  (0.697) (0.749) (0.522) (0.667) (0.430) (1.000) (0.337) (0.352) (0.099)* (1.000) (0.221) 
Takeover Subset 0.73 -0.48 0.76 0.18 1.01 0.00 0.00 -0.82 1.05 0.00 3.20  (0.465) (0.632) (0.447) (0.857) (0.313) (1.000) (1.000) (0.412) (0.294) (1.000) (0.074)* 
Market Abuse Subset -0.37 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.711) (0.912) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.562) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Pre-event vs. post-event year Full Sample -1.19 0.79 -0.12 -1.40 0.79 0.60 -1.27 -0.92 -0.03 0.00 0.00  (0.234) (0.430) (0.905) (0.162) (0.430) (0.549) (0.204) (0.358) (0.976) (1.000) (1.000) 
Takeover Subset -0.41 0.98 0.40 -0.92 1.06 0.00 0.00 -0.83 0.34 0.00 0.17  (0.682) (0.327) (0.689) (0.358) (0.289) (1.000) (1.000) (0.407) (0.734) (1.000) (0.683) 
Market Abuse Subset -1.82 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.069)* (0.984) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.764) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7.21: Control Sample Corporate Governance Quality Indicator Variable Comparisons between Pre-event, Event and Post-event Years 
Below are comparisons in CGQ and the components thereof between each year for the control sample of companies. Wilcoxon signed rank tests are conducted to test for differences 
in the continuous variables and McNemar’s chi-squared tests are conducted to test for differences in the discrete variables. Values for Wilcoxon’s Z and 2 are reported in bold and the statistical significance of the difference in each variable is reported below in brackets. 
Continuous Variables 
 
Discrete Variables 
CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE CEOCH ACI 
 Pre-event vs. event year -0.99 -0.33 0.07 1.02 0.00 0.08 -0.43 -0.35 -0.40 0.00 0.552 (0.322) (0.741) (0.944) (0.308) (1.000) (0.936) (0.667) (0.726) (0.689) (1.000) (0.458) Event vs. post-event year 1.47 1.27 -0.51 -0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 (0.142) (0.204) (0.610) (0.490) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.734) (1.000) (1.000) Pre-event vs. post-event year 0.09 0.58 -1.21 0.42 0.00 0.18 -0.03 -1.15 0.44 2.571 0.00 (0.928) (0.562) (0.226) (0.675) (1.000) (0.857) (0.976) (0.250) (0.660) (0.141) (1.000) 
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Table 7.22: Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality Indicator Variable Comparisons between Pre-event, Event and Post-event Years 
Below are comparisons in the benchmark-adjusted CGQ indicator variables between each year. Wilcoxon signed rank tests are conducted to test for differences in the continuous variables with a number of exceptions in the market abuse subset where paired samples t-tests are used. For the market abuse subset, paired samples t-tests are conducted to test for differences in the variables CGQad, MEETad, INEDad, ACMad and PPSad between each year and in the variables EDad, ACSad and SHAREad between the event and post-event years. McNemar’s chi-squared tests are conducted to test for differences in the discrete variables. Values for Wilcoxon’s Z, Paired samples t and 2 are reported in bold and the statistical significance of the difference in each variable is reported below in brackets.  Continuous Variables Discrete Variables  CGQad EDad SIZEad MEETad INEDad ACSad ACMad PPSad SHAREad CEOCHad ACIad 
 Pre-event vs. event year Full Sample -0.93 2.17 -3.71 -2.73 5.44 3.09 -4.08 -1.64 1.37 0.00 1.30  (0.352) (0.030)** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.101) (0.171) (1.000) (0.248) Takeover Subset -1.19 2.93 -2.82 -2.65 4.58 3.45 -4.31 -1.43 1.62 0.00 1.33  (0.234) (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.153) (0.105) (1.000) (0.248) 
Market Abuse Subset  0.29 -0.64 -2.62 -0.08 3.41 0.53 0.74 -0.62 0.11 0.00 0.00 (0.602) (0.522) (0.009)*** (0.940) (0.003)*** (0.596) (0.469) (0.543) (0.912) (1.000) (1.000) 
Event vs. post-event year Full Sample -0.63 2.33 2.70 -3.38 3.49 -4.56 --5.02 -1.92 -1.63 0.00 1.50  (0.529) (0.020)** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.055)* (0.103) (1.000) (0.221) 
Takeover Subset  -0.95 2.41 2.55 -2.79 2.93 -4.37 -4.80 -2.18 -2.01 0.00 3.20  (0.342) (0.016)** (0.011)** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.029)** (0.044)** (1.000) (0.074)* 
Market Abuse Subset -0.39 0.73 1.07 -1.53 0.12 -0.24 -0.75 -0.56 0.93 0.00 0.00 (0.702) (0.477) (0.285) (0.146) (0.905) (0.817) (0.464) (0.583) (0.368) (1.000) (1.000) 
Pre-event vs. post-event year Full Sample -0.66 2.58 0.14 -4.08 5.57 -4.17 -4.89 -2.25 -2.13 0.00 0.00  (0.509) (0.010)** (0.889) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.024)** (0.033)** (1.000) (1.000) 
Takeover Subset  0.18 2.65 0.69 -3.64 5.06 -3.89 -5.08 -2.25 -1.66 0.00 0.17  (0.857) (0.008)*** (0.490) (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.024)** (0.097)* (1.000) (0.683) 
Market Abuse Subset -0.75 0.61 -0.87 -1.37 1.46 -1.54 -0.38 -0.87 -1.35 0.00 0.00 (0.466) (0.542) (0.384) (0.192) (0.165) (0.124) (0.712) (0.400) (0.177) (1.000) (1.000) 
***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7.23: Corporate Governance Quality Indicator Variable Comparisons between Takeover and Market Abuse Cases 
Below are comparisons in CGQ and its components between the takeover and market abuse subsets of the sample. The first part of the table presents comparisons between CGQ in the takeover subset with that in the market abuse subset for the pre-event, event and post-event years. Mann-Whitney tests are conducted to test the statistical significance of the differences in the continuous variables and Chi-squared tests are conducted to test the statistical significance of the differences in the discrete variables. The second part presents comparisons of CGQ change (∆CGQ) in the takeover with that in the market abuse subset. Mann-Whitney tests are conducted to test the statistical significance of the differences in 
all variables. Values for Mann Whitney’s Z and 2 are reported in bold and the statistical significance of the difference in each variable is reported below in brackets. The comparisons presented below pertain to both the unadjusted and adjusted CGQ variables.  Continuous Variables Discrete Variables 
  CGQ MEET ED SIZE INED ACS ACM PPS SHARE CEOCH ACI 
 
 CGQ in Individual Years 
 Pre-event year 2.69 1.46 -1.27 -0.22 2.96 1.09 1.71 2.10 1.83 0.01 8.42 
(0.007)*** (0.144) (0.204) (0.826) (0.003)*** (0.276) (0.087)* (0.036)** (0.067)* (0.900) (0.004)*** 
 
Event year 3.52 3.08 -0.80 -0.40 2.95 1.48 2.96 1.51 0.69 0.69 22.4 
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.424) (0.689) (0.003)*** (0.139) (0.003)*** (0.131) (0.490) (0.408) (0.001)*** 
 
Post-event year 1.23 1.07 -0.90 -0.26 2.25 1.09 2.30 1.65 0.21 2.92 5.53 
(0.219) (0.285) (0.368) (0.795) (0.024)** (0.276) (0.021)** (0.099)* (0.834) (0.087)* (0.019)** 
 
 CGQ Change 
 Pre-event to event 
year 
0.01 0.94 -1.53 0.30 -0.05 0.42 0.55 -0.13 -0.24 0.11 0.35 
(0.992) (0.347) (0.126) (0.764) (0.960) (0.675) (0.582) (0.897) (0.810) (0.912) (0.726) 
 
Event to post-event 
year 
-0.67 -0.91 0.44 -0.72 0.01 -0.13 0.08 0.22 0.91 0.12 -0.97 
(0.503) (0.363) (0.660) (0.764) (0.992) (0.897) (0.936) (0.826) (0.363) (0.905) (0.332) 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7.24: Summary of CGQ in the Main Research Sample and in the Control Sample 
Below are the mean values for the variables measuring total and component CGQ scores and changes therein in companies in (i) the main research sample and (ii) the control sample. For the variables (a) CEOCH and (b) ACI, the percentage of companies where (a) the roles of CEO and chairman are split and (b) there is a majority independent audit committee is reported for each of the three years studied. Presented alongside the statistics for each year and for each annual change are the results of statistical tests for differences in CGQ and its components between the two samples. Mann-Whitney tests are conducted to test the statistical significance of the differences in the continuous variables and Chi-squared tests are conducted to test the statistical significance of the differences in the discrete variables. Values for Mann Whitney’s Z and 2 are reported in bold and the statistical significance of the difference in each variable is reported below in brackets. 
  Pre-event year Event year Post-event year Pre-event to event year Event to post-event year Sample: Main Control Statistical Difference Main  Control  Statistical Difference Main  Control  Statistical Difference Main  Control  Statistical Difference Main  Control Statistical Difference 
 
n= 135 136 72 68 62 54 71 68 62  54 
CGQ 66.62 56.90 -4.44 (0.001)*** 
 
68.08 57.33 -2.88 (0.004)*** 67.76 57.90 -2.89 (0.004)*** 1.70 0.91 0.20 (0.842) -0.48 -1.23 -0.82 (0.412) MEET 6.06 5.23 -2.26 (0.024)** 
 
6.38 5.00 -2.59 (0.010)** 6.44 4.59 -3.37 (0.001)*** 0.46 0.09 -0.34 (0.734) 0.23 -0.41 -0.58 (0.562) ED 6.87 6.86 0.21 (0.834) 
 
6.38 6.91 1.12 (0.263) 6.63 7.30 1.23 (0.219) -0.35 -0.09 -1.39 (0.165) 0.08 0.15 0.10 (0.920) SIZE 7.84 7.46 -1.59 (0.112) 
 
7.83 7.13 -1.44 (0.150) 7.65 7.23 -0.78 (0.435) 0.20 -0.33 0.78 (0.435) -0.11 0.15 0.61 (0.542) 
INED 4.36 4.28 -0.41 (0.682) 
  
4.65 5.04 0.85 (0.395) 4.42 5.36 1.41 (0.159) 0.06 0.27 -0.42 (0.675) -0.19 -0.08 -0.09 (0.928) 
ACS 8.38 6.53 -4.12 (0.001)*** 
 
8.50 6.51 -2.96 (0.003)*** 8.24 6.38 -2.79 (0.005)*** 0.15 0.00 -0.21 (0.834) -0.18 -0.23 -0.43 (0.667) ACM 7.51 5.43 -4.72 (0.001)*** 
 
7.53 5.40 -3.27 (0.001)*** 7.74 5.31 -3.45 (0.001)*** 0.17 0.09 0.19 (0.849) 0.39 -0.28 -1.01 (0.313) PPS 5.97 4.90 -2.66 (0.008)*** 
 
5.77 4.25 -2.03 (0.042)** 6.55 4.10 -3.26 (0.001)*** 0.08 0.29 0.17 (0.865) -0.27 0.00 -0.54 (0.589) SHARE 2.66 3.29 0.89 (0.374) 
 
2.96 3.45 0.87 (0.384) 2.68 3.26 0.32 (0.749) 0.29 0.22 -0.21 (0.834) -0.39 -0.28 0.52 (0.603) CEOCH  92.60 83.80 5.00 (0.025)** 
 
97.20 83.60 7.27 (0.007)*** 98.40 87.20 5.38 (0.020)** 0.14 0.18 0.04 (0.968) 0.16 -0.26 -0.35 (0.726) ACI  77.80 54.40 29.7 (0.001)*** 84.70 52.70 15.5 (0.001)*** 77.40 56.40 -4.97 (0.026)** 0.42 0.18 -0.22 (0.826) -0.65 0.00 0.53 (0.596) 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 7.25: Overview of CGQ Components Prior to Application of Scoring Methodology 
  Pre-event year Event year Post-event year 
  Full sample Takeover subset Market abuse subset 
 
Control sample Full sample Takeover subset Market abuse subset 
Control sample Full sample Takeover subset Market abuse subset 
Control sample 
n= 135 110 25 136 72 54 18 68 62 46 16 
 
54 
Average no. board meetings 7.87  8.27 6.12 6.21 8.78 10.11 4.78 5.89 8.47 8.93 7.13 5.67 
Average percentage of executive directors on board 
42.43 41.29 47.36 42.09 38.13 36.72 42.36 43.5 38.54 38.05 39.93 43.02 
Average no. board members  7.70  7.91 6.76 7.35 7.79 8.30 6.28 7.39 7.47 8.00 5.94 7.23 
Average percentage of non-executive directors deemed independent 
41.40 44.64 27.13 40.04 44.11 50.29 25.56 46.9 41.62 46.27 28.24 47.97 
Average no. audit committee members 3.09 3.12 2.96 2.25 3.07 3.30 2.39 2.43 2.98 3.17 2.44  2.17 
Average no. audit committee meetings 2.91 3.07 2.20 2.18 3.17 3.57 1.94 2.14 3.19 3.61 2.00  2.03 
Average CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.014 -0.005 0.009 0.006 -0.009  -0.005 
Average percentage of common shares owned by board 
9.12 6.26 21.72 9.79 7.64 4.96 15.68 9.92 7.21 4.84 14.00 8.85 
Percentage of companies where roles of CEO and chairman split 
92.60 91.80 92.00 83.80 97.20 98.10 94.40 83.60 98.40 97.80 93.70 87.20 
Proportion of companies with a majority independent audit committee 
77.80 82.70 56.00 54.40 84.70 96.30 50.00 52.70 77.40 84.80 56.30 56.40 
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 Average values of total CGQ score reported for the takeover subset of the sample in 
Table 7.14 are notably higher than those for the market abuse subset in Table 7.15 and results 
presented in Table 7.23 show that the difference in CGQ score between the two subsets is 
statistically significant in the pre-event and event years. The average pre-event year CGQ 
score achieved by companies in the takeover subset which are eventually acquired is 
discernibly lower than that for those which survive the takeover attempt. On average, the CGQ 
scores assigned to companies which go on to survive takeover attempts is highest in the year 
of the offer but declines in the following year. This immediately suggests that improvements 
brought about in the year of a takeover offer may be short-lived. The lower CGQ of 
companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse is consistent with prior observations 
made by Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010), who report that insider trading is more 
prevalent in companies with characteristics of poor governance such as large board size and 
low director independence.  
 Tables 7.14 and 7.15 also report that, on average, improvements in CGQ occur in both 
subsets between the pre-event and event years. The average improvement in the takeover 
subset is slightly greater than that in the market abuse subset. While an average deterioration is 
observed in the takeover subset between the event and post-event years, a further improvement 
occurs in the market abuse subset. As discussed previously, there is almost no publicity 
surrounding market abuse cases until the event year while takeover speculation is often 
published in the newspapers before the offer is announced. Whether or not the earlier 
improvements in CGQ observed in the takeover subset are associated with the more timely 
newspaper reporting on takeover offers is of particular interest in the present study and will be 
further examined in Section 7.4. 
 Results presented in Table 7.24 indicate that CGQ in the main research sample is 
significantly higher than that in the control sample in each year studied. While the average 
total annual CGQ scores in the control sample are in the range of 56.90 to 57.90, those in the 
main sample are in the range of 66.62 to 68.08. The difference between the two samples is 
interesting given that companies in both samples face the same requirements or are similarly 
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encouraged to adhere to standards of best practice in corporate governance. In fact, the 
proportions of AIM listed companies, which are not as strictly required to adopt the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, in the two samples are similar71. When the annual changes in 
CGQ scores reported in the last two columns of Table 7.24 are considered, similar trends are 
observed. In both samples, there is an average increase in CGQ between the pre-event and 
event years which may possibly be attributable to the impending takeover threat. This is 
followed by an average decrease between the event- and post-event years which may be due to 
the passing of the threat. The average increase observed in the main sample is greater than that 
in the control sample and the average decrease is smaller. It is possible that the greater 
improvement and smaller deterioration observed in the main sample is attributable to the 
greater regulatory oversight of companies in this sample.  
 The control sample cannot be separated into different subsets in the same manner as 
the main sample since the companies are not involved in cases where there is either a breach 
of the Rules of the Takeover Code or of Section 118 of FSMA. However, individual 
comparisons of CGQ in two subsets of the main sample with that in the control sample 
indicates that CGQ in the takeover subset is again notably higher than that in the control 
sample. CGQ in the market abuse subset is at a similar level to that in the control sample. 
While the meaningfulness of this comparison is limited by the small size of the market abuse 
sample subset, it may possibly indicate that a company’s involvement with the Takeover 
Panel, rather than with the FSA, has some influence on the quality of their governance. 
 Accordingly when CGQ in the main research sample is considered against the 
benchmark of CGQ established by the control sample, it would appear that, at an overall level, 
the quality of governance of the companies studied herein is relatively good. While the 
average CGQ scores in the sample are a good deal below the optimal score of 100 in each year 
studied, they are better than what might be expected for companies of their size and industrial 
locations. Thus, it is essential to adjust the scores of sample companies accordingly when 
examining how they may be associated with newspaper reporting. Results reported in Table 
                                                     71 26% of companies in the control sample and 24% of companies in the main research sample are listed on the AIM. 
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7.17 and 7.18 demonstrate that the benchmark-adjusted total corporate governance quality 
scores in both the full research sample and the takeover subset are positive in each year 
studied. In the full sample, benchmark-adjusted CGQ increases between the pre-event and 
event years and continues to increase between the event and post-event years. In the takeover 
subset, benchmark-adjusted CGQ increases between the pre-event and event years but 
decreases between the event and post-event years.  Despite a small average pre-event to event 
year improvement, the average benchmark-adjusted CGQ in the market abuse subset is lowest 
in the year of the abuse. This is consistent with the lower event year CGQ score observed in 
the market abuse sample subset relative to that in the control sample and further suggests that 
the implication of a company’s shares in market abuse may be symptomatic of poor 
governance.  
 In general, it would not appear that involvement in TMA cases which require 
regulatory intervention is due to poor pre-existing governance quality, particularly since pre-
event year CGQ in the main sample is notably higher than that in the control sample. This 
might be expected since, as discussed in Subsection 7.2.1, responsibility for regulatory 
intervention in the vast majority of cases does not lie with sample companies. The greater pre-
event to event year improvement in CGQ in the main research sample may be attributable to 
companies’ closer involvement with official market authorities and the potential associated 
additional regulatory scrutiny. To shed further insight into these total scores and changes 
therein, there now follows an examination of the various facets of corporate governance that 
collectively measure CGQ in the sample. 
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a. Board Leadership 
Board Meetings 
Table 7.25 reports that the boards of companies in both the research sample and the control 
sample do not, on average, meet on a monthly basis in any of the years studied. As discussed 
previously, the necessity for board meetings is apt to be higher in the years when companies 
face takeover attempts or when the incidence of market abuse is either suspected or revealed. 
It would appear that this may be the case when the offer is subject to the direct oversight of the 
Takeover Panel, but not when the offer proceeds without regulatory intervention, nor does it 
appear to be the case for companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse. 
 Although results in Table 7.13 indicate that the annual frequency of board meetings 
observed in the research sample is considered insufficient in terms of CGQ, the comparisons 
provided in Table 7.24 demonstrate that scores assigned for board meeting frequency are 
significantly higher than those in the control sample in each of the three years studied. Thus, 
the boards of companies in the main sample may consider the frequency with which they meet 
to be adequate for companies of their size or that more regular meetings are not necessary 
given the circumstances in the industries in which they are located. The fact that the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) does not provide a specific recommendation on how often 
boards should meet in a given year may explain the lower than expected activity of boards in 
both samples. 
 When statistics on the scores assigned to companies in the individual takeover and 
market abuse subsets, presented in Tables 7.14 and 7.15, are considered, higher mean scores 
are observed in the takeover subset in each year. This is particularly apparent in the event year 
and results of a Mann Whitney test, presented in Table 7.23, confirm that the number of board 
meetings held by companies in the takeover subset is significantly higher than the number of 
meetings held by boards of companies in the market abuse subset. The benchmark-adjusted 
scores for board meeting frequency in the takeover subset, presented in Table 7.18, are 
positive in each year studied while those for the market abuse subset in Table 7.19 are 
negative for the pre-event and event years and although positive in the post-event year, remain 
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low. Thus, relative to companies which are not subject to direct regulatory supervision, the 
frequency of board meetings in companies which are involved with the Takeover Panel is 
more indicative of good governance quality than is that in companies which are involved with 
the FSA. 
 The fact that an increase in the number of meetings occurs in the market abuse subset 
one year later than in the takeover subset may be explained by the length of time it takes for 
the possibility of market abuse to be investigated or confirmed. Nevertheless, even in the post-
event year, the number of board meetings held by the average company in the market abuse 
subset, although higher than that in the control sample, is lower than that in the takeover 
subset. It may be the case that boards of companies whose shares are implicated in market 
abuse may not attribute the abuse to their own negligence or consider it the responsibility of 
regulators to deal with the matter. The fact that such a low average score is observed within 
the market abuse subset in the event year does however raise concerns regarding the vigilance 
of boards of companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse.  
 
The Roles of the CEO and the Board Chairman 
As can be seen in Table 7.13, the roles of CEO and chairman are performed by different 
individuals in the vast majority of sample companies. It appears that the roles are separated in 
proportionately more companies by the end of the three years studied. Indeed, of the ten 
components of CGQ, the highest scores are observed for separating the roles of CEO and 
chairman in each year. Table 7.24 shows that these scores are significantly higher than those 
in the control sample. These results indicate high adoption of the recommendations of 
Principle A.2 of the Corporate Governance Code (2010) which recommends that the positions 
of CEO and board chairman be held by separate individuals. 
 Tables 7.14 and 7.15 demonstrate that the positions of CEO and chairman are held by 
different individuals in a high proportion of companies in both subsets. It is interesting to note 
the relatively higher incidence of CEO-chairman duality in companies which are eventually 
acquired than in those which overcome the takeover attempt. This may indicate that boards 
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which are dominated by the CEO are less able to make improvements when faced with a 
takeover threat, leading to forced improvements in a takeover. The roles are combined in 
proportionately more companies in the market abuse subset than in the takeover subset in the 
event and post-event years. In fact, as Table 7.23 shows, this difference is statistically 
significant in the post-event year. At this early stage in the analysis, the increased tendency of 
companies to have a separate CEO and chairman by the end of the three years studied may be 
attributed to various factors, not least the replacements of CEOs following takeover attempts 
or where company management or directors abused their positions as insiders. As noted in 
Chapter Four, such replacements have been associated with press exposure of the board’s 
shortcomings (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009). Subsection 7.6.1 
examines if changes in the board leadership roles in the present research sample are associated 
with newspaper reporting on takeover and market abuse cases.  
 
b. Board Effectiveness 
The Balance between Executive and Non-executive Directors 
As can be seen from Table 7.25, the proportion of executive directors on the boards of 
companies in the main research sample, on average, remains below 50% over the three years 
studied, as does that in the control sample. Table 7.13 shows that mean values for the variable 
ED in the main sample remain close to six in each year, further indicating that an equal 
balance between executive directors and non-executive directors is not achieved on the 
average board in any year studied. Comparisons in Table 7.24 indicate that while scores for 
the pre-event year are in line with the benchmark established by the control sample, they move 
below it in the event and post-event years as the imbalance between executive and non-
executive directors increases while that in the control sample decreases. Table 7.13 shows that 
there is an average deterioration in scores between the pre-event and event years, followed by 
an average improvement between the event and post-event years. The results of a Wilcoxon 
test, presented in Table 7.20, illustrate that scores assigned for board balance are significantly 
higher in the pre-event year than in the event year. While improved balance is observed in the 
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post-event year, it is not significantly different from that in the event year. When the 
benchmark-adjusted scores in Table 7.17 are considered, this improvement is no longer 
apparent. Instead, a decline in score is observed as scores in the main sample move further out 
of line with those in the control sample. As can be seen from Table 7.22, the difference in the 
benchmark-adjusted scores between the event and post-event years is statistically significant. 
 Both the unadjusted scores in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 and the adjusted scores in Tables 
7.18 and 7.19 show that boards in the market abuse subset are more balanced than those in the 
takeover subset. They also demonstrate that the average deterioration in board balance 
between the pre-event and event years occurs in the takeover subset but not in the market 
abuse subset. Furthermore, while the average board becomes more balanced in the takeover 
subset between the event and post-event years, the average board in the market abuse subset 
becomes less balanced. 
 As is evident from Table 7.25, the board imbalance in the research sample arises from 
an under-representation of executive directors. Principle B.1.2 of the Corporate Governance 
Code (2010) advises that at least half of the boards of larger companies consist of independent 
non-executive directors. If this guidance is followed by boards with non-independent non-
executives, it would result in the proportion of non-executives being greater than 50%. This 
may explain the observed imbalance on sample boards. Indeed, it is possible that defections 
from the board occur around the time of takeover or market abuse cases which may involve 
executives being replaced by non-executives, who are less affiliated with management and 
hence are more likely to prioritise the interests of shareholders.  
 
Board Size 
While average values for board size, presented in Table 7.25, suggest that the boards in the 
main research sample are of a suitable size in terms of CGQ, results reported in Table 7.13 
indicate otherwise. Mean values indicate that the size of sample boards does not, on average, 
meet the criteria of CGQ established herein. Thus, there may be extremely large and small 
boards which the sample average reported in Table 7.25 does not reflect. Un-tabulated results 
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of a frequency analysis performed on the board size data, prior to application of the scoring 
methodology, show that there are a number of very large boards in the takeover subset of the 
sample in each year and there are a number of small boards in the market abuse subset. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 7.24, scores assigned for board size are slightly 
higher than those in the control sample and the benchmark-adjusted scores reported in Table 
7.17 remain positive in each year studied. 
  Results presented in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 show that boards of companies in the 
market abuse subset are deemed to be of a more appropriate size than those in the takeover 
subset in each year. Un-tabulated results of tests for differences conducted on the unscored 
data reveals significant differences between the takeover and market abuse subsets in each 
year at both the 1% and 5% levels. While Table 7.14 indicates an improvement in board size 
in the takeover subset between the pre-event and event years, it indicates a reversal between 
the event and post-event years, as the threat of takeover passes. Table 7.15 shows that in the 
market abuse subset, boards are considered to be of a slightly more appropriate size in the year 
in which the abuse occurs than in the previous year and that, following the abuse, the 
appropriateness of board size improves further. While tests for difference in unadjusted scores 
for board size do not detect any significant differences between the three years studied, those 
conducted on the adjusted scores indicate otherwise. Relative to scores in the control sample, 
the differences between the pre-event and event years are statistically significant in both 
subsets, as is that between the event and post-event years in the takeover subset  
 Taken together, these initial results suggest that there is a lack of uniformity in board 
size in the research sample; this may be explained by the absence of a specific 
recommendation regarding board size in the Corporate Governance Code (2010). The 
tendency for boards to comprise more or less members than may be required raises concerns 
that they may be dysfunctional in the absence of explicit policy guidelines on board size.  
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Director Independence 
Results in Table 7.13 show that scores assigned on the basis of board independence are, on 
average, among the lowest of those for the ten components of CGQ. Table 7.24 illustrates that 
although scores are slightly above the benchmark in the pre-event year, they move below it in 
subsequent years. Table 7.25 indicates that less than 50% of non-executive directors on the 
average board are independent. Given that, on average, 60% of the directors on boards in the 
present sample are non-executives, it may be inferred that sample boards are comprised of 
approximately 30% independent members, considerably lower than the standard of 50% 
recommended under Principle B.1 of the Corporate Governance Code (2010). As noted 
earlier, the boards of sample companies are most balanced in favour of non-executive directors 
in the event year. Consistent with this observation, Tables 7.13 and 7.25 indicate an average 
increase in independence between the pre-event and event years and an average decline 
between the event and post-event years.  
 Table 7.14 indicates that independence is considerably lower in takeover targets which 
are acquired than in those for which offers fail, suggesting that the presence of independent 
directors may improve a company’s ability to overcome the threat of takeover. Independence 
is much lower in the market abuse sample subset than in the takeover subset. Results of Mann 
Whitney tests, provided in Table 7.23, show that this difference is statistically significant in 
each year studied. The lower confidence level with which the significance of the difference is 
stated in the post-event year may be explained by the increase in independence which occurs 
in the market abuse subset between the event and post-event years, as indicated in Tables 7.15 
and 7.25, while independence decreases in the takeover subset as indicated in Table 7.14 and 
7.25.  
 While director independence in the main research sample is lower than what is 
desirable under best practice guidelines, it should be noted that scores achieved for board 
independence are, on average, higher in the post-event year than in the pre-event year. Thus 
there is some improvement over the three years studied, albeit smaller than that observed in 
the control sample. As discussed previously, increases in board independence have been 
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attributed to press exposure of board underperformance (Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009). The 
increases in independence observed in the present sample over the course of newspaper 
reporting on takeover and market abuse cases may lend some support to this finding. The 
results of analysis of possible associations between independence and newspaper reporting are 
discussed in Subsection 7.6.1.  
 
c. Accountability: the Role of the Audit Committee 
Audit Committee Size 
Table 7.13 illustrates that the average score achieved for audit committee size in the main 
research sample is high relative to the other components of CGQ. As can be seen from Table 
7.24, scores for audit committee size are significantly higher than the benchmark scores set by 
the control sample in each year. Results provided in Tables 7.14, 7.15, 7.18 and 7.19 reveal 
that the audit committees in the takeover subset are considered to be of a more suitable size 
than those in the market abuse subset despite a more appropriate board size being observed in 
the market abuse subset.  
 As regards changes in scores, opposing trends are again observed between the two 
sample subsets. An average score increase occurs in the takeover subset between the pre-event 
and event years, followed by a decrease between the event and post-event years. When scores 
are benchmark-adjusted, this decrease appears much smaller as scores in the control sample 
decrease by a similar magnitude. As can be seen from Table 7.22, benchmark-adjusted scores 
for audit committee size in the takeover subset are significantly higher in the event and post-
event years than in the pre-event year. In the market abuse subset, an average score decrease 
occurs between the pre-event and event years and, while no change in the unadjusted scores in 
the market abuse subset is evident between the event and post-event years, an improvement in 
the adjusted scores is observed.  
 In the event year, audit committee size is considered most appropriate in the takeover 
subset and least appropriate in the market abuse subset. Un-tabulated results of a frequency 
analysis on the audit committee size data, prior to scoring, shows that in the event year, 77.7% 
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of companies in the takeover subset and 61.1% of companies in the market abuse subset have 
an appropriately sized audit committee in terms of CGQ. Five companies (27.8%) in the 
market abuse subset have not established an audit committee, while only one company (1.9%) 
in the takeover subset does have an audit committee. The merits of establishing an audit 
committee are strongly emphasised under Principle C.3 of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010); however, as adoption of the Corporate Governance Code’s recommendations is 
voluntary for AIM companies, the observed absence of audit committees in certain companies 
in the market abuse subset may be partially attributed to the inclusion of AIM companies in 
the sample. Nevertheless, the vast majority of AIM companies in the takeover subset have 
established an audit committee. This might suggest that AIM companies whose shares are 
implicated in market abuse may not follow the guidelines of the Corporate Governance Code 
as they are encouraged to. 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
As can be seen in Tables 7.13, 7.17 and 7.25, over three quarters of companies in the main 
research sample have majority independent audit committees, compared with just over one 
half of companies in the control sample. When the takeover and market abuse sample subsets 
are considered separately, it appears that audit committee independence is higher in the 
takeover subset. Results of statistical tests for differences, reported in Table 7.23, show that 
audit committees in the takeover subset are significantly more independent than those in the 
market abuse subset.   
 Table 7.14 shows that in the pre-event year, proportionately more companies which go 
on to survive takeover attempts have majority independent audit committees than those which 
succumb to the offer. Audit committee independence in takeover targets is highest in the event 
year. Following the same pattern as observed for board independence, board meetings and 
audit committee size, the audit committees of takeover targets become more suitably 
independent as the threat of takeover faces them, before reverting back to a level slightly 
above that observed in the year before the event. Improvements in the market abuse subset 
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again appear to occur somewhat later than those in the takeover subset. As Table 7.15 shows, 
there is no change in the independence of audit committees of companies in the market abuse 
subset between the pre-event and event years and an improvement in independence between 
the event and post-event years.  
 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Table 7.25 indicates that an average of three audit committee meetings is held per annum in 
companies in the main research sample, compared with an average of two in the control 
sample. More audit committee meetings are held within takeover targets that are closely 
involved with the Takeover Panel, which most likely reflect the greater incidence of audit 
committees in the takeover subset of the research sample. As can be seen from Table 7.13, an 
average score of between seven and eight is achieved within the full sample for the 
appropriateness of the number of audit committee meetings held, with a slight improvement 
being observed over the three years studied. Table 7.24 demonstrates that these scores are 
significantly higher than the benchmarks set within the control sample. 
 As noted, more audit committee meetings are observed within the takeover subset. 
Indeed, average scores achieved within the takeover subset for audit committee activity are 
high relative to many other components of CGQ and Table 7.25 indicates that these takeover 
targets on average meet at least three times in the year. Nevertheless, Table 7.14 shows that 
average scores remain below ten. It is thus likely that certain audit committees in the sample 
subset meet more regularly than three times per annum while others meet less frequently. 
Table 7.14 and 7.18 also indicate that there is an average improvement in score over the three 
years surrounding cases. Average scores for both the event year and post-event year are 
notably higher than that reported for the pre-event year. Table 7.20 reports no significant 
differences in the unadjusted scores between years. However, results for the benchmark-
adjusted scores in Table 7.22 indicate that, relative to the control sample, the frequency of 
audit committee meetings is significantly higher in both the event and post-event years than in 
the pre-event year.  
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 Average scores achieved within the market abuse subset are markedly lower than 
those in the takeover subset. Table 7.23 shows that this difference is statistically significant in 
all three years. Scores are, however, in line with the benchmark scores set by the control 
sample. While the lower scores in the market abuse subset relative to the takeover subset may 
be explained by the considerable proportion of companies which fail to establish an audit 
committee, the lower mean scores for audit committee meeting frequency than for audit 
committee size would suggest that even in cases where audit committees are in place, 
meetings may not be held as frequently as in the takeover subset. The lower average score for 
audit committee meetings observed in the market abuse subset in the event year is consistent 
with the simultaneous lower average score for audit committee size.  
 
Collectively, these three sets of results indicate that audit committee quality is considerably 
lower in the market abuse subset than in the takeover subset. The quality of audit committees 
in takeover targets is not considered optimal under the present CGQ scoring system, 
particularly in the year prior to the takeover or offer withdrawal, but it is above the benchmark 
set by the control sample. This suggests that the size, independence and activity of audit 
committees in the takeover subset of the research sample is more appropriate than what might 
be expected from companies of their sizes and industries. Moreover, the governance quality of 
audit committees tends to improve in companies which survive the takeover attempt.  
 The improvement in scores assigned for audit committee size in the takeover subset in 
the event year might indicate an enhanced effort by boards to oversee the financial integrity of 
the company as the threat of takeover becomes imminent. In the year in which market abuse 
occurs, a considerable proportion of the companies whose shares are implicated have not 
established an audit committee. Even when a committee is established, what is presently 
regarded as a sufficient number of meetings is not always held. These results are indicative of 
insufficient monitoring of the financial reporting process, with the possible implication that 
price-sensitive information may be leaked by insiders. In the year of the abuse, 50% of 
companies whose shares are involved fail to fully observe the independence guidelines set out 
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under Principle C.3.1 of the Corporate Governance Code (2010), further suggesting that an 
audit committee of appropriate size and independence which is suitably active may well serve 
to provide some control over the flow of price-sensitive financial information. 
 
d. Directors’ Remuneration and Incentives 
CEO Pay to Performance Sensitivity 
Results reported in Table 7.13 indicate that CEO pay to performance sensitivity is one of the 
weaker elements of CGQ. Average scores in the pre-event and event years are below six. 
Although it would appear that the sensitivity of CEO pay to performance in the main research 
sample is not optimal in terms of the CGQ criteria set herein, Table 7.24 shows that the scores 
achieved are significantly higher than the benchmark scores. Consistently, the benchmark-
adjusted scores reported in Table 7.17 are positive in each year studied. Accordingly, CEO 
pay in sample companies may be more reflective of performance than that in their industry 
peers. It may be the case that the low average scores observed in both the main sample and the 
control sample are driven by companies in certain industries whose performance has changed 
to due circumstances within those industries which are beyond the CEO’s control.  
 On further inspection, it would seem that the lack of sensitivity of CEO pay to 
performance, suggested by the sample averages, is largely due to increases in the wealth of 
shareholders of certain companies while the pay of their CEOs decreases. The average CEO 
pay to performance sensitivity ratios reported in Table 7.25 indicate that a negative 
relationship exists between CEO pay and performance in the main sample in both the pre-
event and event years. Un-tabulated results of a frequency analysis of the pre-event year data 
reveals that in 41 companies (30.4% of the sample), there are negative CEO pay to 
performance ratios which are explained by increasing shareholder wealth and decreasing CEO 
pay, while in 21 companies (15.5%), there are negative ratios which are due to decreasing 
shareholder wealth and increasing CEO pay. A similar analysis of the event year data reveals 
that in 17 companies (23.7%), there are negative ratios which are due to increasing 
shareholder wealth and decreasing CEO pay, while in 14 companies (19.5%), there are 
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negative ratios which are due to decreasing shareholder wealth and increasing CEO pay. Thus, 
while the CEO’s pay is not sensitive to performance in a considerable proportion of the 
sample in the pre-event and event years, it is the CEO, rather than the shareholders, who 
experiences a loss in the majority of cases. Similar findings are derived for the control sample, 
where the CEO incurs a loss in spite of shareholder gains in 18% of companies in the pre-
event year, 26.3% of companies in the event year and 24.9% of companies in the post-event 
year. There appears to be an improvement in the main sample in the post-event year when the 
average score assigned for CEO pay to performance sensitivity increases to 6.55. As can be 
seen from Table 7.25, the average ratio of CEO pay to performance in the post-event year is 
0.009, indicating that on average, CEO pay increases by £9 per £1,000 increase in shareholder 
wealth. In fact, CEO pay in the main sample seems quite well structured relative to that in the 
control sample where CEO pay remains insensitive to performance throughout the three years 
studied. 
 When the takeover and market abuse sample subsets are considered individually, it 
would seem that changes in CEO pay in the takeover subset are more sensitive to changes in 
shareholder wealth than in the market abuse subset. Table 7.23 shows that scores assigned for 
CEO pay to performance sensitivity in the takeover subset are significantly higher than those 
in the market abuse subset in the pre-event and post-event years. While Table 7.25 shows that 
there is a negative average CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio of -0.001 in the takeover 
subset in the pre-event year, positive average ratios of 0.004 and 0.006 are observed for the 
event- and post-event years respectively. Average scores in the takeover subset are also higher 
than those reported for the control sample in each of the three years studied.  
 While scores in the market abuse subset are in line with the benchmark scores set by 
the control sample companies, Table 7.25 reports negative average ratios for the market abuse 
subset for each of the three years studied. A frequency analysis of the data for the market 
abuse subset shows that in the majority of these companies, the negative ratios are due to an 
increase in CEO pay while shareholder wealth decreases. Thus, it would appear that in the 
market abuse subset in particular, the levels of remuneration awarded to CEOs are not 
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reflective of performance. This is indicative of a lack of adherence to Principle D.1 of the 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) and would suggest that the incentives and rewards for 
safeguarding and maximising shareholder wealth are not appropriately structured. 
 
Directors’ Shareholdings 
The average proportion of shares owned by boards, reported in Table 7.25, initially suggests 
that in the full main sample, directors’ shareholdings are close to what is presently considered 
necessary to be an effective incentive to work within shareholders’ interests. Nevertheless, 
scores assigned for the appropriateness of directors’ shareholdings are lower than the 
benchmark scores in all years studied indicating that the shareholdings of boards in the control 
sample may serve as a more effective incentive to maximise returns. 
  As can be seen from Tables 7.14, 7.15, 7.18 and 7.19, scores assigned for the 
suitability of the levels of director share ownership are low in both the takeover and market 
abuse subset. The average values in Table 7.25 suggest that the low scores observed in the 
takeover subset arise because, in a large percentage of companies, boards hold a low 
proportion of shares. In contrast, the low scores in the market abuse subset are due to a large 
percentage of companies where boards hold a large proportion of shares. As Table 7.23 shows, 
the difference in the score between the takeover and market abuse subsets in the pre-event 
year is statistically significant. In addition, un-tabulated results of Mann-Whitney tests on the 
shareholding data, prior to application of the scoring methodology, show that the proportion of 
shares owned by boards differs significantly between the two subsets in all three years at both 
the 1% and 5% levels. While the percentage of shares owned by boards in the takeover subset 
is, on average, lower than that in the control sample, it is closer to the control sample average 
than that in the market abuse subset, which is discernibly higher.   
 Table 7.25 shows that the average percentage of common shares owned by boards in 
the takeover subset is lower in the event year than in the pre-event year. While this might lead 
one to expect a decline in the average score, as the proportion of shares owned by boards 
moves further away from 10%, Table 7.14 shows that in the takeover subset, there is a slight 
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average increase in score between the pre-event and event years. Un-tabulated results of a 
frequency analysis of the pre-event to event year changes in shareholdings reveals that there 
are proportionately more increases in shareholdings, leading to a score improvement; 
however, the increases which occur are small in magnitude. While there are fewer decreases in 
shareholdings, the magnitude of many of these is large, with the effect that the average 
shareholding in the takeover subset in the event year is lower than that in the pre-event year. 
As can be seen from Table 7.14, there is an average decrease in score in the takeover subset 
between the event and post-event years, as the proportions of shares owned by boards 
decrease.  
 Table 7.15 shows that there is also an average score improvement between the pre-
event and event years in the market abuse subset, as directors’ shareholdings move toward the 
10% level, which is deemed optimal in terms of the CGQ criteria set herein. There is an 
average decline in score between the event and post-event years, despite the lower average 
shareholding in the post-event year reported in Table 7.25. Un-tabulated results of a frequency 
analysis of the changes in shareholdings show that while there are proportionately more 
decreases in shareholdings, many are of a small magnitude such that they have little effect on 
score, while the increases which occur in certain sample companies have the effect of 
lowering scores. 
  Although, the proportions of shares owned by boards in the takeover subset are 
deemed inappropriately low, while those in the market abuse subset are deemed 
inappropriately high , similar patterns are observed in both sample subsets and in the control 
sample in that there is an average score improvement between the pre-event and event years, 
followed by a decrease between the event and post-event years. Table 7.20 indicates that the 
decline in score which occurs between the event and post-event years results in a significantly 
lower score being achieved in the full sample in the post-event year than in the event year.  
 These results indicate that the proportions of shares owned by boards, in terms of 
CGQ, is considered poor on average within the full research sample. The low average scores 
reported in Table 7.14, accompanied by low average values reported for the takeover subset in 
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Table 7.25 for each year, suggest that the boards of companies involved in takeover cases may 
not bear the same levels of risk as their shareholders. In contrast, the low average scores 
reported in Table 7.15 and the associated high average values reported in Table 7.25 for each 
year indicate that directors may be somewhat entrenched in companies involved in market 
abuse cases. It is unlikely that the greater ownership stakes held by directors in the market 
abuse subset reflects shares acquired through prohibited dealings since the average 
shareholdings of boards in the market abuse subset decline over the three year period. A 
considerable amount of directors’ shareholdings may have been accumulated through the 
awarding of stock-based compensation, particularly since boards in the market abuse subset 
tend to have fewer independent non-executive directors than those in the takeover subset.  
 
7.3. Initial Tests for Causality 
As stated in Chapter Five, this study poses the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Changes in corporate governance quality are associated with volumes of newspaper 
reporting on takeover offers and instances of market abuse. 
 
As outlined in Figure 7.1, there is a further, third stage in the analysis before the research 
model is applied to the data. This involves a performing a preliminary test to investigate if a 
causal relationship exists between corporate governance quality change and newspaper 
reporting. As described in Chapter Five, the relationship between ΔCGQ and newspaper 
reporting is initially examined by testing for differences in ΔCGQ between the cases which 
receive the greatest amount of newspaper coverage (the high media quartile) and the cases 
which receive the least amount of coverage (the low media quartile). In order to do so, the 
changes in corporate governance quality between two consecutive years of cases are ranked in 
terms of the volumes of newspaper reporting on cases in the first of those two years. The 
highest and lowest media quartiles are then identified. Mann Whitney tests are conducted to 
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compare ΔCGQ in the high media quartile with that in the low media quartile. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 7.26.   
 
Table 7.26: Comparisons of ∆CGQ between High and Low Media Samples Below are comparisons of both the unadjusted and adjusted changes in the total CGQ scores between the quartile of the sample which receives the highest newspaper coverage and the quartile which receives the lowest coverage. Comparisons are also made in the takeover and market abuse sample subsets individually.    Full Sample  Takeover  Market Abuse 
 ∆CGQ between pre-event year and event year 
Mann Whitney Z 2.23  1.83  - 
Significance (0.026)***  (0.067)*  - 
∆CGQ between event year and post-event year 
Mann Whitney Z 0.05  0.72  1.38 
Significance (0.960)  (0.472)  (0.168) 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
  
Results show that there is a statistically significant difference in the pre-event to event year 
change in CGQ between cases which receive the most newspaper coverage in the pre-event 
year and those which receive the least. This significant difference pertains to both the 
unadjusted and adjusted measures of ΔCGQ in the full sample and in the takeover subset. 
Because the level of newspaper reporting on market abuse cases in the pre-event year is so 
low, the analysis is not performed for the market abuse subset separately. In the full sample, 
the average value for unadjusted ΔCGQ in the high media quartile is 5.59 and that for adjusted 
ΔCGQ is 0.07. In the low media quartile, the average unadjusted ΔCGQ is -1.58 and the 
average adjusted ΔCGQ is -0.10. In the takeover subset, the average value for unadjusted 
ΔCGQ is 5.77 in the high media quartile and that for adjusted ΔCGQ is 0.09. In the low media 
quartile, the average unadjusted ΔCGQ is -1.91 and the average adjusted ΔCGQ is -0.12. 
 Accordingly, when the unadjusted values are considered, the differences in ΔCGQ 
between the high and low media quartiles arise because there is a small deterioration in CGQ 
in cases which receive no newspaper coverage while there is an improvement in CGQ, of a 
greater magnitude, in those cases which receive the most newspaper coverage. When the 
benchmark-adjusted values are considered, the differences in ΔCGQ between the two quartiles 
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may be attributed to a small improvement in CGQ in cases which receive the most newspaper 
coverage and a greater deterioration in those cases which receive no newspaper coverage. 
 These results initially suggest that a causal relationship exists between newspaper 
reporting in the pre-event year and the pre-event to event year change in CGQ. Although this 
inference cannot be made for market abuse cases in isolation, the apparent relationship 
between ΔCGQ and newspaper reporting in the takeover subset is also detected in the full 
research sample where market abuse cases are included.  
 The difference in the event to post-event year change in CGQ between the high and 
low media quartiles is not significant in the full sample or in either subset thereof. In the full 
sample, the average values for unadjusted ΔCGQ in the high and low media quartiles are 0.16 
and 1.71 respectively and those for adjusted ΔCGQ are 0.18 and 0.26; in the takeover subset, 
the average values for unadjusted ΔCGQ in the high and low media quartiles are 0.09 and 0.56 
respectively and those for adjusted ΔCGQ are 0.12 and 0.20; and in the market abuse subset, 
the average values for ΔCGQ in the high and low media quartiles are 1.19 and 5.43 
respectively and those for adjusted ΔCGQ are 0.01 and 0.31. These results suggest that 
changes in corporate governance quality between the event and post-event years of takeover 
and market abuse cases are positive in direction irrespective of the level of newspaper 
coverage they receive in the event year. Interestingly, for cases which receive low levels of 
newspaper coverage in the event year, the magnitude of the improvement in CGQ between the 
event and post-event years is greater than for cases which receive high levels of coverage in 
the event year.  
 Thus, on first inspection, it appears that there is a significant difference in the pre-
event to event change in corporate governance quality between cases which receive high 
levels of newspaper coverage and those which receive low levels of newspaper coverage in the 
pre-event year. The difference in the event to post-event year change in corporate governance 
quality between cases which receive high event year coverage and cases which receive low 
event year coverage is not significant. This may indicate that newspaper reports published in 
the early stages of cases have a stronger influence on boards’ propensity to implement 
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governance changes than those reports published in later stages. Inferences cannot be made 
with certainty until the research model is applied. The next section presents and discusses the 
results of the multivariate analysis employed to fully investigate possible associations between 
changes in corporate governance quality and newspaper reporting.  
 
7.4. Multivariate Analysis 
This section presents the multivariate analysis performed to test the research posed herein. As 
outlined in Chapter Five, the possibility that changes in corporate governance quality are 
influenced by the same forces which determine the amount of newspaper reporting on TMA 
cases gives rise to endogeneity concerns in the present research. To alleviate these concerns, 
the analysis is performed in two stages. The first stage OLS regression model (Equation 5.1) is 
employed to examine associations between newspaper reporting on takeover and market abuse 
cases and its potential determinants and to isolate a measure of newspaper reporting which 
does not reflect the influence of these determinants- company size, age and industrial location, 
the nature of regulatory issues in cases and the economic environment. For each case, the 
residual value is determined from the regression. Since these values represent the difference 
between the observed values of newspaper reporting and those predicted by the model, they 
provide a measure of the volume of newspaper reporting on each case which is not correlated 
to any of the determinants. This measure is then used in the second stage OLS regression 
model (Equation 5.2) which effectively tests the research hypothesis H1, by examining 
associations between changes in corporate governance quality between two consecutive years 
of a TMA case and the volume of newspaper reporting in the first.  
 Prior to conducting each stage of the multivariate analysis, correlation analysis must 
be performed for the first and second stage models. Using Pearson correlation coefficients, 
this analysis is performed for each model in order to examine if any of the explanatory 
variables are highly correlated such that their inclusion in the model might create problems of 
multicollinearity. All correlation analysis is conducted using SPSS version 21 and all 
multivariate analysis is conducted using PcGive version 13.3.  
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a. The Determinants of Newspaper Reporting   
As discussed, the present study recognises five factors which may influence the amount of 
newspaper coverage companies receive when involved in a takeover or market abuse case. 
These are company size, company age, the industrial location of the company, the economic 
environment and issues associated with the takeover or market abuse case. Before the first 
stage of the multivariate analysis is performed to test for associations between newspaper 
reporting and its potential determinants, correlation analysis is conducted to examine if any of 
the variables measuring the determinants are highly correlated.  
 
Correlation Analysis 
The results of correlation analysis for the first stage model are presented in Table 7.27. The 
model is not applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting on companies in the market abuse 
subset in isolation due to low levels of newspaper reporting in the pre-event year. 
Consequently, correlation analysis for the determinants of newspaper reporting in the pre-
event year is not performed for the market abuse subset separately.  
 The results indicate that a high positive correlation exists between company size 
(CSIZE) and company age (AGE) in the full sample. A weaker positive correlation exists 
between the two variables in the takeover subset when the model is applied to event year 
newspaper reporting. The most likely explanation for this is simply that companies grow over 
time and hence, size increases with age. While this association might raise concerns regarding 
multicollinearity, the variables CSIZE and AGE are retained in the model since, as discussed 
in Chapter Four, a company’s size and age may have individual influences on the extent to 
which it is recognised by the newspaper media and its audiences and hence, the amount of 
newspaper coverage it receives when involved in a TMA case. Moreover, because entirely 
different data is employed for the measurements made by these two variables, the correlations 
are unlikely to create multicollinearity problems. 
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Table 7.27: Correlation Analysis: Determinants of Newspaper Reporting Below are the Pearson correlation coefficients used to examine correlations between the independent variables in the first stage OLS regression model (Equation 5.1). The first part of the table presents the correlation coefficients for the independent variables when the model is applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting. The second part presents the correlation coefficients for the independent variables when the model is applied to event year newspaper reporting.  
  CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 INDGENt-1 ISSt ECONt-1 
 Pre-event year newspaper reporting 
 Full Sample (n= 71) CSIZEt-1 1     AGEt-1 0.305** 1    INDGENt-1 0.177 -0.023 1   ISSt -0.424*** -0.255** -0.320*** 1  ECONt-1 0.177 -0.105 -0.087 -0.211* 1 Takeover Subset (n= 54) CSIZEt-1 1     AGEt-1 0.199 1    INDGENt-1 0.046 -0.107 1   ISSt 0.002 -0.085 -0.063 1  ECONt-1 0.154 -0.154 -0.193 0.068 1 Event year newspaper reporting 
 Full Sample (n= 62) CSIZEt-1 1     AGEt-1 0.353*** 1    INDGENt-1 0.062 -0.002 1   ISSt -0.502*** -0.222* -0.253** 1  ECONt-1 0.091 -0.052 -0.070 -0.147 1 Takeover Subset (n= 46) CSIZEt-1 1     AGEt-1 0.247* 1    INDGENt-1 -0.130 -0.085 1   ISSt -0.157 0.087 0.066 1  ECONt-1 0.078 -0.070 -0.158 0.202 1 Market Abuse Subset (n= 16) CSIZEt-1 1     AGEt-1 0.349 1    INDGENt-1 0.073 -0.183 1   ISSt -0.420 0.131 -0.050 1  ECONt-1 -0.211 -0.288 -0.115 -0.332 1 Variable Definitions: CSIZEt-1:Company size, measured as ln (total fixed assets in the pre-event year); AGEt-1:Company age, measured as the number of years from the date on which the company’s ordinary shares were first admitted to the listing on the relevant stock markets to the date on which newspaper reporting begins; INDGENt-1:General industry location of company; ISSt: Primary reason for regulation of takeover or market abuse case; ECONt-1: Economic environment, measured as ln (GDP for the UK at the first quarter of the pre-event year). 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level  
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 CSIZE is highly negatively correlated with the primary issue in TMA cases (ISS) in 
the full sample. This would effectively imply that smaller companies are involved in TMA 
cases which put shareholders’ interests at a greater risk. Given that larger companies face 
more stringent requirements to follow best practice corporate governance guidelines, it is 
plausible that such an association exists. In the present sample, it is explained by the fact that 
market abuse cases, which the author considers to represent a greater expropriation of 
shareholder wealth, involve smaller companies, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. 
Indeed, when the takeover and market abuse subsets are considered separately, no such 
correlation appears to exist. Given that the model is applied to the two subsets individually, 
the variable ISS is also retained. 
 The variable AGE is negatively correlated with the variable ISS in the full sample but 
not in either sample subsets. This correlation implies that the interests of shareholders in older 
companies are placed at a lesser risk when the companies are involved in TMA cases. The 
correlation in the present sample, however, has an explanation similar to that for the 
correlation between the variables CSIZE and ISS. Since this thesis considers market abuse to 
represent a greater injustice to shareholders, the correlation most likely arises due to the 
tendency, noted in Section 7.2, for companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse 
cases to be younger than those companies involved in takeover cases. Again, when the 
takeover and market abuse subsets are considered separately, no such correlation is detected. 
Consequently, both the variables AGE and ISS remain included in the model. 
 A high negative correlation is also observed between general industry location 
(INDGEN) and ISS in the full sample but not in either subset. This suggests that more 
companies from certain industries are involved in takeover cases while more companies from 
other different industries are involved in market abuse cases. As mentioned previously, 
takeover waves tend to be experienced at an industry level (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001; Martynova and Renneboog, 2005); however, since the 
industry classification is not based on the extent of takeover activity within the industries, the 
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correlation most likely exists for spurious reasons. Accordingly, the variable INDGEN is also 
retained in the model.  
 The variables ISS and the economic environment (ECON) are also negatively 
correlated in the full sample. This may indicate that shareholders’ interests are at a lesser risk 
when the national economic environment is healthier. Since it is reasoned herein that 
shareholders’ interests are at the greatest risk in market abuse cases, it would seem that market 
abuse cases occur more at times when the economy is weaker. As discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter, the greatest number of market abuse cases occurs at the beginning of the 
sample period. Although economic conditions were less buoyant at this time than in later years 
studied, the higher incidence of market abuse cases is attributed to the fact that FSMA was 
only recently implemented and had not yet created a sufficient deterrent. Consequently, it is 
likely that this explains the correlation which exists between ISS and ECON and the variable 
ECON remains included in the model.   
  
Multivariate Analysis 
The results for the OLS regression model employed to examine the determinants of newspaper 
reporting (Equation 5.1) are provided in Table 7.28. The results indicate that newspaper 
reporting on TMA cases is strongly determined by the size of companies involved. Significant 
positive associations are detected between company size and the volumes of reports published 
in both the pre-event and event years in the full sample and in the individual takeover subset. 
Partial R2 values indicate that the marginal contribution of company size in explaining 
newspaper reporting on TMA cases is higher than that of the other potential determinants. 
This supports the conjecture that journalists are more likely to report on large companies 
because of their richer information environments (Miller, 2006). Since it would appear that  
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Table 7.28: The Determinants of Newspaper Reporting Below are the results of the OLS regressions of (i) the pre-event year reporting variable (NPRt-1) and (ii) the event year reporting variable (NPRt) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting.  Full Sample Takeover Subset Market Abuse Subset  t-value t-prob Part. R2 t-value t-prob Part. R2 t-value t-prob Part. R2 Dependent Variable: NPRt-1 n=71 n=53  Constant 0.129 0.900 0.001 0.335 0.739 0.002 - - - CSIZEt-1 1.800 0.077* 0.047 1.910 0.063* 0.072 - - - AGEt-1 1.780 0.080* 0.046 1.620 0.112 0.053 - - - INDGENt-1 0.389 0.699 0.002 0.265 0.792 0.002 - - - ISSt -1.220 0.226 0.023 -0.350 0.728 0.003 - - - ECONt-1 -0.147 0.884 
 
0.001 -0.357 0.723 0.003 - - - 
Model Diagnostics R2  0.212 Adj. R
2 0.152 
 
F (5, 65)  3.503 (0.007)*** R
2  0.156 Adj. R
2 0.066 F (5, 47) 1.740 (0.144) - - - 
Dependent Variable: NPRt n=62 n=46 n=16 Constant 0.097 0.923 0.001 3.080 0.004 0.192 -0.512 0.620 0.026 CSIZEt-1 4.560 0.001*** 0.271 8.090 0.001*** 0.620 -0.460 0.677 0.018 AGEt-1 -0.038 0.970 0.001 -2.300 0.027** 0.117 1.390 0.194 0.162 INDGENt-1 -1.280 0.205 0.029 -3.460 0.001*** 0.231 -0.746 0.473 0.053 ISSt -1.300 0.198 0.030 5.730 0.001*** 0.451 0.836 0.423 0.065 ECONt-1 -0.124 0.901 
 
0.001 -3.310 0.002*** 0.215 0.499 0.629 0.024 
Model Diagnostics R2  0.423 Adj. R
2  0.372 F (5, 56)  8.220 (0.001)*** 
 
R2  0.709 Adj. R
2 0.672 F (5, 40)  19.480(0.001)*** R
2  0.297 Adj. R
2 -0.054 F (6, 10)  0.845 (0.548) 
Variable Definitions: NPRt-1: Pre-event year newspaper reporting, measured as ln (1+No. newspaper reports in the pre-event year); NPRt: Event year newspaper reporting, measured as ln (1+No. newspaper reports in the event year); CSIZEt-1: Company size, measured as ln (total fixed assets in the pre-event year); AGEt-1: Company age, measured as the number of years from the date on which the company’s ordinary shares were first admitted to the listing on the relevant stock markets to the date on which newspaper reporting begins; INDGENt-
1: General industry location of company; ISSt: Primary reason for regulation of TMA case; ECONt-1: Economic environment, measured as ln (GDP for the UK at the first quarter of the pre-event year). 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7.28 Continued: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants for Pre-event and Event Years  Pre-Event Year Event Year   Predicted Residual Predicted Residual 
 Full Sample n=  71 62 
 Mean 0.907 0.000 2.809 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.757 1.458 1.279 1.492 
Min  -1.096 -2.175 -0.828 -4.496 
Max 2.356 4.675 5.796 3.538 
Takeover Subset  n=   53 46 
 Mean 1.215 0.000 3.468 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.713 1.657 1.520 0.974 
Min  -0.456 -2.504 0.035 -1.598 
Max 2.700 4.458 6.223 3.153 
Market Abuse Subset  n=   16  Mean - - 0.914 0.000 
Std. Dev. - - 0.478 0.738 
Min  - - -0.150 -1.052 
Max - - 1.927 1.508 
 
larger companies take a more prominent place in the media spotlight, it may be the case that 
the newspaper media may play a greater role in aligning managers’ and directors’ interests 
with those of shareholders in larger companies. It seems that the amount of newspaper 
coverage which companies involved in market abuse cases receive relies less on their size. As 
discussed in Section 7.2, the low levels of newspaper reporting on market abuse cases is most 
likely to be attributable to journalists’ inability to access information on such cases. Hence, 
even when the shares of large companies, which would normally be quite visible in the news 
media, are implicated in market abuse, the story may not receive a considerable amount of 
newspaper coverage. 
 A significant positive association is detected between pre-event year newspaper 
reporting and company age in the full sample and a significant negative association is between 
event year newspaper reporting and company age in the takeover subset of the sample. The 
literature reviewed in Chapter Four generally indicates that older companies tend to have 
richer information environments and are generally more visible in the media. The higher levels 
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of coverage of TMA cases involving older companies in the pre-event year is consistent with 
this conjecture. However, it would appear that in the year of the main events of a takeover 
case, younger firms tend to receive more coverage. This may be because journalists do not 
report on younger companies with the same immediacy as they would with older companies 
which are recognised more readily by readers. Hence, they may be less inclined to speculate 
on potential takeover offers for younger companies. However as the offer becomes imminent, 
it may be considered more newsworthy as the likelihood of an effective takeover with real 
implications for various stakeholders increases. Moreover, in the event year, there is apt to be 
a greater availability of information on the actions of the parties involved such the search costs 
associated with reporting on younger companies are reduced. 
 For the takeover subset of the sample, a significant negative association is detected 
between event year newspaper reporting and the general industrial location of the target 
company. Bearing in mind the coding system employed to indicate general industrial location 
outlined in Table 5.8, it would appear that takeover offers for companies in the oil, gas and 
consumer goods and services industries receive more coverage than do those for companies in 
the financial services and utilities industries. As discussed in Chapter Four, the oil, gas and 
consumer goods and services industries are considered to be high profile industries and hence, 
companies in these industries are apt to be of greater interest to the mainstream newspaper 
media and to its readers throughout society. Companies in the oil and gas industries generate 
considerable employment and, because of their wealth, are of significance in the national and 
global economy (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). Consumer goods and services 
industries invest highly in marketing and, consequently, are visible both to the media and the 
general public (Brammer and Millington, 2006).  While newspaper coverage of banks and 
other financial services companies increased following the global financial crisis of 2008 
(Schecter, 2009; Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010; Stromback, Jenssen and Aalberg, 2011), the 
news media has been criticised for being complacent during the sub-prime lending bubble and 
economic boom years (Schecter, 2009; Starkman, 2009). Thus, it is likely that over the 
majority of the sample period, takeover offers for companies in the financial industry may not 
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have been considered as newsworthy as would those for large oil or gas produces or for major 
retailers. As can be seen from Table 7.28, no significant association is detected between pre-
event year newspaper reporting and companies’ general industrial locations. Since pre-event 
year newspaper reporting is largely based on rumour and speculation, it would seem that 
industry is only a significant determinant of newspaper reporting when there is more certainty 
about the offer. There is no evidence to indicate that industry is a significant determinant of 
reporting on market abuse cases. Again, this is most likely to be due to a scarcity of 
information such that even abuses involving the shares of companies in high profile industries 
go largely unreported. 
 A significant negative association is detected between event year newspaper reporting 
and national economic performance in the takeover subset of the sample. As noted in Chapter 
Four, the mainstream newspaper media may consider the potential consequences of takeover 
offers for employees, creditors and customers to be more significant when the economy is 
weaker as they may have a negative effect on overall flow of wealth within the economy. The 
fact that this association is detected in the event year only also suggests that economic 
performance is not a significant determinant of speculative newspaper commentary on 
takeover offers. Again, no significant association is detected in the individual market abuse 
sample subset which is also likely to be attributable to the barriers journalists face when 
reporting on corporate crimes such as market abuse.  
 Finally, a significant positive association is detected between event year newspaper 
reporting and the primary reason for the intervention of the Takeover Panel. The partial R2 
value of 0.451 indicates that after company size, the nature of the regulatory issue makes the 
greatest contribution to the model’s capacity to explain event year newspaper reporting. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the issues which give rise to regulatory intervention are categorised 
in terms of the severity of their implications for shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, these 
results indicate that takeover cases where shareholders’ interests are jeopardised to the greatest 
extent receive the most coverage. While this is encouraging to the extent that it indicates that 
the newspaper media may serve a watchdog role for shareholders by publicising issues that put 
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their interests at risk, the low levels of newspaper coverage of market abuse issues, which are 
presently considered to pose a greater threat to shareholders’ interests, suggests that the 
capacity of the newspaper media to perform this function is limited.   
 Having considered all of the significant associations detected between newspaper 
reporting and its potential determinants, a number of model testing diagnostics must be 
consulted to assess the model specification. 
  
Model Significance 
The results of F-tests show that the model is statistically significant from zero when applied to 
pre-event year newspaper reporting in the full sample, but not when applied to the takeover 
subset separately. Results also indicate that the model is statistically significant from zero 
when applied to event year newspaper reporting in the full sample and in the takeover subset 
but not in the market abuse subset.  
 
Goodness of Fit 
R2 values suggest that for the full sample, 21.2% of the variation in pre-event year newspaper 
reporting from case to case may be explained by company size, age and general industrial 
location, the economic climate at the time of the case and the reason for regulatory 
intervention in the case. The adjusted R2 value, however, indicates that when the number of 
independent variables in the model is accounted for, the model has the capacity to explain 
15.2% of the variation in pre-event year newspaper reporting between cases, while 84.8% may 
be attributable to other factors. The R2 value of 0.156 and the adjusted R2 value of 0.066 
reported for pre-event year newspaper reporting in the individual takeover subset indicate that 
the explanatory power of the model is lower when applied to takeover cases in isolation. 
 When event year newspaper reporting is considered, the explanatory power of the 
model appears greater. The R2 value for the model when applied to the full sample is 0.423. 
These values for the model when applied to the individual takeover and market abuse subsets 
are 0.709 and 0.297 respectively. The adjusted R2 values for the full sample and the takeover 
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subset are also high relative to those for the pre-event year (0.372 and 0.672 respectively). The 
adjusted R2 value of -0.054 for the market abuse subset denotes that the explanatory power is 
considerably lower for market abuse cases.  
 Taken together, these results indicate that the model best fits the event year newspaper 
reporting data in the takeover subset. As noted above, this is where the strongest associations 
are observed between newspaper reporting and its suggested determinants. In fact, it would 
appear that event year newspaper reporting on takeover cases is strongly associated with each 
of the five factors of interest. While it would not appear that companies’ industrial locations, 
the regulatory issues facing them or the economic environment significantly influence pre-
event year newspaper reporting, the sizes and ages of companies do appear to determine the 
amount of coverage they receive. These influences considered, it would appear essential that 
the residual values derived from this model are employed in the second stage model so that it 
is possible to examine the relationship between corporate governance quality change and a 
measure of newspaper reporting which is independent of these factors. Thus, any significant 
associations detected between changes in corporate governance quality and this measure of 
newspaper reporting may provide a more valid indication that newspaper reporting on 
takeover and market abuse cases influences changes in corporate governance quality in the 
companies involved. 
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b. The Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality Change  
As outlined at the beginning of this section, the second stage OLS regression model employed 
herein effectively tests the research hypothesis, H1, by examining associations between 
changes in corporate governance quality and newspaper reporting. Before this model is 
applied to the data, further correlation analysis must be conducted for the explanatory 
variables included in the model.  
 
Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis for the second stage model again seeks to determine if any of the 
explanatory variables included in the model are strongly correlated so as to mitigate potential 
issues of multicollinearity. The results of this analysis should also confirm that the newspaper 
reporting variables employed are not correlated with any of the variables measuring company 
size, age and general industry location, regulatory issues and the economic environment. 
 Results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.29. As noted, due to low levels of 
newspaper reporting in the pre-event year, the model is not applied to the pre-event to event 
year change in corporate governance quality in the market abuse subset in isolation. 
Consequently, correlation analysis for the determinants of pre-event to event year changes in 
CGQ is not performed for the market abuse subset separately. 
 Immediately, it ought to be noted that no correlations exist between the newspaper 
reporting variable, RESNPR, and company size (CSIZE), company age (AGE), general 
industry (INDGEN), regulatory issue (ISS) or economic environment (ECON). The Pearson 
correlation coefficients thus confirm that the newspaper reporting variable which will be 
employed in the second stage regression model does not reflect any influence of these five 
factors, thereby alleviating endogeneity concerns to a considerable degree. 
 A strong negative correlation is detected in both the full sample and the takeover 
subset between pre-event year newspaper reporting (RESNPRt-1) and pre-event year 
benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality (CGQt-1(ad)). Furthermore, a weaker positive 
correlation is detected in the full sample and in the takeover subset between event year  
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Table 7.29: Correlation Analysis: Determinants of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-event to Event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change 
 Below are the Pearson correlation coefficients used to examine correlations between the independent variables in the second stage OLS regression model (Equation 5.2) when applied to the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ.  
  RESNPRt-1 CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 INDGENt-1 ISSt ECONt-1 CGQt-1(ad) PERFt-1 INSTt-1 
 Full Sample  (n= 71) RESNPRt-1 1         CSIZEt-1 0.000 1        AGEt-1 0.000 0.305** 1       INDGENt-1 0.000 0.177 -0.023 1      ISSt 0.000 -0.424*** -0.255** -0.320*** 1     ECONt-1 0.000 0.177 -0.105 -0.087 -0.211* 1    CGQt-1(ad) -0.308*** 0.493*** 0.181 0.127 -0.443*** -0.059 1   PERFt-1 0.427 0.335*** 0.109 -0.069 -0.147 0.047 0.120 1  INSTt-1 -0.037 0.046 -0.072 0.136 -0.292** 0.242** 0.008 -0.024 1 
 Takeover Subset  (n= 53) RESNPRt-1 1         CSIZEt-1 0.000 1        AGEt-1 0.000 0.199 1       INDGENt-1 0.000 0.046 -0.107 1      ISSt 0.000 0.002 -0.085 -0.063 1     ECONt-1 0.000 0.154 -0.154 -0.193 0.068 1    CGQt-1(ad) -0.381*** 0.199 0.026 -0.882 0.210 0.040 1   PERFt-1 0.121 0.337** 0.075 -0.136 0.067 0.003 0.080 1  INSTt-1 0.059 0.184 -0.200 -0.019 0.059 0.282** -0.067 -0.096 1 
 Variable Definitions: RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting; CSIZEt-1: Company size, measured as ln (total fixed assets in the pre-event year); AGEt-1:Company age, measured as the number of years from the date on which the company’s ordinary shares were first admitted to the listing on the relevant stock markets to the date on which newspaper reporting begins; INDGENt-1:General industry location of company; ISSt: Primary reason for regulation of takeover or market abuse case; ECONt-1: Economic environment, measured as ln (GDP for the UK at the first quarter of the pre-event year); CGQt-1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the pre-event year; PERFt-1: Industry-adjusted company performance in the pre-event year, measured as: (company sales in pre-event year – average industry sales in pre-event year)/standard deviation of industry sales in pre-event year; INSTt-1: Proportion of institutional ownership of the company in the pre-event year. 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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  Table 7.29 Continued: Correlation Analysis: Determinants of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change 
 Below are the Pearson correlation coefficients used to examine correlations between the independent variables in the second stage OLS regression model (Equation 5.2) when applied to the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ in the full research sample and the takeover subset. Results for the market abuse subset are presented on the next page. 
  RESNPRt CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 INDGENt-1 ISSt ECONt-1 CGQt(ad) PERFt INSTt-1 
 Full Sample  (n= 62) RESNPRt 1         CSIZEt-1 0.000 1        AGEt-1 0.000 0.353** 1       INDGENt-1 0.000 0.062 -0.002 1      ISSt 0.000 -0.488*** -0.277** -0.309** 1     ECONt-1 0.000 0.091 -0.052 -0.068 -0.223* 1    CGQt(ad) 0.247* 0.538*** 0.193 0.232* -0.418*** -0.042 1   PERFt 0.205 0.348*** -0.004 -0.080 -0.163 0.019 0.105 1  INSTt-1 0.184 0.099 0.065 0.187 -0.231* 0.227* 0.072 -0.106 1 
 Takeover Subset  (n= 46) RESNPRt 1         CSIZEt-1 0.000 1        AGEt-1 0.000 0.247* 1       INDGENt-1 0.000 -0.130 -0.085 1      ISSt 0.000 -0.079 -0.046 -0.061 1     ECONt-1 0.000 0.080 -0.070 -0.157 -0.017 1    CGQt(ad) 0.232* 0.177 0.031 0.115 0.494*** 0.129 1   PERFt 0.028 0.348** -0.059 -0.150 0.046 -0.032 0.039 1  INSTt-1 0.113 0.251* -0.007 0.069 -0.066 0.262* 0.047 -0.191 1 
 Variable Definitions: RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting; CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; PERFt: Industry-adjusted company performance in the event year, measured as: (company sales in event year – average industry sales in event year)/standard deviation of industry sales in event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level  
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Table 7.29 Continued: Correlation Analysis: Determinants of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change 
 Below are the Pearson correlation coefficients used to examine correlations between the independent variables in the second stage OLS regression model (Equation 5.2) when applied to the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ in market abuse subset. 
  RESNPRt CSIZEt-1 AGEt-1 INDGENt-1 ISSt ECONt-1 CGQt(ad) PERFt INSTt-1 
 Market Abuse Subset (n= 16) 
RESNPRt 1         CSIZEt-1 0.000 1        AGEt-1 0.000 0.349 1       INDGENt-1 0.000 0.073 -0.183 1      ISSt 0.000 -0.286 -0.070 -0.049 1     ECONt-1 0.000 -0.216 -0.290 -0.111 -0.234 1    CGQt(ad) 0.249 0.831*** 0.196 0.124 -0.156 -0.540** 1   PERFt -0.150 -0.085 -0.234 -0.179 -0.211 0.761*** -0.382 1  INSTt-1 0.085 0.242 0.020 0.427 0.107 0.033 -0.192 0.256 1 
 Variable Definitions: RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting; CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; PERFt: Industry-adjusted company performance in the event year, measured as: (company sales in event year – average industry sales in event year)/standard deviation of industry sales in event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level 
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newspaper reporting (RESNPRt) and event year benchmark-adjusted corporate governance 
quality (CGQt(ad)). If the news media serves its corporate governance role as this thesis 
proposes, such correlations may be expected. As an effective monitor of managers and 
directors, the attention of the news media may be initially attracted to companies with a lower 
quality of internal governance (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 
2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009). Even if the governance quality of these companies 
improves in the event year, they may remain under media scrutiny for some time (Lauterbach 
and Pajuste, 2014). If pre-existing CGQ is a determinant of both newspaper reporting and 
CGQ change, there may still be a possibility that an endogenous relationship exists between 
changes in CGQ and newspaper reporting. Thus, it is essential that this possibility is addressed 
when testing the robustness of the research model in the next section. 
 The results show that CSIZE is positively correlated with AGE in the full sample and 
also in the takeover subset when the model is applied to the event to post-event change in 
corporate governance quality. As discussed at the beginning of this section, these correlations 
are most likely to be explained by companies’ growth over time. Notwithstanding this 
association, a company’s age may influence changes in corporate governance quality in a 
different manner to its size and therefore, it is deemed necessary to include both variables in 
the model. 
 A strong negative correlation is observed between CSIZE and ISS in the full sample. 
As was also considered at the beginning of this section, this correlation is likely to be 
attributable to the fact that market abuse cases, which are deemed to represent a greater 
expropriation of shareholder wealth, involve smaller companies. Consistent with the decision 
made for the first stage model, the variable ISS is retained since no correlations are observed 
when the takeover and market abuse subsets are considered separately. 
 CSIZE is positively correlated with pre-existing governance quality in the full sample 
and also in the market abuse subset. This correlation is most likely due to the fact that 
adoption of the principles of the Corporate Governance Code is voluntary for the smaller, 
growing companies listed on the AIM. Hence, the quality of governance in these companies 
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over the past year is apt to be lower than that of larger companies, listed on the Main Market 
where the listing rules require that the principles of the Code be adopted on a comply or 
explain basis. Since both a company’s size and the quality of its governance over the past year 
may have individual influences on changes in CGQ, both variables are retained in the model.  
 CSIZE is also positively correlated with Industry-adjusted Performance (PERF) in the 
full sample and in the takeover subset thereof. This correlation is to be expected as industry-
adjusted sales is presently employed as the performance measure, while total fixed assets is 
employed as the measure of company size. In effect, companies with more assets have a 
greater ability to generate sales while smaller companies which are still growing, such as those 
on the AIM may not yet have fully entered the product market. Again, both measures may 
have distinct influences on changes in corporate governance quality and hence, they are both 
included in the model. 
 The variable AGE is negatively correlated with the variable ISS in the full sample. 
This correlation was also observed in the correlation analysis for the first stage model. As 
discussed, this is most likely to be due to the tendency for companies in the market abuse 
subset to be younger than those in the takeover subset. Since no such correlation is detected 
when the two subsets are considered separately, both variables are also included in the second 
stage model. 
 As was the case in the first stage analysis, a strong negative correlation exists between 
INDGEN and ISS in the full sample. Consistent with the decision made previously, the two 
variables are included in the second stage model as the correlation is more likely to arise for 
spurious reasons rather than due to a systematic correlation between the regulatory issues 
facing companies and their industrial locations. 
 When the model is applied to the event to post-event year change in CGQ, a positive 
correlation exists between companies’ governance quality over the past year and their general 
industrial locations. This correlation, which is observed in the full sample only, indicates that 
companies in the oil, gas and consumer goods and services industries had the poorest 
governance quality in the event year while those in the financial industry had the highest. This 
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may be because many banks and financial services companies face additional regulatory 
requirements imposed by the FSA, such that their boards may meet more frequently or their 
audit committees may function more effectively. However, this correlation is not observed 
elsewhere and hence, it may be merely coincidental. Since the two variables measure entirely 
different characteristics of the sample, they are both included in the model. 
 As was observed in the correlation analysis performed for the first stage model, the 
variables ISS and ECON are negatively correlated in the full sample. As noted, it is likely that 
this correlation arises due to the greater number of market abuse cases at the beginning of the 
sample period, when national economic performance was weaker, than in later years studied. 
Consistent with the decision made previously, both variables remain included in the second 
stage model.   
 The variable ISS is negatively correlated with the past year’s corporate governance 
quality as measured in both the pre-event and event years in the full sample, while, in the 
individual takeover subset, ISS is positively associated with the past year’s corporate 
governance as measured in the event year. This implies that when takeover and market abuse 
cases are considered collectively, companies involved in more serious regulatory issues 
exhibit a lower governance quality as measured using the present CGQ scoring method. Since 
market abuse cases are presently deemed to be the most serious issues, this effectively 
indicates what has already been observed in Section 7.2; that companies in the market abuse 
subset tend to have a lower quality of governance than do those in the takeover subset. 
However, when the takeover subset is considered in isolation, the targets of offers involving 
more serious breaches of the Takeover Code exhibit higher CGQ in the event year. A 
significant correlation is not observed for pre-event year scores. This suggests that in the year 
of an offer, during which a particularly serious violation of the Takeover Code occurs, the 
CGQ of target companies is higher than that of targets of offers involving lesser violations. 
Although, as reported in Section 7.2, the target is not to blame for the violation in the majority 
of cases, the company may be subject to additional regulatory scrutiny because of it being the 
target of the offer. This may explain the observed correlation; however, it may also be 
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spurious. As the two variables measure discrete characteristics of the sample, they are both 
retained in the model.  
 A negative correlation also exists between the severity of the regulatory issue and the 
proportion of institutional ownership (INST) in the full sample. Section 7.2 has already noted 
that the proportions of companies in the takeover subset owned by investment institutions is 
higher than that of companies in the market abuse subset, where the regulatory issues are 
presently considered more severe. As considered in Section 7.2, this finding may indicate that 
abuses such as insider dealing are more likely in companies which lack strong shareholder 
monitoring. Notwithstanding this correlation, the changes in corporate governance quality 
being examined in the model may be determined by the two factors in different manners and 
hence, they are both included. 
 A positive correlation is detected between ECON and INST in the full sample and in 
the takeover subset, effectively indicating that institutional ownership of companies increases 
with improving economic conditions. This correlation might be expected as more prosperous 
economic conditions implies that there is more wealth to invest and also that the country’s 
stock exchange offers an attractive setting for investment. However, as economic conditions 
improved over the sample period, the percentage of UK listed shares owned by institutions 
declined (ONS, 2013). Thus, this correlation may be spurious. For this reason, both variables 
are retained in the model. 
 When the model is applied to the event to post-event year change in CGQ, a positive 
correlation is detected between CSIZE and INST in the takeover subset only. One possibility 
is that larger companies, listed on the Main Market of the Exchange, attract investment from 
more institutional investors, particularly from those overseas. However, since this weak 
correlation is only detected in one instance in the research sample, it may be spurious and the 
decision to include both variables in the model is retained. 
 In the market abuse subset, a negative correlation is observed between CGQ in the 
past year and the economic climate, suggesting that as economic conditions improve, the 
governance quality of companies in the sample subset deteriorates. Leung and Horowitz 
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(2010) find that during an economic downturn, there is a greater alignment of the interests of 
directors with those of shareholders. Thus, it is possible that as the economy improves, 
directors are more inclined to pursue self-serving objectives and become less vigilant monitors 
of shareholders’ interests such that the quality of governance in the company is lower. Since 
this correlation is only detected in the small market abuse subset, generalisations ought not to 
be made. As the variables ECON and CGQ measure quite distinct features of the sample, they 
are both retained in the model. 
 A strong positive correlation exists between PERF and ECON in the market abuse 
subset. This correlation might also be anticipated as company sales are apt to increase with an 
increasing flow of wealth in the economy. In fact, it is surprising that such a correlation is not 
observed elsewhere in the sample. As noted in Section 7.2, companies in the market abuse 
subset tend to underperform by industry standards. Thus, their sales may be more sensitive to 
economic performance than those of companies which meet the industry standard. Since this 
correlation is only observed on this occasion, both variables, which measure different facets of 
the sample, are retained in the model. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
The results of the second stage OLS regression model which examines the determinants of 
benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality change (Equation 5.2) are provided in Table 
7.30. Results reveal that the association between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event 
year change in CGQ and pre-event year newspaper reporting is positive and statistically 
significant in the full sample (p= 0.041) and also in the takeover subset (p= 0.072). Having 
refined the measure of newspaper reporting such that it does not reflect any influence of 
factors which may also influence ∆CGQ, these results are consistent with those reported in 
Section 7.3, which indicate a causal relationship between pre-event newspaper reporting on 
TMA cases, as measured in its unrefined form, and changes in CGQ in the companies 
involved between the pre-event and event years. Results also show that the association  
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Table 7.30: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.680 0.100 0.045 RESNPRt-1 2.090 0.041** 0.068 CSIZEt-1 1.840 0.071* 0.053 AGEt-1 -0.490 0.626 0.004 INDGENt-1 -0.014 0.989 0.001 ISSt -1.070 0.287 0.019 ECONt-1 -1.700 0.095* 0.046 CGQt-1(ad) -4.400 0.001*** 0.244 PERFt-1 -1.920 0.060* 0.058 INSTt-1 1.590 0.116 0.041 BLAMEt 1.680 0.099* 0.045  R2: 0.406  Adj. R2: 0.307  F (10, 60):  4.101 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 0.410 0.684 0.004 RESNPRt-1 1.850 0.072* 0.075 CSIZEt-1 1.900 0.065* 0.079 AGEt-1 -0.921 0.362 0.020 INDGENt-1 0.365 0.717 0.003 ISSt 2.580 0.014** 0.137 ECONt-1 -0.497 0.622 0.006 CGQt-1(ad) -6.630 0.001*** 0.511 PERFt-1 -1.380 0.174 0.044 INSTt-1 0.188 0.852 0.001 BLAMEt -1.610 0.115 0.058  R2: 0.651  Adj. R2: 0.568  F (10, 42):  7.825 (0.001)***  
Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting; CSIZEt-1: Company size, measured as ln (total fixed assets in the pre-event year); AGEt-1: Company age, measured as the number of years from the date on which the company’s ordinary shares were first admitted to the listing on the relevant stock markets to the date on which newspaper reporting begins; INDGENt-1:General industry location of company; ISSt: Primary reason for regulation of takeover or market abuse case; ECONt-1: Economic environment, measured as ln (GDP for the UK at the first quarter of the pre-event year); CGQt-1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the pre-event year; PERFt-1: Industry-adjusted company performance in the pre-event year, measured as: (company sales in pre-event year – average industry sales in pre-event year)/standard deviation of industry sales in pre-event year; INSTt-1: Proportion of institutional ownership of the company in the pre-event year; BLAMEt: 1 if the company is responsible for regulatory intervention in the TMA case and 0 if otherwise. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7.30 Continued: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 0.004 0.997 0.001 RESNPRt -0.247 0.806 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.190 0.033** 0.086 AGEt-1 1.150 0.257 0.025 INDGENt-1 0.730 0.469 0.010 ISSt 0.932 0.356 0.017 ECONt-1 -0.082 0.935 0.001 CGQt(ad) -2.310 0.025** 0.095 PERFt 0.114 0.910 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.382 0.704 0.003 BLAMEt 0.098 0.922 0.001 
 R2: 0.200  Adj. R2: 0.043  F (10, 51):  1.276 (0.269) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant -0.596 0.555 0.010 RESNPRt -0.531 0.582 0.008 CSIZEt-1 2.870 0.007*** 0.191 AGEt-1 1.400 0.172 0.053 INDGENt-1 0.308 0.760 0.003 ISSt 0.792 0.434 0.018 ECONt-1 0.480 0.634 0.007 CGQt(ad) -1.470 0.151 0.058 PERFt -1.210 0.233 0.040 INSTt-1 0.037 0.971 0.001 BLAMEt 2.580 0.014** 0.159 
 R2: 0.393  Adj. R2: 0.220  F (10, 35):  2.270 (0.036)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 2.020 0.100 0.449 RESNPRt 0.738 0.494 0.098 CSIZEt-1 1.210 0.280 0.227 AGEt-1 -0.320 0.762 0.020 INDGENt-1 0.526 0.621 0.052 ISSt -1.840 0.126 0.403 ECONt-1 -1.980 0.104 0.441 CGQt(ad) -1.360 0.231 0.271 PERFt 1.120 0.315 0.200 INSTt-1 -0.504 0.635 0.048 BLAMEt -0.641 0.550 0.076 
 R2: 0.719  Adj. R2: 0.156  F (10, 5):  1.278 (0.415) 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting; CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; PERFt: Industry-adjusted company performance in the event year, measured as: (company sales in event year – average industry sales in event year)/standard deviation of industry sales in event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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between the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in CGQ and event year 
newspaper reporting is negative in both the full sample and the takeover subset and positive in 
the market abuse subset; however, this association is not statistically significant in the full 
sample or in either subset thereof. In order to fully examine the extent to which changes in 
CGQ may be explained by newspaper reporting, it is necessary to consult a number of model 
testing diagnostics to assess if the model is correctly specified. 
 
Model Significance 
The results of F-tests show that when the model is applied to the benchmark-adjusted pre-
event to event change in CGQ, it is statistically significant from zero. Results do not indicate 
that the model is statistically significant from zero when applied to the benchmark-adjusted 
event to post-event change in the full sample or in the market abuse subset. The model is, 
however, statistically significant from zero in the takeover subset of the sample.  
 
Goodness of Fit 
Results indicate that when the sample is taken as a whole, 40.6% of the variation in the 
benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year CGQ change from case to case may be explained 
by pre-event year newspaper reporting together with the other determinants considered. Thus, 
the model may account for as much as 40.6% of the pre-event to event year change in CGQ in 
sample companies, while 59.4% of the change is driven by other factors. The adjusted R2 value 
of 0.307 implies that when the number of independent variables in the model is accounted for, 
the explanatory power of the model is somewhat lower such that it may only explain 30.7% of 
the variation in the pre-event to event year change in CGQ in the full sample. The R2 value of 
0.651 and the adjusted R2 value of 0.568 reported for the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to 
event year change in CGQ in the individual takeover subset indicate that the explanatory 
power of the model is higher when applied to takeover cases in isolation. Partial R2 values of 
0.068 and 0.075 for the variable RESNPRt-1 in the full sample and takeover subset respectively 
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indicate that the marginal contribution of pre-event newspaper reporting in explaining the pre-
event to event year change in CGQ is quite high.  
 Changes in CGQ in both the full sample and the takeover subset appear to be 
explained better by the ex-ante quality of governance in sample companies (partial R2 = 0.244 
and 0.511 respectively). A strong negative association exists between the change in CGQ 
between the pre-event and event years and the existing level of governance, as measured in the 
first of those two years (p = 0.001). As such, companies with a lower quality of governance in 
the pre-event year are significantly more likely to experience improvements in CGQ by the 
event year than those companies with a higher quality of governance. In the takeover subset of 
the sample, the marginal contributions to the explanatory power of the model made by 
company size and the nature of the regulatory issue are also relatively high (0.079 and 0.137 
respectively). Both are significantly positively associated with CGQ change, indicating that 
larger takeover targets and targets of offers involving serious breaches of the Takeover Code 
are significantly more likely to experience improvements in CGQ between the pre-event and 
event years. As discussed previously, the smaller companies in the sample, which are listed on 
the AIM, may not implement governance changes as readily as they are not stringently 
required to adopt the principles of the Corporate Governance Code. As has also been 
considered, the target of an offer which involves a serious breach of the Takeover Code may 
experience more intense regulatory scrutiny than it otherwise would, even if it is not to blame 
for the violation. Thus, it would seem that, in the takeover subset, regulatory oversight is a 
stronger determinant of changes in CGQ than media oversight. Nevertheless, newspaper 
coverage does appear to perform a significant role. 
 With regard to the model when applied to the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event 
year change in CGQ, the R2 values for the full sample and the takeover subset are lower than 
those observed for the pre-event to event change (0.200 and 0.393 respectively). The R2 value 
for the market abuse subset is quite high (0.719), but ought to be interpreted with caution 
given the small sample size. The adjusted R2 values of 0.043, 0.220 and 0.156 reported for the 
full sample and the takeover and market abuse subsets respectively further denote that the 
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explanatory power of the model is considerably lower when applied to the event to post-event 
year change. The partial R2 values for RESNPRt indicate that, relative to the other 
determinants, event year newspaper reporting makes a low contribution to explaining the 
event to post-event year change in CGQ in the full sample and in the takeover and market 
abuse subsets (0.001, 0.008 and 0.098). Partial R2 values again indicate that the marginal 
contribution of company size to the explanatory power of the model is relatively high in the 
full sample and in both the takeover and market abuse subsets (0.086, 0.191 and 0.227 
respectively). Company size is again significantly positively associated with the benchmark-
adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ in the full sample and in the takeover subset, 
but not in the market abuse subset. In the full sample, the quality of governance in the event 
year also appears to be a significant predictor of the event to post-event year change in CGQ 
(p = 0.025, partial R2 = 0.095). Again, the association between the two variables is negative. In 
the takeover subset, the question of whether or not the target is to blame for the violation of 
the Takeover Rule in the event year appears to significantly influence changes in CGQ over 
the following year. The significant positive association between the variables BLAMEt and 
∆CGQt→t+1(ad) (p = 0.014, partial R2 = 0.159) implies that the likelihood of CGQ improvements 
is greater when the target is responsible for Takeover Panel intervention. This is consistent 
with results derived for the pre-event to event year change in the takeover subset and further 
indicates that direct regulatory oversight encourages positive governance change. While 
neither the question of who is to blame nor the nature of the market abuse issue appears to be a 
significant driver in market abuse cases, the nature of the abuse does make a large contribution 
to explaining CGQ change in the market abuse subset (partial R2 = 0.403). However, the 
negative association, while not statistically significant, suggests that for companies whose 
shares are involved in more severe abuses, governance quality tends to deteriorate between the 
year of the abuse and the following year.  
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In sum, it would seem that the model is a better fit for the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to 
event year change in CGQ than for the event to post-event year change. The model is 
statistically significant from zero and exhibits greater explanatory capacity when applied to the 
pre-event to event year change in both the full sample and in the individual takeover subset. 
The association between CGQ change and newspaper reporting depicted in the model is 
positive and statistically significant when applied to the pre-event to event year change. These 
results suggest the hypothesis, H1, to be true with respect to the pre-event to event year change 
in CGQ. When the model is applied to the event to post-event year change, the association is 
positive in the market abuse subset only and not significant in the full sample or in either 
sample subsets.  
 
 Therefore, H1 cannot be rejected with respect to the pre-event to event year change in 
CGQ; however, it must be rejected with respect to the event to post-event year change in 
CGQ.  
 
 This implies that newspaper reports published in the early stages of takeover cases can 
significantly influence boards’ propensity to improve corporate governance quality. The larger 
the volume of reports on the anticipated takeover, the greater is the improvement in internal 
corporate governance quality. Reports published in later stages do not appear to have a direct 
impact on changes in corporate governance quality. Given that the applicability of the model 
to the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ is limited by a lack of pre-
event newspaper reporting on market abuse cases, inferences are not made regarding the 
influence of newspaper reports on the pre-event to event change in CGQ in market abuse 
cases.  
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7.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section provides further insight into the robustness of the research model and the validity 
of results by examining if the results are sensitive to measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables. To make such an assessment, the second stage research model 
(Equation 5.2) is modified such that alternative combinations of the benchmark-adjusted 
corporate governance quality variables and newspaper reporting variables, as measured by the 
residual values from the first stage model (Equation 5.1), are employed. Results for the 
modified models are compared with those reported above. As noted in the previous section, it 
may be the case that a company’s corporate governance quality in a given year is a 
determinant of both the amount of newspaper coverage it receives in that year and the extent 
to which its corporate governance quality changes between that year and the next. 
Accordingly, the sensitivity of results is further tested by modifying the first stage model to 
include existing corporate governance quality as a determinant of newspaper reporting. The 
residual values derived are then employed to operationalise the newspaper reporting variable 
in the second stage model so as to further address the possibility of an endogenous relationship 
between changes in CGQ and newspaper reporting. The final robustness test of the model 
explores the possibility, discussed in Chapter Four, that there may be occasions where certain 
newspaper publications do not devote the same level of coverage to issues facing companies 
as other publications do if, for example, they have affiliations or advertising contracts with the 
companies. Accordingly, in the last robustness test, the intensity of newspaper coverage of 
TMA cases is considered and a coefficient of variation is employed in the second stage model 
to account for cases where there is a good deal of coverage by some newspapers but not by 
others. All results of sensitivity analysis are presented in Appendix G. 
 Correlations between the explanatory variables in each of the modified models are 
also examined to assess the potential for problems of multicollinearity to arise. The results of 
this analysis are not reported but are available from the author on request. Any associations 
between variables detected have explanations similar to those discussed in the previous section 
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and the analysis has not indicated any cause to eliminate any of the explanatory variables from 
any variation of the model.  
 
a. Alternative Associations between Corporate Governance Quality Change and Newspaper 
Reporting 
The first phase of the sensitivity analysis examines if the benchmark-adjusted changes in 
corporate governance quality are more strongly associated with newspaper reporting in 
different years of cases. To perform this analysis, the second stage model is modified such that 
alternative newspaper reporting variables are employed. The explanatory power and goodness 
of fit of the modified models are examined in order to determine if corporate governance 
quality change might be better explained by the amount of newspaper reporting at different 
stages of cases. 
 
Pre-event to Event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change 
Since the pre-event to event year change in CGQ is not apparent until the end of the event 
year, the change may coincide with event year newspaper reporting. Sensitivity analysis is 
performed in order to assess if the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ 
is also associated with event year newspaper reporting. According, the first stage model is 
applied to the event year newspaper reporting and the residual values derived are employed to 
operationalise the variable RESNPRt in the second stage model which is applied to the 
benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ. The results of this analysis, 
presented in Table G.1 in Appendix G, provide no evidence that the benchmark-adjusted pre-
event to event year change in corporate governance quality is associated with event year 
newspaper reporting. R2 and adjusted R2 values for the full sample and the takeover subset 
indicate that the modified model has less explanatory power than when pre-event newspaper 
reporting is employed. While comparisons cannot be made for the market abuse subset, the 
adjusted R2 value reported in Appendix G is low relative to the values reported for the model 
as originally specified when applied to the full sample and the takeover subset in Table 7.30. 
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Event to Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change 
The evidence presented thus far suggests that newspaper reports published over the pre-event 
year have a stronger impact on corporate governance quality change than those published over 
the event year. To investigate if pre-event year newspaper reporting may also have an impact 
on the event to post-event year change in CGQ, the first stage model is applied to pre-event 
year newspaper reporting and the derived residual is employed to operationalise the variable 
RESNPRt-1 in the second stage model which is applied to the benchmark-adjusted event to 
post-event year change in CGQ. Results, presented in Table G.2 of Appendix G, show no 
evidence of a significant association in either the full sample or in the takeover subset. The 
analysis is not performed for the market abuse subset due to the low level of pre-event year 
newspaper reporting on market abuse cases. The R2 and adjusted R2 for the modified model 
when applied to the full sample are in line with those reported in the second part of Table 7.30 
and those for the takeover subset are slightly higher. However, it would seem that neither pre-
event year newspaper reporting nor event year newspaper reporting has a significant impact on 
the event to post-event year change in CGQ.  
 As the event to post-event year change in CGQ is not apparent until the end of the 
post-event year, the change may coincide with post-event year newspaper reporting. To 
examine this possibility, the model is modified so that it is specified to test for associations 
between the event to post-event year change in CGQ and post-event year newspaper reporting. 
Accordingly, the first stage model is applied to post-event year newspaper reporting and the 
residuals obtained are used in the second stage model to operationalise the variable 
RESNPRt+1 when applied to the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ. 
The results of these tests, presented in Table G.3, indicate that no significant association exists 
between the event to post-event change in CGQ and the newspaper reports which follow the 
initiation of this change. The R2 and adjusted R2 for the modified model are in line with those 
reported in the second part of Table 7.30. These results considred, it would not appear that the 
level of newspaper reporting over any stage of a TMA case has a significant impact on event 
to post-event year changes in the governance quality of companies involved. 
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b. Annual Corporate Governance Quality Variables 
Having found evidence to indicate that newspaper reporting is associated with changes in 
corporate governance quality, it is of interest to identify if newspaper reporting is also 
associated with the benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores for the individual years of takeover or 
market abuse cases. To examine if such an association exists, the first stage model is applied 
to newspaper reporting in the pre-event, event and post-event years and the residual values 
derived are used to operationalise the variable RESNPR in the second stage model which is 
applied to the benchmark-adjusted annual corporate governance quality scores for the same 
years. 
 
Pre-event Year Corporate Governance Quality 
Results for the second stage model when applied to pre-event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ 
and pre-event year newspaper reporting for the full sample and the takeover subset, presented 
in Table G.4 in Appendix G, show that a significant negative association exists between CGQ 
and newspaper reporting in the pre-event year, both in the full sample and in the takeover 
subset. Thus, pre-event year newspaper reporting is significantly associated with both the 
benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and with the benchmark-adjusted 
CGQ scores in sample companies in the pre-event year. However, while the extent of the 
change between the two years increases with increasing newspaper coverage, the score in the 
first of those two years is lower for companies which feature in a higher number of newspaper 
reports. Results of the F-tests show the model is significant at the 1% level. It should also be 
noted that, for this analysis of the determinants of pre-event year CGQ, the previous year’s 
CGQ score is not included as an explanatory variable in the second stage model due to the 
unavailability of CGQ data in certain cases leading to a high number of missing observations. 
Furthermore, the model is not applied to pre-event year CGQ and pre-event year newspaper 
reporting for market abuse cases due to low levels of pre-event year newspaper reporting.  
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Event Year Corporate Governance Quality 
Results for the second stage model when applied to the event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ 
scores for the full sample and both subsets, presented in Table G.5, do not offer any evidence 
of a significant association between event year CGQ and event year newspaper reporting. 
Overall, the second stage model is significant when applied to the full sample and both subsets 
and its explanatory power is higher than that for pre-event year CGQ.  
 
Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality  
The results for the second stage model when applied to the post-event year benchmark-
adjusted CGQ score and post-event year newspaper reporting, presented in Table G.6, show 
no indication of a significant association between post-event year CGQ and post-event year 
newspaper reporting. The model is statistically significant from zero in the full sample and in 
both subsets. Its explanatory power is higher than that for pre-event year CGQ. For the full 
sample and the takeover subset, it is lower than that when applied to event year CGQ and for 
the market abuse subset, it is higher. Results for the market abuse subset should, however, be 
interpreted with caution given the small sample size.  
 
Because the CGQ and newspaper reporting variables employed in this phase of the analysis 
are measured over the same periods in time, it is difficult to make inferences regarding 
causality. The existence of a significant negative association between pre-event year 
benchmark-adjusted CGQ and pre-event year newspaper reporting suggests that newspaper 
speculation regarding takeover offers focuses more on companies with a lower quality of 
internal governance. Thus, it could be the case that the quality of a company’s governance 
determines the amount of newspaper coverage it receives. The possibility that the amount of 
newspaper coverage companies receive is determined by the quality of their governance is 
further considered later in this section. Before doing so, a number of tests are performed to 
examine if there are any time lags involved in the relationship between CGQ and newspaper 
reporting. 
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c. Potential Time Lags 
The following analysis is performed to examine if companies’ CGQ scores in a given year 
year are associated with newspaper reporting in previous years. 
 
One Year Time Lags 
To investigate if the impact of newspaper reporting on companies’ involvement in takeover 
and market abuse cases is apparent in their CGQ scores one year later, two variations of the 
second stage model are considered. Firstly, the model is applied to the event year benchmark-
adjusted CGQ scores and pre-event year newspaper reporting and secondly, it is applied to the 
post-event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores and event year newspaper reporting. In both 
cases, the first stage model is applied to the relevant newspaper reporting dataset. The results 
of these analyses, which can be seen in Tables G.7 and G.8 respectively, show that the second 
stage models are both significant when applied to the full sample and the relevant subsets. A 
significant positive association is detected between pre-event year newspaper reporting and 
event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ in the takeover subset of the sample. However, there is 
no evidence of a significant association between pre-event newspaper reporting and event year 
CGQ in the full sample nor is there any evidence to indicate that event year newspaper 
reporting is significantly associated with post-event year CGQ in the full sample or in either 
subset thereof. The significant positive association between pre-event year newspaper 
reporting and event year governance quality in the takeover subset, together with the 
significant negative association between pre-event year newspaper reporting and pre-event 
year CGQ, reported in Table G.4, support the main finding that pre-event year newspaper 
reporting is significantly positively associated with the pre-event to event year change in 
CGQ. Collectively, these findings might be interpreted to indicate that, for the takeover subset 
at least, companies with low governance quality attract more newspaper coverage in the pre-
event year and experience the greatest improvements such that they have high governance 
quality in the event year. 
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Two Year Time Lag 
To examine if the impact of pre-event year newspaper reporting is apparent in corporate 
governance quality two years later, the second stage model is applied to the post-event year 
benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores and pre-event year newspaper reporting. The results of this 
analysis, presented in Table G.9, provide no indication of a significant association between 
newspaper reporting on cases and the benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores of companies 
concerned two years later.  
 
d. CGQ as a Determinant of Newspaper Reporting 
Thus far, this section has considered some evidence to suggest that companies’ corporate 
governance quality may influence the amount of newspaper coverage they receive. The 
primary research model employed in this study accounts for the possibility that both the level 
of newspaper coverage which companies receive and changes in their governance quality are 
determined by their size, age, industrial location, the regulatory issues they face and the 
economic climate. While the second stage model considers pre-existing CGQ as a predictor of 
CGQ change, the first stage model does not account for the possibility that newspaper 
reporting on companies is also determined by the quality of their governance. If a company’s 
existing corporate governance quality simultaneously influences both corporate governance 
quality change and newspaper reporting, the results of the main analysis reported in Section 
7.4 may suffer from an endogeneity bias.  
 To address this concern, the first stage model is modified to include companies’ 
existing CGQ as a determinant of newspaper reporting and the residual values derived are 
used to operationalise the variable RESNPR in the second stage model. As in the main 
analysis, the first stage model is applied to newspaper reporting in the pre-event and event 
years and the second stage model is applied to the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year 
change in CGQ and the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ. 
Consistent with the main analysis, companies’ existing corporate governance quality is 
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measured in the pre-event year in the first instance and in the event year in the second. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table G.10 and G.11. 
 As expected, the results for the first stage model show that pre-event year newspaper 
reporting is significantly negatively associated with pre-event year benchmark-adjusted 
corporate governance quality. While event year newspaper reporting is significantly positively 
associated with event year benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality in the individual 
takeover and market abuse subsets, such an association is not apparent in the combined 
sample. Since the results of the main analysis, reported in Table 7.30, indicate that the pre-
event to event year change in CGQ is significantly positively associated with pre-event year 
newspaper reporting and significantly negatively associated with pre-event year CGQ, it is 
important to examine how the results for the second stage model are affected when the 
measure of pre-event year newspaper reporting employed does not reflect how it is influenced 
by pre-event year CGQ. The results, reported in Table G.10, again indicate that the association 
between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and pre-event year 
newspaper reporting is positive and statistically significant; however, the significance of the 
association in the full sample is stated at a lower confidence level than in the main analysis. 
Thus, the results of this robustness test support those from the main analysis to the extent that 
they indicate that pre-event year newspaper reporting has a significant positive influence on 
the pre-event to event year change in CGQ. However, the strength of this influence, as inferred 
from the results of the main analysis, may be overestimated to some degree. Consistent with 
the results of the main analysis, the results reported in Table G.11 show that, when the 
alternative event year newspaper reporting variable is employed in the second stage model and 
the model is applied the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ, event 
year newspaper reporting is not a significant predictor of the event to post-event year change 
in CGQ. 
  For pre-event year newspaper reporting, a comparison of the R2 and adjusted R2 
values reported in the first part of Table G.10 with those reported in the first panel of Table 
7.28 indicate that the modified first stage model is a better fit for the data than the first stage 
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model as specified in the main analysis. While the first stage model, as originally specified, is 
not statistically significant from zero when applied to the individual takeover subset, the 
modified version is. For the modified second stage model when applied to the benchmark-
adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ, R2 and adjusted R2 values are slightly lower 
than those for the original second stage model specification, reported in Table 7.30. The model 
is statistically significant from zero in both instances.  
 With regard to the modified first stage model when applied to event year newspaper 
reporting, results reported in Table G.11 show that, in the full sample and the market abuse 
subset, the R2 values are higher than those for the original specification reported in Table 7.28 
but lower in the takeover subset. The model is significant from zero in the full sample and in 
the takeover subset, but not in the market abuse subset. When similar comparisons are drawn 
for the second stage model, it seems that employing the alternative newspaper reporting 
variable does not affect the R2 values in either the full sample or the takeover subset; however, 
R2 values for the modified model in the market abuse subset are slightly lower. The modified 
second stage model is significant in the takeover subset only. 
 While these results imply that the strength of the association between newspaper 
reporting and subsequent changes in corporate governance quality may not be as great as first 
thought, they ought not to cast doubt upon the main findings. Results for the modified first 
stage model suggest that the amount of newspaper coverage which a company receives in a 
given year of a TMA case is partly determined by its corporate governance quality in that 
year. If mainstream newspaper media devotes more coverage to takeover and market abuse 
cases involving companies with a lower quality of corporate governance, its governance role 
may be more meaningful than the main findings of this study would suggest. As such, the 
newspaper media may act as both a monitor of boards of directors and as a stimulus for 
governance improvements. This effectively implies that the newspaper media is more likely to 
report on external control events involving companies with poor internal governance and that 
such reporting may encourage improvements in the internal governance systems of companies 
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concerned. Thus, newspaper reporting may compliment the disciplinary effects of the threat of 
takeover on the board of directors.  
 Such an inference should, however, be made cautiously since the measures of 
newspaper reporting and CGQ employed in the first stage model are taken over the same 
periods in time. The primary purpose of this test has been to examine if the results for the 
second stage model derived in the main analysis are driven by an association between two of 
the explanatory variables in the model, newspaper reporting and pre-existing CGQ, so as to 
provide verification for the main finding. An effective examination of CGQ as a determinant 
of newspaper reporting would require the incorporation of time lags. Accordingly, a number 
of further tests are conducted to examine if the amount of newspaper coverage which 
companies receive in a given year of a TMA case is determined by their corporate governance 
quality in the previous year. To perform such tests, the first stage model is modified on two 
occasions so that it is specified to test for associations between (i) pre-event year benchmark-
adjusted CGQ and event year newspaper reporting and (ii) event year benchmark-adjusted 
CGQ and post-event year newspaper reporting. The results of this analysis, which are 
presented in Table G.12, provide no indication that newspaper reporting in either the event 
year or the post-event year of TMA cases is determined by the corporate governance quality of 
the companies involved in the previous year. While it is of interest to examine if newspaper 
reporting in the pre-event year is determined by companies’ corporate governance quality in 
the previous year, such an investigation cannot be performed due to the aforementioned 
unavailability of CGQ data for sample companies for the year prior to the pre-event year. 
Although these results do not indicate that companies’ corporate governance quality 
influences the amount of newspaper coverage they receive, the possibility that CGQ is a 
determinant of newspaper reporting cannot be dismissed given the significant associations 
detected between newspaper reporting and CGQ in both the pre-event and event years. 
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e. The Intensity of Newspaper Reporting 
As a final means of examining the sensitivity of the main results to measurement of newspaper 
reporting, the intensity, as well as the total amount, of newspaper coverage on TMA cases is 
considered. Chapter Four has discussed the possibility that not all newspaper publications give 
the same attention to issues involving companies, perhaps because of a reliance upon certain 
companies for advertising revenues or because a newspaper’s owners or editors are in some 
way affiliated with a company’s directors or shareholders. Thus, a company which is affiliated 
with one newspaper may not receive very much coverage in that newspaper when there are 
problems facing its board, but feature prominently in all others. Yet, because of a lack of 
coverage in that one newspaper, the overall level of newspaper coverage may not reflect the 
intensity of reporting by the other newspapers. Thus, a potential shortcoming of the second 
stage model employed in the main analysis is that it does not account for the intensity of 
newspaper coverage, which may have an influence on changes in corporate governance 
quality.   
  
The Intensity of Newspaper Reporting by Newspaper Publications 
To explore the intensity of newspaper reporting in the present sample, the newspaper reporting 
data for the pre-event and event years of each TMA case is organised by newspaper 
publication. For each case, the number of reports in each publication in the pre-event and 
event years is recorded. From these figures, a coefficient of variation among publications 
(cvp) for a given year, t, of a TMA case is determined for each case using the following 
formula: 
 
cvpt = Standard Deviation of Reports per Newspaper Publication in t Mean of Reports per Newspaper Publication in t 
 
Where: 
t  = (i) the pre-event year or (ii) the event year of a TMA case. 
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The coefficient of variation offers a useful means of comparing the dispersion of newspaper 
reporting among publications from case to case. While the standard deviation of the number of 
reports per newspaper publication provides a measure of dispersion for a given case, it is 
difficult to make meaningful comparisons on a case by case basis as the total number of 
reports published on each case varies, as do the means about which they occur. The coefficient 
of variation, or the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, provides a standardised 
measure of variation which is independent of the total level of reporting on cases.  
 Table G.13 provides descriptive statistics for the coefficients derived for sample cases. 
As can be seen, the coefficient of variation by newspaper publications in the pre-event year 
(cvpt-1) for both the full sample and the takeover subset ranges from zero to 2.85. In the market 
abuse subset, values for cvpt-1 range from zero to 2.84. Coefficients of zero arise for cases 
which receive no coverage in any newspaper. When only those cases which receive coverage 
are considered, the minimum value for cvpt-1 in both the full sample and the takeover subset is 
0.28. In the market abuse subset, the minimum values for cvpt -1 of 2.69 is much greater. Thus, 
in the pre-event year, reporting among newspapers on the most widely covered takeover case 
is over ten times more dispersed than that on the case which receives the most restricted 
coverage. In contrast, reporting among newspapers on the most widely covered market abuse 
case is only six per cent more dispersed than that on the case which receives the most 
restricted coverage. It is, however, important to bear in mind that the vast majority of market 
abuse cases are not reported on by any newspaper in the pre-event year.  
 In the event year, the coefficient of variation in reporting by newspaper publications 
(cvpt) ranges from zero to 2.90 in both the full sample and the market abuse subset and from 
zero to 2.84 in the takeover subset. When only those cases which receive coverage are 
considered, the minimum value for cvpt in both the full sample and the takeover subset is 0.09. 
In the market abuse subset, the minimum value for cvpt of 1.19 is again much greater. Thus, 
reporting among newspapers on the most widely covered takeover case is over thirty times 
more dispersed than that on the case which receives the most restricted coverage, while 
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reporting on the most widely covered market abuse case is just over twice as dispersed as that 
on the case which receives the most restricted coverage. 
 
The Intensity of Newspaper Reporting by Newspaper Groups 
Since the amount of coverage which a newspaper publication devotes to a given case may 
depend on the newspaper’s owner, it is important to also consider the newspaper group to 
which the publication belongs. As outlined in Chapter Five, the eight publications employed 
herein consist of four daily newspapers and their four Sunday equivalent editions. The four 
daily newspapers and their Sunday equivalents belong to four different newspaper groups. 
Accordingly, a second version of the coefficient (cvg) is employed to measure the variation in 
coverage among the four groups. In this instance, the number of reports published on cases in 
the pre-event and event years in each daily publication is added to the number of reports 
published in their Sunday equivalents and the coefficient of variation in reporting by 
newspaper groups for the pre-event and event years of each case is determined for each case 
using the following formula: 
 
cvgt = Standard Deviation of Reports per Newspaper Group in t Mean of Reports per Newspaper Group in t 
 
Where: 
t  = (i) the pre-event year or (ii) the event year of a TMA case. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the coefficients of variation among the four newspaper groups are 
also presented in Table G.13. Results show that the coefficient of variation among groups in 
the pre-event year (cvgt-1) for the full sample of cases ranges from zero to 2.05 and the 
coefficient of variation among groups in the event year (cvgt) ranges from zero to 2.11. In the 
takeover subset, cvgt-1 ranges from zero to 2.00 and cvgt ranges from zero to 2.11 and in the 
market abuse subset, cvgt-1 ranges from zero to 2.05 and cvgt ranges from zero to 2.00. When 
cases which do not receive any coverage are disregarded, the minimum values for cvgt -1 and 
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cvgt in both the full sample and the takeover subset are 0.05 and 0.09 respectively. In the 
market abuse subset, these values are 2.00 and 0.39 respectively. Hence, in the pre-event year, 
reporting among newspaper groups on the most widely covered takeover case is over forty 
times more dispersed than that on the case which receives the most restricted coverage. For 
market abuse cases, reporting among newspaper groups on the most widely covered case is 
only three per cent more dispersed than that on the case which receives the most restricted 
coverage. The difference in the event year is lower; reporting among newspaper groups on the 
most widely covered takeover case is twenty three times more dispersed than that on the case 
which receives the most restricted coverage and reporting on the most widely covered market 
abuse case is five times more dispersed than that on the case where coverage is most 
restricted. 
 On the whole, these comparisons indicate that there is considerable variation in the 
intensity of newspaper coverage from case to case. The variation for takeover cases is much 
greater than for market abuse cases. Although comparisons suffer from caveat of the 
differences in the sizes of the two sample subsets, the smaller variation in the intensity of 
coverage of market abuse cases may be attributable to the difficulties associated with reporting 
on such offences. As such, because information on market abuse cases is difficult to acquire, 
the benefits of publishing the news story may outweigh the benefits of being discreet so as to 
remain loyal to the company involved. 
 
Corporate Governance Quality Change and the Intensity of Newspaper Reporting 
To examine how the main results for the second stage model are affected when the intensity of 
newspaper coverage is accounted for, two alternative specifications of the model are 
considered. In the first, the variable RESNPRt is adjusted to reflect the variation in reporting 
by newspaper publications. This is achieved by multiplying the values for RESNPRt by the 
values for cvpt. The resulting measures are used to operationalise the variable, RESNPRvpt, 
which captures both the overall level of reporting on cases and the intensity of coverage by 
newspaper publications for a given year, t, of a TMA case. In the second adaptation of the 
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model, the variable RESNPRt is adjusted to reflect the variation in reporting by newspaper 
groups. In this instance, the values for RESNPRt are multiplied by the values for cvgt and the 
resulting measures are used to operationalise the variable, RESNPRvgt, which is employed as 
the newspaper reporting variable in the second stage model. Both variations of the model are 
applied to (i) the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and (ii) the 
benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in CGQ.  
 The results of this analysis, which are presented in Table G.13, indicate that, in the 
full sample, the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in corporate governance 
quality remains significantly positively associated with newspaper reporting when the 
intensity of coverage by both newspaper publications and newspaper groups is accounted for. 
The association between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in corporate 
governance quality and newspaper reporting is also significant in the individual takeover 
subset when the variation in coverage by publications is accounted for but not when the 
variation in reporting by newspaper groups is considered. When the results in Table G.13 are 
compared with the results for the original second stage model, reported in Table 7.30, R2 and 
adjusted R2 values indicate that the modified models are a slightly poorer fit for the data. Like 
the original second stage model, the modified models are statistically significant from zero 
when applied to the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ in both the 
full sample and the takeover subset thereof. 
 When the modified models are applied to the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event 
year change in corporate governance quality, there is, again, no evidence of a significant 
association between event year newspaper reporting and changes in CGQ. R2 and adjusted R2 
values are slightly lower for the full sample and the market abuse subset and slightly higher 
for the takeover subset. As was the case with the original second stage model, the modified 
models are only statistically significant when applied to the takeover subset of the sample. 
 In sum, these results indicate that the association between the pre-event to event year 
change in CGQ and pre-event year newspaper reporting is statistically significant when the 
intensity of reporting is taken into account. However, the association appears somewhat 
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weaker, particularly when the variation in coverage by newspaper groups considered. These 
results, taken together with those from the main analysis in Table 7.30, suggest that the overall 
amount of media publicity surrounding TMA cases may influence changes in governance 
quality in companies concerned quite strongly; however, in cases which receive a good deal of 
coverage from some newspapers but little coverage from others, this influence may be weaker. 
Thus, the practical value of the newspaper media in corporate governance appears to rely upon 
the extent to which journalists expose issues in companies. This implies that the independence 
of the newspaper media from the companies on which it reports is integral to its role in 
corporate governance. This implication is discussed in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Summary  
Table 7.31 summarises the results of all tests of the sensitivity of the research model. After 
considering all possible associations, results indicate that newspaper coverage of companies’ 
involvement in external governance events influences internal corporate governance quality in 
one primary manner; early reporting on the threat of takeover appears to lead boards of 
directors to take measures such that shareholders are provided enhanced protection over the 
following year. The results of sensitivity analysis provide further indication that any influence 
the newspaper media may have on improvements in corporate governance quality is short 
lived, since pre-event year newspaper reporting has not been found to be significantly 
associated with the event to post-event year change in CGQ. Furthermore, since neither event 
year nor post-event year newspaper reporting have been found to be significantly associated 
with the event to post-event year change in CGQ, it would appear that coverage of the main 
case events and ex-post analysis does not have a meaningful impact on the actions of boards 
concerned. It is only newspaper reports which initially publicise cases that may encourage 
changes in CGQ. 
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Table 7.31: CGQ Sensitivity Analysis: Summary  
 Test Rationale Main Findings Implications Refer to Appendix G  Alternative Associations between Corporate Governance Quality Change and Newspaper Reporting 
To examine if changes in CGQ are associated with levels of newspaper reporting at different stages of cases. 
No significant associations detected Indicates that improvements in CGQ do not coincide with newspaper publicity of the possibility of takeover, rather they follow it. Neither event year nor post-event year newspaper reporting have a significant impact on changes in CGQ, it is only newspaper reports published early in cases that may encourage changes in CGQ. Pre-event year newspaper reporting does not have a significant impact on the event to post-event change in CGQ indicating that newspaper reports published early in cases do not have a lasting influence on changes in CGQ. 
Tables G.1 to G.3 
Annual Corporate Governance Quality Variables 
To test for associations between annual benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores and simultaneous newspaper reporting. 
Significant negative association detected between pre-event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ and pre-event year newspaper reporting in full sample and takeover subset. 
Indicates that companies with lower CGQ receive more newspaper coverage in the pre-event year of TMA cases. Suggests that CGQ may be a determinant of newspaper reporting. 
Tables G.4 to G.6 
Potential Time Lags To test for potential time delays in associations between annual benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores and newspaper reporting.  
Significant positive association detected between pre-event year newspaper reporting and event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ in the takeover subset only.  
Implies that companies which receive more newspaper coverage in the pre-event year of takeover cases have higher CGQ in the event year.  
Tables G.7 to G.9 
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Table 7.31 Continued: CGQ Sensitivity Analysis: Summary  
 Test Rationale Main Findings Implications Refer to Appendix G  CGQ as a Determinant of Newspaper Reporting To examine if the association between CGQ change and newspaper reporting is affected by potential associations between newspaper reporting and pre-existing CGQ and to effectively examine if CGQ determines newspaper reporting. 
Significant negative association detected between pre-event year newspaper reporting and pre-event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ. Significant positive association detected between event year newspaper reporting and event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ in the individual takeover and market abuse subsets. Significant positive association detected between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable as adjusted such that it does not reflect the influence of pre-existing CGQ. No significant association detected between newspaper reporting in a given year and CGQ in the previous year. 
Supports results from the main analysis but the lower confidence level at which the significance of the association between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and the adjusted pre-event year newspaper reporting variable is stated in the full sample suggests that the influence of newspaper reporting on CGQ change may be weaker than first thought. No strong conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not newspaper reporting is determined by CGQ.   
Tables G.10 to G.12 
The Intensity of Newspaper Reporting  To explore the intensity of newspaper coverage of cases and to examine how the association between CGQ change and newspaper reporting is affected when the intensity of newspaper reporting is accounted for. 
Considerable variation in the intensity of coverage of takeover cases detected. Significant positive association detected between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable, as adjusted to reflect variations in coverage by newspaper publications, in the full sample and in the takeover subset. Significant positive association detected between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in CGQ and the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable, as adjusted to reflect variations in coverage by newspaper groups, in the full sample only.  
Indicates that pre-event to event year CGQ change is influenced by both the overall amount and intensity of pre-event year newspaper reporting. However, the influence of the newspaper media appears weaker when the intensity of coverage is accounted for. 
Table G.13 
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 The results of this sensitivity analysis both support the main findings and shed some 
valuable insight into the nature of the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
newspaper reporting. The results indicate that (i) pre-event year newspaper reporting is 
significantly negatively associated with pre-event year CGQ; (ii) event year newspaper 
reporting is significantly positively associated with event year CGQ; and (iii) pre-event year 
newspaper reporting is significantly positively associated with event year CGQ. These 
findings imply that companies with low CGQ attract more media attention in the pre-event 
year and that these companies, which experience greater improvements in CGQ between the 
pre-event and event years, continue to be monitored by the media in the event year. However, 
since newspaper reporting is not found to be significantly associated with companies’ CGQ in 
the previous year, it cannot be fully ascertained if the attention of the newspaper media is 
attracted to companies with a certain quality of governance. 
 Finally, results of this analysis have shown that changes in corporate governance 
quality are associated with the intensity of newspaper reporting as well as with the overall 
amount of coverage devoted to TMA cases. However, the association between CGQ change 
and newspaper reporting appears weaker when the intensity of coverage is accounted for. As 
such, the overall amount of newspaper publicity surrounding cases appears to have a relatively 
strong influence on changes in CGQ; however, the effective influence of this publicity may be 
weaker when the specific manner in which it comes about is considered. This finding implies 
that the positive influence of the newspaper media on corporate governance is contingent upon 
the extent to which issues in companies are exposed across the newspaper media which in turn 
relies upon the independence of newspapers from the companies on which they report. 
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7.6. Further Analysis 
The main analysis of the influence of newspaper reporting on takeover and market abuse cases 
on corporate governance quality in companies involved has uncovered some support for the 
hypothesis posed in this study. Results indicate that newspaper reports published in the early 
stages of takeover offers have an impact on corporate governance quality. Specifically, larger 
volumes of reports on potential takeovers, published in the year prior to the offer’s success or 
failure, are associated with larger improvements in the extent to which the boards of target 
companies serve to protect shareholders’ interests over the following year.  
 This section addresses a number of remaining questions regarding the influence of 
newspaper reporting on external control events on the primary internal control mechanism in 
companies involved. Primarily, this section examines the link between newspaper reporting 
and corporate governance quality in a more meticulous manner by testing for associations 
between newspaper reporting and the individual components of CGQ. In addition, 
consideration is given to whether the nature of the association between newspaper reporting 
on takeover offers and changes in corporate governance quality in companies targeted differs 
between hostile and friendly offers.   
 
7.6.1. Corporate Governance Quality Component Analysis 
Analysis of changes in corporate governance quality conducted thus far has concentrated on 
companies’ total benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores. To shed insight into the specific aspects of 
board structure and behaviour which are most sensitive to the influence of the newspaper 
media, an analysis of associations between changes in the ten individual components of CGQ 
and newspaper reporting is conducted. Accordingly, the second stage model is modified such 
that the benchmark-adjusted change in the score assigned for a given component of CGQ is 
employed as the dependent variable rather than the change in the overall score. The pre-
existing benchmark-adjusted score for the component in question is employed as an 
explanatory variable instead of pre-existing benchmark-adjusted total CGQ. As in the main 
analysis, the newspaper reporting variables employed measure the residual values derived 
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from the first stage regression model (Equation 5.1), the results of which are presented in 
Table 7.28 in Section 7.4. This analysis is performed for the full sample, the takeover subset 
and the market abuse subset where feasible. Results are presented in Appendix H. The main 
findings are reported below. 
 
a. Pre-event to Event Changes in CGQ Components 
Analysis of associations between the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year changes in 
the components of CGQ and pre-event newspaper reporting are performed for the full sample 
and the takeover subset. Analysis is not performed for the market abuse subset in isolation due 
to the low levels of pre-event year newspaper reporting noted previously. The main findings 
are as follows: 
 
A significant positive association is detected in the takeover subset between the benchmark-
adjusted changes in scores assigned for having a separate CEO and chairman and pre-event 
year newspaper reporting.  
 
This implies that companies which receive more newspaper coverage due to their being 
targeted for takeover are more inclined to split the roles of CEO and chairman than those 
which receive little coverage. As noted in Subsection 7.2.3, the proportion of companies 
where the CEO serves as chairman is smaller in the event year than in the pre-event year. This 
decrease may be partly attributed to the acquisition of companies where the roles are 
combined. Descriptive statistics presented earlier in Table 7.14 reveal maximum values of 10 
for the change in score assigned for board leadership roles between the pre-event and event 
years, indicating that the roles are split in a certain amount of sample companies which survive 
the takeover attempt. Un-tabulated results of a frequency analysis performed for just those 
companies where the roles are combined in the pre-event year shows that 75% of the 
companies in which the CEO serves as chairman are acquired in the event year, 12.5% remain 
independent and do not split the roles and 12.5% remain independent and split the roles. These 
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results indicate that the majority of boards which permit CEO-chairman duality are disciplined 
by the market for corporate control through a takeover, while one half of those which avoid 
such discipline split the roles in the following year. Given the unambiguous disapproval of 
CEO-chairman duality in best practice guidelines, it may be that a company’s being publicised 
as a takeover target in the press may encourage its board to split the roles in order to improve 
the perceived quality of governance in place within the company.  
 
A significant positive association is detected between the benchmark-adjusted changes in 
scores assigned for audit committee meeting frequency and pre-event year newspaper 
reporting in the full sample and in the takeover subset.  
 
This indicates that takeover targets which receive more newspaper coverage in the pre-event 
year make greater efforts to improve their internal systems of monitoring the integrity of their 
financial reports over the following year in that their audit committees become more active. 
However, it appears again that boards with audit committees which are not deemed to meet 
sufficiently regularly in terms of the criteria of corporate governance quality set herein are 
more likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control than make changes in 
response to media coverage. Un-tabulated results of a frequency analysis performed on the 
unscored audit committee meeting data reveals that of the companies whose audit committees 
meet infrequently, 45% are acquired, 10% remain independent and meet more frequently in 
the event year and 45% remain independent and meet as regularly or less frequently. In the 
takeover subset, these figures are 54%, 15% and 31% respectively.  
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A significant positive association is detected in the takeover subset between the benchmark-
adjusted changes in scores assigned for CEO pay to performance sensitivity and pre-event 
year newspaper reporting.  
 
This implies that newspaper exposure of the companies’ vulnerability to acquisition may 
encourage boards to ensure that changes in the CEO’s remuneration are more reflective of 
changes in shareholders’ wealth. Un-tabulated results of a frequency analysis performed on 
the unscored pre-event and event year CEO pay to performance sensitivity data reveals that of 
the companies where the CEO’s pay is not sensitive to performance, i.e. companies with a 
negative CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio, 42% are acquired, 39% remain 
independent and the CEO’s pay becomes more sensitive to performance and 19% remain 
independent and the CEO’s pay becomes less sensitive to performance or there is no change in 
sensitivity. Of the companies with a positive but high CEO pay to performance sensitivity 
ratio (0.05 or higher, i.e. where the CEO’s pay increases by £50 or more per £1,000 increase in 
shareholder wealth), 50% are acquired and 50% remain independent and the CEO’s pay 
becomes more sensitive to performance. These results indicate that for companies where the 
sensitivity of the CEO’s pay to performance is not adequately monitored, the likelihood that 
the board will be disciplined by the market for corporate control through a takeover is almost 
equal to the likelihood that actions will be taken such that the CEO’s pay becomes more 
reflective of his performance in maximising shareholders’ wealth. For companies which take 
such actions, the extent to which CEO pay becomes more sensitive to performance increases 
with the amount of coverage which the offer receives. 
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A significant positive association is detected in the takeover subset between the benchmark-
adjusted changes in scores assigned for directors’ shareholdings and pre-event year 
newspaper reporting.  
 
This suggests that newspaper media publicity surrounding a takeover offer may promote a 
better alignment of the interests of the target’s directors with those of its shareholders. As 
such, directors of targets which receive high levels of newspaper coverage are more inclined 
to change their shareholdings such that their interests in the company act as a sufficient 
incentive to maximise returns without rendering them entrenched. It would appear, however, 
that directors whose interests are not appropriately aligned with those of shareholders are more 
likely to be replaced in a takeover than to make changes in response to newspaper 
commentary. As noted in Subsection 7.2.3, directors in sample companies tend own very large 
or very small proportions of the companies’ shares. While it tends to be the latter case in the 
takeover subset, instances of very large shareholdings are also observed. Un-tabulated results 
of a frequency analysis performed on the unscored pre-event and event year directors’ 
shareholding data reveals that of the companies where collectively, the board owns less than 
1% of the company’s shares or more than 20%, 49% are acquired, 9% remain independent and 
make changes such that directors’ interests move closer to the 8 to 10% shareholding level, 
deemed herein as appropriate in terms of CGQ, and 42% remain independent but make no 
changes or directors’ shareholdings move further away from the 8 to 10% level.  
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b. Event to Post-event Changes in CGQ Components 
The main findings are as follows: 
  
A significant negative association is detected in the full sample between the benchmark-
adjusted changes in scores assigned for audit committee meeting frequency and event year 
newspaper reporting. 
 
This suggests that the audit committees of companies which receive the most newspaper 
coverage in the event year meet less regularly in the post-event year than they did in the event 
year. These results, taken together with the results detected for the pre-event to event year 
change in audit committee meeting frequency, indicate that pre-event year newspaper 
reporting encourages audit committees to meet more frequently in the event year than they do 
in the pre-event year while event year newspaper reporting has an opposite influence. It is 
important to bear in mind that these results pertain mainly to takeover cases. As noted above, a 
decline in meeting frequency is consistent with the passing of a takeover offer. Hence, it is 
unlikely that newspaper coverage has a strong negative influence on CGQ in terms of audit 
committee activity, particularly given that the association between newspaper reporting and 
the overall benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in CGQ has been found to be 
insignificant. 
 
7.6.2. Hostile vs. Friendly Takeovers 
The variable ISSt is employed throughout the main analysis to control for the likelihood that 
changes in corporate governance quality may be partly explained by the extent to which issues 
that arise in cases pose a risk to shareholders’ interests. In takeover cases, the board’s response 
to the offer might also explain changes in board structure and behaviour. For the takeover 
subset of the sample only, further analysis is conducted whereby the second stage model is 
modified such that the variable ISSt is replaced with the variable HOST. HOST is defined as a 
binary variable that assumes a value of 1 if the offer is hostile and 0 if the offer is friendly. 
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The modified model is applied to (i) the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event change in 
CGQ and (ii) the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in CGQ. The newspaper 
reporting variables employed measure the values derived from the first stage regression model 
(Equation 5.1), the results of which are presented in Table 7.28 in Section 7.4. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 7.32.  
 
As can be seen, a significant positive association is again apparent between the benchmark-
adjusted pre-event to event change in CGQ and pre-event year newspaper reporting and this is 
stated at a higher confidence level that that detected in the main analysis; however, no 
significant association is detected between changes in CGQ and the nature of the offer. R2 and 
adjusted R2 values indicate that the power of the model to explain both the pre-event to event 
Table 7.32: Hostile vs Friendly Takeovers Below are the results, for the takeover sample subset, for the second stage model when modified to include the binary variable HOST which indicates whether the offer is hostile or friendly. 
  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad); (n= 53) 
 Constant 0.431 0.669 0.004 RESNPRt-1 2.560 0.014** 0.135 CSIZEt-1 1.680 0.101 0.063 AGEt-1 -1.110 0.272 0.029 INDGENt-1 0.133 0.895 0.001 HOST -0.930 0.358 0.020 ECONt-1 -0.431 0.669 0.004 CGQt-1(ad) -5.840 0.001*** 0.449 PERFt-1 -1.360 0.180 0.042 INSTt-1 0.233 0.817 0.001 BLAMEt 
 
-1.580 0.121 0.056 
R2: 0.604 
 
Adj. R2: 0.509 F (10, 42): 6.394 (0.001)*** 
Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad); (n= 46) 
 Constant 0.565 0.576 0.009 RESNPRt -0.520 0.607 0.008 CSIZEt-1 2.610 0.013** 0.162 AGEt-1 1.390 0.174 0.052 INDGENt-1 0.132 0.895 0.001 HOST -0.292 0.772 0.002 ECONt-1 0.439 0.663 0.006 CGQt(ad) -1.260 0.215 0.044 PERFt -1.220 0.232 0.041 INSTt-1 -0.005 0.996 0.001 BLAMEt  2.410 0.022** 0.142 R2: 0.384 
 
Adj. R2: 0.208 F (10, 35): 2.182 (0.043)** 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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change and the event to post-event change in CGQ is lower when the issue of whether the 
offer is friendly or hostile is employed as an explanatory variable instead of the issue which 
requires Takeover Panel supervision. 
 
7.7. Conclusion 
Results presented in this chapter reveal a number of attributes of the nature of newspaper 
reporting on the operation and breakdown of the market for corporate control and provide 
some insight into how reporting is associated with the quality of the primary corporate 
governance mechanism operating within the company- the board of directors.  
 Univariate analysis has shown that takeover cases receive considerably more 
newspaper coverage than market abuse cases. When these results are considered in the context 
of the literature reviewed in Chapter Four, it appears likely that the lesser amount of 
newspaper reports published on market abuse cases is a symptom of the difficulties the 
newspaper media face in investigating instances of corporate crime and reporting on the 
actions of parties involved until they have been confirmed by official regulatory authorities. In 
contrast, information on takeover cases is publically disclosed in a timely manner, which 
allows the media to report on potential and actual takeovers with greater ease. Given that the 
newspaper sample presently employed is extracted from the archives of mainstream 
broadsheet publications, it may also be the case that takeover cases are considered more 
newsworthy to the general public as they have more far reaching implications for society in 
terms of employment and the availability of products and services. 
 Results of analysis performed to investigate the research hypothesis posed herein, 
indicate that newspaper reporting on takeover cases in the year prior to the withdrawal of the 
offer is significantly associated with changes in corporate governance quality in companies 
targeted. Specifically, the greater the amount of reports published in the pre-event year, the 
greater the improvement in the corporate governance quality of companies targeted between 
the pre-event and event years. The same observation is not made when the association 
between the amount of reports published in the year of the offer and the change which occurs 
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over the following year is examined. No associations are detected in isolation between 
newspaper reporting on market abuse cases and changes in the corporate governance quality 
of the companies whose shares are implicated. Analysis of associations between newspaper 
reporting and corporate governance quality change in market abuse cases is severely limited 
by the low levels of newspaper reporting on market abuse cases. Within the context of the 
theory of the market for corporate control, the results derived for takeover cases suggest that 
newspaper coverage of attempted takeovers publicises directors’ underperformance. The 
media literature discussed in Chapter Four would suggest that this publicity may impose 
reputational penalties on directors, thereby encouraging them to institute reform.  
 The next chapter discusses these results in detail. The implications of these findings 
are assessed such that the extent of the study’s contribution may be evaluated in Chapter Nine.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS  
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the wider implications of the main findings of the study from both a 
research and practical perspective. The chapter begins by considering the main findings 
regarding newspaper reporting on the sample companies. The findings concerning corporate 
governance quality are then discussed. Finally, findings derived from testing for the 
hypothesised association between corporate governance quality change and newspaper 
reporting are considered. 
 
8.2. Newspaper Reporting on Takeover and Market Abuse Cases  
8.2.1. Discussion of Key Findings 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter has revealed that takeover cases receive 
significantly more mainstream broadsheet newspaper coverage than market abuse cases. 
Newspaper reporting on takeover cases is also observed to be timelier than that on market 
abuse cases. For takeover cases, the majority of newspaper reporting concerns speculation on 
potential offers and coverage of events and issues which arise during the offer period, while 
for market abuse cases, the majority of newspaper reports are published in the years following 
the incidence of the abuse and pertain mainly to legal and regulatory intervention.  
 The higher level and superior timeliness of mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
coverage on takeover cases is likely to be largely attributable to the greater public availability 
of information on takeovers than on instances of market abuse. In the prelude to a takeover 
offer, a company’s share price and the financial information it releases may indicate that it is a 
potential takeover target. When the offer is announced, the offeror and offeree will make both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures which indicate the likely success and potential 
implications of the bid. In contrast, there is unlikely to be any signals regarding the incidence 
of market abuse as offenders conceal their actions to avoid being penalised. When the abuse is 
detected, regulators may wait until they have established liability before disclosing details of 
the abuse, the identity of the offender and the penalties facing him.  
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 The findings of this study are thus consistent with the view of the newspaper media as 
an intermediary in the company environment which selects, collects and repackages 
information on issues and events which impact shareholders’ wealth from other sources and 
makes it accessible to a wide audience (Deephouse, 2000; Miller, 2006; Dyck, Volchkova and 
Zingales, 2008; Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010). In doing so, the newspaper 
media publicises the quality of the board as a corporate governance device such that the level 
of reporting may have an impact on their reputations as monitors. The evidence produced by 
this study suggests that the newspaper media is a potentially valuable information 
intermediary in the context of takeover offers to the extent that it may notify the company’s 
shareholders and its broader stakeholders of the identities and intentions of potential offerors 
and continues to provide considerable coverage over the offer period, thereby informing a 
range of interested parties of the implications of the offer and publicising the actions of the 
target boards.  
 Findings indicate that the value of the broadsheet newspaper media as an information 
intermediary is the context of market abuse is much lower. Mainstream journalists may not be 
sufficiently financially literate to suspect the incidence of market abuse. Moreover, given the 
short timeframe in which market abuse occurs, journalists may not be quick enough to detect 
and investigate suspicious share price movements before the abuse ceases. Nevertheless, 
findings produced by Miller (2006) suggest that the newspaper media may still perform a 
watchdog function by publishing the suspicions of and allegations made by third parties. This 
study has found little evidence that such a role is performed by UK mainstream broadsheets 
with regard to market abuse. Journalists who are alerted to possible abuses by others may well 
lack the resources to conduct the further investigations necessary to verify allegations. 
Moreover, they are unlikely to run the risk of incurring the legal and reputational costs 
associated with publishing reports which may be inaccurate, untrue and possibly cause 
defamation of character. Ex-post newspaper coverage of market abuse cases cannot 
compensate investors for lost opportunities to make a trading profit or for being deliberately 
misled by other market participants. Nonetheless, it may draw attention to the board’s 
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response to the abuse and communicate the success of regulators in bringing offenders to 
account, thereby pressurising both parties to bring about enhanced protection for shareholders. 
The amount of broadsheet newspaper coverage on market abuse cases observed herein is 
however much more infrequent than that on takeover cases. 
 The level of broadsheet newspaper coverage of takeover offers may also be higher 
than that on instances of market abuse because takeover offers provide more value as news 
stories. Takeovers have more direct implications for general newspaper audiences in terms of 
employment, both within the target company and its suppliers; the supply and price of 
products and services; and possibly even national prestige in cases of cross-border offers. 
Although market abuse conjures negative connotations about market integrity and thus may 
create concern at national level, it may not be considered to be of great interest to audiences 
outside of the immediate investment community.  
 Having assessed the extent to which a number of specific features of takeover and 
market abuse cases, and the companies they involve, determine the amount of newspaper 
coverage they receive, it would appear that takeover cases involving large companies, which 
tend generally to be more visible to the newspaper media, receive the most coverage. The age 
of the company also appears to a significant factor determining the amount of coverage which 
cases receive. Results for the first stage model indicate that in the pre-event year, takeover 
offers for older companies tend to receive more newspaper coverage while in the event year, 
offers for younger companies tend to receive more coverage. This implies that speculative 
newspaper reporting on potential takeovers focuses more on older, well established 
companies; however, when an offer becomes imminent, it is the younger targets which receive 
the most attention from the newspaper media. Results also show that event year newspaper 
reporting on takeover offers is determined by the general industry in which the target is 
located, the primary reason for Takeover Panel intervention and the economic environment. It 
appears that, in the event year, offers for companies in the oil and gas and in the consumer 
goods and services industries attract more coverage, as do offers involving more severe 
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regulatory breaches. Furthermore, the amount of newspaper coverage which takeover cases 
receive decreases as national economic performance improves.  
 While the main analysis has not detected any significant determinants of newspaper 
reporting on market abuse cases, sensitivity analysis has revealed that company size and age 
and the nature of the abuse may be significant factors determining the amount of newspaper 
coverage they receive. Again, it appears that in the event year, larger and younger companies 
receive more newspaper coverage and that coverage increases with the severity of the abuse. 
 Sensitivity analysis has also detected significant associations between companies’ 
existing CGQ and the amount of newspaper coverage the TMA cases in which they are 
involved receive. Results indicate that, in the pre-event year, the broadsheet newspaper media 
tends to devote more focus to companies with low corporate governance quality. In the event 
year, however, it is the companies with high corporate governance quality which receive the 
most newspaper coverage. While these results would suggest that CGQ is a determinant of 
newspaper reporting, no strong inferences may be made in this regard since no associations 
are detected between newspaper reporting and CGQ in the previous year.  
 These factors considered, it would appear that company size is the primary 
determinant of newspaper reporting on TMA cases. Thus, it is reasonable to expect boards of 
large, high-profile companies to be continually exposed to scrutiny in the broadsheet 
newspaper media. Consequently, the boards of such companies may be more strongly 
encouraged to improve their efforts to serve shareholders’ interests when the TMA cases in 
which they are involved feature in the broadsheet press. As such, the mere presence of an 
active broadsheet media may serve to deter boards of large companies from taking actions out 
of self-interest when the company is faced with the threat of takeover or when price sensitive 
information regarding the company is released and misused in the stock markets. However, 
the governance value of the media to shareholders of smaller companies may not be as great. 
 Sensitivity analysis has also explored the intensity of newspaper coverage of cases. 
Results indicate considerable variation in the intensity of reporting on takeover cases. Thus, 
while certain takeover cases receive similar levels of attention from all newspapers, others 
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receive a great deal more attention from some newspapers, and newspaper groups, than others. 
One possible reason for such variations in coverage is a reluctance to report on certain 
companies’ vulnerability to takeover, and possibly the fact that board members have violated a 
Rule of the Takeover Code, due to affiliations between certain newspaper groups and the 
takeover targets in question. Another is a high level of reporting on the possibility of the board 
being replaced in a takeover, and perhaps also on the regulatory breach, by newspapers which 
harbour biases towards the companies in question.  
 
8.2.2. Implications 
This study has demonstrated that the UK mainstream broadsheet newspaper media devotes 
extensive coverage to the operation of the market for corporate control. This is a source of 
information overlooked in much prior UK research on takeovers. Those which recognise the 
role of the media in forecasting and reporting on takeover offers focus largely on the specialist 
financial press and newswire services (Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994; Weir, Laing and 
Wright, 2005; Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly, 2011). There is a limited presence of widely 
disseminated specialist financial newspapers in the UK, which are published on a frequent 
basis. Hence, mainstream broadsheet newspaper coverage may have a greater influence on the 
behaviour of the offeror and offeree boards and shareholders than one might expect. This 
study has endeavoured to provide some indication of this influence. 
 Since UK broadsheet newspapers have a vast and diverse readership, mainstream 
newspaper reports on takeovers may serve as a primary information source for broader 
stakeholders in the company. Given that takeovers have implications for employees (Coffee, 
1988; Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Slinger and Deakin, 1999; Deakin, 2005; Goergen, 
O’Sullivan and Wood, 2014), creditors (Lehn and Poulson, 1989; Amihud, Lev and Travlos, 
1990; Asquith and Wizman, 1990; Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2007), customers (Kim and Singal, 
1993; Singal, 1996) and various other parties in the company environment, it is likely that the 
mainstream media may serve as a useful resource for scholarly research concerned with the 
broader costs and effects of takeovers for non-shareholder stakeholders. Of the five takeover 
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offers which were found to have received the most broadsheet newspaper coverage in the 
present study, one concerned a long established producer of consumer goods, two concerned 
well known retailers, one concerned a premiership football team and one concerned a 
multinational metals and mining company. Thus, broadsheet newspaper reports are apt to be a 
valuable source of information for employees and customers in particular and, as a result, may 
have an important influence on their perceptions of and responses to takeover offers. Because 
all of these stakeholders are members of the voting public, the amount of newspaper coverage 
a takeover receives may determine policy responses not only in the immediate area of takeover 
regulation but in fields such as competition, employment and taxation to name but a few.   
 The practical value of the broadsheet newspaper in terms of corporate governance 
appears to be limited to matters on which there is an availability of relatively clear signals and 
pre-existing information but nonetheless affect shareholder wealth and directors’ reputations. 
The large volume of newspaper reporting in the ex-ante phases of takeover cases provides 
evidence of a high level of speculation in the UK broadsheet newspaper media on possible 
takeover offers. The tendency for journalists to report on offers before they are officially 
announced indicates that the broadsheet newspaper media is often a timelier source of 
information than the Takeover Panel and Regulatory Information Services. Yet, with this 
timeliness comes concerns regarding the reliability of information. Journalists may be suitably 
skilled to interpret indicators of company performance and sufficiently perceptive to anticipate 
a takeover offer before it is officially announced; however, newspapers cannot confirm that an 
offer appears imminent until the offeror has expressed a firm intention through the official 
channels. Investors and other interested parties must ultimately use their own discretion in 
judging the likelihood of the offer. The perceived accuracy and independence of the 
newspaper speculating the offer may well influence decisions whether or not to take any 
action such as selling or purchasing shares in the company.  
 Chapter Four of this thesis has established that broadsheet newspapers traditionally 
have tended to be perceived as credible and accurate sources of news relative to many other 
media vehicles. Nevertheless, as technology evolves, journalists at broadsheet newspapers are 
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under increasing pressure to cover the news almost as soon as it emerges so as to compete 
with online media vehicles (Tambini, 2008; Lewis et al., 2010). While newswires will 
inevitably have the story first, the analysis, commentary and opinion conventionally provided 
almost exclusively by newspaper journalists is now also being provided on the websites of 
broadcasters, news magazines, bloggers and through social media. With only limited time to 
conduct research, accuracy might suffer and sources may go unverified (Tambini, 2008). 
Accordingly, in forecasting potential takeovers, newspapers may make mistakes and as a 
result, reports may influence naïve investors to make imprudent investment decisions. As this 
study has focused only on instances where offers actually proceed, it has not been possible to 
further assess this possibility empirically. The fact that reports on market abuse cases are not 
published until the information is certified is encouraging in terms of veracity and accuracy. 
Nevertheless, the low level of newspaper reporting on market abuse cases detected in this 
study reflects poorly on the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media as a corporate watchdog. 
It also raises concerns about its viability as a medium for whistleblowers. It may be the case, 
however, that market abuse is a challenge welcomed more at specialised financial media 
outlets.  
 Having found that the broadsheet newspaper media provides a high level of coverage 
of takeover offers over the offer period, it is relevant to evaluate the opportunities for reports 
to become biased in favour of the offeror or offeree managers and directors. This largely relies 
upon the sources from which journalists select and collect information. Statements made by, 
or on behalf of, the offeror and offeree boards over the offer period boards must meet the 
standards of accuracy required by Rule 19 of the Code. However, this does not guarantee that 
the media will remain independent when reporting on the conduct of both parties over the 
course of the offer. This study finds that newspaper coverage of some takeover cases is 
relatively evenly dispersed among newspaper publications and newspaper groups, while other 
cases are reported on by some newspaper publications and groups much more so than others. 
There is, thus, reason to suspect some bias among the newspaper titles considered in this study 
and the groups to which they belong. As such, the low intensity of coverage on certain cases 
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detected herein may be attributable to certain newspaper groups’ affiliations with or financial 
reliances upon certain companies in the research sample.   
 Research into the UK newspaper media indicates that journalists at UK broadsheets 
endeavour to take an independent stance on all topics on which they report (Doyle, 2006; 
Tambini, 2008). In fact, it would appear that independent reporting by the UK broadsheet 
media is impeded more by time and resource constraints than by the existence of corrupt 
relationships between the press and the corporate sector. Nevertheless, where newspaper 
groups depend largely on the corporate sector for financing, it may be inevitable that their 
journalists will be restrained from reporting negative information on certain companies, 
particularly when financing from alternative sources is scarce. 
  As readers move online, the traditional business model of newspapers, which relies 
largely a combination of revenues from newspaper sales and advertising services, is no longer 
sustainable. Newspaper management globally have been forced to implement wage-
reductions, lay-offs and spending cuts on resources (Pew Research Centre, 2012). Research 
conducted by Lewis et al. (2010) shows that journalists at the top end of the UK press bear a 
workload approximately three times greater than they did twenty years ago. This has left 
broadsheet journalists with no other option than to avail of the pre-packaged news offered by 
PR agents. While this study acknowledges that the newspaper media is not an original 
information source, an increased reliance on PR generated material creates cause for concern. 
Although not all PR is intended to be misleading, it may introduce bias into newspaper 
reports. Given that both the bidding and target entities may employ PR agents in an endeavour 
to convince shareholders and other stakeholders of the merits and demerits of the bid 
(Tambini, 2008; Brennan, Daily and Harrington, 2010), the credibility of PR-based reports 
may be impaired. Thus, the potential value of the newspaper media’s role in publicising 
boards’ underperformance and issues which jeopardise shareholder wealth may be diminishing 
rapidly. Moreover, as newspaper sales decline and newspapers become less attractive outlets 
for advertisers, newspaper groups must maintain good relations with their remaining 
advertisers and with other companies, such as banks, on whom they rely for funding. As 
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noted, such a reliance can lead to biased reporting. Indeed, it is not unknown for UK 
broadsheet titles to refrain from reporting on problems in companies due to the power of these 
companies to cut their expenditure on advertising in the newspaper or even to break off lines 
of credit which may be funding the group to which the newspaper belongs (Oborne, 2015). 
 Unless newspaper companies develop suitable pricing models for online and digital 
editions of newspapers, they will continue to experience such financial difficulties. As a result, 
they will be unable to pay skilled staff members and have less money to spend on information 
acquisition which will inevitably result in a decline in the credibility and accuracy of 
newspaper reports. Thus, it would appear essential that the broadsheet newspaper media 
overcomes the challenges it currently faces and learns to use the internet and digital 
technology to its advantage rather than allowing it to lead to its demise as a quality source of 
news commentary and analysis, not only in the company and market environment but in 
society in general.    
 The opportunities for information on takeover offers to become distorted are thus 
significant. As noted in Chapter Four, newspaper speculation of takeovers may be based on 
tips and leaks from insiders as well as on legitimate information signals (Jarrell and Poulsen, 
1989, Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008). It is important for journalists to exercise caution 
when alerted to a takeover bid or an extraordinary event as information may be leaked by 
insiders in an attempt to manipulate the market or to facilitate insider dealing. Moreover, the 
incentives of journalists with interests in shares may be skewed; the opportunity to make a 
trading profit may entice even the most conscientious journalist to produce a biased report. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, this has already occurred in the tabloid newspaper media in the 
UK. The regulations set out in the Perimeter Guidance Manual (hereinafter, PERG) of the 
FCA Handbook, outlined in Appendix F, might be criticised as being somewhat loose. While 
the PERG requires that media reports must not aim to lead or enable persons to buy or sell 
securities or relevant investments, the interests of journalists are largely assumed to be aligned 
with those of their readers. The responsibility to ensure that journalists make known any 
personal interest in the securities on which they comment is left to the newspaper body for 
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which they report once they fall within the remit of the Press Complaints Commission 
(hereinafter, the PCC) Editors’ Code (2012), which as Appendix E outlines, is basically 
flawed. From this respect, this study highlights the importance of policies and standards for 
the news media when reporting on issues, events and developments at the firm and market 
level. As the FCA prepares to implement the European Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation 
No. 596/2014) in 2016 and as regulation of the UK news media moves up political agendas 
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2014), it would appear opportune 
for discussions to consider the interrelationship between the news media, the company and the 
markets such that timely, independent and accurate reporting is encouraged and appropriate 
relationships and clear boundaries are established between journalists, management, directors, 
investors and other market participants.  
 
8.3. Corporate Governance Quality 
8.3.1. Discussion of Key Findings 
As the previous chapter has shown, corporate governance quality in the main research sample 
appears quite high relative to that in the control sample of companies which are of a similar 
size and come from the same or neighbouring industries. The benchmark-adjusted scores for 
each CGQ component, except for directors’ shareholdings, are positive in the pre-event year, 
suggesting that companies’ involvement in regulated TMA cases is not due to poor pre-
existing standards of governance. In the event and post-event years, overall benchmark-
adjusted CGQ remains positive. Thus, it may be the case that close involvement with the 
regulatory authorities encourages companies’ to maintain high standards of governance. 
  CGQ is significantly higher in the takeover subset of the sample than in the market 
abuse subset. The high quality of governance in the takeover subset is particularly apparent 
when considered relative to the control sample. As in the control sample, an average increase 
in CGQ score is observed in the takeover subset of the main sample between the pre-event and 
event years, followed by an average decline between the event and post-event years. The pre-
event to event year increase in both samples suggests that the takeover attempt may discipline 
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directors and encourage governance improvements. The slightly larger increase observed in 
the takeover subset of the main sample may indicate that the additional regulatory oversight of 
the offer leads to enhanced governance improvements in the year of the offer. Nevertheless, 
the average event to post-event decline, which is also slightly greater in the takeover subset of 
the main sample, indicates that improvements may only be made in the short-term. 
 While governance quality in the market abuse subset is in line with that in the control 
sample, particularly low scores are observed for director independence and the suitability of 
the level of directors’ share ownership. This suggests that the boards of companies whose 
shares are implicated in market abuse may not be sufficiently independent or appropriately 
incentivised to adequately safeguard shareholders’ interests. This may have adversely affected 
the level of transparency surrounding transactions by insiders and have led to inappropriate 
disclosures of inside information. An average increase in CGQ is observed in the market abuse 
subset between the pre-event and event years. In some cases, governance improvements may 
not have occurred until after the incidence of the abuse in the event year, consistent with 
boards making an enhanced effort to protect shareholders’ wealth. In others, however, the 
improvements may have coincided with the incidence of the abuse, suggesting that they were 
insufficient to prevent its occurrence. The continued increase in CGQ between the event and 
post-event years provides a clearer indication of improved shareholder protection in the 
aftermath of market abuse. Nevertheless, the average post-event year CGQ score in the market 
abuse subset of the sample remains low relative to that in the takeover subset and scores 
assigned for elements of CGQ including board balance, director independence and directors’ 
shareholdings remain low relative to the control sample. To shed further insight into the 
changes in CGQ observed in the research sample, findings are now discussed in terms of the 
four specific aspects of the board focused on.  
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a. Board Leadership 
CEO-chairman duality is uncommon in the main sample and in both subsets thereof and 
decreases further over the three years studied, particularly in the takeover subset. While 
relatively fewer companies in the control sample have a separate CEO and chairman, the 
majority of companies have split the roles. The low incidence of duality is not surprising; 
indeed, it was customary to have a separate CEO and board chairman, even before the 
publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 (Laing and Weir, 1999). As shown in the previous 
chapter, three quarters of the takeover targets with a CEO who also serves as chairman are 
acquired in the event year, and of the companies which survive the takeover attempt, one half 
splits the roles. Thus, the market for corporate control appears to be effective in disciplining 
boards where the CEO harbours unfettered decision making power. This corroborates the 
findings of O’Sullivan and Wong (1999) that duality only serves as an effective takeover 
deterrent when the CEO has a substantial ownership stake in the company; although this study 
does not investigate CEO ownership in isolation, the low shareholdings reported for boards of 
takeover targets indicate that this may be the case.   
 Having also found that there is only a minority of the boards of companies in the 
market abuse subset where the CEO serves as chairman, it would not appear that the 
likelihood of the company’s shares being implicated in market abuse is reduced by separating 
the roles. In terms of the ability of the board’s leaders to oversee the disclosure and use of 
price sensitive information, having a separate CEO and board chairman may only be beneficial 
if the chairman is truly independent, which, as Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) note, is often 
not the case. 
 Boards in the takeover subset of the sample appear more active than those in both the 
market abuse subset and the control sample, with the average board in the takeover subset 
meeting more regularly in each year studied. As expected, boards in the takeover subset hold 
more meetings in the year of the offer. Relative to the control sample, a greater improvement 
in scores assigned for board meeting frequency is observed in the takeover subset between the 
pre-event and event years, possibly suggesting that target boards tend to meet more regularly 
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when the offer is directly regulated by the Takeover Panel. Although fewer meetings are held 
in the following year, boards appear to be more active in the year following the threat of 
takeover than they were in the year prior to it. Board meeting frequency in the market abuse 
subset is more in line with that in the control sample; however, boards in the control sample 
meet more regularly in the pre-event and event years. Boards in the market abuse subset seem 
to meet more regularly in the year after the incidence of the abuse, possibly indicating that 
efforts are being made to strengthen controls concerning price sensitive information and the 
trading behaviour of insiders so as to ultimately ensure more robust protection for all of the 
company’s shareholders.  
 
b. Board Effectiveness 
As noted in Chapter Five, the present CGQ scoring system posits that it is optimal for boards 
to achieve an equal balance between executives and non-executive directors such that the 
board possesses sufficient firm specific knowledge while remaining free from management 
dominance. There is less than a 50% executive presence on boards in both sample subsets in 
each year studied. While this is also the case in the control sample, a greater balance is 
achieved in the event and post-event years. The proportion of non-executives serving on the 
average board tends to be in the region of 60% and is lower than results reported by Zaman, 
Hudaib and Haniffa (2011), Gregg, Jewell and Tonks (2012) and Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012). 
It would not appear that the minority executive presence has an impact on whether or not a 
company is acquired since scores assigned to the targets of both successful and unsuccessful 
takeover are almost equal. Executive representation is lowest in the year of a takeover offer 
and in the year following the incidence of market abuse. It may be the case that boards recruit 
non-executives at these times in an endeavour to enhance the perceived quality of governance 
in the company since, as noted in Chapter Three, executive appointments are often associated 
with CEO dominance (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Carcello et 
al., 2011).  
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 Board independence is much lower in the market abuse subset than in both the 
takeover subset and the control sample. While 50% of non-executive directors on the average 
board in the takeover subset are independent in the year of the offer, this is not the case in the 
preceding or subsequent year. Nevertheless, boards in the takeover subset are more 
independent than those in the control sample in the pre-event and event years. The greater 
average proportions of independent non-executive directors in both the takeover subset and the 
control sample suggests that when faced with the threat of takeover, independence improves. 
This is encouraging to the extent that the presence of independent directors on the boards of 
companies targeted for takeover has been found to benefit their shareholders in a manner not 
achieved by affiliated non-executives (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Cotter, Shivdasani and 
Zenner, 1997).  
 As noted in the previous chapter, a number of takeover targets studied herein have 
oversized boards while certain boards of companies whose shares are implicated in market 
abuse do not contain the requisite number of members which is presently considered necessary 
to achieve a sufficient level of shareholder protection. Boards in the control sample are 
generally larger than those in the market abuse sample and smaller than those in the takeover 
subset. Thus, it is unlikely that the large board sizes observed in the takeover subset and the 
small board sizes observed in the market abuse subset may be explained by company size or 
industry location. Although the boards of the control sample of takeover targets tend not to be 
oversized, the large size of boards in the takeover subset of the main sample is worth noting. 
The fact that these large boards face the discipline of the market for corporate control is 
consistent with the argument reviewed in Chapter Three that large boards do not function as 
an appropriate governance device (Jensen, 1993).  
 The relatively small board size observed in the market abuse subset, to an extent, 
conflicts with the findings of Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010) that insider dealing is more 
prevalent in companies with large boards. It is important to note however, that the present 
sample differs to that employed by Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer. Firstly, it consists of 
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companies whose shares are implicated in various other forms of market abuse along with 
insider dealing and secondly, the insiders in question are not always members of the board. 
 
c. Accountability and the Role of the Audit Committee  
Relative to most other components of CGQ, audit committee size is considered to be of quite 
good quality in the main research sample and scores observed in both sample subsets are, on 
average higher than those in the control sample, where audit committees tend to comprise 
fewer than three members. Again, companies in the takeover subset achieve higher scores than 
those in the market abuse subset. On average, audit committees in the takeover subset 
comprise three members in all years, consistent with prior research on UK listed companies 
(Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; Avison and Cowton, 2012). This is also the case in 
companies in the market abuse subset, in the year prior to the abuse. However, the average 
number of audit committee members in the year of the abuse and in the following year 
decreases to two. Since the audit committees of companies in the control sample also tend 
only to consist of two members, it may be the case that this is considered sufficient to meet 
companies’ requirements given their sizes and the industries in which they are located. 
 In the year prior to the offer, over 75% of companies in the takeover subset which go 
on to be acquired and over 90% of the companies which avoid takeover have majority 
independent audit committees. The fact that more companies which survive the takeover 
attempt have majority independent audit committees may suggest that audit committee 
independence contributes to performance improvements generated by boards when faced with 
the prospect of replacement in a takeover. Audit committees of targets in the takeover subset 
are considerably more independent than those of the targets in the control sample. In the year 
of the offer, audit committee independence increases in the takeover subset while it decreases 
in the control sample with the result that almost all companies in the takeover subset have a 
majority independent audit committee while the audit committees of just over half of the 
control sample of companies have a majority of independent members. Thus, it may be the 
case that while subject to the direct oversight of the Takeover Panel, boards endeavour to 
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maintain and improve the independence their key internal financial control. Almost one half of 
companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse have audit committees which are 
dominated by executives or affiliated non-executives or have no audit committee at all. 
However, given that a similar proportion of audit committees in the control sample do not 
have an independent majority, it may be the case that an executive presence is necessary in 
order to meet industry demands or that companies are not large enough to require such a 
strong independent presence. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter Three, audit committee 
independence is argued to deter management from engaging in illegal insider dealing 
(Enriques and Volpin, 2007). The findings of the present study thus lend some support to this 
view.  
 Audit committee meetings also appear to be held more regularly in companies in the 
takeover subset than in those in the market abuse subset. On average, three or more meetings 
per annum are held in the takeover subset while audit committees in companies in the market 
abuse subset tend to hold only one or two meetings. The empirical evidence indicates that it is 
customary for the audit committees of large UK companies to meet between three and four 
times in the year and for those in smaller companies to meet at least twice (Zaman, Hudaib 
and Haniffa, 2011; Avison and Cowton, 2012). Hence, the difference in audit committee 
meeting frequency between the takeover and market abuse subsets may be partly attributed to 
the fact that companies in the market abuse subset tend to be smaller. However, the frequency 
with which the average audit committee in the takeover subset meets is also greater than that 
in the control sample. While the distribution of company size in the full main sample is similar 
to that in the control sample, the largest companies are contained within the takeover subset. 
This may explain some of the difference, however it is also likely that the some audit 
committees in the takeover subset hold more meetings than what is the norm for companies of 
their size. Although audit committee meeting frequency in the market abuse subset tends to be 
in line with that in the control sample, a particularly low average benchmark-adjusted score is 
observed for audit committee meeting frequency in the market abuse subset for the event year. 
This indicates that audit committees in the market abuse subset are not very active in the year 
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in which the abuse occurs. Since independent and active audit committees are found to limit 
the publication of misleading financial reports (Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003), the low 
independence and inactivity of audit committees in companies whose shares are implicated in 
market abuse in the year of the abuse most likely denotes inactive monitoring of financial 
reporting and a failure to ensure that robust internal controls are in place.   
 
d. Directors’ Remuneration and Incentives 
Chapter Seven reports that CEO pay is more sensitive to performance in the takeover subset of 
the sample than in the market abuse subset. Although changes in CEO pay in the takeover 
subset in the pre-event year are, on average, insensitive to changes in shareholders’ wealth, the 
insensitivity tends to be attributable to reductions in the remuneration of CEOs of certain 
companies which do not reflect the growth in the wealth of their shareholders. While it is 
preferable that the CEO be appropriately awarded for his performance in maximising 
shareholders’ returns and be incentivised to continue to do so, it is encouraging to find that 
CEOs in the takeover subset are not overcompensated, particularly since pay raises may be 
used as a form of takeover defence. CEO pay becomes more sensitive to performance in the 
takeover subset in the event and post-event years as the average CEO pay to performance ratio 
becomes positive. This contrasts the control sample where negative CEO pay to performance 
sensitivity ratios are observed in all three years studied. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
improvement observed in the takeover subset is triggered by the takeover attempt. Instead, it 
may be the case that close involvement with the regulatory authorities may prompt a review of 
performance and rewards, possibly leading to necessary adjustments in CEO pay. 
 As Chapter Seven has shown, scores assigned for CEO pay to performance sensitivity 
in the market abuse subset are closer to those in the control sample. However, as noted, the 
negative ratios in the market abuse subset tend to arise due to an increase in CEO pay as 
shareholder wealth decreases while in the control sample they tend to be attributable to 
declining CEO pay and increasing shareholder wealth. Thus, CEOs of companies whose 
shares are implicated in market abuse are often excessively remunerated. This raises the 
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concern that other members of boards in the market abuse subset may be paid more than what 
they possibly deserve given the observed losses in shareholders’ wealth coupled with the 
disadvantage at which they are placed due to the incidence of the abuse. There is a small 
increase in the average CEO pay to performance sensitivity ratio in the market abuse subset 
between the event and post-event years which may indicate an attempt to reform the manner in 
which the CEO’s pay is determined, possibly encouraged by the intervention of regulatory 
authorities over the course of the abuse.   
 Chapter Seven has shown that the scores achieved for the appropriateness of directors’ 
shareholdings in both the takeover and market abuse subsets fall below the benchmark in all 
three years studied. Directors of companies in the takeover subset tend to hold a lower 
proportion of shares than the boards of companies in the control sample while boards in the 
market abuse subset are tend to hold a much higher proportion of shares. Chapter Seven 
largely dismissed the possibility that the larger holdings of boards in the market abuse subset 
reflects shares purchased through prohibited dealings since the average shareholdings of 
boards in the market abuse subset decline over the three year period; however, the decline in 
shareholdings observed between the pre-event and event years may be partly due to 
illegitimate sales of shares.  
 Although the larger shareholdings observed in the market abuse subset does not 
directly denote that boards award themselves more stock-based compensation than those in the 
takeover subset, this may be the case since boards in the market abuse subset are found to be 
less independent than those in both the control sample and the takeover subset. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) expresses that the holding of share options by non-
executive directors may compromise their independence (Provisions B.1.1 and D.1.3). While 
independent directors may still purchase and hold shares in the company, they might only do 
so on a small scale so as to preserve their independence. However, as a consequence, their 
interests may not be sufficiently aligned with those of shareholders. This may be the case in 
the takeover subset of the sample. 
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8.3.2. Implications 
At a theoretical level, the findings of this study support the theory of the market for corporate 
control to the extent that it appears that the threat of takeover leads to improvements on the 
board of directors such that it serves as a higher quality governance device. Such 
improvements are observed in both the main sample and in the control sample. The lower pre-
event year scores observed for the targets of successful offers than for those which survive is 
consistent with the more severe form of discipline which the market for corporate control 
exerts on these companies.   
 Nevertheless, since CGQ scores decline as the threat of takeover passes, the board 
may only be disciplined in the short-term. Relative to the control sample, improvements are 
observed in board meeting frequency, board size and all three audit committee components as 
boards are threatened by the possibility of takeover. Relatively more companies also split the 
roles of CEO and chairman. However, the benchmark-adjusted scores for board size and audit 
committee size and independence decline in the year following the attempt. Thus, there is an 
apparent failure to maintain and enhance the governance improvements generated by the threat 
of takeover in the long-term. It may be the case that greater practical efforts are required by 
shareholders to lobby boards to make further governance improvements, or at least to avoid 
deteriorations, when the threat of takeover passes. There are various reasons why institutional 
investors in the UK may be reluctant to actively voice concerns regarding management 
performance; these include the possibility of being deemed an insider or to be acting in 
concert and thus being subject to the requirements of the mandatory bid rule (the Kay Review, 
2012). The incentives to engage with management also appear to weaken as the relationships 
between companies and their ultimate owners become increasingly intermediated by 
investment managers (Celik and Isaksson, 2013). Thus, in order for shareholder activism to 
complement the operation of market for corporate control such that boards remain disciplined 
in the aftermath of a takeover threat, it would appear necessary for progress to be made at 
policy level in implementing measures to encourage shareholder engagement, such as those 
proposed in the Kay Review (2012). 
325  
 Although the corporate governance quality of companies in the market abuse subset is 
in line with that in the control sample, boards of companies whose shares are implicated in 
market abuse are found to be less independent than boards of companies in the control sample 
which are of a similar size and operate in the same or neighbouring industries. The 
shareholdings of boards in the market abuse subset are also dramatically higher than their 
peers, which may be indicative of entrenchment. Despite the observed lack of director 
independence, board balance in the market abuse subset tends to become skewed in favour of 
non-executive directors in the event and post-event years, suggesting a possible absence of 
skills and expertise as well as independence on boards. These symptoms of poor governance 
may mean that the release and use of price sensitive information and the trading behaviour of 
insiders is not suitably controlled, leading to the possible breakdown of the market for 
corporate control. Since there is a large proportion of AIM companies in the market abuse 
subset, these features may possibly be explained by the fact that AIM companies are not 
obliged to adopt the UK Corporate Governance Code nor are they required adhere to the 
DTRs. The lack of director independence in companies whose shares are implicated in market 
abuse is consistent with findings by Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010) that director 
independence is associated with a lower incidence of insider dealing. This lack of 
independence, coupled with the ownership stakes of boards which are indicative of 
entrenchment, suggests that improper disclosures and illegitimate trading behaviour of insiders 
may be overlooked by directors. Findings also indicate that the boards of companies involved 
in market abuse cases are smaller than those in both the control sample and the takeover 
subset. Hence, recruitment of additional independent members may be necessary to avoid 
shareholders’ interests being similarly jeopardised in future.  
 While the quality of audit committees in the market abuse subset is similar to that of 
audit committees in the control sample, they do not satisfy the criteria of CGQ set herein and 
the average scores observed for audit committee meetings, size and independence are lower 
than those observed in the takeover subset. Thus, the audit committee may perform a role in 
limiting the potential for market abuse to occur. The FRC’s 2012 Guidance on Audit 
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Committees states that the audit committee has a responsibility to review price sensitive 
information before it is released (Para. 4.4). As noted in Chapter Seven, almost 28% of 
companies in the market abuse subset do not have an audit committee in place in the year of 
the abuse. Thus, it may be the case that price sensitive information may be reviewed arbitrarily 
with the implication that those with access to it may disclose it in a selective and untimely 
manner. Market abuse regulations tend not to delegate responsibility to the audit committee 
for controlling the release and use of inside information. Neither MAD nor the more recent 
European Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation No. 596/2014) make any reference to a role 
for the audit committee. In the context of the London Stock Exchange, companies admitted to 
trading on the Main Market are required to follow the UK Corporate Governance Code’s 
guidelines regarding the establishment of an audit committee. DTR 7.1.3, which applies only 
to companies admitted to trading on the Main Market, also outlines the audit committee’s 
responsibility to monitor the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal control systems. These 
provisions aside, there is an absence of recognition of the potential role that an appropriately 
structured and active audit committee may play in ensuring the orderly and timely release of 
price-sensitive information such that the opportunities for insider dealing, improper disclosure, 
misuse of information and market manipulation may be reduced.  
 This study has found that companies involved in TMA cases experience a greater 
improvement in CGQ between the pre-event and event years than companies in the control 
sample which do not encounter such close regulatory supervision. While this improvement is 
not apparent when the market abuse subset is considered in isolation, the event to post-event 
year improvement observed in the market abuse subset coincides with or follows the 
commencement of regulatory investigations in the majority of cases. Given that the assurance 
of protection to investors is the primary objective of both the Takeover Code and the Code of 
Market Conduct, it would appear that involvement with market regulators may encourage 
improvements in internal governance mechanisms. Findings, thus, indicate considerable 
potential for market regulators to increase the role they perform in promoting high standards 
of corporate governance in the companies which fall within their remit. This may facilitate 
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audit committees in achieving the necessary structure and level of activity to adequately 
oversee the orderly and timely flow of price-sensitive information from the company to the 
markets and hence lessen the opportunities for market abuse to occur. 
 As suggested above, the low scores observed for certain elements of CGQ in the 
market abuse subset may be partly attributed to the fact that almost one half of sample market 
abuse cases involve the shares of AIM listed companies. Thus, there may be an argument in 
favour of extending the requirement to adopt the UK Corporate Governance Code to AIM 
listed companies. If the principles of the Corporate Governance Code were fostered in 
companies as they grow, best practice in corporate governance may come to be regarded as 
standard practice by the time at which companies graduate to the Official List of the 
Exchange. Improved corporate governance alone is unlikely to prevent a company’s shares 
from being implicated in market abuse. As noted in the previous chapter, the board may not be 
able to fully prevent all insiders and market participants from behaving in such an illegitimate 
manner; much of the responsibility for market surveillance and creating appropriate deterrents 
lies with the FCA. Nevertheless, market abuse may only be effectively regulated and market 
transparency may only be maintained if issuers make the requisite disclosures, which is likely 
to be encouraged by an effective board of directors.  
 Findings also raise a number of points for discussion regarding the clarity of advice 
provided in the UK Corporate Governance Code. The distinct tendency for sample companies 
to have a separate CEO and chairman highlights the effectiveness of the unambiguous 
language used under Principle A.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) to 
discourage CEO-chairman duality. Such clarity may be useful elsewhere in the Corporate 
Governance Code. As noted in Chapter Three, there are no specific best practice guidelines on 
how frequently board meetings ought to be held; Provision A.1.1 simply states that “the board 
should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties effectively”. This is certainly open to 
interpretation. Having found that in the event year, boards in the takeover subset tend to meet 
almost twice as regularly as those in the control sample and more than twice as regularly as 
those in the market abuse subset, there seems to be considerable differences in the level of 
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board activity both within the main sample and between companies in the main sample and 
their neighbours in the control sample. There may be an argument in favour of more precise 
guidelines in this regard. However, setting specific benchmarks for board meeting frequency 
may encourage a box-ticking approach being taken to governance, as Hahn and Lasfer (2007) 
point out. Indeed, given that boards in the control sample tend not to meet any more than 
seven times per annum, the monthly board meeting benchmark set in the present study may be 
a somewhat ambitious expectation, particularly as boards become more internationally 
diverse. Nevertheless, board meetings provide an opportunity for independent directors to 
challenge the CEO on various issues and to address various issues which affect shareholder 
wealth. Hence, greater encouragement may be required in best practice recommendations. For 
instance, guidelines as to how geographically dispersed board members might communicate 
using modern communications technologies might go some way to increasing the activity of 
boards of UK companies.  
 The structure and composition of the board is another area where the 
recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code are somewhat opaque. Principle B.1 
recommends that boards comprise “an appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge of the company”. This study has assumed that since executive 
directors are involved in the day to day business of the company, they make an important 
contribution to the board in terms of skills, experience and knowledge. While affiliated non-
executives may make a similar contribution, their knowledge of and skills in the company’s 
business may be outdated. Hence, it has been deemed appropriate that boards be equally 
balanced between executives and non-executive directors.  
 Average scores indicate that boards in the control sample tend to achieve a slightly 
better balance than those in the main sample. Findings suggest that board balance tends to be 
skewed in favour of non-executives, particularly in the takeover subset. This may be partly 
attributable to Provision B.1.2 of the Corporate Governance Code which recommends that at 
least one half of the boards of larger companies be composed of independent non-executives. 
Thus, where there are both affiliated and independent non-executives on the board, non-
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executives may be in the majority. Board independence is however observed to be much lower 
than 50% in both the main sample and the control sample. As independence is determined 
herein solely on what boards chose to disclose in their annual reports, it may even be 
overestimated since such disclosures may not reflect the true independence of directors 
(Mulgrew, Lynn and Rice, 2014).  
 Given that affiliated non-executives are so strongly represented on sample boards, one 
might question their value in terms of corporate governance. While the UK Corporate 
Governance Code offers clear examples of how a non-executive’s independence might be 
impaired, it provides little guidance as to the extent to which a non-independent non-executive 
representation is necessary. While affiliates such as ex-employees or long-serving board 
members may bring considerable experience to boardroom, there is little empirical evidence to 
indicate that they perform a vital role in protecting shareholders’ interests. In fact, studies 
which link affiliated non-executives with bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton, 1994) and excessive 
CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) suggest otherwise. It is arguable 
that affiliated non-executives may be just as susceptible to the influence of the CEO as 
executives. Thus, some benchmark for affiliated non-executive representation may also 
deserve a mention in the UK Corporate Governance Code.  
 Such a benchmark may also be useful with regard to board size. Provision B.1.2 
recommends that the boards of smaller companies contain at least two independent members; 
however, in the absence of a clear recommendation on how many members ought to sit on the 
board, two independent members may be of little value as monitors if they are considerably 
outnumbered by executives and affiliated non-executives. Since a one-size-fits-all approach is 
unlikely to be suitable in the presence of variables such as the size of the company and the 
nature of its business, benchmarks may need to be suitably tailored and fine-tuned. This study 
has detected parallels between board size in the main sample and the control sample which has 
been matched by company size and industry. Hence, such benchmarks may possibly need to 
account for the industry in which companies operate and various metrics of size in addition to 
the markets on which their shares are listed.  
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8.4. Corporate Governance Quality and Newspaper Reporting 
8.4.1. Discussion of Key Findings 
The results of tests of the research hypothesis posed in this study show that newspaper 
reporting on takeover cases in the year prior to the withdrawal of a takeover offer is 
significantly positively associated with changes in corporate governance quality in companies 
targeted over the following year. This study does not find any evidence to indicate that 
newspaper reporting on takeover cases in the year in which the offer fails is associated with 
changes in corporate governance quality in targets over the following year, nor does it detect 
an isolated association between newspaper reporting at any stage in a market abuse case and 
changes in corporate governance quality in the companies whose shares are implicated in the 
years surrounding the abuse. The association between pre-event year newspaper reporting and 
pre-event to event year changes in corporate governance quality is also found to be positive 
and significant when tested for in the combined sample of takeover and market abuse cases; 
however the association between event year newspaper reporting and event to post-event year 
changes in corporate governance quality is again found to be insignificant.  
 Appropriate measures have been taken to assure the reliability of these results and it 
may be affirmed that they are not driven by endogeneity in the sample which may arise 
because newspaper reporting and changes in CGQ are influenced by similar factors. Having 
adjusted CGQ and changes in CGQ to account for the sample-specific effect which 
companies’ close exposure to regulatory oversight may have on boards’ characteristics and 
behaviour, these results are generalizable to UK listed companies when involved in takeovers 
and similar control transactions, irrespective of whether or not the actions of parties involved 
contravene the Takeover Code or Section 118 of FSMA.  
 Given that the CGQ of the takeover targets in the control sample also increases 
between the pre-event and event years, it might be argued that the governance improvements 
observed in the research sample over the year of the offer are a response to the threat of 
takeover, independent of the level of newspaper coverage the offer receives. Since the level of 
newspaper media exposure to which the offers for companies the control sample has not been 
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measured, it is not possible to determine if the CGQ increases observed in the control sample 
are associated with newspaper coverage. However, the results of preliminary causality tests 
performed on the main sample have shown that the targets of offers which receive the most 
pre-event year newspaper coverage experience significantly greater positive changes in 
corporate governance quality than the targets which receive the least amount of coverage or no 
coverage at all. In fact, having found that targets of offers which receive little or no pre-event 
year newspaper, on average, experience deteriorations in corporate governance quality it 
would not appear appropriate to assume that the threat of takeover in isolation generates 
governance improvements.  
 Hence, the main finding of this study is that the amount of broadsheet newspaper 
reporting on anticipated takeover offers which eventually fail is associated with improvements 
in the corporate governance quality of companies targeted over the year following the 
publication of the reports. The more publicity a takeover threat receives in the mainstream 
broadsheet media, the greater the changes made on the board of directors such that the board 
adheres more closely to certain best practice guidelines, legislative guidelines and scholarly 
recommendations. 
 
8.4.2. Implications 
The main findings are consistent with the theory of the market for corporate control (Manne, 
1965). Under the theory, companies are targeted for takeover due to managers’ and directors’ 
underperformance. By providing early warning signals that a company is a potential takeover 
target, the newspaper media may accentuate the threat imposed by the market for corporate 
control and perform a corporate governance role by encouraging board reform before an actual 
takeover, described by Fama (1980) and Coffee (1984) as the remedy of last resort, becomes 
necessary. The present results may thus be interpreted to indicate that newspaper reports 
which publicise a company’s vulnerability to the threat of takeover may motivate boards to 
make appropriate changes such that they provide enhanced management oversight and 
improved shareholder protection.  
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 This study finds that the boards of 51% of a sample of companies which are targeted 
for takeover are effectively replaced in a takeover. In the context of the theory of the market 
for corporate control, the threat of takeover appears to discipline boards in 49% of sample 
companies before an actual takeover becomes necessary. Findings indicate that the volume of 
newspaper coverage these companies receive prior to the abandonment of the bid is 
significantly positively associated with improvements in corporate governance quality in the 
year in which the bid is dropped. Since directors wish to maintain reputations as expert 
monitors in order to secure future board positions (Fama, 1980), they ought to avoid negative 
publicity regarding their ability to safeguard shareholders’ interests (Dyck, Volchkova and 
Zingales, 2008), particularly in takeover situations (Liu and McConnell, 2013). The significant 
positive association between the amount of newspaper reports in the year prior to the 
abandonment of the offer and changes in corporate governance quality over the following year 
indicates that pre-event year newspaper reporting poses the greatest threat to directors’ 
reputations. Since Rule 21 of the Code restricts boards from taking frustrating actions once the 
offer commences but does not extend to pre-bid defences, directors’ greatest opportunity to 
defend the bid may come during the pre-event year. Hence, the actions directors’ take in 
response to the takeover threat at this time may be subject to the greatest scrutiny from the 
newspaper media and its readers, including shareholders and other stakeholders. In effect, the 
more newspaper reports which are initially published about a company’s vulnerability to 
takeover, the greater the potential reputational penalties imposed on directors. This may 
pressurise directors to make changes to the board over the year in which the offer fails so as to 
limit any reputational damage caused both from falling vulnerable to the threat of takeover and 
from defending the offer. Results may thus be interpreted to indicate that through its influence 
on directors’ reputations, early newspaper reporting on takeover offers promotes governance 
improvements. Accordingly, it appears that the newspaper media may serve as something of a 
catalyst in the market’s disciplinary process. By encouraging boards to act within 
shareholders’ interests, the broadsheet newspaper media may well complement the operation 
333  
of the market for corporate control and possibly assist in bringing about governance 
improvements.  
 By detecting a significant positive association between improvements in corporate 
governance quality and newspaper reporting on a company’s vulnerability to takeover, this 
study supports and adds a new dimension to research on the corporate governance role of the 
media. Prior research has shown that media publicity surrounding infringements of 
shareholders’ rights pressurises managers into taking remedial action (Dyck, Volchkova and 
Zingales, 2008) and that press criticism of board performance leads to improvements in 
corporate governance quality through replacements of board members and increases in 
independence as the remaining board members seek to avoid reputational damage and 
replacement (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009). This study adds to 
this work by showing that newspaper coverage of the mere possibility of boards being 
replaced through the market’s disciplinary mechanism is associated with improvements in the 
quality of the board as a corporate governance device. Improvements observed include more 
frequent board meetings, boards reaching a more appropriate size, separation of the roles of 
CEO and chairman, improved audit committee size and independence, more frequent audit 
committee meetings, improved CEO pay to performance sensitivity and directors’ 
shareholdings reaching a level at which alignment of their interests with shareholders’ is more 
likely. Further analysis conducted herein reveals that pre-event year newspaper coverage of 
takeover offers which eventually fail is most strongly associated with improvements in certain 
areas. The targets of failed takeover offers which receive high levels of pre-event year 
newspaper coverage are more inclined to split the roles of CEO and chairman in the following 
year. They are more likely to make greater efforts to improve their internal financial control 
systems in that audit committee meeting frequency increases. The manner in which 
remuneration and incentives are structured is also more likely to improve as changes in CEO’s 
pay become more sensitive to changes in shareholders’ wealth and directors’ shareholdings 
move to a level at which they act as a more effective incentive without creating the risk of 
entrenchment. Results of analysis presented in the previous chapter indicate that boards which 
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fail to ensure that CEO pay is tied to performance are equally as likely to be replaced in a 
takeover as they are to overcome the threat and go on to oversee improvements in the structure 
of CEO pay over the following year. They also show that boards which exhibit CEO-chairman 
duality, boards with inactive audit committees and boards whose collective ownership stakes 
in companies are too small or too large to effectively align their interests with those of 
shareholders’ are more likely to be replaced in a takeover than to survive the attempt and make 
improvements over the following year. Thus, it would seem that the market for corporate 
control is the most powerful disciplinary force that boards are subject to; however, for those 
boards which are able to overcome the threat, the amount of publicity the offer initially 
receives in the broadsheet newspaper media may influence the extent of improvements on 
target boards. 
 A negative association is detected herein between the volume of newspaper reporting 
in the year in which the offer fails and changes in corporate governance quality over the 
following year. Since this association is not found to be statistically significant, it is unlikely 
that newspaper coverage of the events surrounding the withdrawal of a takeover offer has a 
strong influence on the actions taken by target boards over the following year. Thus, it would 
appear that any role performed by the broadsheet newspaper media in enhancing the 
disciplinary effects of a takeover threat is only a temporary one. Despite the observed reversal 
in the corporate governance quality, 84% of the targets which survive the takeover attempt 
remain independent over the two years following the offer. Thus, it would seem that in the 
vast majority of cases, the need for market discipline does not arise again in the medium-term. 
Whether or not the apparent investor satisfaction with the boards of sample companies arises 
from directors’ efforts to avoid further reputational damage cannot be ascertained using the 
current research methodology.  
 These findings provide testament to the practical value of the newspaper media as an 
information intermediary both in the company and market environment. In comparison to 
various other intermediaries and gatekeepers of information considered in Chapter Four, the 
broadsheet newspaper media has a unique capacity to inform a broad range of parties within 
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and beyond the boundaries of the firm in a relatively timely manner. By reporting on the 
activity of the market for corporate control in threatening directors’ positions, and in doing so, 
influencing their reputations in the labour market, the newspaper media may assist the markets 
in protecting shareholders’ interests by encouraging reform at the company level.  
 Sensitivity analysis has revealed that companies with low CGQ receive the most 
newspaper coverage in the pre-event year and those with high CGQ receive the most coverage 
in the event year. Having taken measures to ensure that the association detected between pre-
event year newspaper reporting and pre-event year CGQ does not drive the main findings of 
this study, the positive influence of pre-event year newspaper reporting on pre-event to event 
year changes in CGQ remains evident. Thus, there is reason to suggest that the newspaper 
media focuses mainly on companies with low quality governance at the beginning of TMA 
cases and even though pre-event year newspaper reporting encourages an improvement in the 
governance of these companies, they continue to be monitored by the newspaper media in the 
event year. This would suggest that companies’ corporate governance quality determines the 
amount of newspaper coverage they receive. Given that the literature strongly portrays the 
press as a monitor of directors’ actions and performance (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Johnson 
et al., 2005; Miller, 2006; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009; Lauterbach and Pajuste, 2014), this 
may well be the case. However, these results cannot confirm this since measurements of CGQ 
and newspaper reporting are taken over the same periods in time and analysis which 
incorporates time lags does not produce any evidence of a significant link between newspaper 
reporting and corporate governance quality in the previous year.  
 Given that the evidence indicates that the broadsheet newspaper media plays a 
meaningful role in promoting, and possibly monitoring, corporate governance quality change, 
it is crucial that concerns about the broadsheet’s sustainability and its future independence, 
accuracy and credibility be addressed by industry professionals and policymakers so that its 
incentives do not become aligned with managers and directors. Results of sensitivity analysis 
indicate that when the varying intensity of coverage of takeover cases is accounted for, the 
influence of the newspaper media on changes in corporate governance quality may not be as 
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strong as first anticipated. This implies that even when a takeover offer receives a high level of 
coverage in the broadsheet media generally, the board of the company involved may not face 
the same reputational costs if certain newspapers do not report on the case to the same extent 
as do others. Thus, while the broadsheet newspaper media does appear to possess the potential 
to have a significant positive impact on the actions of the boards of companies on which it 
reports, its practical value in corporate governance may be reduced considerably where 
newspapers bear allegiances to the boards of certain companies such that they do not fully 
expose boards to public scrutiny. While the same might be said for newspapers which devote 
an unwarranted amount of coverage to issues facing the boards of certain companies due to 
negative relations with the company, such biased reporting is unlikely to be observed to any 
great extent within the UK broadsheet media as it may constitute as defamatory. As such, it 
would appear that while regulation of the newspaper media discourages observable bias, it 
may not account for the bias manifest in a lack of reporting on issues. The next chapter 
devotes further consideration to the necessity for impartial, independent reporting within the 
broadsheet media if it is to be of tangible value in corporate governance.  
 This study’s failure to detect a significant link between newspaper reporting in the 
year of the offer and changes in corporate governance quality may suggest that the newspaper 
media’s role in corporate governance in the context of takeover offers may only be of short-
term value. It may be the case that as more information is made available by other parties as 
an offer becomes imminent, the influence of the newspaper media diminishes. Indeed, given 
the opportunities for newspaper reports themselves to become biased over the offer period, 
they may have a lesser impact as they are not credited as readily.  
 While this study has found that early newspaper coverage on the disciplinary 
operation of the market for corporate control is significantly positively associated with 
governance changes in companies involved, it fails to detect an association between early 
newspaper reporting on events which may cause the market for corporate control to fail and 
governance changes in the companies whose shares are implicated. Investigation of an 
association between pre-event year newspaper reporting and changes in corporate governance 
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quality in market abuse cases has been largely constrained by low levels of pre-event year 
newspaper reporting. In this respect, the findings of the main analysis of this study highlight 
the practical barriers to reporting on white collar crime and illegitimate behaviour in the 
corporate and market context. Principally, the fact that market abuse is prohibited by law 
means that offenders endeavour to conceal their actions such that there may be no signals or 
clues to prompt journalistic investigations (Miller, 2006). Even if suspicions are harboured 
among the news media, resource constraints present a significant impediment to investigative 
journalism (Doyle, 2006; Tambini, 2008; Lewis et al., 2010). Those more critical of the news 
media might, however, argue that, resource shortages aside, journalists, particularly those in 
the mainstream media, are not sufficiently financially literate to detect market abuse and to 
follow up with a rigorous investigation (Sherman, 2002).  
 It has been possible to examine the hypothesised association between event year 
newspaper reporting and changes in corporate governance quality in market abuse cases. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that by reporting on instances of market abuse, the 
newspaper media highlights directors’ failure to implement sufficient controls over the release 
and use of inside information and to prevent insiders from taking actions aimed at 
manipulating the company’s share price. Although corporate governance quality improves in 
companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse, it remains low. While the validity of 
findings suffers from the small number of instances studied, one inference may be that the 
level of newspaper reporting on market abuse cases is insufficient to impose significant 
reputational costs on directors. The volume of newspaper reporting on market abuse cases in 
the year of the abuse is small. In fact, some cases receive no coverage until regulatory 
intervention is complete. As noted in Chapter Seven, this may be a number of years later, with 
the effect that certain members of the board in place at the time of the abuse have retired. 
Nevertheless, Joe, Louis and Robinson’s (2009) study shows that just one instance of media 
exposure of governance problems suffices to encourage board reform. Thus, it may also be the 
case that in practice, mainstream newspaper reports on abuses are not perceived by boards to 
possess the potential to harm their reputations vis-à-vis the investment community. Unlike 
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takeover offers, which may have implications for a variety of segments of society, market 
abuse may be thought of as an issue which is deemed important mainly by stock market 
participants and thus, reporting by specialist financial media vehicles may have a greater 
impact on their reputations in this regard.  
 Alternatively, directors may not immediately acknowledge that the incidence of the 
abuse indicates a need for changes to the board and governance improvements, irrespective of 
the level of press exposure it receives. The analysis presented in the previous chapter finds no 
evidence of a significant association between changes in CGQ and the question of blame in 
market abuse cases. As such, it would not appear that responsibility for the abuse determines 
changes in corporate governance quality. Although managers and directors are directly 
involved in 44% of the market abuse cases studied presently, they may not assume 
responsibility until the FSA, the UK’s competent authority for stock market regulation over 
the sample period, identifies the offender. While it may be immediately apparent that a party 
has contravened a Rule of the Takeover Code, a manager or director who engages in market 
abuse may attempt to conceal that they have committed market abuse for a number of years, 
particularly since they face the possibility of being penalised through the courts. In contrast, 
directors who are in breach of the Takeover Code have not engaged in an illegal act and hence 
do not face such severe consequences. 
 The findings of this study indicate that corporate governance quality tends to be low in 
companies whose shares are involved in market abuse. While at the aggregate level, the 
governance quality of companies in the market abuse subset is in line with the benchmark set 
within the control sample, there are specific areas where the quality of governance within the 
market abuse subset falls below that in the control sample. Specifically, the boards of 
companies in the market abuse subset of the sample tend to comprise a low proportion of 
independent members and members tend to own a large proportion of the company’s shares, 
possibly indicating entrenchment. In addition, their CEOs tend to be paid a sum which does 
not reflect their performance in maximising shareholders’ returns. The tendency for the boards 
of companies involved in market abuse cases to fail to establish an audit committee or to have 
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an inactive audit committee consisting of a low proportion of independent members is also 
worth noting. Given that market abuse represents an injustice to shareholders, it might be 
argued that, in practice, boards of directors ought to play a greater role in protecting their 
shareholders against such abuses. As noted in Section 8.3 there is a lack of recognition of the 
need for appropriate governance within issuers in market abuse regulations; hence, greater 
interaction between policymakers at market and company level may be beneficial in terms of 
investor protection from this perspective. 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
The discussion presented in this chapter concludes that the essence of the mainstream UK 
broadsheet newspaper media’s role in corporate governance is as an information intermediary 
which republishes information from a variety of sources and makes it accessible to a range of 
parties throughout the company and market environment, and in so doing, promotes a 
realignment of directors’ interests with those of shareholders. The mainstream newspaper 
media appears more capacitated to serve this role in contexts where information may be 
acquired quite readily and where the issues in question are of interest to a wide and varied 
audience. Such conditions exist when the market for corporate control operates successfully. 
However, when illegitimate behaviour which may lead to the breakdown of the market for 
corporate control takes place, barriers are erected which impede the ability of the mainstream 
broadsheet press to function as an effective information intermediary. 
 Almost one half of the sample of takeover offers employed in this study fail; in these 
cases, directors appear to respond to the threat of takeover by making changes to different 
areas of the board. This study has shown that the extent of these changes is positively 
associated with the volume of mainstream broadsheet newspaper coverage the offer receives. 
Thus, findings imply that by interpreting signals and collecting information regarding the 
possibility of takeover, the newspaper media may publicise the prospect of the board’s 
replacement. Such publicity exposes the board’s ability to serve as a corporate governance 
device to the company’s shareholders, potential investors, peer companies wherein directors 
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may seek board positions in the future and other stakeholders who have contractual 
relationships with the company, both explicit and implicit, regarding the supply of labour, 
materials, credit, infrastructure and a market for its products.   
  In contrast, the instances of market abuse involving UK listed shares studied 
presently receive little coverage until regulatory intervention has ensued, by which time the 
board of directors of companies have undergone routine refreshment. Accordingly, this 
study’s failure to detect any link between newspaper reporting and changes in corporate 
governance quality may not have come as a surprise. This chapter has acknowledged various 
factors which may explain the low levels of newspaper coverage observed in this study. The 
concealed and rapid nature of market abuse and a lack of time, training and financial resources 
may constrain mainstream broadsheet journalists’ ability to follow up on and verify their own 
and the suspicions of informants. This coupled with the risk of being held liable for 
defamation of character and the confidential nature of regulatory investigations may explain 
why market abuse cases receive low levels of newspaper coverage which is belated in nature. 
It has also considered a number of explanations as to why corporate governance quality does 
not appear to change in response to the newspaper reports which are published in the year of 
the abuse and it may be the case that boards do not perceive mainstream newspaper reports on 
market abuse to threaten their reputations, either due to their predominantly non-financial 
specialist audience, because they do not believe the abuse to be a failure on their part, or if 
they do, they do not explicitly acknowledge this. That said; the possibility that the mainstream 
broadsheet newspaper media may serve a role in corporate governance by reporting on market 
abuse cannot be fully rejected presently given the small size of the sample of market abuse 
cases employed in this study. Having discussed, and considered the implications of, findings 
regarding the corporate governance role of newspaper reporting on takeover offers and market 
abuse, the conclusions of this study are drawn in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
9.1. Introduction 
Access to information on the activities of managers and directors is fundamental to 
appropriate governance of dispersedly owned companies. Possible methods of enhancing 
company disclosures have led a distinct line of inquiry in the corporate governance literature 
for many years (Diamond and Verrechia, 1991; Forker, 1992; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 
1999; Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004); yet, the problem of information asymmetry 
persists. Recognition of the capacity of external intermediaries such as the news media to 
alleviate this problem (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; 
Bushee et al., 2010; Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013) deserves commendation for 
bringing fresh perspective to research in this area.   
 Building upon this work, the present study has endeavoured to evaluate the corporate 
governance role of the newspaper media in a setting where responsibility for shareholder 
protection lies immediately with the board of directors, but ultimately rests with the market for 
corporate control. The findings discussed in the previous chapter suggest that the newspaper 
media possesses considerable power to encourage boards to serve the interests of shareholders. 
It would appear that by publicising directors’ exposure and responses to market enforced 
discipline, the broadsheet newspaper media performs a meaningful function in promoting 
board accountability in publically owned companies in the UK.     
 This chapter reaches a number of conclusions about the role served by mainstream 
broadsheet newspaper reporting on market level issues concerning shareholder protection in 
corporate governance processes at the company level. This enables the contribution of the 
study to be assessed in terms of theory, empirical evidence, method, context and practice so 
that recommendations in a number of these areas may be made. Following this, the limitations 
of the study are addressed and potential avenues for future research are considered. 
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9.2. Conclusions 
9.2.1. The Newspaper Media as a Catalyst in the Market for Corporate Control 
Since boards of UK listed companies face few mandatory requirements to serve the interests 
of shareholders, the presence of an active market for corporate control has a critical influence 
on the UK system of corporate governance. This thesis has considered how a lack of reliable 
information regarding a company’s performance may enable ineffective managers and 
directors to avoid discipline. It has suggested that, although subject to many of the limitations 
of more traditional intermediaries in the company and market environment, the broadsheet 
newspaper media may make a valuable contribution to corporate governance in the UK. 
Specifically, it is proposed that by keeping shareholders and other key stakeholders informed 
on the operation of the market for corporate control, while creating potential reputational costs 
for directors who are subject to its discipline, the newspaper media may have an important 
impact on governance at company level. This study is not the first to acknowledge the news 
media as an active participant in the market for corporate control. As an intermediary which 
offers ready access to a large amount of information on the developments which occur over 
the course of a takeover offer in a relatively timely manner, the news media may 
simultaneously benefit shareholders in both the bidding (Liu and McConnell, 2013) and target 
companies (Buehlmaier, 2013).  
 Having considered the findings of this study, the value of the news media in takeover 
situations may be appreciated from a further perspective, i.e. through its influence over the 
reputations and hence, the actions of target directors. The significant positive association 
detected herein between newspaper reporting on the possibility of a takeover and subsequent 
changes in the target’s corporate governance quality suggests that newspaper publicity 
surrounding a company’s vulnerability to takeover triggers action amongst the members of its 
board. Through its influence over directors’ reputations, mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
reporting on potential takeovers encourages changes to be made on the target board so that it 
serves as a means of promoting better quality corporate governance. Newspaper reporting 
prior to the announcement of the offer is apt to have a particularly strong influence on 
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directors’ reputations since it publicises the fact that the performance of the board has reached 
such a low level that a takeover, a tool often saved for correcting egregious management 
failure, may be necessary. Moreover, it subjects directors who erect pre-bid defences to public 
scrutiny.  
 The governance improvements with which newspaper reporting is associated is 
apparent in board size, board meeting frequency, the roles of CEO and chairman, audit 
committee size, independence and activity, CEO pay to performance sensitivity and directors’ 
ownership interests. Newspaper reporting is significantly associated with changes in board 
leadership roles, audit committee meeting frequency, CEO pay to performance sensitivity and 
directors’ shareholdings in isolation; yet, boards which exhibit low governance quality in 
many of these areas are more likely to be replaced in a takeover than to overcome the attempt 
and make the changes thereafter. Thus, effective takeovers have the greatest disciplinary 
power; however, where the threat of takeover suffices to correct boards’ shortcomings in these 
areas, the newspaper media may serve a role in encouraging reform. Accordingly, this study 
concludes that the broadsheet newspaper media catalyses the disciplinary operation of the 
market for corporate control and in doing so, serves a role in corporate governance. 
 The value of broadsheet newspapers in this respect ought not to be overestimated. The 
influence of the broadsheet newspaper media on corporate governance quality and changes 
therein may be considerably weaker where there are variations in coverage among 
publications and among newspaper groups. In effect, unless all newspaper titles fully expose 
issues in companies, their boards may not face the same reputational risks and hence, may not 
be as strongly encouraged to implement positive governance changes. Moreover, corporate 
governance quality has been found to deteriorate in targets once the threat of takeover passes, 
irrespective of the amount of newspaper reports published in the year of the offer or in the 
year before or after it. At best, the positive influence of the newspaper media on corporate 
governance is short-term in nature and the responsibility for pressurising boards to maintain 
and enhance the improvements made over the year of the offer may be left to shareholders and 
policymakers. As such, the newspaper media may facilitate a temporary realignment of 
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directors’ interests with those of shareholders, creating an opportunity for more central 
stakeholders to enhance the quality of the board as a corporate governance device via 
enhanced policy guidelines and shareholder activism. Thus, while broadsheet newspaper 
reporting may catalyse reform, it is by no means a solution to the agency problem which has 
driven corporate governance research for decades. 
 
9.2.2. The Limited Vigilance of the Newspaper Media 
Stock market abuse is undesirable for various reasons outlined in Chapter Two. The present 
study views market abuse as a form of behaviour which is contrary to the effective operation 
of the market for corporate control. Accordingly, this thesis has proposed that the newspaper 
media’s corporate governance role in the context of the market for corporate control may 
entail a watchdog function, whereby it alerts shareholders and other interested parties of 
market abuse and informs them of its implications. Chapter Four has, however, acknowledged 
that as a corporate watchdog, the news media can fail to bark sufficiently early to prevent 
loses of shareholders’ wealth (Dyck and Zingales, 2002b; Sherman, 2002; Doyle, 2006). 
Findings discussed in Chapter Eight indicate that stock market abuse is one area in which this 
weakness is particularly apparent.  
 While the newspaper media may serve a purpose in aiding the market for corporate 
control in disciplining boards, it shows little potential to signal or limit abuses which may lead 
to its breakdown. Having found no evidence of a significant association between newspaper 
reporting on instances of market abuse and changes in corporate governance quality in the 
companies whose shares are implicated, the hypothesis posed herein has been rejected with 
respect to market abuse. Because the sample of market abuse cases employed in this study is 
small, it cannot be conclusively stated that newspaper reporting on market abuse has no 
impact on corporate governance quality in the companies whose shares are involved. 
However, the low level of broadsheet newspaper reporting on market abuse cases observed in 
this study would indicate that they may not receive adequate publicity to have a sufficient 
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influence on directors’ reputations and hence, their incentives to make changes to the board 
such that it serves as a higher quality governance device.  
 Although a meaningful amount of reports on abuses would not be expected in the pre-
event year, given that it is impossible to predict its occurrence, the small amount of reports 
published in the year of the abuse indicates that barriers to reporting on market abuse exist 
even as it occurs and in the months following its incidence. In light of academic commentary 
on the time and resource shortages which UK broadsheet journalists have faced over the past 
decade (Doyle, 2006; Tambini, 2008; Lewis et al., 2010), it would seem that the costs 
associated with investigating and verifying suspected abuses outweigh the potential benefits of 
publishing the story, particularly since online media vehicles may still release the story first.  
 The previous chapter has also considered the possibility that broadsheet newspaper 
reporting on instances of market abuse may not have an influence on board changes in 
companies involved because it does not impose reputational costs on their directors, who do 
not assume responsibility for its occurrence. While the threat of takeover may be directly 
attributed to the performance of managers and directors, a company’s shares may become 
implicated in market abuse irrespective of the quality of the board as a corporate governance 
device. The board may ensure that the Code of Market Conduct, the DTRs and the Listing 
Rules are adhered to; however, they cannot prevent all market participants from trading in the 
company’s shares in an illegitimate manner. Moreover, while directors’ responses to a 
takeover offer can significantly impact shareholders’ wealth, directors of companies whose 
shares are implicated in market abuse ultimately entrust the FCA to investigate and remedy the 
abuse. As a result, the actions of directors of takeover targets are likely to be subject to more 
scrutiny by the media, shareholders and stakeholders than are those of directors in companies 
whose shares are implicated in market abuse. Thus, newspaper reporting on market abuse 
cases may not threaten directors’ reputations and hence, their future board positions in the 
same manner as does that on takeover cases.  
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9.3. Contributions of the Study 
This study has contributed to the literature on multiple levels. This section discusses these 
contributions in terms of theory, empirical evidence, method, context and practice. A summary 
of these contributions is provided in Table 9.1. 
  This study has provided considerable support for the theory of the market for 
corporate control (Manne, 1965) by providing evidence which indicates that companies which 
are threatened by takeover experience improvements in corporate governance quality, 
consistent with Coffee’s (1984, p.1202) analogy of the board of directors as a “tripwire” 
which is triggered before an actual takeover, the remedy of last resort, becomes necessary. 
Consistently, this study finds that boards which are replaced in an effective takeover, on 
average, exhibit lower corporate governance quality prior to the offer than those which avoid 
the extreme form of discipline exerted by a takeover. The findings presented herein contribute 
to this theory by indicating that the volume of mainstream broadsheet newspaper coverage the 
offer receives is positively associated with governance improvements. This suggests that 
broadsheet newspaper publicity encourages boards which face the threat of takeover to 
enhance the quality of governance they provide. As such, the mainstream broadsheet 
newspaper media may catalyse the disciplinary operation of the market for corporate control 
by disseminating information throughout the company and market environment in the early 
stages of a takeover offer and in doing so, increasing directors’ reputational stakes in surviving 
the takeover attempt. These findings support Borden’s (2007) conjecture that the news media 
may catalyse the market’s response to managerial and board failure. However, while Borden 
envisages this process to come about via shareholders’ actions, the present findings indicate 
that shareholders need not necessarily respond to coverage in order for the news media to 
promote discipline of boards. Findings however imply that a weakness of the newspaper 
media’s role in this respect is its limited ability to detect and warn parties of market abuse 
which may impede the disciplinary capacity of the market for corporate control and place 
shareholders at a disadvantage. 
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Table 9.1: Contribution of the Present Study  Supports Develops Adds Theory Supports the theory of the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965). Develops this theory by considering how news media reporting on takeover offers and stock market abuse impacts the operation of the market for corporate control from the perspective of the board of directors. 
 
Adds a new dimension to Borden’s (2007) argument that the news media may catalyse the market’s response to management and board failure by encouraging shareholders to take action by providing evidence which suggests that the news media catalyses the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control by encouraging directory to take action. Empirical Evidence Supports research on (i) the news media’s influence on corporate governance (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009); (ii) the news media’s impact on decision-making in the context of takeovers (Liu and McConnell, 2013; Buehlmaier, 2013); (iii) the news media’s role as an information intermediary (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010) and (iv) the media’s impact on managers’ and directors’ reputations (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013). 
Builds on prior research on the corporate governance role of the news media at market level (Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Ahern and Sosyura, 2014) by employing a sample which includes both takeover offers and instances of market abuse so as to consider the impact of newspaper reporting on both the operation and the possible failure of the market for corporate control. 
Findings indicate that the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media facilitates the effective interaction of the primary external and internal methods of shareholder protection- the market for corporate control and the board of directors. This study’s focus on the target board contrasts prior studies which have considered how news media coverage of takeovers serves a corporate governance role by informing target shareholders directly (Buehlmaier, 2013) and vis-à-vis its influence on the reputations of acquiring management (Liu and McConnell, 2013). Method Supports prior studies which discretely evaluate multiple facets of the board of directors (see Table 3.1).         
 Follows the methodology of Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2008) to the extent that media data is manually collected and appraised, the volumes of news articles are employed as the primary media measures and steps are taken to address the possibility of an endogenous relationship between the newspaper media and corporate governance change.  
Develops a scoring system to achieve scaled measures so that the quality of ten key aspects of the board may be evaluated relative to extant best practice guidelines.       
 Develops this methodology by employing a broader range of newspaper sources, a larger sample of cases and a longer timeframe. The newspaper reporting variable employed is adjusted such it is independent of the influence of multiple factors which may also influence corporate governance change. 
Introduces a novel benchmark-adjusted aggregate measure of corporate governance quality, tailored specifically to the context of UK listed plcs, which focuses exclusively on key facets of the board so as to reduce the potential for measurement error. In this respect, this study contrasts and adds to previous studies which evaluate board characteristics discretely (see Table 3.1) and those which employ aggregate measures of corporate governance quality developed by commercial agencies (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
 Provides new evidence to indicate that causality flows from the newspaper media to improvements in corporate governance. Notwithstanding this evidence, this study recommends that further research is necessary to investigate if corporate governance quality may also be a determinant of newspaper reporting.  
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Table 9.1 Continued: Contribution of the Present Study 
  Supports 
 
Develops Adds 
Context Supports research on the impact of the print media on corporate governance (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Johnson et al., 2005; Miller, 2006; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2008; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010; Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013).  
 
Prior studies employ a sample solely composed of specialist business and financial publications (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Johnson et al., 2005; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010; Buehlmaier, 2013) or a sample composed of a combination of specialist and mainstream publications (Miller, 2006; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013). 
 
Highlights that the mainstream newspaper media in isolation may influence the actions of boards.   
 Advocates commentary on the role of the media in promoting the value of corporate governance at policy level in the UK (Jones and Pollitt, 2001; 2004). 
Builds upon a vast body of research on corporate governance in UK listed plcs. Detects a news media influence on corporate governance behaviour in UK listed plcs, a setting which has heretofore been largely unexplored in research on the corporate governance role of the media. 
 Practice Verifies that takeover offers for large public listed companies attract considerable publicity in the news media. Confirms the difficulties associated with reporting on white collar crimes such as market abuse.  
Highlights the potential value of the newspaper media as an information intermediary between boards, shareholders and numerous other market participants and company stakeholders. Stresses the incentives of managers and directors to attempt to bias newspaper reports. Highlights the barriers to investigative journalism which impede the news media’s potential role as a watchdog for illegitimate behaviour at the company and market level. 
 
This study shows that broadsheet newspaper reports may potentially influence the effectiveness of boards of directors as instruments of shareholder protection and thus, makes a number of recommendations regarding the sustainability of the quality UK broadsheet newspaper media from the unique viewpoint that accurate, credible, timely and independent newspaper reporting is of value in corporate governance and in the context of business and finance in general.    Reaffirms the importance of promoting high standards of corporate governance at the company level. 
Emphasises the importance of effective interaction between different corporate governance mechanisms, primarily the market for corporate control, the board of directors, shareholder activism and the legal and regulatory system. Indicates that the newspaper media can facilitate this interaction. 
 
This study highlights that although takeover offers serve a key role in disciplining boards which may not serve as fully effective corporate governance devices, the governance improvements which come about following a takeover threat may not be sustained in the long term. Thus, it invites policymakers to further consider the clarity of existing best practice guidelines and the scope of listed companies to which they apply. It also urges the development of measures to facilitate shareholder activism in UK companies which have already been initiated at policy level. 
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 At an empirical level, this study builds upon a growing stream of research on the 
influence of the news media on corporate governance (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; 
Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009) and more specifically, to a line of inquiry concerning the 
corporate governance role of news media coverage of takeovers (Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and 
McConnell, 2013). Findings shed further insight into the impact of news media coverage of 
takeovers by indicating that the amount of publicity an offer receives in the newspaper media 
may influence the efforts the target board makes to provide enhanced shareholder protection. In 
this respect, this study adds a new dimension to previous work which shows that the news 
media aligns the interests of the managers of the acquiring company with those of its 
shareholders (Liu and McConnell, 2013). The present research takes a novel approach by 
endeavouring to examine the impact of newspaper coverage of both the operation of the market 
for corporate control and behaviour which may cause it to breakdown. While findings regarding 
the impact of newspaper coverage of market abuse cases are inconclusive, the low level of 
attention paid by the mainstream broadsheet media to instances of market abuse highlights that 
there are limits to its value in facilitating the operation of the market for corporate control. The 
mainstream broadsheet press appears to serve as a poor watchdog for and source of information 
on illegitimate behaviour which can interrupt the effective functioning of the market for 
corporate control. Findings also support the view of the press as an information intermediary in 
the company environment (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010) by illustrating that 
the UK mainstream broadsheet newspaper media, with a wide and varied audience of both 
immediate and broader company stakeholders, provides extensive coverage of takeovers such 
that it impacts corporate governance behaviour in target companies. 
 In terms of method, this study follows the methodology adopted by Dyck, Volchkova 
and Zingales (2008) to the extent that media data is manually appraised and the volumes of 
news articles are employed as the primary measure of media coverage, but differs in that a 
broader range of newspaper sources are employed and data is collected over a longer timeframe 
for a larger sample of cases. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to 
manually appraise a sample of newspaper reports of such volume. Moreover, this study, like 
that of Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, takes appropriate steps to address possible endogeneity 
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in the sample. Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales identify an exogenous component of newspaper 
coverage and use this as the basis for isolating a causal link between newspaper reporting and 
corporate governance reform. Despite having tested and verified the reliability of their 
instrument, they acknowledge that their study alone cannot fully confirm that causality flows 
from the news media to corporate governance reform and identify this issue as an area for future 
research. In response to this call, the present study devises a measure of newspaper reporting 
which is independent of the influence of a comprehensive range of factors which may drive 
corporate governance change and hence, is considered not to be endogenously linked to 
corporate governance quality change. Having identified a positive relationship between this 
measure and corporate governance quality change, this study adds to the work of Dyck, 
Volchkova and Zingales by providing further evidence to indicate a causal link between 
newspaper media reporting and subsequent improvements in corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, in presenting this evidence, this study acknowledges that companies’ pre-existing 
governance quality may also determine the amount of coverage which they receive. This 
possibility has been briefly examined herein; however, tests are inconclusive. Thus, while the 
present study has gone some way in pursuing the research avenue identified by Dyck, 
Volchkova and Zingales, more work is needed to investigate the direction of causality in the 
relationship between the media and corporate governance. Section 9.6 makes further 
suggestions in this regard. Also in terms of method, the study builds upon prior studies which 
discretely evaluate multiple facets of the board of directors, a summary of which is provided in 
Table 3.1 in Chapter Three, by developing a novel aggregate measure of corporate governance 
quality which is based primarily upon best practice guidelines in place in the UK during the 
sample timeframe. This measure accounts for key aspects of the board which are central to its 
capacity to protect shareholders. Using a control sample of companies, which is identified using 
the nearest neighbour matching technique (Abadie and Imbens, 2006; 2011; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2009), a benchmark of corporate governance quality is established and the corporate 
governance quality of companies in the main research sample is adjusted accordingly so as to 
account for the possibility that the quality of their governance may be influenced by the close 
regulatory scrutiny to which they are exposed. In this respect, the methodology is distinct from 
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studies which employ aggregate measures of corporate governance quality developed by 
commercial agencies (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Carcello et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008). Such measures, which consider a large number of board attributes, although 
comprehensive, may be susceptible to measurement error (Daines, Gow and Larcker, 2010) and 
may not account for firm-specific circumstances, such as exposure to additional regulatory 
oversight as is the case in the present research sample.  
 This study also makes a valuable contribution in terms of context. Notwithstanding the 
vast body of research on corporate governance in UK listed plcs, little attention has been paid to 
the role of the news media. Although research on the corporate governance role of the news 
media remains very much in its infancy, it is not a new concept. The collapse of Enron in 2001 
seems to have sparked an intrigue with the role of the media among scholars of corporate 
governance in the US context (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Agrawal and Chanda, 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2005; Borden, 2007; Brickley, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009). However, the same 
interest has not yet arisen in the UK, despite the much earlier incidence of corporate scandals 
including those at Polly Peck International, Maxwell Corporate Communications and the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce, which are argued to have driven the development of best practice 
guidelines in the UK (Jones and Pollitt, 2001; 2004). This is surprising, not least because of the 
presence of a long established quality broadsheet newspaper media (Doyle, 2006; Tambini, 
2008) which has avoided much of the recent criticism made of tabloid newspapers (the Leveson 
Report, 2012), but also because of the strong emphasis placed on shareholder protection in the 
UK (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Bebchuk, 2005; 2007; Armour and Skeel, 2006). 
Accordingly, one of the most significant contributions of the present study is that it introduces a 
fresh strand of corporate governance research, that on the role of the media, into a context, the 
London Stock Exchange, which has hosted considerable academic inquiry into corporate 
governance for decades. Also, on a contextual level, this study follows much prior work in its 
focus on the print media. Prior work in this area tends to converge upon the specialist business 
and financial press (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; Johnson et al., 2005; Miller, 2006; Core, Guay 
and Larcker, 2008; Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009; 
Bushee et al., 2010; Buehlmaier, 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013). While a number of these 
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studies employ mainstream newspapers (Miller, 2006; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2008; Liu and 
McConnell, 2013), they do not consider the impact of news coverage which is intended for a 
general audience in isolation. As noted in the previous chapter, there is a limited presence of 
widely disseminated business and financial newspapers which are published sufficiently 
regularly to provide information on the day to day activities of companies in the UK. Chapter 
One of this thesis illustrates that mainstream broadsheet newspapers tend to be read more by 
individuals with professional occupations. As an implication, mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
reports may attract the attention of a variety of stakeholders in the company, thereby not only 
affecting the board’s reputation with investors but also with regulators, creditors, employees, 
customers, suppliers and other parties in the company’s environment. Accordingly, when an 
event such as a takeover offer reaches the mainstream news media, the response taken by the 
target board is subject to the scrutiny of a broader range of parties than if it were only to appear 
in the financial and business press. Moreover, because there are a number of daily mainstream 
broadsheets in circulation, a greater plurality of views is offered. This thesis has provided 
evidence to suggest that mainstream newspapers may pose a significant threat to directors’ 
reputations and hence, have an impact on the actions they take to preserve shareholders’ wealth. 
As noted above, this study has provided evidence to support Borden’s (2007) conjecture that the 
financial news media may catalyse the disciplinary operation of the market for corporate 
control; however, it has shown that coverage need not be provided in the specialist financial 
media to have such an influence. The evidence suggests, however, that the value of mainstream 
broadsheets may be limited to shareholders in larger companies which tend generally to be 
visible to the media. Moreover, the broadsheet newspaper media’s attention to issues which 
affect shareholders wealth also appears to rely on the ease with which they may be reported on, 
such that they provide little information on injustices such as market abuse. 
 Finally in terms of practice, this study provides verification of the amount of publicity 
which takeover offers receive in the newspaper media and provides evidence to support the 
view of the newspaper media as an information intermediary in the company and market 
environment. The practical value of the newspaper media to investors and other stakeholders 
has already been acknowledged by prior researchers in this respect (Deephouse, 2000; Dyck, 
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Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010). This study 
highlights the potential value of the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media to shareholders 
and other stakeholders in UK listed companies which are targeted for takeover. UK broadsheet 
newspapers are widely disseminated sources of information on directors’ actions such that they 
may serve a purpose in curtailing self-serving behaviour among directors in takeover situations. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the essence of the newspaper media’s role is in its capacity 
to gather information from a variety of sources and make it accessible to various parties; 
however, when the costs of gathering and dispersing information are high, the newspaper 
media’s ability to serve its role is impeded. Hence, the practical value of the newspaper media in 
instances of white collar crime such as market abuse is low. The previous chapter also noted 
that the extent to which the newspaper media may be exploited as an information intermediary 
in practice relies upon the reliability of newspaper reports. Since directors are aware of the 
power of the media to shape their reputations, they and their PR agents may take advantage of 
the pressures journalists face to obtain information on company events at low cost, in a timely 
manner. The differing intensity of newspaper reporting from case to case which has been 
observed herein indicates a reluctance on the part of certain newspaper titles and newspaper 
groups to fully expose problems in some companies, possibly due to a lack of independence 
from the companies in question. Where this is the case, the capacity of the broadsheet 
newspaper media to promote governance improvements may be reduced. The next section 
makes a number of recommendations as to how the value of the broadsheet newspaper in 
corporate governance, and in business and finance more generally, may be sustained in the 
future. This study also reaffirms the importance of promoting high standards of corporate 
governance in companies listed in the UK. The evidence presented herein suggests that 
alternative oversight mechanisms may work in harmony to protect shareholders’ wealth. By 
reporting on an established method of disciplining managers and directors- the takeover offer, 
the newspaper media, a non-traditional participant in corporate governance, may facilitate the 
efficacy of the threat of takeover in encouraging board reform. The value of this interaction is 
likely be enhanced through the involvement of policymakers and shareholders. The previous 
chapter has suggested that continued maintenance of policies which encourage boards to adhere 
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to standards of best practice in corporate governance and policy-level initiatives aimed at 
promoting active shareholder participation are necessary in order to preserve and develop the 
governance improvements brought about through media publicised takeover offers. Given that 
the public opinion expressed via the news media has been recognised as a driver of policy 
developments in the UK in the past (Jones and Pollitt, 2001; 2004) and that shareholder activists 
have been observed to exploit the newspaper media to confront underperforming management 
(Becht et al., 2010), it would seem that there are numerous potential practical complementarities 
between traditional corporate governance mechanisms and the news media.  
 
9.4. Main Recommendations 
9.4.1. The Need for Strategy and Standards in the Future of the Newspaper Media 
As noted above, the practical value of the newspaper media in corporate governance is 
diminishing as accuracy and independence are sacrificed for low-cost information acquisition 
and rapid news coverage. Competition from online real-time news providers and resource 
shortages appears to have created an incentive to acquire information on a quid-pro-quo basis 
and to neglect verifying and certifying this information. In the absence of clear guidelines on 
appropriate relationships with sources and standards of accuracy, information communicated 
through the newspaper media cannot be fully relied upon by its readers. This thesis thus makes a 
two-fold recommendation that the future of the broadsheet media ought to be guided by well-
defined business strategy and independent regulation. The ideas put forward in respect are 
founded upon findings from two fields of inquiry into the future role of the newspaper media in 
society. The position of the newspaper media in the digital age has received considerable 
attention in media research and in Parliament (The House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications, 2008; Pew Research Centre, 2012; the Reuters Institute, 2013). The issue of 
independent press regulation has come to prominence since the publication of the Leveson 
Report in 2012. An outline of the background to the Leveson Inquiry and a summary of its 
findings are provided in Appendix E.  
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The Need for Appropriate Strategy  
The broadsheet newspaper industry needs to adopt a new strategy to survive in the digital age 
(PwC, 2009; Pew Research Centre, 2012; Simon Kucher and Partners, 2012). After a decade of 
debate in this area, newspapers are adapting to selling their content online with differing levels 
of success (The Reuters Institute, 2014). In devising this strategy, newspapers face a multitude 
of choices as to how best to sell and augment their product offering using digital technology. 
Amid all of these options, the nature of the offering itself may go overlooked. It appears 
necessary for the broadsheet newspaper media to make a decision whether to offer credible 
news coverage somewhere within its traditional reporting timeframe or to report less reliable 
information in a shorter timeframe than it has done in the past. The decision is apt to rest 
heavily on the preferences of broadsheet readers, such that it may maximise much needed 
revenues. The literature on the newspaper media reviewed in this thesis indicates that the 
broadsheet’s unique selling point is the provision of well-founded and trusted opinion and 
analysis on topics which lend themselves to being discussed in the written word. Research 
indicates that, as one of the most established media vehicles in society, broadsheet newspapers 
have earned an unparalleled reputation for the provision of quality news coverage, with which 
comes considerable consumer loyalty (Simon Kucher and Partners, 2012; the Reuters Institute, 
2013). Accordingly, this thesis recommends that in order to continue to serve as a valuable 
information intermediary and hence perform important roles in various aspects of society, not 
least in corporate governance, the broadsheet newspaper media must adhere to its core 
competency of reporting reliable information. 
 Competition from timelier news providers is not new to the newspaper media. The 
House of Lords’ report on the state of the UK news media (2008) reflects that in the 1950s, the 
emergence of television news gave rise to predictions on the death of the newspaper. However, 
as is evident from the readership and circulation statistics presented in Chapter Five, the 
broadsheet newspaper media continues to boast a vast readership fifty years later, in spite of the 
fact that it only reports the news on a daily basis. It now faces a new challenge in the digital age; 
however, this ought to be considered an opportunity rather than a threat. By exploiting digital 
technologies and the internet to augment their offerings, broadsheet newspapers may perform an 
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even more meaningful role in publicising the issues of the day both in print and on the World 
Wide Web. Social media vehicles do appear to be treated as friend rather than foe as 
newspapers use services such as Twitter and Facebook to disseminate headlines and to attract 
readers, which in turn provokes discussion of the news among social media users (Pew 
Research Centre, 2012; Reuters Institute, 2014). This is unarguably a positive development; not 
only can audiences help each other to understand the news, but it may facilitate discussion and 
collective action amongst interested parties. In the context of corporate governance, the 
implications may well be significant in terms of strengthening the voice of shareholders and 
other stakeholders in the company.  
 Attracting readers through social media is by no means a full solution to newspapers’ 
difficulties in generating revenues; in fact, it may exacerbate its problems since many will just 
read the headlines as a substitute for buying the full paper. The broadsheet newspaper industry 
must adapt to a business model which will allow it to generate the necessary funding for 
accurate and independent news reporting. This requires development of new methods of 
providing advertising and establishment of a conventional method of charging readers. 
Opportunities exist for newspapers to use the internet to offer targeted marketing facilities, 
rather than traditional advertising services to clients (PwC, 2009; Pew Research Centre, 2012). 
By offering novel advertising facilities, newspapers may attract new advertisers such that they 
are not reliant upon specific companies for income. As noted throughout this thesis, such a 
dependence can greatly impair the newspaper media’s capacity to act as a corporate watchdog. 
Broadsheet readers are willing to pay a suitable price for their papers online, even more so when 
editions are available as apps for mobile devices (the Reuters Institute, 2013; 2014). Simon 
Kucher and Partners (2012) report that 86% of UK broadsheet readers believe it is fair to pay an 
appropriate amount for online content. Distribution of news via mobile apps presents new 
opportunities for newspapers to charge their readers appropriately because digital payments are 
scalable. While buying just one article of a physical newspaper is not viable, it is possible to do 
so when the newspaper is digitalised. Strategies such as moveable paywalls may encourage 
readers to pay increasing amounts for content and increase reader demand and loyalty. UK 
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newspapers also possess the advantage that they report in the English language and can use the 
internet to expand their reach across international boundaries. 
 
The Need for a Standards-based Approach 
An audience’s trust in the media goes beyond the question of whether or not they believe what 
journalists report, it relates more to a confidence in their ability to help their audiences make 
sense of the news (Coleman, Anthony and Morrison, 2009). It appears however that the public’s 
trust is hard earned, not only for the media but for public figures of authority and information 
intermediaries generally. The results of an annual trust and credibility survey conducted by 
Edelman (2013) reveals that there has been a 5% increase in trust in the media globally since 
2012. Fifty seven per cent of international respondents indicated trusting the media while only 
48% had the same trust in their governments. Even less trust is placed in CEOs (43%) and 
official regulatory bodies (36%). Of the 42% of respondents who signalled a lack of trust in 
businesses generally, involvement in corruption and misplaced incentives were cited as the main 
reasons. Despite a global increase in trust in the media, UK audiences have less confidence in 
the media than they did in 2012. With 37% of UK respondents indicating their trust in the 
media, this represents a 10% decline from 2012. This finding is attributed mainly to the 
publication of the Leveson Report on press standards in the UK in 2012. As noted in Chapter 
Four, the Leveson Inquiry was triggered by ethical failings at tabloid newspapers and the Report 
of the Inquiry praises the credibility and reliability of the broadsheet press on numerous 
occasions. Although the criticisms made in the Report of the Leveson Inquiry pertain less to 
broadsheet journalists, more recent concerns aired about the independence of certain UK 
broadsheets from companies which supply them with finance (Oborne, 2015) raise serious 
questions about the integrity and impartiality of broadsheet business journalism and create 
doubt about how accurately key executives are represented in contemporary broadsheet 
newspapers. As a result, readers may not fully credit newspaper reports on events and issues in 
companies such that the capacity of the broadsheet media to threaten directors’ reputations and 
hence, its influence on corporate governance may be declining. In light of findings presented 
herein that the influence of the newspaper media on CGQ change is weaker when the varying 
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intensity of reporting is accounted for, it would appear critical that an appropriate framework of 
ethical standards be fully established to strengthen the independence of the broadsheet 
newspaper media and the extent to which readers may trust in it. 
 UK newspapers operate under a system of self-regulation which, pursuant to the 
recommendations of the Leveson Report, is currently being amended such that it will have 
statutory underpinnings and be overseen by a truly independent body (see Appendix E). This 
thesis advocates this development from the perspective of the role of the broadsheet newspaper 
media in corporate governance. The media’s role in holding corporate powers to account is 
acknowledged in the Leveson Report72; however, it is emphasised that to fulfil this role, the 
media must remain independent from those in power73. A certain degree of interaction between 
the newspaper media and those in positions of power in the company is necessary for informed 
reporting. Notwithstanding this, appropriate independent oversight of the broadsheet newspaper 
media and a clear set of guidelines on appropriate conduct for journalists are necessary to 
prevent the development of undesirably close relationships between broadsheet journalists and 
directors, their PR agents and other corporate insiders in positions of power.  
 As it emerges, it appears that the new regulatory system involves greater measures to 
prevent misrepresentation in newspaper reports74 and may involve enhanced transparency 
surrounding information sources75. In light of the findings of this study, that the broadsheet 
newspaper media serves a potentially valuable role as an information intermediary in the 
context of takeover offers and in holding target boards accountable to shareholders, a system of 
regulation which serves to reduce the potential for bias and inaccuracies is welcomed. Since 
monitoring the content of newspaper reports could arguably be perceived as censorship, systems 
of monitoring journalistic conduct are crucial. Such a system may facilitate the dissemination of 
more reliable information to minority shareholders and stakeholders and enable the broadsheet 
newspaper media to pose a more meaningful threat to directors’ reputations.  
                                                     72 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume 1, Part B, Chapter 2, Para. 4.1. 73 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume 1, Part B, Chapter 2, Para. 4.5. 74 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 8. 75 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume 2, Part F, Chapter 2, Para. 9.75. 
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 The Leveson Report acknowledges that newspapers may never be able to fully avoid 
the publication of factual errors since journalists will always work to meet deadlines; as such, 
the balance between accuracy and timeliness will most likely remain at the discretion of 
journalists and editors. Thus, the need for active monitoring of decisions made at broadsheet 
newspapers is significant, particularly given the aforementioned pressures currently placed on 
journalists to produce reports quickly. This is especially pertinent in the present context; 
journalists may receive tips and leaks from insiders, the publication of which may result in a 
misrepresentation of the current and future position of the company.  
 This study emphasises the importance of monitoring the level of transparency 
surrounding sources of information. This is desirable to the extent that readers may become 
more aware of possible biases and be better able to evaluate the accuracy of information. 
Nonetheless, to be truly informative, newspaper reports must make an ex-ante effort to 
minimise the potential for bias either by using independent information sources or by presenting 
a balanced and accurate view of an issue or event. Effective outside oversight and assessment of 
such efforts together with greater resources may well prove valuable in this regard. Moreover, 
given the lax attitude taken by the PCC toward disclosure of journalists’ own financial interests 
in companies noted in the previous chapter, an independently monitored regulatory system may 
provide for greater transparency surrounding journalists own incentives to present a particular 
view of a company and its board.   
 In sum, this thesis recommends that in order for the broadsheet newspaper media as an 
information intermediary to play a positive role in corporate governance in the future, the 
industry must identify and embark upon a strategic route which will provide funding for the 
resources necessary for quality news coverage. To assure such quality, the industry requires a 
robust regulatory system. The success of these proposed initiatives are interdependent; oversight 
is necessary to ensure that resources are put to their most appropriate use, while resources are 
likely to enhance the ease with which regulations are adhered to. Progress is already being made 
in both areas; however, care must be taken to ensure that accurate, credible and independent 
news coverage may be easily accessed in a suitably timely manner both by corporate 
stakeholders and society in the long-term. 
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9.4.2. The Need to Maintain and Enhance Corporate Governance Improvements 
following Takeover Offers 
Having found that the improvements in corporate governance quality which come about in the 
year of a media publicised takeover offer are not sustained in the following year, this thesis 
recommends that more effective long-term oriented monitoring of directors and managers by 
institutional investors is necessary after the company falls vulnerable to takeover. It is 
recommended that policy developments are necessary to promote such monitoring and to enable 
governance improvements to be sustained in the long-term. It is envisaged that this may result 
in greater requirements for information from the news media and other intermediaries.  
 
More Effective Shareholder Voice 
The decline in corporate governance quality observed over the year following a takeover offer 
in both the main research sample and in the control sample indicates that a somewhat short-term 
view is taken toward shareholder protection. One primary reason for this may be that the long-
term concerns of shareholders are not effectively communicated to managers and directors. 
While statistics presented in Chapter Seven indicate a strong institutional investor presence in 
sample companies, the results for the second stage model provide no evidence to indicate that 
the presence of institutional investors has any influence on changes in CGQ. This is consistent 
with the findings of the Kay Review (2012) which indicate that the character and quality of 
shareholder engagement in UK listed plcs in poor76. Reasons for this include the persistence of 
free-rider problems, increasingly intermediated investment chains and concerns regarding the 
mandatory bid rule and insider dealing regulations. As a result, exit has typically been preferred 
over voice on the markets of the London Stock Exchange. Accordingly, the Kay Review calls 
for regulatory practice to favour investing over trading77. A number of measures which may be 
taken to achieve more effective communication of shareholders’ long-term objectives have been 
                                                     76 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para 1.30. 77 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para 6.1. 
361  
proposed in the Kay Review. Development of the Stewardship Code78 is deemed necessary to 
promote trust along the investment chain such that the skills and knowledge of asset managers 
are integrated with the supervisory role of those employed in corporate governance, leading to 
positive and supportive engagements79. Regulatory policies which encourage asset managers to 
hold more concentrated investment portfolios which are differentiated from benchmark indices80 
and a disintermediation of the investment chain81 are advocated as a means of increasing asset 
managers’ incentives to engage. Regulators including the Takeover Panel82 and the FCA83 are 
urged to provide greater clarity on possible applications of the mandatory bid rule and breaches 
of insider dealing rules respectively. The establishment of an ‘investors’ forum’ is also proposed 
as a means of alleviating collective action problems; this would involve investment institutions 
co-ordinating to discuss concerns and to take appropriate action84. The present study shows that 
targets of offers which require direct Takeover Panel intervention tend to experience greater 
governance improvements than do targets of offers which are subject only to routine Panel 
supervision. This finding considered, the closer involvement of market regulators in governance 
at the firm level would appear to be a positive development.  
 In October 2014, the Government published a progress report on implementation of the 
recommendations (UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2014). Among the 
developments reported is the publication of the 2012 edition of the UK Stewardship Code, 
which has clarified the aim and definition of stewardship with emphasis on the need for 
investors to engage with management on companies’ long-term strategies and sustainable 
                                                     78 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Recommendation 1. 79 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para 6.3. 80 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Chapter Seven, Main Principle.  81 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para 6.13. 82 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para. 7.6 and 7.7. 83 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para.10.17. 84 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Recommendation 3. 
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returns85. In addition, the Investors’ Forum was established in July 2014 with the objectives of 
promoting the value of long-term approaches to investment and a cultural change throughout the 
investment chain and supporting engagement with management of failing companies86. The 
report also notes progress made by the FCA to establish rules and guidelines aimed at reducing 
conflicts of interest between asset managers and their clients87. The report acknowledges that 
more progress is necessary in order to change the culture of UK equity markets and outlines a 
number of further steps which can be taken to achieve this change. These include monitoring the 
commitment of signatories to the Stewardship Code; development of the Investors’ Forum; and 
organised consultations between government and senior stakeholders from the business and 
investment industries on how best to foster engagement and stewardship88. Having provided 
further evidence to suggest that measures taken to enhance shareholder protection are short-term 
in nature, this thesis commends this progress and urges policy makers to promptly pursue the 
proposed next steps so as to remove impediments to active shareholder participation in 
governance.  
 
Clearer Guidelines on Best Practice 
Another factor which may explain the deterioration in corporate governance quality following 
the passing of a takeover offer is the ambiguity in certain areas of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code discussed in Chapter Eight. A number of provisions of the Corporate 
Governance Code are open to subjective interpretations; this coupled with boards’ relative 
freedom to provide boiler-plate explanations for non-compliance may result in a laissez-faire 
attitude being taken toward their structure and activities. As such, it may take an extreme threat 
such as a takeover offer to exert the necessary pressure on boards to act within shareholders’ 
interests. However, when this threat passes, board leadership, effectiveness, accountability and 
incentives again become somewhat misguided.                                                      85 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2014. Building a culture of long-term equity investment- implementation of the Kay Review: progress report, Para. 2.3. 86 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2014. Building a culture of long-term equity investment- implementation of the Kay Review: progress report, Para. 2.23. 87 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2014. Building a culture of long-term equity investment- implementation of the Kay Review: progress report, Para. 2.69. 88 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2014. Building a culture of long-term equity investment- implementation of the Kay Review: progress report, Para. 1.9. 
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 The need for flexibility in the UK Corporate Governance Code has been acknowledged 
in Chapter Two of this thesis since a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance may 
create considerable regulatory costs for companies (Bainbridge, 2003; Gillan, Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Hertig, 2005; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008). Nevertheless, if structured 
appropriately, best practice recommendations could establish clearer guidelines on the size, 
composition and level of activity of boards and their committees such that they are adequately 
equipped to deal with the company’s contingencies. This may only require some subtle 
adjustments to existing recommendations so that they provide more tailored guidance while 
retaining flexibility. Given that there are significant differences in seven of the ten board 
characteristics studied presently between the main sample and control sample which are 
matched by company size and industry, more consideration might be given to these factors in 
best practice guidelines. In only six provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) is 
a distinction made between companies above and below the FTSE 350 (Provision B.1.2- 
director independence, Provision B.6.2- board evaluation, Provision B.7.1- re-election of 
directors, Provision C.3.1- audit committee composition, Provision C.3.7- appointment of the 
external auditor and D.2.1- remuneration committee composition). 
 Despite over a decade of academic and policy debate over the effectiveness of the 
comply-or-explain approach, little regard has been paid to the clarity of the guidelines of the 
Combined Code and its successor the Corporate Governance Code. Instead, the focus has been 
on the clarity of explanations for non-compliance (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Arcot, Bruno and 
Faure-Grimaud, 2010; the European Company Law Experts, 2013a; Shrives and Brennan, 
2015). This is particularly apparent at policy level; the recently introduced EU Recommendation 
on the Quality of Corporate Governance Reporting (Commission Recommendation 
2014/208/EU) pertain solely to the manner in which companies disclose their compliance with 
best practice codes and explain their reasons for non-compliance. While the FRC has published 
specific guidance on board effectiveness (FRC, 2011) and the role of audit committees (FRC, 
2012a), the approach taken is similarly general to that employed in the Corporate Governance 
Code. It may be worth considering if boards might provide more meaningful explanations for 
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non-compliance if the standards to which they are expected to adhere to were explained more 
clearly. 
 Chapter Eight has already contemplated that shareholders in AIM listed companies may 
benefit if the Exchange required these companies to follow best practice guidelines. This would 
most certainly require a fine-tuning of the UK Corporate Governance Code to accommodate for 
the differences in the corporate governance standards expected of small and large companies. 
Policymakers have already recognised that the banking and financial services industry has 
specific governance needs (the Walker Review, 2009). Given that the literature indicates that 
companies in knowledge-intensive and competitive industries may require larger, more insider-
oriented boards than what is recommended in best practice guidelines (Boone et al., 2007; 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang, 
2008; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009), there is certainly a case for greater tailoring of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. 
 
The Role of Information Intermediaries and Gatekeepers 
With appropriate policy and regulatory guidance, there are opportunities for both shareholders 
and the board itself to work to sustain the governance improvements generated by a takeover 
threat, such that the four primary mechanisms of corporate governance, identified by Denis and 
McConnell (2003), work in harmony. Effective interaction of these mechanisms requires 
communication of relevant information between the key stakeholders in question- shareholders, 
directors, regulators and policymakers on each other’s success in promoting long-term value for 
shareholders. As noted above, much of the information disclosed by boards under the UK 
Corporate Governance Code lacks meaning; similarly, the Kay Review advocates more 
meaningful disclosures by companies on an annual and interim basis89. Professor Kay notes that 
much of the mandatory disclosures made by companies only create noise in the markets90; he 
points out that external information intermediaries such as the newspaper media are often 
                                                     89 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Recommendation 12. 90 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para. 10.4. 
365  
trusted more than companies themselves91. Thus, it would seem that information provided by 
the company and by other stakeholders ought to be of greater quality but limited in quantity. 
Since the publication of the Kay Review, mandatory quarterly disclosure requirements are being 
removed in the UK92. The newspaper media and other gatekeepers of company information may 
then sever a greater role in communicating information to stakeholders in the time period 
between periodic disclosures. The findings of this study indicate that information published in 
newspapers prior to a takeover offer has an impact on the quality of boards as corporate 
governance devices. Given that this study finds that the newspaper media also pays considerable 
attention to takeover targets in the year of and in the year following a takeover offer, it may 
benefit shareholders and other stakeholders in monitoring the post-bid actions of and decisions 
made by boards, as could other gatekeepers of company information. However, as noted in the 
introduction to this thesis, not all gatekeepers can be trusted equally. 
 Coffee (2001; 2002; 2004) presents a model of a gatekeeper which may be applied to 
intermediaries including auditors, lawyers analysts and ratings agencies. The gatekeeper model 
is a third party enforcement strategy that relies on the fact that it may be easier to deter a third 
party from engaging in an illegitimate transaction since they have less to gain from that 
transaction than corporate insiders. Deterrence may be caused by the threat of regulatory action, 
the threat of reputational costs or a combination of the two. The gatekeeper model is most 
successful under three conditions. Firstly, the gatekeeper has a legal obligation to provide 
shareholders with accurate information. Secondly, reputational concerns align the interests of 
the gatekeeper with those of shareholders. Finally, the gatekeeper is paid only a nominal fee by 
a client company such that there are no incentives for the gatekeeper’s interests to become 
aligned with those of the company’s management.  
 Coffee (2001) notes a number of issues which may render the gatekeeper model 
vulnerable to failure. One reason it might fail is if there are imprecise standards with which to 
evaluate the gatekeeper’s performance. A second reason is if the gatekeeper’s independence 
                                                     91 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making, Final Report (2012), Para. 10.11. 92 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2014. Building a culture of long-term equity investment- implementation of the Kay Review: progress report, Para. 2.35-2.36. 
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from management is compromised with the effect that the gatekeeper may collude with or be 
coerced by management. A third reason for failure is if there are agency problems within the 
gatekeeper firm such that the interests of one or a number of individuals working for it are 
aligned with a client’s management. Coffee (2002) provides two further explanations for failure. 
The first is that there may be an absence of sufficient reputational, regulatory and legal penalties 
to deter gatekeepers from acquiescence. The second explanation, more pertinent during times of 
market prosperity, is based on the previously explained phenomenon of stock market euphoria. 
Coffee argues that investors seek the services of gatekeepers only when they are cautious and 
sceptical. During times of stock market bubbles, investors have a tendency to throw caution to 
the wind. In order to retain a demand for their services, gatekeepers adopt the optimistic attitude 
embraced by most other market participants. As noted in Chapter Four, similar comments have 
been made regarding the sentiment of newspaper reports (Galbraith, 1990; Dyck and Zingales, 
2002b; Tambini, 2008).  
 Nevertheless, the broadsheet newspaper media may satisfy Coffee’s success criteria to a 
greater degree than many more traditional gatekeepers. As noted in the previous subsection, its 
reputation for credible reporting has earned it a faithful readership and hence, a loyal consumer 
base. As noted, it is believed that this reputation may be what allows it to survive in the digital 
age if it successfully maintains an arm’s length relationship with the companies on which it 
reports. In contrast, auditors may be more successful by developing reputations for discretion 
(Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010), analysts’ reputations may only come into question in cases 
of large management failures (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010) and the primary concern of PR 
agents is the company’s reputation (Tambini, 2008). In terms of fees, newspapers may rely upon 
companies for advertising revenues; however, this is contingent upon newspapers serving the 
interests of their readers such that they continue to pay for reports. While analysts are also paid 
by the information user, analysts, particularly those on the sell-side, receive large fees for 
investment banking and underwriting services. Aside from public interest entities, auditors of 
UK companies may still be paid by companies for both audit and non-audit services such that 
they may receive considerably more than a nominal fee. PR agents again are paid by companies 
solely to project a positive image of their performance. Although newspapers are not legally 
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obliged to provide readers with accurate information, it appears that the developing newspaper 
regulatory system will impose more stringent requirements on journalists in a manner that is 
underpinned by the law. Auditors are subject to more stringent statutory requirements in this 
respect. Analysts and PR agents may constitute as insiders for the purposes of FSMA; however, 
they face little legal consequences for disseminating inaccurate information, once it is not 
considered to be price sensitive.  
 Accordingly, effective post-bid monitoring of management may be enhanced through 
appropriate use of information intermediaries or gatekeepers of information on companies. The 
news media may perform a particularly important role. Indeed, if fully exploited, the influence 
of the news media on corporate governance may be much greater than the findings of this study 
indicate. It is, however, crucial that the independence of broadsheet newspapers from the 
corporate sector be preserved and, where necessary, enhanced. This discussion has converged 
upon the broadsheet newspaper media; however, as technology evolves, the role of the 
broadsheet may be complemented and enhanced through co-operation with alternative media 
vehicles such that key stakeholders in corporate governance may communicate and access 
information with maximum ease in a timely manner and hence, better safeguard shareholders’ 
wealth on a continued long-term basis.  
 
9.5. Limitations of the Study 
This study, like most others has its limitations. Firstly, as has already been acknowledged, the 
size of the sample of market abuse cases is unsuitably small for the purposes of the present 
research. This has made it difficult to shed insight into the corporate governance role of the 
newspaper media in the context of market abuse and has adversely impacted the validity of 
findings derived in this respect. Since market abuse is prohibited by law, the incidence of 
market abuse cases will inevitably be much lower than the incidence of conventional and 
necessary events such as the emergence of takeover offers. The sample size could have been 
enlarged to a small degree by including criminal cases of market abuse. However, as Table 2.6 
in Chapter Two shows, only ten such cases were dealt with by the FSA over the sample 
timeframe. As it was the objective of this study to investigate the role of newspaper media 
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reporting on market abuse as a civil offence in the formative years of FSMA, criminal cases 
were not included in the sample. As noted in Chapter Six, a larger sample could have been 
generated by including companies not listed on the Main Market or the AIM of the London 
Stock Exchange; however, this was constrained by data availability. The decreased size of the 
takeover sample subset is in the event and post-event years is also regrettable but unavoidable 
given the nature of the issue in question. As can be seen in Table 2.3 of Chapter Two, a 
considerably larger number of takeover offers required the intervention of the Takeover Panel 
over the sample timeframe; however, data availability also determined the decision to include 
only Main Market and AIM companies. While extending the sample time-frame may have 
allowed for a larger sample of takeover offers, this would have resulted in the size of the sample 
subset being further out of proportion with the market abuse sample subset.  
 The fact that this study has considered corporate governance quality from the sole 
perspective of the board of directors is a further limitation of this study. Another primary 
stakeholder group which may take actions to influence governance at the company level is the 
shareholders. This chapter has advocated the importance of greater shareholder participation in 
governance in order to sustain the board improvements observed in the year of a takeover offer. 
The research model employed herein has accounted for the proportion of institutional ownership 
of sample companies. However, this study has been unable to explicitly discern if newspaper 
coverage has any effect on their motivations to take action. Prior to conducting this study, the 
researcher considered a number of manners through which the relationship between newspaper 
reporting and shareholders’ attitudes and actions might be assessed. Share price movements 
provide one indicator of changes in shareholders’ satisfaction with managers and directors over 
the course of newspaper reporting. However, the sensitivity of share price to a multitude of 
issues and events in the company environment renders it a noisy indicator and would leave it 
difficult to isolate a causal link between shareholders’ actions and newspaper media reporting 
on the events considered herein. While qualitative methods of directly investigating the opinions 
of institutional investors toward newspaper reports were considered, timing and accessibility 
constraints rendered such approaches unviable for the present study. The possibility of 
employing such methods in future research is discussed in the next section. Extant empirical 
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evidence strongly indicates that institutional shareholders have faith in the ability of media 
exposure to drive management and board reform (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, 
Louis and Robinson, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that newspaper reports on takeover 
offers may have an impact on the attitudes and actions of target shareholders. It may be the case, 
however, that the specialist financial press has a stronger influence in this regard. 
 Indeed, this study’s use of a media sample consisting solely of mainstream newspaper 
reports has limited the generalisability of findings to other media vehicles. The rationale for the 
focus on the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media was explained in Chapter One; relative to 
other media sources in circulation over the sample timeframe, broadsheet newspaper reports are 
regarded a more accurate, credible and independent source of information than many broadcast 
and online media vehicles. They are also considered more accessible than, and equally as timely 
as, specialist publications. Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that while the mainstream 
newspaper media has a unique capacity to reach a range of company stakeholders, the specialist 
financial press is apt to have a more direct influence on the investment community. Since the 
present study has primarily considered corporate governance as a method of protecting 
shareholders’ interests rather than those of the company’s stakeholders in general, specialist 
financial newspaper reports might be considered more suitable for use in this study. Since the 
number of specialist financial newspapers which are widely disseminated in the UK is small, 
their capacity to subject boards to public scrutiny is limited. Accordingly, this study has shown 
that the mainstream newspaper media may promote enhanced shareholder protection via its 
access to a range of corporate stakeholders, despite the fact that their interests may not be fully 
aligned with those of shareholders. It ought to be noted, however, that due to the growth in the 
use of online and digital news media toward the end of the sample period, which at the time of 
writing has increased much more, it would appear necessary for future research to incorporate 
news published online and in digital format; this is discussed further in the next section.  
 The unit weighting method applied herein (i.e. where all of the ten board characteristics 
were weighted as making an equal contribution to CGQ) might also be thought of as a limitation 
of the study. It could also be argued that in evaluating corporate governance quality, certain 
aspects of the board of directors may have deserved to have been weighted as being more 
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important than others. A number of differential weighting approaches were trialled by the 
researcher. This involved testing alternative combinations, whereby certain components were 
weighted more importantly, and comparing the resulting measures with those employed herein. 
The difference was negligible. One potential explanation for this is that a number of the 
components are strongly positively correlated (Wainer, 1976; Ree, Caretta and Earles, 1998; 
Bobko, Roth and Buster, 200793). Furthermore, attributing unsubstantiated importance to certain 
components may have introduced subjectivity into the overall measures of CGQ for sample 
companies. Hence, the decision to weight each of the ten components equally was sustained. 
Given that certain provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code are open to interpretation, 
the standards of CGQ set herein are, to a degree, based on the researchers’ own interpretation. 
For this reason, UK and international reports and policy documents on best practice in corporate 
governance and theoretical and empirical literature were also consulted when establishing the 
scoring scales. Moreover, having applied the CGQ scoring methodology to companies at 
different stages over a ten year time period, it has not been possible to assess each company’s 
governance quality based on the precise legislative and regulatory guidelines in place in the year 
in question. To achieve such an assessment would have required a number of different scoring 
systems to be devised and employed and would have resulted in inconsistencies between the 
measures of CGQ attained for companies.    
 This study’s exclusive focus on newspaper reporting on issues relating to the market for 
corporate control has also lowered the generalizability of results. As such, it cannot be claimed 
that newspaper reporting on all issues concerning management control has a similarly positive 
influence on corporate governance. It may be the case that news media coverage of alternative 
issues may influence governance differently. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, 
theory suggests that managers and directors are also subject to other forms of market-based 
control- that which comes from the labour markets and that which comes from the product 
                                                     93 This research is based on Wilks’ (1938) theorem which suggests that as inter-component correlations increase and as the number of components increases, the variability of weights decreases. Correlation analysis between the raw measures of the CGQ components employed herein reveals strong positive correlations between board characteristics such as board meeting frequency, director independence and audit committee meeting frequency. While strong negative correlations are detected between the proportion of executives on the board and director independence, these may be explained by the literature reviewed in Chapter Three. The results of this analysis are available from the author on request. 
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markets. This thesis has surmised that the governance changes which come about from 
newspaper reporting on companies’ being subject to the discipline of the market for corporate 
control may be influenced by directors’ aspirations to preserve their reputations with future 
employers and the company’s reputation with its customers. However, this has not been 
investigated directly. Furthermore, this study has not considered how newspaper reporting on 
governance issues within the company, such as board structure and behaviour or infringements 
of shareholders’ rights might impact corporate governance quality. Prior research has found that 
press coverage of such issues has a positive influence on board and management accountability 
in companies in the US (Johnson et al., 2005; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009) and Russia 
(Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). Thus, it may be the case that such coverage may also 
promote improvements in corporate governance quality in UK listed companies, perhaps to a 
greater extent than that on the company’s exposure to the discipline of the market for corporate 
control. Alternatively, given the criticism that the news media lack an appreciation for basic 
governance issues (Bednar, 2012), it may be the case that certain internal governance issues 
may not receive sufficient analysis and critique in newspapers so as to impose reputational costs 
on directors and hence encourage necessary governance changes. These issues, which this study 
has not considered, present opportunities for future research which are discussed in the next 
section.      
 The analysis conducted herein has involved a number of steps to establish that causality 
runs from newspaper reporting to corporate governance quality change and to address the 
possibility of an endogenous relationship between the two variables so as to assure the validity 
of results. However, the possibility that the level of attention which companies receive from the 
newspaper media is determined by their corporate governance quality cannot be dismissed. In 
addition to finding a significant positive association between pre-event year newspaper 
reporting and subsequent changes in CGQ, a significant negative association is detected 
between the pre-event year benchmark-adjusted CGQ scores and pre-event year newspaper 
reporting and a significant positive association is detected between the event year benchmark-
adjusted CGQ scores and event year newspaper reporting. Thus, it may be the case that 
broadsheet journalists are more inclined to speculate about TMA cases involving companies 
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with low governance quality and that this coverage promotes governance improvements in the 
companies concerned; in the following year, the companies which experience improvements 
may continue to be monitored by the broadsheet press. Sensitivity analysis has confirmed that 
the association between pre-event year newspaper reporting and pre-event to event year changes 
in CGQ remains positive and statistically significant when the association between pre-event 
year newspaper reporting and pre-event year CGQ is accounted for. Yet, it cannot be 
ascertained if the amount of coverage companies receive in the pre-event and event years 
depends on their corporate governance quality since the annual corporate governance quality 
scores and newspaper reporting are contemporaneously measured. The relationship between 
companies’ benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality scores in one year and the 
amount of newspaper reporting they receive in the following year has been examined to achieve 
a clearer indication. However, there is no evidence of a significant association. Hence, while 
this study provides robust and conclusive evidence to show that speculative, pre-event year 
newspaper coverage of takeover offers encourages governance improvements between the pre-
event and event years, one of its limitations is its inability to conclusively state whether or not 
the amount of coverage which companies receive is in some way determined by the ex-ante 
quality of their governance. 
 The present study has been framed within the theory of the market for corporate control. 
As explained in Chapter Two, there are various alternative explanations for takeovers and it is 
possible that some of the offers considered herein may have had motives other than to discipline 
management. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to ascertain that all of the offers included 
in the sample were made in an endeavour to replace underperforming managers and directors. 
While a line of argument contends that only hostile offers have disciplinary motives, Chapter 
Two has outlined that there is empirical evidence to contest this view. Even if disciplinary 
offers could be clearly characterised as being hostile in nature, it can be difficult to conclusively 
distinguish between a hostile and a friendly offer. As noted in Chapter Two, an offer may 
appear friendly but in fact be hostile (Hart, 1988). Given that Rule 21 of the Takeover Code 
greatly restricts directors from taking frustrating actions once a bona fide offer appears 
imminent, it may be the case that the proportion of genuinely hostile offers in the present 
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sample is larger than 24%, as reported in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged 
that not all of the takeovers studied herein may have been made with the intention of replacing 
the target board, with the implication that the extent of reputational costs imposed on directors 
may be overestimated to some extent. 
  Finally, this study has been limited to companies listed on two markets of the London 
Stock Exchange and thus its findings may not apply to companies on different markets or to 
overseas companies, particularly those outside of the Anglo-American jurisdiction. The market 
for corporate control has traditionally been less active in countries in Continental Europe and 
Asia, where control tends to be concentrated in the hands of one or a small number of 
shareholders and the role and structure of the board often differs to that typical of UK 
companies (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Burkhart and Lee, 2008). In 
emerging economies, the stock markets are not yet fully developed and governance patterns 
differ to those in developed economies (Fan, Wei and Xu, 2011). Consequently, the level of 
newspaper reporting on issues concerning the market for corporate control may be lower and 
may not have a similar impact on corporate governance as that observed herein. 
 
9.6. Avenues for Future Research 
As the previous section has discussed, there are a number of limitations to this study. While the 
researcher has endeavoured to address each issue encountered, these limitations may be 
overcome to a greater degree in future research. Indeed, the limitations of this study present 
avenues for future research in the areas of corporate governance and the market for corporate 
control and, in particular, on the influence of the news media in this respect. A number of these 
avenues are now considered. 
 As noted above, online and digital media vehicles are rapidly playing a significant role 
in society. This is particularly apparent within the business community. Business professionals 
are particularly inclined toward accessing news via mobile apps and websites, since computers, 
smartphones and tablets are the tools of their trade (Thurman, 2014). This study has 
acknowledged that online newswire services are the primary means through which investors 
receive genuine news; however, there has been a noteworthy increase in extent to which online 
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media vehicles, particularly social media vehicles, are intermediating between the company and 
its shareholders and among shareholders in recent years. In April 2013, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (hereinafter, the SEC) granted companies permission to announce key 
company information through social media websites if its shareholders are alerted that they 
intend to do so (SEC, 2013). While such a move has not yet been taken in the UK, it may only 
be a matter of time. This would certainly confer social media with considerable influence on 
boards’ activities and investors’ attitudes toward them. Social media also appears to be having 
an impact on trading strategies; Pan, Altshuler and Pentland (2012) have detected a movement 
of social trading, whereby traders share tips and trades and follow each other online and earn 
higher returns from doing so. Hence, there is a potentially lucrative avenue emerging for 
research into the role of online media, social media in particular, in corporate governance. The 
market for corporate control may again provide an interesting backdrop for such research. 
Indeed, given that social media reporting may be timelier and less constrained by resource 
shortages than newspaper reporting, it may play a greater role in communicating potential and 
actual instances of market abuse and hence, have a more discernible impact on boards and 
shareholders. A comparative analysis between the newspaper media and social media may be 
insightful in this regard. 
 The previous section has also noted that the insight derived from the present findings 
may be enhanced by considering corporate governance from a shareholder’s perspective. An 
examination of the actions of shareholders in companies targeted for takeover and of those in 
companies whose shares are implicated in market abuse over the course of newspaper reporting 
on these events would help to achieve a more comprehensive assessment of the corporate 
governance role of the newspaper media in the context of the market for corporate control. 
Since news media reports can inform shareholders of the wealth-effects of managerial decision-
making in takeover situations (Liu and McConnell, 2013) and influence shareholders’ decisions 
regarding acceptance of the offer (Buehlmaier, 2013), it is likely that much of the newspaper 
media’s influence on corporate governance in takeover targets comes about via the company’s 
shareholders. This study has failed to isolate a link between newspaper reporting and corporate 
governance in the context of market abuse; however, such a relationship may be more apparent 
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were corporate governance to be examined from the viewpoint of shareholders. Shareholders 
may perceive behaviour which constitutes as market abuse to have caused them an injustice 
(Bainbridge, 1993; Lee, 2002). Accordingly, newspaper reports on its incidence may lead 
shareholders to question the robustness of internal controls over the release and use of price-
sensitive information and the trading behaviour of insiders. As noted in the previous section, 
specialist financial news media vehicles may be more influential in this respect. As suggested in 
Subsection 9.4.2, shareholders may have a valuable role to play in sustaining the governance 
improvements which come about following a media publicised takeover threat. Empirical 
evidence provided by Joe, Louis and Robinson (2009) indicates that investors anticipate 
governance reforms to follow media scrutiny of the board. However, it would not appear from 
the findings of this study that effective action is taken by investors or any other stakeholder to 
encourage or maintain such reform. With adequate access to shareholders, qualitative research 
methods, such as surveys and interviews, offer potential approaches through which to gain an 
understanding of their attitudes toward, and responses to, newspaper coverage of the operation 
and potential breakdown of the market for corporate control. Such research may yield valuable 
insight into the extent to which newspaper reporting influences shareholders’ decisions to take 
action when there is a change in the degree to which they may have faith in the board.  
 Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
media may have a discernible influence on the attitudes and actions of broader stakeholders in 
the company, especially in the context of takeover offers. This study has provided evidence to 
suggest that mainstream newspaper coverage of takeover offers can promote a realignment of 
directors’ interests with those of shareholders. However, it has not considered if such coverage 
leads to a greater attendance to the interests of other stakeholders in companies by their boards. 
One group of stakeholders of particular interest in this respect are employees (Slinger and 
Deakin, 1999; Deakin, 2005; Goergen, O’Sullivan and Wood, 2014). The Takeover Bids 
Directive Assessment Report (2011) notes that target employees may be greatly affected by 
takeovers. Employees may lose permanent positions in the company, be required to work under 
inferior conditions or be assigned tasks in which they are inexperienced and ill-trained. The 
mainstream newspaper media, as an information source for perhaps less financially literate 
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employees, may influence their perception of the offer, possibly impacting on their performance 
and decisions to invest their human capital elsewhere. Accordingly, when offers fail, managers 
and directors may need to take measures to strengthen relations with employees and to improve 
productivity and morale. It may also have an impact on how policies protect employees’ 
interests. The 2010 Kraft takeover of Cadbury plc which resulted in considerable job losses in 
the UK was subject to considerable attention in the mainstream newspaper media. In the year 
2010, the takeover of Cadbury was the focus of 538 broadsheet newspaper articles studied 
herein. An outcome of this takeover was the amendment of Rule 19.1 of the Code which now 
requires an offeror who makes a statement indicating a course of action it intends, or does not 
intend, to take after the end of the offer period to hold true to that statement for the following 12 
months unless there is a material change of circumstances. As such, offerors who make 
promises to preserve jobs must fulfil that promise in the medium term at least. This study can 
only surmise that the level of media attention which this takeover received may have 
contributed to the policy developments which followed it. Future research may investigate if a 
link exists between newspaper reporting on issues which may concern broader stakeholders, 
such as employees, and measures taken to protect their interests. 
 This study has followed a strand of research, the focus of which has progressed from 
considering how media coverage of governance issues which arise at the company level 
influences corporate governance practices within the company (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; 
Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009) to how coverage of the 
operation of the market for corporate control impacts governance within the company (Liu and 
McConnell, 2013). The direction in which this line of inquiry has progressed is indicative of the 
news media’s potential to facilitate an interaction between internal and external control 
mechanisms. This research may be developed further. As noted in the previous section, there are 
alternative theories of market control which deserve consideration in this regard. The labour and 
product markets offer two attractive settings in which to base a study of the news media as an 
intermediary between the markets and the company. The present findings are consistent with the 
view that press scrutiny of board performance leads to governance improvements as directors 
endeavour to limit damage to their professional reputations in the labour markets (Dyck, 
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Volchkova and Zingales, 2008). While this view is solidly grounded in the literature (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Harford 2003), an empirical investigation of 
the impact of the news media coverage on corporate governance conducted from the perspective 
of the labour markets may provide direct verification. Since it is also possible that media reports 
regarding board performance impact the company’s relationship with key product market 
participants including suppliers, competitors and customers, such reports may encourage 
governance improvements as boards endeavour to avoid product market discipline. Given the 
reach of the news media, the mainstream news media in particular, across the product markets, a 
direct examination of how the media’s influence over the reputation of the company and its 
board in the product markets impacts the quality of its governance may also make a valuable 
contribution to the literature in this area. 
 This study has noted that empirical research assessing corporate governance quality at 
the aggregate level, from the perspective of the board tends to employ measures developed by 
commercial ratings agencies. While measures such as the ISS QuickScore and Standard and 
Poor’s GAMMA Scores are comprehensive and account for the standards of governance set by 
a country’s legal and regulatory systems, they have been described as lacking predictive validity 
(Daines, Gow and Larcker, 2010). One reason for this is that the large number of board 
attributes assessed creates considerable scope for measurement error. This study has avoided 
such an approach and an original method of evaluating corporate governance quality has been 
devised for the purposes of the study so that only aspects of the board considered to 
fundamentally determine its capacity to protect shareholders’ interests are considered. This 
method too has its limitations, a number of which are acknowledged in the previous section. 
Nevertheless, the method may be developed and adapted to different samples and settings. 
Researchers might consider adjusting this or devising a similar method to appraise board quality 
in future research. As mentioned in the previous section, the unit weighting system employed 
herein may be considered a limitation of the study. Having trialled alternative weighting 
systems, the researcher deemed the system employed presently to be most appropriate. 
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Nonetheless, future research may consider surveying analysts or employing the DELPHI 
method94 to identify a more appropriate relative weighting system. 
 While the evidence presented herein strongly indicates that causality runs from 
newspaper reporting to corporate governance quality change, it is acknowledged that the focus 
of the newspaper media may be more inclined toward companies with a certain quality of 
corporate governance. As noted in the previous section, one of this study’s limitations is its 
inability to conclusively determine if the amount of coverage which companies receive when 
involved in a TMA case in some way depends on their governance quality. Future research may 
provide more clarity in this regard. As discussed in Chapter Seven, in order to effectively 
examine if the amount of newspaper coverage companies receive is influenced by the quality of 
their governance, corporate governance quality should be measured over a time period which 
precedes the publication of the newspaper reports considered. Such an analysis has been 
performed herein incorporating a one year time lag and the results do not provide any indication 
of a significant link. Given that the literature strongly indicates that the extent of media 
exposure companies receive is contingent upon the quality of their governance (Farrell and 
Whidbee, 2002; Johnson et al., 2005; Miller, 2006; Joe, Louis and Robinson, 2009; Lauterbach 
and Pajuste, 2014), future research ought to reassess this relationship, possibly incorporating 
longer or shorter time lags. It might also identify additional factors which should be controlled 
for when examining the determinants of newspaper reporting. Conclusive evidence in this 
regard would allow for a greatly enhanced understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between the newspaper media and corporate governance quality. 
 On a final note, this thesis has endeavoured to add a new contextual dimension to 
knowledge on the corporate governance role of the news media by examining the influence of 
the UK news media on corporate governance in the UK. There are many jurisdictions in which 
the media’s role in corporate governance remains unexplored. As noted in the previous section, 
the results derived herein may be of limited relevance to overseas companies. Since legal, 
regulatory and market frameworks vary internationally as does the independence, credibility and 
                                                     94 The DELPHI method was devised at the RAND Corporation as a means of obtaining the most reliable opinion consensus of a group of experts by subjecting them to a series of questionnaires in depth interspersed with controlled opinion feedback (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). 
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accessibility of the news media, it is likely that the media’s influence on corporate governance 
may manifest itself differently from country to country. Accordingly, it is recommended that 
future research in this area continue to expand to unexplored research settings. It is envisaged 
that a comparative study of the news media’s influence on corporate governance in a number of 
different jurisdictions may make a particularly valuable contribution to knowledge in this 
respect. Moreover, a study on the influence of newspaper reporting on the operation and 
potential failure of the market for corporate control, conducted at European level, may yield 
some interesting insight into the extent to which a company’s exposure to the threat of takeover 
or the implication of its shares in market abuse impacts corporate governance at the firm level. 
In particular, a European level study is apt to involve a larger sample of market abuse cases. 
This may provide for more insightful results than those derived herein with respect to market 
abuse.    
    
9.7. Final Remarks 
The news media has, in the past, been discounted as a peripheral actor in the company 
environment which entertains rather than informs its audiences and distorts rather than 
encourages rational economic behaviour. This opinion is changing and the news media is 
increasingly recognised as a platform from which issues which pose threats to shareholders’ 
wealth may be publicised. This study has provided new evidence to support this view. By 
providing extensive coverage of takeover offers, the UK mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
media may inform a variety of stakeholders, not least the company’s shareholders, of how target 
boards’ responses to offers may affect their interests, thereby affecting directors’ reputations 
and promoting better quality governance at the company level. As such, the broadsheet 
newspaper media can catalyse the disciplinary operation of the market for corporate control and 
thus, can have a positive, albeit temporary, influence on corporate governance. While the 
evidence suggests that the mainstream broadsheet newspaper media possesses little potential to 
signal or limit abuses which may lead to its breakdown, investigation of news media reporting 
on a larger sample of market abuse cases may produce different results.  
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 Heretofore, the role of the news media in corporate governance has received little 
attention in the context of the UK. This study has begun to fill this gap in the literature and has 
identified areas where its findings may be built upon. Given the dispersed nature of ownership 
of UK listed companies, a far reaching and accessible information intermediary such as the 
newspaper media may influence corporate governance in the UK in a number of regards.  
 The future value of the newspaper media in corporate governance is however contingent 
upon the success of forthcoming regulation and promotion of ethical standards among the UK 
press. Although complete accuracy and independence may be somewhat idealistic, appropriate 
standards in these areas are essential in order for newspapers to serve as a credible and reliable 
source of information. Furthermore, the newspaper media can only perform a sustainable role in 
shareholder protection if it overcomes the challenges it presently faces in adapting to the digital 
age. Accordingly, the industry must assume a strategic focus in this regard.  
 The extent to which the benefits of newspaper reporting may be sustained also relies 
largely on the efficacy of the primary corporate governance mechanisms in place in UK 
companies. Initiatives aimed at reducing the barriers to active shareholder engagement with 
directors and managers must be followed through in policy and practice. Future codes of best 
practice may also require more fine-tuning such that they are more suitably tailored to company-
specific factors and continue to avoid taking a generic approach to governance.  
 Shareholders in UK listed companies are afforded considerable protection from an 
active market for corporate control which has been successfully regulated in a flexible and 
timely manner for almost fifty years. As this study highlights, relatively few instances of market 
abuse have been detected on either the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market or on the AIM 
since the turn of the century. This study has identified a further attribute of this landscape which 
can serve to protect shareholders’ interests and facilitate the effective functioning of the market 
for corporate control in the UK- the broadsheet newspaper media. As traditional mechanisms of 
corporate governance continue to develop and adapt to ever-changing company and market 
environments, the newspaper media is an information intermediary which may provide valuable 
assistance in alleviating information asymmetries and in holding directors and managers to 
account in UK companies. As newspapers face opportunities to expand their reach and impact 
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across various sections of society, including the business and financial community, and across 
international boundaries, its role in corporate governance may well be one of growing 
importance which necessitates continued scholarly attention. 
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APPENDIX A : UK GUIDANCE ON BEST PRACTICE IN CORPORATE  
GOVERNANCE, 1992-2012 
 Report/Code Details 
 The Cadbury Report (1992) Developed and published by the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, under the chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury, in response to public concern regarding corporate failures of the late 1980s and 1990s. Contained a code setting out the rights and responsibilities of shareholders, directors and auditors.  
 The Greenbury Report (1995) Report on a Study of Directors’ Remuneration conducted by a committee chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury. Dealt with accountability, disclosure and shareholders’ interests.  
 The Hampel Report (1998) Published by the Committee on Corporate Governance under the chairmanship of Sir Ronald Hampel. Gave further consideration to the issues addressed in both the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. Reinforced the importance of corporate governance as a method of shareholder protection and emphasised its positive contribution to the company as a whole. 
 The Combined Code (1998) Published by the London Stock Exchange. Consolidated the recommendations of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. Recommended a system of best practice standards of corporate governance in terms of the board conduct, composition and remuneration, relations with shareholders, accountability and audit. Companies listed on the Main Market of the exchange were mandated to disclose, in all annual reports published on or after 31 December 1998, the extent to which they complied with the Combined Code and in doing so, provide an explanation for any non-compliance. 
 The Turnbull Report (1999) Report on a study by the Internal Control Working Party, under the chairmanship of Nigel Turnbull. A response to a recommendation of the Combined Code that boards should report whether they had reviewed the company’s system of internal control and risk management. Provided guidance on the internal control procedures necessary to manage risk. 
 The Higgs Review (2003) Following the enactment of corporate governance legislation in the US in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the UK government commissioned an independent review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, led by Derek Higgs, in January, 2003. The review contained recommendations relating to appointments to the board, board structure, tenure and remuneration, the roles of CEO and chairman and shareholder relations.  
 The Tyson Report (2003) Report of a task force chaired by Laura D’Andrea Tyson on the recruitment and development of non-executive directors. Provided recommendations on board diversity. 
 The Smith Report (2003) Produced by the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues, under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Smith. Offered specific guidance for audit committees.  
 The Combined Code (2003) Issued by the FRC to incorporate the advice put forward in the Turnbull, Higgs and Smith Reports.  
 The Turnbull Review (2004) Reviewed effectiveness of guidance set out in the 1999 Report. Recommended a requirement for boards to confirm in the annual report that any necessary remedial action is taken where there are major weaknesses in internal control systems. 
 The Combined Code (2006) Outcome of a review of the progress made in implementing the Combined Code (2003). Provided additional guidelines on shareholder voting by proxy and the provision of company information via the company website.  
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APPENDIX A : UK GUIDANCE ON BEST PRACTICE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1992-2012 (continued) 
 Report/Code Details 
 The Combined Code (2008) Removed a restriction on chairmen from serving on more than one FTSE 100 board and permitted chairmen of smaller companies to sit on the audit committee. 
 The Walker Review (2009) In response to the global financial crisis of 2008, an independent review of the effectiveness of corporate governance in the UK banking industry was conducted under Sir David Walker. Recommendations included the creation of a stewardship code, for companies generally, aimed at making management more accountable to institutional investors.  
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and the UK Stewardship Code (2010) 
Replaced the Combined Code (2008). The section of the Combined Code which dealt with institutional investors was removed and replaced by the separate UK Stewardship Code (2010), which aims to promote the generation of long-term returns to shareholders. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) placed more emphasis on risk management and external board evaluation and recommend that all directors of FTSE 350 companies be subject to annual re-election by shareholders.  
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) 
Placed greater emphasis on the independence and effectiveness of external audit and requires companies to report on how they have taken measures to ensure boardroom diversity and to provide more detailed explanations for non-compliance. 
 The UK Stewardship Code (2012) Clarifies the aim and definition of stewardship with emphasis on the need for investors to engage with management on companies’ long-term strategies and sustainable returns.  
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) 
Introduces requirement for boards to include a viability statement in its strategic report to investors which provides a broad assessment of long-term solvency and liquidity, Boards of listed companies required to ensure that executive remuneration is designed to promote the long-term success of the company and demonstrate how this is being achieved more clearly to shareholders. Companies encouraged to explain, when publishing general meeting results, how they intend to engage with shareholders when a significant percentage of them have voted against any resolution. 
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APPENDIX B : KEY ASPECTS OF THE UK TAKEOVER CODE 
 Requirements of the Code Rationale Rule 9: The Mandatory Bid Rule  
Requires an offeror, upon gaining control of a certain percentage of the voting rights of a company, to make an offer to the remaining shareholders in the company at a specified price.  Rule 9.1 sets the threshold for a mandatory bid at 30% or more of the voting rights of the company.  Offers made under Rule 9 must be conditional only upon the offeror having received acceptances in respect of shares which, together with shares acquired or agreed to be acquired before or during the offer, will result in the offeror and any person acting in concert95 with it holding shares carrying more than 50% of the voting rights96.  Mandatory offers must be made at a price no lower than the highest price paid by the offeror or any party acting in concert with it over the twelve months prior to the announcement of the offer97. 
Gives effect to Article 5 of the Takeover Directive, although the Mandatory Bid Rule was included in the Code prior to transposition of the Directive. Reflects the first general principle set out under Article 3(1), which states that “all holders of the securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of securities must be protected”. Protects minority shareholders by ensuring they are afforded an equal opportunity to (i) exit the company at a fair price, (ii) share in the takeover premium and (iii) make a decision whether or not to sell their shares, undistorted by the threat of remaining a minority shareholder without an exit option (Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, 2005; Armour and Skeel, 2006; European Company Law Experts, 2013b). Rule 21: The Board Neutrality Rule  
Rule 21.1 affirms that during the course of an offer or beforehand, if the offeree board considers a bona fide offer is imminent, the board must not, without the approval of shareholders in general meeting, take any actions to frustrate an offer or a potential bona fide offer or to deny the offeree shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the offer. It restricts the offeree board from: (i) issuing shares, transferring or selling shares out of treasury or agreeing to do so; (ii) issuing or granting options in respect of any unissued shares; (iii) creating or issuing, or permitting the creation of issue of, any securities carrying rights of conversion into or subscription for shares; (iv) selling, disposing of or acquiring assets of a material amount, or agreeing to do so and (v) entering into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. Rule 21.2, states that an offeree company cannot agree to pay an inducement fee to a potential offeror without the Panel’s consent. Where consent is granted, the inducement fee should represent no more than 1% of the value of the offeree company and it must be confirmed that payment of the fee is within the best interests of the offeree shareholders.  
Gives effect to Article 9 of the Takeover Directive; however, the Code largely restricted offeree directors from defending takeover offers prior to the Directive. Reflects the third General Principle, set out under Article 3(1), which states that ”the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid”. In the context of a hostile takeover offer, restrictions on frustrating actions implemented through the board neutrality rule have the effect of ensuring that the offeree board acts within its shareholders’ interests and that the decision as to whether or not to accept a takeover offer is left with the offeree shareholders. Rule 21.2 limits the ability of the offeree board to invite a white knight98 to launch a competing bid in a hostile takeover situation so as to frustrate the unwelcome bid.  
                                                     95 Under the Code, a group of persons are considered to be acting in concert if they, pursuant to an agreement or understanding (whether formal or informal), co-operate to obtain or consolidate control of a company or to frustrate the successful outcome of an offer for a company. 96 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 9.3 (a). 97 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 9.5 (a). 98 A white knight bidder may be an associate company, customer, supplier or even a competitor of the company (Sudarsanam, 1995). 
B-2  
APPENDIX B: KEY ASPECTS OF THE UK TAKEOVER CODE (Continued) 
 Rule 36: Restrictions on Partial Offers 
A partial offer is one made to shareholders of a certain class to acquire only a proportion of their shares.  Under Rule 36.1, the Panel’s consent is required for all partial offers. Such consent is likely only to be granted when the offer is for shares carrying less than 30% of voting rights.  If the Panel consents, the offeror and any parties acting in concert with it are restricted from making any further acquisitions of shares over the offer period or over the 12 months following the end of the offer period (Rule 36.3).  The offer can only be declared unconditional as to acceptances if acceptances are received in respect of all shares offered for (Rule 36.4).  The offer must also be approved by at least 50% of the offeree’s shareholders who are independent of the offeror and parties acting in concert with it (Rule 36.5).  When a partial offer is made for a company with more than one class of equity share capital which could result in the offeror and persons acting in concert with it being interested in shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights, a comparable offer must be made for each class (Rule 36.8).  
The rationale for such tight regulation on partial offers is due to the opportunities they create for offerors to isolate those shareholders who do not receive an offer into a minority group (Yarrow, 1985). Partial offers are often a pre-curser to two-tiered offers where the minority group of remaining shareholders are coerced into tendering their shares at a lower price (Lowenstein, 1983; Bebchuk, 1985; Coates, 2000).  
Rule 31: Timing of the Offer  
Rule 31 sets out unambiguous deadlines which an offeror must meet and specifies the amount of time which must be allowed for shareholders to decide on the merits and demerits of the offer.  An offer must initially remain open for at least 21 days following the date on which the offer document is published (Rule 31.1). After an offer has become or is declared unconditional as to acceptances, the offer must remain open for acceptances for at least 14 days after the date on which it would otherwise have expired (Rule 31.4).  An offer may not become or be declared unconditional as to acceptances after midnight on the 60th day after the date on which the initial offer document was published (Rule 31.6).  All conditions must be fulfilled or the offer must lapse within 21 days of the first closing date, or the date on which the offer becomes or is declared unconditional as to acceptances, whichever is the latter (Rule 31.7).  Consideration must be sent to shareholders within 14 days of the closing date of the offer, or the date on which the offer becomes or is declared wholly unconditional, or the date of the receipt of an acceptance complete in all respects, whichever is the latter (Rule 31.8).  
Rule 31.1 prevents the offeror from influencing the offeree shareholders by making them an offer which is open for a limited time only.  Rules 31.6 to 31.8 discourage unnecessary delays over the course of a takeover offer. 
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The Interests of Employees (Rule 24.2) 
Deals with the intentions of the offeror with regard to the business, employees and pension scheme(s) of the offeree and of the offeror, where the offeror is a company. Under this rule, the offeror must state, in its offer document, its intentions with regard to the future business of the offeree company and explain the long-term commercial justification for the offer. It must also state its intentions regarding the continued employment of the employees and management of the offeree company and of its subsidiaries, including any material change in the conditions of employment and its strategic plans for the offeree company, and their likely repercussions on employment and the location of the offeree company’s places of business. If the offeror has no intention to make any changes in this regard or if it believes there will be no repercussions on employment or the location of the offeree’s businesses, it must make a statement to that effect. The offeror is bound to remain committed to any such statements for a period of twelve months from the date on which the offer period ends, or other date referred to in the statement, unless there is a material change in circumstances99. 
Rule 24.2 was amended in September 2011 so as to clarify the responsibilities of both the offeror and offeree boards to communicate the merits and potential consequences of takeover offers to employees (the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2011). This was provoked by the 2010 hostile takeover of Cadbury plc by Kraft Inc. When announcing that it was considering making an offer for Cadbury, Kraft expressed an intention to keep Cadbury’s Somerdale factory open. However, within a week of the takeover, Kraft announced the closure of the Somerdale factory (the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2010a). A subsequent consultation by the Panel gave consideration as to the amount and timeliness of information which should be provided to broader stakeholders in offeree companies over the offer period (the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 2010b). It was noted that while there were provisions in place to ensure that employees remained informed as to the potential consequences of takeovers, offerors tended only to meet their minimum requirements in this regard100.     
  
  
                                                     99 The Takeover Code (11th ed.), Rule 19.1, Note 3. 100 The Takeover Panel (2010), Consultation Paper 2010/2, Para 5.15. 
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APPENDIX C : MARKET ABUSE UNDER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND  
MARKETS ACT 2000 
Tables C.1 to C.4 present an overview of key definitions pertaining to market abuse as set out in 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and related regulations, and outline the manner in 
which market abuse is regulated in accordance with these definitions.
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Table C.1: Key Market Abuse Definitions under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000   FSMA Section Definition Market abuse 118 Behaviour, by one person, or two or more persons acting jointly or in concert, which occurs in relation to qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market or those for which a request for admission to trading on such a market has been made, and falls within at least one of the four broad categories of (i) insider dealing, (ii) improper disclosure, (iii) misuse of information or (iv) market manipulation.  
 NOTES: Prior to the transposition of MAD in July 2005, the definition of market abuse set out in FSMA relied largely on the concept of the regular market user.  
 The regular user test enables it to be determined if behaviour related to qualifying investments traded on a prescribed market falls below the market’s expected standards. The test is based on a hypothetical person who regularly deals on the market and in investments of the kind in question101.  
 Prior to MAD, market abuse was defined under Section 118 as behaviour likely to be regarded by a regular user of that market who is aware of the behaviour as a failure on the part of the person or persons concerned to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his or their position in relation to the market; involving at least one of the following categories of behaviour: 
 Misuse of information: Behaviour based on information which is not generally available to those using the market but which, if available to a regular user of the market, would or would be likely to be regarded by him as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in investments of the kind in question should be effected.  
 Giving a false or misleading impression: Behaviour that is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or demand for, or as to the price or value of, investments of the kind in question.  
 Distortion: Behaviour that would, or would be likely to, be regarded by a regular user of the market as behaviour which would, or would be likely to, distort the market in investments of the kind in question. 
 Since the transposition of MAD, the regular user test is retained in FSMA only for those categories of abusive behaviour which are not drawn from the Directive102. These are contained under subsections 118(4) and (8) of FSMA. Both of these subsections and section 130A which defines the regular user, cease to have effect as of the 31 December 2014. 
 Insiders 118B Any person who has inside information- 
 (a) as a result of his membership of an administrative, management or supervisory body of an issuer of qualifying investments, 
 (b) as a result of his holding in the capital in the issuer of qualifying investments,   (c) as a result of having access to the information through the exercise of his employment, profession or duties,  
 (d) as a result of his criminal activities, or  
 (e) which he has obtained by other means and which he knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, is inside information. 
                                                     101 MAR 1.2.20 G. 102 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations, SI 2005/381. 
C-3  
Table C.2: Definition of Inside Information under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 In relation to qualifying investments, or related investments, which are not commodity derivatives, inside information is defined under FSMA s.118C (2) as information of a precise nature which (a) is not generally available, (b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying investments or to one or more of the qualifying investments, and (c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the qualifying investment or the price of related investments103. Accordingly, inside information has four defining characteristics; it is (i) precise, (ii) not generally available, (iii) relevant and (iv) price-sensitive, these characteristics are defined below. Characteristic FSMA Section  Definition Guidance on Interpretation Precise 118C(5) Information is precise if it (a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonable be expected to come into existence, or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur, and (b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of those circumstances, or that event on the price of qualifying investments or related investments. 
This definition is extracted from Article 1(1) of Directive 2003/124/EC. Part (a) concerns the content of information and indicates that any factual statement, related in any way, to an actual circumstance or event within the issuer may constitute as inside information. According to the CESR’s Level Two advice, a circumstance exists or a matter is true when it is based on firm and objective evidence which can be communicated accurately (as opposed to rumours), i.e. if the circumstances can be proven to exist or if the matter can be proven to be true104. Part (a) acknowledges that a circumstance or event need not yet be existent to be accurately communicated as inside information. DTR 2.7 guides issuers to carefully assess whether speculation or rumours gives rise to a situation where a disclosure obligation is triggered, this will depend on the accuracy of the rumour. Part (b) concerns the effects of the information. The CESR advises that information would be likely to be categorised as precise if it would lead a reasonable investor to make an investment decision without, or at low, risk or without haste or if it would be likely to be exploited immediately on the market105.  Not Generally Available  
118C(8) Information which can be obtained by research or analysis conducted by, or on behalf of, users of a market is to be regarded as being generally available to them. 
MAR 1.2.12 E lists a number of factors which should be considered in determining whether or not information is generally available, these are: (a) Whether the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market or a prescribed auction platform through an RIS or otherwise in accordance with the rules of that market; (b) Whether the information is contained in records which are open to inspection by the public; (c) Whether the information is otherwise generally available, including through the internet, or some other publication (including if it is only available on payment of a fee), or is derived from information which has been made public; (d) Whether the information can be obtained by observation by members of the public without infringing rights or obligations of privacy, property or confidentiality; and (e) The extent to which the information can be obtained by analysing or developing other information which is generally available.  Article 1(1) of MAD defines inside information as that which has not been made public rather than that which is not generally available. The CESR advises that information may be deemed to be publically available without having being disclosed by the issuer in conformity with the requirements set out by the competent authority106.  
                                                     103 A similar definition for inside information in relation to a person charged with the execution of orders concerning any qualifying investments or related investments is contained under Section 118C (4). 104 CESR/02-089d, para. 20. 105 CESR/02-089d, para. 20. 106 CESR/06-562b, para. 1.9. 
C-4  
Table C.2 Continued: Definition of Inside Information under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Characteristic FSMA Section  
 
Definition Guidance on Interpretation 
Relevant 118C(2)(b) and 118C(4)(c) 
Information which relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying investments or to one or more of the qualifying investments. 
 
This definition is taken almost directly from Article 1(1) of MAD.  
 Examples of information directly concerning the issuer, suggested in CESR advice include changes in control and control agreements; management and board changes; mergers, splits and spin-offs107.  
 The definitions of inside information provided under Section 118C of FSMA and under Article 1(1) of MAD indicate that it is not necessary for the information to originate within the issuer108. Price Sensitive 118C (6)  Information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if and only if it is information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of his investment decisions. 
The concept of a ‘reasonable investor’ is introduced in Recital 1 of Directive 2003/124/EC, which states that:  
 “Reasonable investors base their investment decisions on information already available to them, that is to say, on ex-ante available information. Therefore, the question whether, in making an investment decision, a reasonable investor would be likely to take into account a particular piece of information should be appraised on the basis of the ex-ante information. Such an assessment has to take into consideration the anticipated impact of the information in light of the totality of the related issuer’s activity, the reliability of the source of information and any other market variables likely to affect the related financial instrument or derivative financial instrument related thereto in the given circumstances”.  
 It would not be possible to establish a measure of how a movement in the price of an investment could be affected by inside information given the different markets and investments to which market abuse regulations apply109. The concept of a reasonable investor essentially provides a guideline which helps assess the likelihood of information having a significant effect on the price of an investment.  
 DTR 2.2.5 guides that, in identifying inside information, both the investment to which it relates and the reasonable investor who might potentially access it must be considered. It advises that the reasonable investor requires an issuer to (i) take into account that the significance of the information in question will vary with the issuer, depending on factors such as the issuer’s size, recent developments and the market sentiment about the issuer and the sector in which it operates; and (ii) assume that a reasonable investor will make investment decisions relating to the relevant financial instrument to maximise his economic self-interest.  
 DTR 2.2.6 acknowledges that it may not be possible to apply the reasonable investor test to every situation. Any assessment of information should be considered in light of the totality of the issuer’s activities, the reliability of the source of the information and other market variables. 
                                                      107 CESR/06-562b, para. 1.15. 108 CESR/02-089d, para. 31. 109 CESR/02-089d, para. 24. 
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Table C.3: Behaviour which constitutes as Market Abuse under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000- Insider Dealing, Improper Disclosure and Misuse of Information Behaviour FSMA  Section Definition Guidance on Interpretation Insider Dealing 118(2) Insider dealing occurs where an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or related investment on the basis of inside information relating to the investment in question. 
Section 130A defines ‘dealing’, in relation to an investment as: “acquiring or disposing of the investment whether as principle or agent or directly or indirectly, and includes agreeing to acquire or dispose of the investment, and entering into and bringing to an end a contract creating it”. MAR 1.3.2E sets out four types of behaviour which constitute insider dealing: (i) dealing on the basis of inside information which is not trading information; (ii) front running or pre-positioning; (iii) in the context of a takeover, an offeror or a potential offeror entering into a transaction in a qualifying investment on the basis of inside information concerning the proposed bid, that provides merely an economic exposure to movements in the price of the target company’s shares (for example, a spread bet on the target company’s share price); and (iv) in the context of a takeover, a person who acts for the offeror or potential offeror dealing for his own benefit in a qualifying investment or related investments on the basis of information concerning the proposed bid which is inside information. Improper Disclosure 
 
118(3) Improper disclosure occurs where an insider discloses inside information to another person otherwise than in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties. 
MAR 1.4.2E lists two specific types of behaviour which constitutes an improper disclosure, these are: (i) disclosures of inside information by the director of an issuer to another in a social context; and (ii) selective briefing of analysts by directors of issuers or others who are persons discharging managerial responsibilities. MAR 1.4.5E indicates that, in determining if a disclosure is improper, the FCA will consider (i) if the disclosure is permitted by its own rules or those of the Takeover Code or prescribed market in question, (ii) if the disclosure is accompanied by the imposition of confidentiality requirements upon the person to whom the disclosure is made and (iii) if the information is trading information and if it is necessary and reasonable for the disclosure to be made. Under MAR 1.4.7 G, encouraging another to disclose inside information or pressing an insider for information constitutes as market abuse. Misuse of Information 118(4) Behaviour not falling within the category of insider dealing or improper disclosure that is (a) based on information not generally available to those using the market but which, if available to a regular user of the market, would be, or would be likely to be regarded by him as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in qualifying investments should be effected, and (b) is likely to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the person concerned to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation to the market. 
Under MAR 1.5.2E, misuse of information may involve: 
 (i) dealing or arranging deals in qualifying investments based on relevant information which is not generally available and relates to matters which a regular user would reasonably expected to be disclosed to users of the particular prescribed market or prescribed auction platform but does not amount to insider dealing under Section 118 (2) either because the dealing relates to a qualifying investment (to which Section 118 (2) does not apply) or because the relevant information is not inside information as defined under Section 118C or;  
 (ii) a director giving relevant information, which is not generally available and relates to matters which a regular user would reasonably expect to be disclosed to users of the particular prescribed market, to another otherwise than in the proper course of the exercise of his employment or duties in a way that does not amount to improper disclosure as defined under Section 118 (3).  
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Table C.3 Continued: Behaviour which constitutes as Market Abuse under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000- Market Manipulation Behaviour FSMA Section 
 
Definition Guidance on Interpretation 
Manipulating Transactions  
118(5) Manipulating transactions concerns effecting transactions or orders to trade (otherwise than for legitimate reasons and in conformity with accepted market practices on the relevant market) which- 
 (a) give, or are likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or demand for, or as to the price of, one or more qualifying investments, or  
 (b) secure the price of one or more such investments at an abnormal or artificial level. 
 
Examples of such behaviour provided under MAR 1.6.2E include:   (i) buying or selling investments at the close of the market with the effect of misleading investors who act on the basis of closing prices, other than for legitimate reasons;  
 (ii) wash trades;  
 (iii) painting the tape;  
 (iv) entering orders into an electronic trading system at prices which are higher than the previous bid or lower than the previous offer, and withdrawing them before they are executed in order to give a misleading impression of supply and demand for a qualifying investment;  
 (v) buying or selling on the secondary market of qualifying investments or related derivatives prior to the auction with the effect of fixing the auction clearing price for the auctioned products at an abnormal or artificial level or misleading bidders in the auction market, other than for legitimate reasons. 
 Manipulating Devices 
 
118 (6) Behaviour consisting of effecting transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance. 
MAR 1.7.2E outlines that such behaviour may involve:  
 (i) taking advantage of occasional or regular access to the media by voicing an opinion about a qualifying investment while having previously taken positions on that investment and profiting subsequently from the impact of the opinions voiced on the price of that investment without having disclosed that conflict of interest to the public in a proper and effective way; 
 (ii) a transaction or series of transactions that are designed to conceal the ownership of a qualifying investment so that disclosure requirements are circumvented by the holding of the investment in the name of a colluding party, such that disclosures are misleading in respect to the true underlying holding;  
 (iii) pump and dump schemes. 
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Table C.3 Continued: Behaviour which constitutes as Market Abuse under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000- Market Manipulation Behaviour FSMA Section Definition Guidance on Interpretation Dissemination   118 (7) Behaviour consisting of the dissemination of information by any means which gives, or is likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to a qualifying investment by a person who knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the information was false or misleading. 
 
MAR 1.8.3E provides some examples of such behaviour which include:  
 (i) knowingly or recklessly spreading false or misleading information about a qualifying investment through the media, including in particular through an RIS or similar information channel; or 
 (ii) undertaking a course of conduct in order to give a false or misleading impression about a qualifying investment.  
 Distortion and misleading behaviour 
 
118 (8) Behaviour other than that described in the previous three subsections which- 
 (a) is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or demand for or price or value of, qualifying investments, or  
 (b) would be, or would likely to be, regarded by a regular user of the market as behaviour that would distort, or would be likely to distort, the market in such an investment, and the behaviour is likely to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the person concerned to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation to the market. 
 
Factors the FCA will consider in determining whether or not behaviour creates a false or misleading impression listed under MAR 1.9.4E include: 
 (i) the experience and knowledge of the users of the market in question; 
 (ii) the structure of the market, including its reporting, notification and transparency requirements;  
 (iii) the legal and regulatory requirements of the market; (iv) the identity and position of the person responsible for the behaviour; and (v) the extent and nature of the visibility or disclosure of the person’s activity. 
 Factors the FCA will consider in determining whether or not behaviour fails to meet the standards expected by a regular user listed under MAR 1.9.5E include:  
 (i) if the transaction is pursuant to a prior legal or regulatory obligation to a third party;  
 (ii) if the transaction is executed in a way which takes into account the need for the fair and efficient operation of the market; 
 (iii) the characteristics of the market in question including the users and applicable rules and codes of conduct;  
 (iv) the position of the person in question and the standards reasonably to be expected of him in light of his experience skill and knowledge; 
 (v) if an organisation created a false or misleading impression, whether the individuals responsible could only know they were likely to create a false or misleading impression of they had access to other information that was held behind a Chinese wall or similarly effective arrangement. 
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Table C.4: Further Aspects of Market Abuse Regulation in the UK Relevant Rules and Guidelines 
 
Requirements/Guidance 
Disclosure and Confidentiality Regarding Inside Information: Prompt disclosure of price sensitive inside information reduces the opportunity for market abuse to occur. However, managers and directors may require time to ensure that information is correct and does not reach the public prematurely such that it might jeopardise the interests of the company. Accordingly, Article 6 of MAD imposes a duty on issuers to disclose inside information, unless there are legitimate reasons to refrain from doing so. The provisions of Article 6 are applied in the UK under DTR 2. 
 DTR 2.2.1  An issuer must notify an RIS as soon as possible of any inside information which directly concerns it unless it takes responsibility, under DTR 2.5.1, for delaying the disclosure so as not to prejudice its legitimate interests. 
 DTR 2.5.6 Whenever an issuer or person acting on his behalf discloses any inside information to any third party, the issuer must make a complete and effective public disclosure of that information via an RIS. 
 Insider Lists: To reduce ambiguity as to which individuals are considered insiders, Article 6 (3) of MAD requires issuers to draw up and maintain an insider list. In the UK, the requirement to create and maintain an insider list is set out under DTR 2.8. 
 DTR 2.8.1 Issuers must ensure that it and persons acting on its behalf or on its account draw up insider lists.  
 DTR 2.8.2 An issuer must, as soon as possible, provide the insider list to the FCA, if requested to do so.  
 DTR 2.8.3 Insider lists specify the identity of the person with access to inside information, the reason for the access and the date on which the list was created and updated. 
 DTR 2.8.4  Insider lists must be promptly be amended as additional individuals gain access or cease to have access to the information or as their reasons for access change.  
DTR 2.8.5 Insider lists must be retained for at least five years after their creation or amendment. 
 DTR 2.8.9 An issuer must ensure its employees with access to inside information acknowledge the legal and regulatory duties entailed and are aware of the sanctions attaching to the misuse or improper circulation of such information.  
 DTR 2.8.10 An issuer must ensure that any person acting on its behalf or its account has drawn up an insider list and can ensure that those included on the list acknowledge the legal and regulatory duties entailed and are aware of the sanctions attaching to the misuse or improper circulation of inside information. 
 Managers’ Transactions: Prompt disclosure of transactions in securities by management within the issuer and by persons associated with them promotes market transparency and reduces the potential for market abuse to occur. Article 6 of Directive 2004/72/EC provides detailed guidance as to how the competent authorities of Member States are to be notified of such transactions. In the UK, the rules as to how managers and their associates are to notify the FCA of transactions conducted on their account are contained under DTR 3.1.  
 DTR 3.1.2 Persons discharging managerial responsibilities and their connected persons must notify the issuer in writing of the occurrence of all transactions conducted on their account in the shares of the issuer or derivatives or related instrument within four business days of the transaction date.  
 DTR 3.1.3 Notifications must include the name of the person discharging managerial responsibilities or the name of the person associated with him, the reason for responsibility to notify, the name of the issuer, a description of the financial instrument, the nature of the transaction, the date and place of the transaction and the price and volume of the transaction. 
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APPENDIX D : THE EUROPEAN MARKET ABUSE REGULATION  
(REGULATION NO. 596/2014) 
 The European Commission adopted proposals for a regulation on insider dealing and market 
manipulation in October 2011. The Regulation seeks to ensure that financial instruments trading 
only on multilateral trading facilities and organised trading facilities are covered110; to improve 
protection against market abuse through commodity derivatives111; to ensure better detection of 
market abuse by enhancing the power of competent authorities to investigate112 and by 
introducing minimum principles for administrative measures or sanctions113; and to introduce a 
proportionate regime for issuers, whose financial instruments are admitted to trading on Small 
and Medium Enterprise growth markets114. The Regulation also accounts for the increase in the 
use of automated trading strategies such as algorithmic trading or high frequency trading, some 
of which may potentially constitute as market abuse. Pending the reclassification of emission 
allowances as financial instruments as part of a review of MiFID, it will be necessary for the 
Market Abuse Regulation to cover emission allowances115.  
 In July 2012, the Commission adopted amended proposals for the Regulation. 
Following investigations into possible manipulation of the EURIBOR (Euro InterBank Offered 
Rate) and LIBOR (London InterBank Offered Rate), which are base interest rates or 
benchmarks indicating the interest rates at which banks are prepared to lend to each other in 
Europe and on the London money market respectively, it was proposed that such benchmarks 
come within the scope of the Regulation116. It was proposed that a definition of the benchmarks 
be included and that the definition of the offence of market manipulation be amended to capture 
                                                     110 European Commission, COM (2011) 651 Final, Para. 3.4.1.1; EU Regulation 596/2014, Recital 8; Article 2. 111 European Commission, COM (2011) 651 Final, Para. 3.4.1.2; EU Regulation 596/2014, Recital 20. 112 European Commission, COM (2011) 651 Final, Para. 3.4.4.1; EU Regulation 596/2014, Recital 62; 70; Article 23. 113 European Commission, COM (2011) 651 Final, Para. 3.4.5.1; EU Regulation 596/2014, Recital 71. 114 European Commission, COM (2011) 651 Final, Para. 3.4.3.3; EU Regulation 596/2014, Recital 6. 115 European Commission, COM (2011) 651 Final, Para. 3.4.1.5; EU Regulation 596/2014, Recital 21; 51. 116 European Commission, COM (2012) 421 Final, Para. 1. 
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manipulation of benchmarks and attempts at such manipulation117. The Regulation, which under 
the Lamfalussy format is a Level One document, was agreed upon by the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission in June 2013 and endorsed by the Parliament in September 
2013. The following November, the European Securities and Markets Authority (hereinafter, 
the ESMA)118 published a Discussion Paper regarding possible Level Two implementing 
measures, which are likely to include regulatory technical standards, delegated acts and 
guidelines. The Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in June 2014. 
 At the same time as it adopted proposals for the Market Abuse Regulation, which 
continues to treat insider dealing and market manipulation as civil offences, the Commission 
also adopted proposals for a Directive requiring Member States to take necessary measures to 
ensure that the criminal offences of insider dealing and market manipulation are subject to 
criminal sanctions (European Commission, 2011). The Directive makes insider dealing119 and 
market manipulation120 criminal offences if committed intentionally. Attempting, inciting, 
aiding or abetting insider dealing or market manipulation is also considered as a criminal 
offence121. The Commission also adopted amended proposals for the Directive in July 2012. The 
proposed Directive was agreed upon by the Council in December 2012 and the Parliament voted 
to approve the Directive in February 2014. The Directive was also published in the Official 
Journal of the EU in June 2014. Under the Protocol on the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, adoption of the Directive is optional for the United Kingdom. In June 2012, the UK 
Government announced that it will not yet opt into the Directive, choosing to examine the 
impact of the legislation before making any further decisions (House of Commons, 2012).  
  
                                                     117 European Commission, COM (2012) 421 Final, Para. 2.3. 118 The ESMA assumed all existing and ongoing tasks from the CESR in January 2011. 119 Directive 2014/57/EU, Article 3. 120 Directive 2014/57/EU, Article 5. 121 Directive 2014/57/EU, Article 6. 
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APPENDIX E : THE LEVESON INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICE  
AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS 
Investigative journalism can serve as a means of holding corporate power to account; however, 
investigative journalism, when conducted for other motives, can easily breach ethical 
boundaries, particularly when it is not suitably regulated. In July 2009, an investigative 
journalist at the UK broadsheet, the Guardian, revealed that the national police had been 
implicated in concealing the extent of mobile phone hacking by a journalist at the UK tabloid, 
the News of the World, owned by News Corp. International. This created great concern among 
the public as to the extent of such invasive tactics in the industry generally and raised questions 
regarding to degree to which the press’s regard for innocent individuals’ privacy was regulated 
on a national level. In response, the UK government, in 2011, commissioned the Right 
Honourable Lord Justice Brian Leveson to conduct an Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and 
Ethics of the Press.  
 The Leveson Inquiry included nine months of hearings during which evidence was 
received from 637 witnesses. It coincided with an extensive police investigation into 
interception of mobile phone messages which led to over 90 arrests. The final report of the 
Leveson Inquiry, published in November 2012, exposes a variety of unethical practices in which 
the UK press engaged for many years and includes numerous recommendations for reform. In 
the report, the Right Hon. Lord Justice Leveson notes that while UK journalists and members of 
the press are granted considerable legal protection and rights to information, these rights come 
with responsibilities, of which there had been outright neglect by certain members of the news 
media industry. These responsibilities to serve the public interest, to respect the truth, to obey 
the law and to uphold the rights and liberties of individuals are fundamental to the press’s role 
in the functioning of society122. The Right Hon. Lord Justice Leveson noted that the relationship 
between the press, politicians and the police has become too close. Although the day-to-day 
relationship between the press and politicians is a healthy one, there have been times where the 
                                                     122 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Executive Summary, Para. 6. 
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government had allowed the press free reign to investigate and report without adequate 
standards of practice. When mobile phone hacking first became an issue, the political response 
had not been commensurate with public concern123.  
 The report contains many very specific recommendations for the future of press 
regulation, some of which are discussed below. Aware that the newspaper media is currently 
experiencing great challenges in evolving with technological change, maintaining readership 
and managing costs, the Right Hon. Lord Justice Leveson stresses that it is not his intention to 
recommend burdensome regulation which would make it even harder for UK newspapers to 
survive.  
 
Media Ownership, Competition and News Plurality 
The Leveson Report takes particular note of the dangers of concentrated ownership of the UK 
media, especially with regard to the power held by the Murdoch family. Presently, the Murdoch 
family controls a substantial stake in the British Sky Broadcasting Group (hereinafter, BSkyB) 
through their ownership of the international media company, News Corp. International. James 
Murdoch, son of Rupert Murdoch, News Corp.’s chairman, has served as both CEO and board 
chairman of BSkB. Murdoch Junior was forced to step down from his role as board chairman of 
BSkyB in 2012, following the hacking scandal at News Corp. Murdoch Jnr.’s departure from 
the role of chairman followed years of pressure from BSkyB’s institutional shareholders to 
reduce the Murdoch family’s control over the board of directors (Weber, 2005). Nevertheless, 
he remains on the board as a non-executive director (BSkyB, 2014).  
 The Leveson Report notes that there had been a long-standing relationship between the 
Murdochs and the government, indications of which emerged when Murdoch acquired the 
broadsheet newspaper, the Times, without any significant reservations being held by the 
Thatcher Administration124. Further cause for concern over the Murdochs’ power within the UK 
media industry and their relationship with the government exists in the handling of an attempt 
                                                     123 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Executive Summary, Para. 113. 124 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Three, Part I, Chapter 2. 
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by News Corp. to increase its holding in BSkyB in 2010. Although efforts were made on the 
behalf of the government to remain impartial in deciding on the merits of the bid, which 
eventually failed, the Right Hon. Lord Justice Leveson reports that informal meetings took place 
between parties involved. The evidence presented before the Leveson Inquiry suggests that 
potential remains for the government to allow powerful interests to dominate within the media. 
Accordingly, the Leveson Report advises that there be greater transparency at each stage of 
political decision making in relation to media mergers125. Chapter Nine of the first volume of 
the Leveson Report makes various recommendations as to how media ownership and plurality 
might be better regulated. These include continual reviews of plurality in the news, with a remit 
extending to online publications, and more effective consultation by the government with 
Ofcom and opposition parties when deciding if media mergers are within the public interest, 
with the basis of all decisions being made publically available. 
 
The PCC Editors’ Code 
The PCC was subject to considerable criticism over the course of the Leveson Inquiry. The 
Right Hon. Lord Justice Leveson identifies the fundamental problem with the PCC is that it is 
essentially a complaints handling body rather than a regulator. He also notes that the PCC Code 
Committee is comprised solely of serving newspaper and magazine editors and thus, lacks 
independence126. It is noted that disciplinary action taken by the PCC has been done with the 
greatest leniency toward the editor or journalist in question127 and that throughout its history the 
PCC has proven that its interests are aligned with those of the press rather than the public128.  
 As an outcome of the Leveson Inquiry, the PCC agreed to enter a transitional phase in 
preparation for its own abolition and replacement129. Chapter Seven of the fourth volume of the 
Report of the Inquiry includes a number of specific recommendations as to the structure and 
                                                     125 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Three, Part I, Chapter 2. 126 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Four, Part J, Chapter 4. 127 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Four, Part J, Chapter 4, Para. 6.54. 128 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Executive Summary, Para. 45. 129 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Four, Part K, Chapter 4. 
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roles of the new regulatory body and the administration of the new regulatory system. It is 
emphasised as crucial that the system of self-regulation be continued, however the system 
should have statutory underpinnings and be overseen by a genuinely independent body130. The 
Right Hon. Lord Justice Leveson envisages that such a body will establish and promote 
standards through a more rigorous code and monitor newspapers’ compliance with that code131. 
The body would also encourage newspapers to be as transparent as possible regarding the 
sources of information for news stories, while ensuring that sources are protected when 
necessary132. In order to incentivise members of the press to participate in the regulatory regime, 
it is proposed that they be offered legal assistance in the event of defamation cases133. 
 
The New Regulatory Regime 
On 30 October 2013, a Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press was sealed. The Charter 
provides for the establishment of a recognition panel for any new press regulator134. The board 
of the panel must reflect experience in the law, finance, public policy and consumer rights135, 
and be suitably independent to the extent that current and former editors of publishers and 
members of the government cannot be members136.  
 The Charter sets out a number of criteria which a regulatory body must meet in order to 
be recognised by the panel. The body must have a board which is independent from industry 
and the government137. The body must contain a code committee which would assume ultimate 
responsibility for standards codes administered by the body. Serving editors may play a role on 
this committee, but not one which is decisive138. Codes must take into account the importance of 
freedom of speech, the public interest, the need for confidentiality and protection of sources and 
                                                     130 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Four, Part K, Chapter 4, Para. 4. 131 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Four, Part K, Chapter 4. 132 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Executive Summary, Para. 63. 133 Report of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012), Volume Four, Part K, Chapter 2, Para. 10. 134 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Article 1.1, Article 3.1. 135 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 1, Para. 3.2 (b). 136 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 1, Para. 3.3. 137 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 1. 138 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 7. 
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the rights on individuals and it must set out standards of journalistic conduct, respect for privacy 
except when issues are in the public interest, accuracy and the need to avoid 
misrepresentation139. The body should make it clear to media vehicles which subscribe to the 
code that they will be held strictly accountable under the standards of the code140. The board of 
the body should require subscribers to have an adequate and speedy process in place for 
handling complaints141 and it should have the power to hear and decide on complaints about 
breaches of the code142. The board should have sufficient powers to investigate breaches of the 
code143, to impose financial sanctions and to require corrections and apologies to be published 
where breaches arise144. It should also provide an arbitral process for civil legal claims against 
subscribers145 
 Thus far, the only initiative taken to establish a recognition panel has been the Impress 
Project (House of Commons, 2014). Impress aims to enhance the integrity and freedom of the 
press while encouraging the highest ethical standards in journalism (the Impress Project, 2014). 
This is to be achieved through complaints handling, arbitration and investigation146. Impress 
will be open to subscribers from across the UK147. The regulatory code employed by Impress 
will initially remain the same as the PCC Editors’ Code, which will be reviewed over the first 
year of full operation and annually thereafter148.  
 The newspaper and magazine industry has begun to establish its regulatory body, the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (hereinafter, IPSO), which has established a set of 
regulations for the industry (IPSO, 2013). Its remit extends to editorial content included in 
printed newspapers, magazines and that published on electronic services operated by regulated 
entities149. Its functions involve handling complaints about breaches of the Editors’ Code, 
                                                     139 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 8. 140 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 8A. 141 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para.10. 142 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 11. 143 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para.18. 144 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para.19. 145 Royal Charter on Self-regulation of the Press 2013, Schedule 3, Para. 22. 146 The Impress Project (2014), Prospectus, Para. 1. 147 The Impress Project (2014), Prospectus, Para. 13. 148 The Impress Project (2014), Prospectus, Para. 16. 149 The Independent Press Standards Organisation (2013), Regulation 1. 
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monitoring compliance with the Editors’ Code150, investigating and adjudicating in cases of 
non-compliance151, providing subscribers with guidance on matters concerning the Editors’ 
Code152 and notifying subscribers of potential breaches without restricting their freedom to 
publish153. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     150 The Independent Press Standards Organisation (2013), Regulation 4.1. 151 The Independent Press Standards Organisation (2013), Regulation 4.2. 152 The Independent Press Standards Organisation (2013), Regulation 4.5. 153 The Independent Press Standards Organisation (2013), Regulation 4.6. 
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APPENDIX F : CURRENT REGULATION OF THE UK NEWSPAPER MEDIA 
The Defamation Act 2013 Provides protection for individuals, members of the press, scientists and academics who wish to publish information and views without the threat of libel action.   Gives legal recourse to those who are genuinely defamed.  
 The PCC Editors’ Code of Practice (2012) 
Applies to editorial material in both printed and online publications.   Includes general standards of accuracy and privacy.  
 Issues principles to be followed when reporting and publishing specific material regarding issues such as children, the medical profession, crime and finance. The latter matter is dealt with under Provision 13, which states: 
 (i) Even where the law does not prohibit it, journalists must not use for their own profit financial information they receive in advance of its general publication, nor should they pass such information to others. 
 (ii) They must not write about shares or securities in whose performance they know that they or their close families have a significant financial interest without disclosing the interest to the editor or financial editor. 
 (iii) They must not buy or sell, either directly or through nominees or agents, shares or securities about which they have written recently or about which they intend to write in the near future. 
 Any publication judged to have breached the PCC Editors’ Code must publish the adjudication in full and with due prominence154.  
 The FCA Perimeter Guidance Manual (PERG) 
Contains rules and guidelines authorising and controlling activities which occur on the boundaries of regulated markets, a number of which pertain to media reporting on investments. These include: 
 PERG 7.3.4: since the investment advice provided by journalists and members of the media is not made on the basis of commission, the activities of journalists are considered to be in the interests of their readers rather than as part of an arrangement with any particular market participant. For example, an investigative journalist may on occasion deem it necessary to warn investors against the purchase of a particular investment because there are suspicions of fraud in connection with that investment. It is the opinion of the FCA that such an exercise is conducted in the public interest rather than for any commercial gain. 
 PERG 8.12.23: acknowledges that journalists and other members of the media will inevitably offer share tips and recommendations on companies in which to invest and that this may affect trading on the stock markets.  
 PERG 8.12.25: anyone who writes for or contributes to a publication, service or broadcast is considered as a person acting in the capacity of a journalist. This includes experts or analysts who may be asked to contribute articles for a publication or website service or to offer their opinion in a broadcast.  
 PERG 8.12.25: requires that, under Article 54 of the Regulated Activities Order, 2001, the purpose of media reports must not be to lead or enable persons to buy or sell securities or relevant investments.  
 PERG 8.12.26: where the subject matter of a report is shares, share options, futures or CFDs relating to shares and where the report identifies directly a person who issues or provides such an investment, the report must be accompanied by an indication of the nature of any financial interest held by the journalist, editor or a member of his family.  
 PERG 8.12.27: exceptions to the disclosure requirement of PERG 8.12.26 include reports in publications, services or broadcasts which have proper systems and procedures which prevent the publication of communications without disclosure of financial interests; or fall within the remit of the PCC Editors’ Code; the Ofcom Broadcasting Code; or the BBC Producers’ Guidelines. 
   
                                                     154 PCC Code (2012), Preamble. 
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APPENDIX G : SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Tables G.1 to G.13 present the results of the corporate governance quality sensitivity analysis 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Tables G.1 to G.3 present the results of the first set of sensitivity 
tests which examine alternative associations between benchmark-adjusted corporate governance 
quality change and newspaper reporting. Tables G.4 to G.6 presents the results of the second set 
of tests which examine associations between the annual corporate governance quality variables 
and newspaper reporting. Tables G.7 to G.9 present the results of the third set of tests which 
examine potential time lags in the association between corporate governance quality and 
newspaper reporting. Tables G.10 to G.12 present the results of the fourth set of tests which 
examine corporate governance quality as a determinant of newspaper reporting. Table G.13 
presents the results of the fifth set of tests which examine the intensity of newspaper reporting. 
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Table G.1a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1- Alternative Associations between Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality Change and Newspaper Reporting: The Determinants of Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
Dependent Variable: NPRt t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.720 0.091 0.043 CSIZEt-1 6.130 0.001*** 0.367 AGEt-1 -1.310 0.196 0.026 INDGENt-1 -2.630 0.011** 0.096 ISSt -4.030 0.001*** 0.200 ECONt-1 -1.720 0.089* 0.044 
 R2: 0.552  Adj. R2: 0.518  F (5, 65):  16.030 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 3.610 0.001 0.217 CSIZEt-1 8.770 0.001*** 0.621 AGEt-1 -2.180 0.034** 0.092 INDGENt-1 -3.770 0.001*** 0.232 ISSt 2.420 0.019** 0.111 ECONt-1 -3.770 0.001*** 0.232 
 R2: 0.666  Adj. R2: 0.631  F (5, 47):  18.780 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=18) 
 
   
Constant -0.469 0.647 0.018 CSIZEt-1 -0.674 0.513 0.036 AGEt-1 1.170 0.266 0.102 INDGENt-1 -1.060 0.309 0.086 ISSt 1.470 0.169 0.152 ECONt-1 0.439 0.669 0.016 
 R2: 0.323  Adj. R2: 0.041  F (5, 12):  1.144 (0.390) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt: Event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  
Table G.1b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants  Predicted Residual Full Sample n=  71  Mean 2.867 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.451 1.307 Min  -1.359 -3.167 Max 5.999 3.454 Takeover Subset  n=   53  Mean 3.534 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.437 1.016 Min  0.567 -3.168 Max 6.080 3.300 Market Abuse Subset  n=  18  Mean 0.902 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.496 0.718 Min  -0.260 -1.085 Max 1.687 1.485 
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Table G.1c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: Benchmark-adjusted Pre-event to Event CGQ Change on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt-1→t(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71)    Constant 1.560 0.125 0.039 RESNPRt -0.004 0.997 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.630 0.107 0.043 AGEt-1 -0.510 0.612 0.004 INDGENt-1 0.458 0.648 0.004 ISSt -1.270 0.210 0.026 ECONt-1 -1.570 0.122 0.039 CGQt-1(ad) -5.210 0.001** 0.311 PERFt-1 -1.000 0.320 0.017 INSTt-1 1.450 0.152 0.034 BLAMEt -0.352 0.726 0.002 
 R2: 0.363  Adj. R2: 0.257  F (10, 60):  3.417 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=53)    Constant 0.379 0.706 0.003 RESNPRt -0.961 0.342 0.022 CSIZEt-1 1.460 0.151 0.049 AGEt-1 -0.646 0.522 0.010 INDGENt-1 0.633 0.530 0.009 ISSt 3.130 0.003*** 0.189 ECONt-1 -0.467 0.643 0.005 CGQt-1(ad) -7.870 0.001*** 0.596 PERFt-1 -0.978 0.334 0.022 INSTt-1 0.087 0.931 0.001 BLAMEt -1.760 0.085* 0.069 
 R2: 0.631  Adj. R2: 0.534  F (10, 42):  7.167 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=18)    Constant 1.090 0.311 0.146 RESNPRt 0.817 0.441 0.087 CSIZEt-1 -0.873 0.412 0.098 AGEt-1 -0.620 0.555 0.052 INDGENt-1 -0.220 0.832 0.007 ISSt -0.287 0.782 0.012 ECONt-1 -1.070 0.321 0.140 CGQt-1(ad) -0.551 0.599 0.042 PERFt-1 1.240 0.256 0.179 INSTt-1 1.310 0.232 0.196 BLAMEt 1.290 0.236 0.193 
 R2: 0.631  Adj. R2: 0.104  F (10, 7):  1.198 (0.417) 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.1a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level    
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Table G.2a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: The Determinants of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt-1) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
 Dependent Variable: NPRt-1 t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=62) 
 
   
Constant -0.316 0.753 0.002 CSIZEt-1 1.040 0.301 0.019 AGEt-1 2.070 0.043** 0.071 INDGENt-1 0.117 0.907 0.001 ISSt -1.160 0.252 0.023 ECONt-1 0.317 0.752 0.002 
 R2: 0.210  Adj. R2: 0.139  F (5, 56):  2.969 (0.019)** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) 
 
   
Constant -0.145 0.885 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.120 0.270 0.030 AGEt-1 1.880 0.067* 0.081 INDGENt-1 0.106 0.916 0.001 ISSt -0.828 0.413 0.017 ECONt-1 0.155 0.877 0.001 
 R2: 0.154  Adj. R2: 0.048  F (5, 40):  1.456 (0.226) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt-1: Pre-event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the pre-event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.2b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants  
  Predicted Residual 
 Full Sample n=  62  Mean 0.891 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.750 1.489 Min  -0.873 -2.171 Max 2.339 4.717 
 Takeover Subset  n=   46  Mean 1.200 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.689 1.707 Min  -0.033 -2.339 Max 2.474 4.533 
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Table G.2c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event Year CGQ Change on Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt→t+1(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=62) 
 
   
Constant -0.024 0.981 0.001 RESNPRt-1 -0.203 0.840 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.270 0.027** 0.092 AGEt-1 1.150 0.256 0.025 INDGENt-1 0.760 0.451 0.011 ISSt 0.898 0.374 0.016 ECONt-1 -0.055 0.957 0.001 CGQt(ad) -2.390 0.021** 0.101 PERFt 0.060 0.953 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.425 0.673 0.004 BLAMEt -0.024 0.981 0.001 
 R2: 0.200  Adj. R2: 0.043  F (10, 51):  1.274 (0.270) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) 
 
   
Constant -0.668 0.509 0.013 RESNPRt-1 -0.967 0.340 0.026 CSIZEt-1 2.850 0.007*** 0.188 AGEt-1 1.430 0.163 0.055 INDGENt-1 0.303 0.764 0.003 ISSt 0.621 0.539 0.011 ECONt-1 0.559 0.580 0.009 CGQt(ad) -1.570 0.125 0.066 PERFt -1.200 0.240 0.039 INSTt-1 0.006 0.995 0.001 BLAMEt 2.720 0.010** 0.174 
 R2: 0.403  Adj. R2: 0.232  F (10, 35):  2.361 (0.030)** 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.2a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level    
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Table G.3a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: The Determinants of Post-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the post-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt+1) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
Dependent Variable: NPRt+1 t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=62) 
 
   
Constant 0.263 0.793 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.380 0.021** 0.092 AGEt-1 0.204 0.839 0.001 INDGENt-1 -0.946 0.348 0.016 ISSt 2.030 0.047** 0.069 ECONt-1 -0.325 0.747 0.002 
 R2: 0.155  Adj. R2: 0.080  F (5, 56):  2.056 (0.085)* 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) 
 
   
Constant 0.520 0.606 0.007 CSIZEt-1 2.210 0.033** 0.109 AGEt-1 0.749 0.458 0.014 INDGENt-1 -0.893 0.377 0.020 ISSt -0.271 0.788 0.002 ECONt-1 -0.547 0.587 0.007 
 R2: 0.176  Adj. R2: 0.072  F (5, 40):  1.703 (0.156) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) 
 
   
Constant -0.196 0.848 0.004 CSIZEt-1 1.900 0.086* 0.266 AGEt-1 -2.310 0.044** 0.347 INDGENt-1 -0.967 0.357 0.086 ISSt 2.730 0.021** 0.427 ECONt-1 0.040 0.969 0.001 
 R2: 0.585  Adj. R2: 0.378  F (5, 10):  2.820 (0.077)* 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt+1: Post-event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the post-event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
**Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.3b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Post-event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants   Predicted Residual Full Sample n=  62  Mean 1.044 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.545 1.206 Min  -0.323 -2.097 Max 2.443 4.559 Takeover Subset  n=   46  Mean 0.921 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.590 1.229 Min  -0.350 -1.755 Max 1.864 4.632 Market Abuse Subset  n=  16  Mean 1.398 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.862 0.789 Min  -0.280 -1.197 Max 3.929 1.596 
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Table G.3c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 1: Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event CGQ Change on Post-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt→t+1(ad)) upon the post-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt+1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.009 0.993 0.001 RESNPRt+1 -0.351 0.727 0.002 CSIZEt-1 2.300 0.025** 0.094 AGEt-1 1.140 0.259 0.025 INDGENt-1 0.758 0.452 0.011 ISSt 0.949 0.347 0.017 ECONt-1 -0.071 0.944 0.001 CGQt(ad) -2.410 0.019** 0.103 PERFt 0.001 0.999 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.443 0.659 0.004 BLAMEt 0.103 0.918 0.001 
 R2: 0.201  Adj. R2: 0.045  F (10, 51):  1.284 (0.264) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant -0.584 0.563 0.010 RESNPRt+1 0.531 0.599 0.008 CSIZEt-1 2.840 0.008*** 0.189 AGEt-1 1.410 0.167 0.054 INDGENt-1 0.325 0.747 0.003 ISSt 0.764 0.450 0.016 ECONt-1 0.469 0.642 0.006 CGQt(ad) -1.490 0.145 0.060 PERFt -1.080 0.287 0.032 INSTt-1 0.100 0.921 0.001 BLAMEt 2.550 0.015** 0.157 
 R2: 0.392  Adj. R2: 0.218  F (10, 35):  2.255 (0.037)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 2.320 0.068 0.518 RESNPRt+1 0.977 0.374 0.160 CSIZEt-1 0.719 0.504 0.094 AGEt-1 0.250 0.812 0.012 INDGENt-1 0.478 0.653 0.044 ISSt -1.890 0.117 0.417 ECONt-1 -2.290 0.070* 0.513 CGQt(ad) -1.050 0.342 0.181 PERFt 1.490 0.196 0.308 INSTt-1 -0.626 0.559 0.073 BLAMEt -1.580 0.175 0.333 
 R2: 0.738  Adj. R2: 0.215  F (10, 5):  1.410 (0.370) 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt+1: Newspaper Reporting in the post-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to post-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.3a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level    
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Table G.4a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2- Annual Corporate Governance Quality Variables: The Determinants of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt-1) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
 Dependent Variable: NPRt-1 t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=135) 
 
   
Constant -0.539 0.591 0.002 CSIZEt-1 2.120 0.036** 0.034 AGEt-1 0.445 0.647 0.002 INDGENt-1 -0.360 0.719 0.001 ISSt -1.950 0.053* 0.029 ECONt-1 0.532 0.596 0.002 
 R2: 0.109  Adj. R2: 0.074  F (5, 129):  3.149 (0.010)** 
 Takeover Subset (n=110) 
 
   
Constant -0.378 0.706 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.910 0.059* 0.034 AGEt-1 0.400 0.690 0.002 INDGENt-1 -0.471 0.639 0.002 ISSt -0.183 0.855 0.001 ECONt-1 0.356 0.722 0.001 
 R2: 0.053  Adj. R2: 0.007  F (5, 104):  1.163 (0.332) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt-1: Pre-event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the pre-event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.4b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants   Predicted Residual 
 Full Sample n=  135  Mean 0.980 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.533 1.526 Min  -0.915 -2.031 Max 2.169 4.954 
 Takeover Subset  n=   110  Mean 1.187 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.396 1.677 Min  0.245 -2.003 Max 2.184 4.821 
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Table G.4c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2: Pre-event Year Benchmark-adjusted CGQ on Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of pre-event year benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality (CGQt-1(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: CGQt-1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=135) 
 
   
Constant 0.425 0.671 0.001 RESNPRt-1 -1.910 0.059* 0.028 CSIZEt-1 4.510 0.001*** 0.140 AGEt-1 0.361 0.719 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.193 0.847 0.001 ISSt -0.419 0.676 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.536 0.593 0.002 PERFt-1 0.187 0.852 0.001 INSTt-1 1.100 0.274 0.010 BLAMEt -0.863 0.390 0.006 
 R2: 0.259  Adj. R2: 0.205  F (9, 125):  4.850 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=110) 
 
   
Constant -1.040 0.299 0.011 RESNPRt-1 -2.150 0.034** 0.044 CSIZEt-1 2.730 0.008*** 0.069 AGEt-1 0.692 0.490 0.005 INDGENt-1 -0.396 0.693 0.002 ISSt 2.030 0.045** 0.040 ECONt-1 0.938 0.350 0.009 PERFt-1 0.425 0.672 0.002 INSTt-1 0.964 0.337 0.009 BLAMEt 0.096 0.924 0.001 
 R2: 0.221  Adj. R2: 0.151  F (9, 100):  3.156 (0.002)*** 
 Variable Definitions: CGQt-1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the pre-event year; RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.4a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level    
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Table G.5a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2: The Determinants of Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
Dependent Variable: NPRt t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=72) 
 
   
Constant 0.820 0.415 0.010 CSIZEt-1 5.170 0.001*** 0.288 AGEt-1 -0.577 0.566 0.005 INDGENt-1 -1.960 0.054* 0.055 ISSt -3.530 0.001*** 0.159 ECONt-1 -0.822 0.414 0.010 
 R2: 0.487  Adj. R2: 0.448  F (5, 66):  12.530 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=54) 
 
   
Constant 1.790 0.080 0.063 CSIZEt-1 6.230 0.001*** 0.447 AGEt-1 -0.903 0.371 0.017 INDGENt-1 -2.230 0.031** 0.094 ISSt 1.600 0.116 0.051 ECONt-1 -1.900 0.064* 0.070 
 R2: 0.492  Adj. R2: 0.439  F (5, 48):  9.291 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=18) 
 
   
Constant -0.469 0.647 0.018 CSIZEt-1 -0.674 0.513 0.036 AGEt-1 1.170 0.266 0.102 INDGENt-1 -1.060 0.309 0.086 ISSt 1.470 0.169 0.152 ECONt-1 0.439 0.669 0.016 
 R2: 0.323  Adj. R2: 0.041  F (5, 12):  1.144 (0.390) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt: Event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.5b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants   Predicted Residual Full Sample n=  72  Mean 2.836 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.366 1.400 Min  -1.277 -4.129 Max 5.850 3.483 Takeover Subset  n=   54  Mean 3.481 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.252 1.273 Min  0.785 -5.046 Max 5.761 3.293 Market Abuse Subset  n=  18  Mean 0.902 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.496 0.718 Min  -0.260 -1.108 Max 1.687 1.485 
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Table G.5c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2: Event Year Benchmark-adjusted CGQ on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of event year benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality (CGQt(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: CGQt(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=72)    Constant 0.933 0.355 0.014 RESNPRt 0.682 0.498 0.008 CSIZEt-1 0.806 0.423 0.011 AGEt-1 -0.105 0.917 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.548 0.586 0.005 ISSt -1.170 0.246 0.022 ECONt-1 -0.927 0.358 0.014 CGQt-1(ad) 7.670 0.001** 0.491 PERFt -0.816 0.418 0.011 INSTt-1 1.330 0.189 0.028 BLAMEt -0.372 0.711 0.002 
 R2: 0.676  Adj. R2: 0.623  F (10, 61):  12.740 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=54)    Constant -0.084 0.934 0.001 RESNPRt 0.950 0.347 0.021 CSIZEt-1 0.559 0.579 0.007 AGEt-1 -0.166 0.869 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.737 0.465 0.013 ISSt 1.970 0.055* 0.083 ECONt-1 0.045 0.964 0.001 CGQt-1(ad) 2.880 0.006*** 0.162 PERFt -0.408 0.685 0.004 INSTt-1 0.440 0.662 0.005 BLAMEt -2.060 0.045** 0.090 
 R2: 0.435  Adj. R2: 0.304  F (10, 43):  3.310 (0.003)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=18)    Constant 1.100 0.309 0.147 RESNPRt 0.812 0.444 0.086 CSIZEt-1 -0.869 0.413 0.098 AGEt-1 -0.622 0.554 0.052 INDGENt-1 -0.210 0.839 0.006 ISSt -0.299 0.773 0.013 ECONt-1 -1.070 0.320 0.141 CGQt-1(ad) 3.860 0.006*** 0.681 PERFt 1.230 0.257 0.179 INSTt-1 1.290 0.236 0.193 BLAMEt 1.280 0.242 0.189 
 R2: 0.917  Adj. R2: 0.799  F (10, 7):  7.754 (0.006)*** 
 Variable Definitions: CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.5a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table G.6: Sensitivity Analysis Test 2: Post-event Year Benchmark-adjusted CGQ on Post-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
 Below are the results of the OLS regression of post-event year benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality (CGQt+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt+1) and the additional explanatory variables. Results of the OLS regression of the post-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt+1) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting are provided in Tables G.3a and b. 
  Dependent Variable: CGQt+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 1.090 0.280 0.023 RESNPRt+1 -0.122 0.903 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.010 0.049** 0.073 AGEt-1 0.592 0.556 0.007 INDGENt-1 0.315 0.754 0.002 ISSt 0.091 0.928 0.001 ECONt-1 -1.140 0.259 0.025 CGQt(ad) 4.470 0.001** 0.281 PERFt+1 0.203 0.840 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.535 0.595 0.006 BLAMEt -0.755 0.454 0.011 
 R2: 0.568  Adj. R2: 0.483  F (10, 51):  6.707 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant 0.435 0.667 0.005 RESNPRt+1 0.665 0.511 0.013 CSIZEt-1 1.530 0.135 0.063 AGEt-1 0.905 0.372 0.023 INDGENt-1 0.208 0.836 0.001 ISSt -0.222 0.826 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.459 0.649 0.006 CGQt(ad) 3.210 0.003*** 0.228 PERFt+1 0.478 0.636 0.007 INSTt-1 -0.463 0.646 0.006 BLAMEt 0.406 0.688 0.005 
 R2: 0.432  Adj. R2: 0.269  F (10, 35):  2.657 (0.016)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 3.960 0.011 0.758 RESNPRt+1 1.640 0.162 0.350 CSIZEt-1 -0.343 0.746 0.023 AGEt-1 1.950 0.109 0.432 INDGENt-1 2.470 0.057* 0.549 ISSt -2.670 0.045** 0.587 ECONt-1 -3.790 0.013** 0.742 CGQt(ad) 2.080 0.092* 0.464 PERFt+1 3.380 0.020** 0.696 INSTt-1 -1.920 0.113 0.425 BLAMEt -1.720 0.146 0.372 
 R2: 0.946  Adj. R2: 0.839  F (10, 5):  8.817 (0.013)** 
 
 Variable Definitions: CGQt+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the post-event year; RESNPRt+1: Newspaper Reporting in the post-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to post-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.3a and b); PERFt-1: Industry-adjusted company performance in the post-event year, measured as: (company sales in post-event year – average industry sales in post-event year)/standard deviation of industry sales in post-event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table G.7a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3- Potential Time Lags: The Determinants of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt-1) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
 Dependent Variable: NPRt-1 t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=72) 
 
   
Constant -0.108 0.914 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.460 0.150 0.031 AGEt-1 2.080 0.042** 0.061 INDGENt-1 0.207 0.837 0.001 ISSt -1.360 0.178 0.027 ECONt-1 0.100 0.920 0.001 
 R2: 0.205  Adj. R2: 0.145  F (5, 66):  3.410 (0.008)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=54) 
 
   
Constant 0.029 0.977 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.580 0.120 0.050 AGEt-1 1.920 0.061* 0.071 INDGENt-1 0.161 0.872 0.001 ISSt -0.615 0.541 0.008 ECONt-1 -0.038 0.970 0.001 
 R2: 0.150  Adj. R2: 0.061  F (5, 48):  1.690 (0.155) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt-1: Pre-event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the pre-event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.7b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants  
  Predicted Residual Full Sample n=  72  Mean 0.876 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.730 1.437 Min  -1.003 -2.137 Max 2.314 4.732 
 Takeover Subset  n=   54  Mean 1.168 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.685 1633 Min  -0.491 -2.347 Max 2.776 4.542 
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Table G.7c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3: Event Year Benchmark-adjusted CGQ on Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of event year benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality (CGQt(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 
 Dependent Variable: CGQt(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=72) 
 
   
Constant 1.100 0.277 0.020 RESNPRt-1 0.643 0.523 0.007 CSIZEt-1 0.448 0.656 0.003 AGEt-1 -0.018 0.986 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.638 0.526 0.007 ISSt -0.975 0.334 0.016 ECONt-1 -1.090 0.281 0.019 CGQt-1(ad) 7.460 0.001** 0.481 PERFt 0.453 0.652 0.003 INSTt-1 1.860 0.068* 0.055 BLAMEt -0.579 0.565 0.006 
 R2: 0.682  Adj. R2: 0.629  F (10, 60):  12.890 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=54) 
 
   
Constant -0.031 0.976 0.001 RESNPRt-1 1.840 0.073* 0.074 CSIZEt-1 0.103 0.919 0.001 AGEt-1 0.591 0.558 0.008 INDGENt-1 0.901 0.373 0.019 ISSt 2.080 0.043** 0.094 ECONt-1 -0.021 0.983 0.001 CGQt-1(ad) 3.140 0.003*** 0.190 PERFt 1.610 0.115 0.058 INSTt-1 1.840 0.073* 0.075 BLAMEt -1.900 0.064* 0.080 
 R2: 0.446  Adj. R2: 0.314  F (10, 42):  3.381 (0.003)*** 
 Variable Definitions: CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.7a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  
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Table G.8a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3: The Determinants of Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting. 
Dependent Variable: NPRt t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=62) 
 
   
Constant 0.696 0.489 0.009 CSIZEt-1 4.300 0.001*** 0.248 AGEt-1 -0.442 0.660 0.004 INDGENt-1 -2.000 0.051* 0.066 ISSt -2.940 0.005*** 0.134 ECONt-1 -0.693 0.491 0.009 
 R2: 0.485  Adj. R2: 0.439  F (5, 56):  10.560 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) 
 
   
Constant 1.350 0.183 0.044 CSIZEt-1 5.610 0.001*** 0.440 AGEt-1 -1.010 0.318 0.025 INDGENt-1 -2.130 0.040** 0.101 ISSt 1.920 0.062* 0.085 ECONt-1 -1.480 0.147 0.052 
 R2: 0.515  Adj. R2: 0.454  F (5, 40):  8.493 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) 
 
   
Constant -0.482 0.641 0.023 CSIZEt-1 -0.567 0.583 0.031 AGEt-1 1.400 0.193 0.163 INDGENt-1 -0.774 0.457 0.057 ISSt 1.130 0.285 0.113 ECONt-1 0.467 0.650 0.021 
 R2: 0.333  Adj. R2: -0.001  F (5, 10):  0.999 (0.465) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt: Event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the event year); Explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.8b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants   Predicted Residual Full Sample n=  62  Mean 2.809 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.370 1.410 Min  -1.035 -4.094 Max 5.822 3.543 Takeover Subset  n=   46  Mean 3.468 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.296 1.258 Min  0.515 -5.027 Max 5.911 3.238 Market Abuse Subset  n=  16  Mean 0.914 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.508 0.719 Min  -0.073 -1.119 Max 1.967 1.471 
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Table G.8c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3: Post-event Year Benchmark-adjusted CGQ on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of post-event year benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality (CGQt+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: CGQt+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 1.070 0.288 0.022 RESNPRt -1.320 0.193 0.033 CSIZEt-1 1.790 0.079* 0.059 AGEt-1 0.564 0.575 0.006 INDGENt-1 0.285 0.777 0.002 ISSt 0.040 0.968 0.001 ECONt-1 -1.120 0.268 0.024 CGQt(ad) 4.630 0.001** 0.296 PERFt+1 0.474 0.637 0.004 INSTt-1 -0.338 0.736 0.002 BLAMEt -0.651 0.518 0.008 
 R2: 0.578  Adj. R2: 0.496  F (10, 51):  6.992 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant 0.256 0.799 0.002 RESNPRt -0.095 0.925 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.750 0.089* 0.080 AGEt-1 0.920 0.364 0.024 INDGENt-1 0.161 0.873 0.001 ISSt 0.130 0.897 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.305 0.762 0.003 CGQt(ad) 3.140 0.004*** 0.220 PERFt+1 -0.089 0.929 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.372 0.712 0.004 BLAMEt 0.963 0.342 0.026 
 R2: 0.438  Adj. R2: 0.278  F (10, 35):  2.730 (0.014)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 3.520 0.017 0.712 RESNPRt 1.170 0.296 0.214 CSIZEt-1 0.890 0.414 0.137 AGEt-1 0.515 0.629 0.050 INDGENt-1 2.120 0.087* 0.475 ISSt -2.160 0.084* 0.482 ECONt-1 -3.410 0.019** 0.699 CGQt(ad) 0.214 0.839 0.009 PERFt+1 2.790 0.039** 0.608 INSTt-1 -1.810 0.131 0.395 BLAMEt -0.598 0.576 0.067 
 R2: 0.936  Adj. R2: 0.807  F (10, 5):  7.273 (0.020)** 
 Variable Definitions: CGQt+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the post-event year; RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.8a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table G.9: Sensitivity Analysis Test 3: Post-event Year Benchmark-adjusted CGQ on Pre-event Year 
Newspaper Reporting  
Below are the results of the OLS regression of post-event year benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality (CGQt+1(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Results of the OLS regression of the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt-1) upon the five potential determinants of newspaper reporting are provided in Tables G.2a and b. 
Dependent Variable: CGQt+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=62) 
 
   
Constant 0.955 0.344 0.018 RESNPRt-1 -0.906 0.369 0.016 CSIZEt-1 1.840 0.072* 0.062 AGEt-1 0.589 0.559 0.007 INDGENt-1 0.389 0.699 0.003 ISSt -0.171 0.865 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.999 0.323 0.019 CGQt(ad) 4.320 0.001** 0.268 PERFt+1 0.502 0.618 0.005 INSTt-1 -0.475 0.637 0.004 BLAMEt -0.170 0.866 0.001 
 R2: 0.571  Adj. R2: 0.487  F (10, 51):  6.781 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) 
 
   
Constant 0.126 0.901 0.001 RESNPRt-1 -1.220 0.231 0.041 CSIZEt-1 1.620 0.113 0.070 AGEt-1 1.000 0.324 0.028 INDGENt-1 0.262 0.795 0.002 ISSt -0.522 0.605 0.008 ECONt-1 -0.173 0.864 0.001 CGQt(ad) 3.200 0.003*** 0.227 PERFt+1 0.303 0.764 0.003 INSTt-1 -0.522 0.605 0.008 BLAMEt 1.160 0.254 0.037 
 R2: 0.461  Adj. R2: 0.307  F (10, 35):  2.993 (0.008)*** 
 Variable Definitions: CGQt+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the post-event year; RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.2a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  
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Table G.10a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4- CGQ as a Determinant of Newspaper Reporting: The Determinants of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting 
 Below are the results of the OLS regression of the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt-1) upon the potential determinants of newspaper reporting, including pre-event year benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality. 
 Dependent Variable: NPRt-1 t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 0.907 0.368 0.013 CSIZEt-1 3.030 0.004*** 0.126 AGEt-1 1.670 0.099* 0.042 INDGENt-1 0.123 0.902 0.001 ISSt -2.310 0.024** 0.077 ECONt-1 -0.932 0.355 0.013 CGQt-1(ad) -3.140 0.003*** 0.133 
 R2: 0.317  Adj. R2: 0.253  F (6, 64):  4.958 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 0.415 0.680 0.004 CSIZEt-1 2.620 0.019** 0.130 AGEt-1 1.720 0.093* 0.060 INDGENt-1 0.031 0.976 0.001 ISSt 0.250 0.803 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.458 0.649 0.005 CGQt-1(ad) -2.980 0.005*** 0.161 
 R2: 0.292  Adj. R2: 0.200  F (6, 46):  3.168 (0.011)** 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt-1: Pre-event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the pre-event year); CGQt-1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the pre-event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  Table G.10b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Pre-event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants  
  Predicted Residual 
 Full Sample n=  71  Mean 0.907 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.926 1.358 Min  -0.874 -2.427 Max 3.050 4.768 
 Takeover Subset  n=   53  Mean 1.215 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.975 1.517 Min  -0.554 -2.489 Max 3.573 4.764 
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Table G.10c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting  
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt-1→t(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 
 Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.730 0.087 0.048 RESNPRt-1 1.870 0.069* 0.055 CSIZEt-1 1.790 0.079* 0.051 AGEt-1 -0.515 0.608 0.004 INDGENt-1 0.178 0.859 0.001 ISSt -1.220 0.226 0.024 ECONt-1 -1.750 0.086* 0.049 CGQt-1(ad) -5.300 0.001*** 0.319 PERFt-1 -1.700 0.095* 0.046 INSTt-1 1.640 0.107 0.043 BLAMEt -0.645 0.522 0.007 
 R2: 0.398  Adj. R2: 0.297  F (10, 60):  3.964 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 0.233 0.817 0.001 RESNPRt-1 1.740 0.090* 0.067 CSIZEt-1 1.880 0.066* 0.078 AGEt-1 -0.884 0.382 0.018 INDGENt-1 0.516 0.608 0.006 ISSt 2.670 0.011** 0.145 ECONt-1 -0.320 0.751 0.002 CGQt-1(ad) -7.830 0.001*** 0.593 PERFt-1 -1.370 0.177 0.043 INSTt-1 0.178 0.860 0.001 BLAMEt -1.650 0.106 0.061 
 R2: 0.648  Adj. R2: 0.564  F (10, 42):  7.720 (0.001)*** 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt-1: Newspaper Reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to pre-event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.10a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  
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Table G.11a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: The Determinants of Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt) upon the potential determinants of newspaper reporting, including event year benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality. 
Dependent Variable: NPRt t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 Full Sample (n=62) 
 
   
Constant 0.583 0.562 0.006 CSIZEt-1 3.510 0.001** 0.183 AGEt-1 -0.416 0.679 0.003 INDGENt-1 -2.090 0.041** 0.074 ISSt -2.740 0.008*** 0.120 ECONt-1 -0.573 0.569 0.006 CGQt(ad) 0.806 0.424 0.012 
 R2: 0.491  Adj. R2: 0.436  F (6, 55):  8.856 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) 
 
   
Constant 1.720 0.094 0.070 CSIZEt-1 5.100 0.001*** 0.400 AGEt-1 -1.090 0.281 0.030 INDGENt-1 -2.530 0.015** 0.142 ISSt 0.697 0.490 0.012 ECONt-1 -1.810 0.077* 0.078 CGQt(ad) 1.760 0.087* 0.073 
 R2: 0.551  Adj. R2: 0.481  F (6, 39):  7.962 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) 
 
   
Constant -2.100 0.065 0.330 CSIZEt-1 2.390 0.041** 0.387 AGEt-1 -2.610 0.028** 0.431 INDGENt-1 -0.771 0.461 0.062 ISSt 1.640 0.135 0.231 ECONt-1 2.130 0.062* 0.336 CGQt(ad) 2.390 0.041** 0.387 
 R2: 0.592  Adj. R2: 0.319  F (6, 9):  2.172 (0.142) 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt: Event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the event year); CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level  
Table G.11b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: Descriptive Statistics: Predicted and Residual Values from OLS Regressions of Event Year Newspaper Reporting on its Potential Determinants  Predicted Residual Full Sample (n=62) Mean 2.809 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.303 1.472 Min  -1.163 -3.866 Max 5.335 3.425 Takeover Subset (n=46) Mean 3.468 0.000 Std. Dev. 1.526 0.964 Min  0.094 -1.459 Max 6.379 3.231 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Mean 0.914 0.000 Std. Dev. 0.738 0.478 Min  -0.376 -0.701 Max 1.914 1.105   
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Table G.11c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event CGQ Change on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71)    Constant 0.007 0.994 0.001 RESNPRt -0.247 0.806 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.240 0.029** 0.090 AGEt-1 1.150 0.257 0.025 INDGENt-1 0.741 0.462 0.011 ISSt 0.931 0.356 0.017 ECONt-1 -0.086 0.932 0.001 CGQt(ad) -2.390 0.021** 0.101 PERFt 0.114 0.909 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.382 0.704 0.003 BLAMEt 0.098 0.994 0.001 
 R2: 0.200  Adj. R2: 0.043  F (10, 51):  1.276 (0.268) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant -0.611 0.545 0.011 RESNPRt 0.652 0.518 0.012 CSIZEt-1 2.890 0.007*** 0.193 AGEt-1 1.400 0.171 0.053 INDGENt-1 0.323 0.749 0.003 ISSt 0.822 0.417 0.019 ECONt-1 0.493 0.625 0.007 CGQt(ad) -1.540 0.133 0.063 PERFt -1.210 0.233 0.040 INSTt-1 0.049 0.961 0.001 BLAMEt 2.590 0.014** 0.161 
 R2: 0.394  Adj. R2: 0.221  F (10, 35):  2.278 (0.035)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 1.970 0.106 0.437 RESNPRt 0.413 0.697 0.033 CSIZEt-1 0.946 0.388 0.152 AGEt-1 0.036 0.973 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.452 0.670 0.039 ISSt -1.640 0.162 0.350 ECONt-1 -1.940 0.109 0.431 CGQt(ad) -1.270 0.261 0.243 PERFt 1.070 0.335 0.186 INSTt-1 -0.479 0.652 0.044 BLAMEt -0.940 0.390 0.150 
 R2: 0.698  Adj. R2: 0.095  F (10, 5):  1.158 (0.463) 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRt: Newspaper Reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values obtained from the first stage OLS regression model when applied to event year newspaper reporting (Tables G.11a and b); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level    
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Table G.12a: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: The Determinants of Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt) upon the potential determinants of newspaper reporting, including pre-event year benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality. 
 Dependent Variable: NPRt t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 
 Full Sample (n=135) 
 
 
   
Constant 1.300 0.196 0.013 CSIZEt-1 7.070 0.001** 0.281 AGEt-1 -0.151 0.880 0.001 INDGENt-1 -2.920 0.004*** 0.063 ISSt -5.230 0.001*** 0.176 ECONt-1 -1.330 0.186 0.014 CGQt-1(ad) 0.569 0.570 0.003 
 R2: 0.517  Adj. R2: 0.494  F (6, 128):  22.810 (0.001)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=110) 
 
 
   
Constant 2.540 0.013 0.059 CSIZEt-1 7.970 0.001*** 0.382 AGEt-1 -0.126 0.900 0.001 INDGENt-1 -3.500 0.001*** 0.107 ISSt -0.324 0.747 0.001 ECONt-1 -2.620 0.010** 0.063 CGQt-1(ad) 1.530 0.128 0.022 
 R2: 0.509  Adj. R2: 0.480  F (6, 103):  17.77 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=25) 
 
 
   
Constant -0.539 0.596 0.016 CSIZEt-1 -0.838 0.413 0.038 AGEt-1 0.224 0.825 0.003 INDGENt-1 -0.640 0.530 0.022 ISSt 1.550 0.140 0.117 ECONt-1 0.516 0.612 0.015 CGQt-1(ad) 0.872 0.395 0.041 
 R2: 0.147  Adj. R2: -0.138  F (6, 18):  0.515 (0.789) 
 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt: Event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the event year); CGQt-1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level  
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Table G.12b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 4: The Determinants of Post-event Year Newspaper Reporting Below are the results of the OLS regression of the post-event year newspaper reporting variable (NPRt+1) upon the potential determinants of newspaper reporting, including event year benchmark-adjusted corporate governance quality. 
 Dependent Variable: NPRt+1 t-value t-prob Part. R2 
 
 Full Sample (n=72) 
 
 
   
Constant 0.930 0.356 0.013 CSIZEt-1 2.410 0.019** 0.082 AGEt-1 0.477 0.635 0.004 INDGENt-1 -1.150 0.254 0.020 ISSt 1.940 0.056* 0.055 ECONt-1 -0.986 0.328 0.015 CGQt(ad) -0.932 0.355 0.013 
 R2: 0.175  Adj. R2: 0.098  F (6, 65):  2.292 (0.045)** 
 
 Takeover Subset (n=54) 
 
 
   
Constant 1.040 0.304 0.022 CSIZEt-1 2.050 0.046** 0.082 AGEt-1 1.090 0.282 0.025 INDGENt-1 -1.160 0.253 0.028 ISSt -0.502 0.618 0.005 ECONt-1 -1.050 0.298 0.023 CGQt(ad) 0.289 0.774 0.002 
 R2: 0.165  Adj. R2: 0.058  F (6, 47):  1.543 (0.185) 
 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=18) 
 
 
   
Constant 0.228 0.824 0.005 CSIZEt-1 1.750 0.108 0.218 AGEt-1 -2.560 0.026** 0.375 INDGENt-1 -1.050 0.318 0.090 ISSt 2.570 0.026** 0.375 ECONt-1 -0.347 0.735 0.011 CGQt(ad) -0.289 0.778 0.008 
 R2: 0.633  Adj. R2: 0.432  F (6, 11):  3.159 (0.047)** 
 Variable Definitions: NPRt+1: Post-event year newspaper reporting measured as ln (1 + No. newspaper reports in the event year); CGQt(ad): Benchmark-adjusted Corporate Governance Quality in the event year; Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level   
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Table G.13a: Descriptive Statistics: Coefficient of Variation in Reporting by Newspaper Publications (cvpt) and Coefficient of Variation in Reporting by Newspaper Groups (cvgt) 
  Whole Sample (n= 136) Takeover (n= 111) Market Abuse (n= 25) 
 cvpt-1 cvpt cvgt-1 cvgt cvpt-1 cvpt cvgt-1 cvgt cvpt-1 cvpt cvgt-1 cvgt 
 Mean  0.43 1.17 0.26 0.71 0.48 1.14 0.29 0.67 0.22 1.33 0.16 0.91 
Std.dev. 0.70 0.74 0.48 0.62 0.68 0.65 0.46 0.56 0.77 1.07 0.56 0.80 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 2.85 2.90 2.05 2.11 2.85 2.84 2.00 2.11 2.84 2.90 2.05 2.00 
Coefficient Definitions 
 cvpt: Coefficient of variation among newspaper publications in a given year, t, of a TMA case, measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of reports per publication in t to the mean reports per publication in t. 
 cvgt: Coefficient of variation among newspaper groups in a given year, t, of a TMA case, measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of reports per group in t to the mean reports per group in t. 
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 Table G.13b: Sensitivity Analysis Test 5- The Intensity of Newspaper Reporting: Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Publication Intensity-adjusted Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt-1→t(ad)) upon pre-event year newspaper reporting as adjusted to reflect the intensity of reporting by newspaper publications (RESNPRvpt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.580 0.120 0.040 RESNPRvpt-1 2.000 0.049** 0.063 CSIZEt-1 1.840 0.070* 0.054 AGEt-1 -0.799 0.427 0.011 INDGENt-1 0.107 0.915 0.001 ISSt -0.717 0.477 0.009 ECONt-1 -1.610 0.114 0.041 CGQt-1(ad) -4.930 0.001*** 0.288 PERFt-1 -1.740 0.087* 0.048 INSTt-1 1.580 0.118 0.040 BLAMEt -0.836 0.406 0.012  R2: 0.403  Adj. R2: 0.303  F (10, 60):  4.045 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 0.425 0.673 0.004 RESNPRvpt-1 1.690 0.098* 0.064 CSIZEt-1 1.900 0.065* 0.079 AGEt-1 -0.917 0.364 0.020 INDGENt-1 0.618 0.540 0.009 ISSt 2.140 0.038** 0.099 ECONt-1 -0.510 0.613 0.006 CGQt-1(ad) -7.130 0.001*** 0.547 PERFt-1 -1.470 0.148 0.049 INSTt-1 0.556 0.581 0.007 BLAMEt -1.910 0.064* 0.080  R2: 0.646  Adj. R2: 0.562  F (10, 42):  7.681 (0.001)***  
Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRvpt-1: Publication intensity-adjusted pre-event year newspaper reporting, measured as: coefficient of variation in reporting among publications in the pre-event year (cvpt-1) x pre-event year newspaper reporting (RESNPRt-1); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table G.13c: Sensitivity Analysis Test 5: Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Publication Intensity-adjusted Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt→t+1(ad)) upon event year newspaper reporting as adjusted to reflect the intensity of reporting by newspaper publications (RESNPRvpt) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.020 0.985 0.001 RESNPRvpt -0.076 0.940 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.130 0.038** 0.082 AGEt-1 1.140 0.260 0.025 INDGENt-1 0.757 0.453 0.011 ISSt 0.948 0.348 0.017 ECONt-1 -0.060 0.953 0.001 CGQt(ad) -2.320 0.024** 0.096 PERFt 0.062 0.951 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.394 0.696 0.003 BLAMEt 0.142 0.888 0.001 
 R2: 0.199  Adj. R2: 0.042  F (10, 51):  1.270 (0.272) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant -0.512 0.612 0.007 RESNPRvpt -0.733 0.468 0.015 CSIZEt-1 2.930 0.006*** 0.197 AGEt-1 1.290 0.206 0.045 INDGENt-1 0.315 0.755 0.004 ISSt 0.860 0.395 0.021 ECONt-1 0.391 0.698 0.004 CGQt(ad) -1.490 0.146 0.060 PERFt -1.230 0.228 0.041 INSTt-1 -0.001 0.999 0.001 BLAMEt 2.550 0.015** 0.157 
 R2: 0.396  Adj. R2: 0.224  F (10, 35):  2.297 (0.034)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 1.930 0.111 0.428 RESNPRvpt 0.237 0.822 0.011 CSIZEt-1 0.920 0.400 0.145 AGEt-1 -0.007 0.995 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.423 0.690 0.035 ISSt -1.620 0.166 0.345 ECONt-1 -1.900 0.116 0.419 CGQt(ad) -1.120 0.314 0.200 PERFt 1.020 0.355 0.172 INSTt-1 -0.466 0.661 0.042 BLAMEt -0.923 0.399 0.146 
 R2: 0.692  Adj. R2: 0.075  F (10, 5):  1.122 (0.478) 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRvpt: Publication intensity-adjusted event year newspaper reporting, measured as: coefficient of variation in reporting among publications in the event year (cvpt) x event year newspaper reporting (RESNPRt); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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Table G.13d: Sensitivity Analysis Test 5: Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Group Intensity-adjusted Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt-1→t(ad)) upon pre-event year newspaper reporting as adjusted to reflect the intensity of reporting by newspaper groups (RESNPRvgt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.560 0.124 0.039 RESNPRvgt-1 1.999 0.051* 0.062 CSIZEt-1 1.650 0.104 0.043 AGEt-1 -0.798 0.428 0.011 INDGENt-1 0.077 0.939 0.001 ISSt -0.663 0.510 0.007 ECONt-1 -1.580 0.119 0.040 CGQt-1(ad) -4.680 0.001*** 0.267 PERFt-1 -1.410 0.165 0.032 INSTt-1 1.480 0.145 0.035 BLAMEt -0.911 0.366 0.014  R2: 0.402  Adj. R2: 0.303  F (10, 60):  4.037 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 0.412 0.683 0.004 RESNPRvgt-1 1.190 0.242 0.032 CSIZEt-1 1.700 0.097* 0.064 AGEt-1 -0.877 0.386 0.018 INDGENt-1 0.513 0.610 0.006 ISSt 2.410 0.020** 0.122 ECONt-1 -0.497 0.622 0.006 CGQt-1(ad) -6.560 0.001*** 0.506 PERFt-1 -1.020 0.314 0.024 INSTt-1 0.393 0.697 0.004 BLAMEt -1.700 0.097* 0.064  R2: 0.635  Adj. R2: 0.548  F (10, 42):  7.295 (0.001)***  
Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRvgt-1: Group intensity-adjusted pre-event year newspaper reporting, measured as: coefficient of variation in reporting among newspaper groups in the pre-event year (cvgt-1) x pre-event year newspaper reporting (RESNPRt-1); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table G.13e: Sensitivity Analysis Test 5: Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-event Year Corporate Governance Quality Change on Group Intensity-adjusted Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event change in Corporate Governance Quality (∆CGQt→t+1(ad)) upon event year newspaper reporting as adjusted to reflect the intensity of reporting by newspaper groups (RESNPRvpt) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad) t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.023 0.981 0.001 RESNPRvgt -0.094 0.925 0.001 CSIZEt-1 2.130 0.038** 0.082 AGEt-1 1.140 0.262 0.025 INDGENt-1 0.759 0.451 0.011 ISSt 0.948 0.347 0.017 ECONt-1 -0.056 0.956 0.001 CGQt(ad) -2.300 0.026** 0.094 PERFt 0.066 0.948 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.394 0.695 0.003 BLAMEt 0.140 0.890 0.001 
 R2: 0.199  Adj. R2: 0.042  F (10, 51):  1.270 (0.272) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46)    Constant -0.525 0.603 0.008 RESNPRvgt -0.692 0.494 0.014 CSIZEt-1 2.920 0.006*** 0.196 AGEt-1 1.270 0.212 0.044 INDGENt-1 0.319 0.752 0.003 ISSt 0.852 0.400 0.020 ECONt-1 0.406 0.687 0.005 CGQt(ad) -1.530 0.136 0.063 PERFt -1.220 0.231 0.041 INSTt-1 -0.011 0.991 0.001 BLAMEt 2.540 0.016** 0.156 
 R2: 0.395  Adj. R2: 0.222  F (10, 35):  2.287 (0.035)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16)    Constant 2.100 0.090 0.469 RESNPRvgt 0.634 0.554 0.074 CSIZEt-1 1.140 0.306 0.206 AGEt-1 -0.087 0.934 0.002 INDGENt-1 0.577 0.589 0.063 ISSt -1.780 0.135 0.388 ECONt-1 -2.070 0.093* 0.463 CGQt(ad) -1.370 0.228 0.274 PERFt 0.969 0.377 0.158 INSTt-1 -0.463 0.663 0.041 BLAMEt -0.560 0.599 0.059 
 R2: 0.711  Adj. R2: 0.134  F (10, 5):  1.232 (0.433) 
 Variable Definitions: ∆CGQt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in Corporate Governance Quality; RESNPRvgt: Group intensity-adjusted event year newspaper reporting, measured as: coefficient of variation in reporting among newspaper groups in the event year (cvgt) x event year newspaper reporting (RESNPRt); Other explanatory variables are as before. 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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APPENDIX H : FURTHER ANALYSIS- CGQ COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
Tables H.1 to H.10 present the results of analysis of associations between the benchmark-
adjusted changes in each of the ten components of CGQ and newspaper reporting. In each table, 
Part A presents the results of the OLS regression of pre-event to event year changes in one of 
the ten components of CGQ upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable, RESNPRt-1, 
and the additional explanatory variables and Part B presents the results of the OLS regression of 
event to post-event year changes in one of the ten components upon the event year newspaper 
reporting variable, RESNPRt, and the additional explanatory variables. RESNPRt-1 and 
RESNPRt are derived from the first stage regression model (Equation 5.1), the results for which 
are presented in Table 7.28 in the main analysis in Chapter Seven. 
 For the pre-event to event year changes, associations are examined using the second 
stage OLS regression model which takes the general form:  
 
ΔCGQt-1→t(ad) = α1 + α2RESNPRt-1 + α3AGEt-1 + α4CSIZEt-1 + α5INDGENt-1 + α6ISSt + α7ECONt-1 
+ α8CGQt-1(ad) + α9BLAMEt + α10PERFt-1 + α11INSTt-1 + εt  
 
Where: 
ΔCGQt-1→t(ad) = the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event year change in the score assigned 
  to one of the ten CGQ components.  
RESNPRt-1 = newspaper reporting in the pre-event year, measured using the residual values 
  obtained from the first stage regression model (Equation 5.1; Table 7.28).  
CGQt-1(ad) = the benchmark-adjusted score assigned to one of the ten CGQ components in 
  the pre-event year. 
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For the event to post-event changes, associations are examined using the second stage OLS 
regression model which takes the general form:  
 
ΔCGQt→t+1(ad) = α1 + α2RESNPRt + α3AGEt-1 + α4CSIZEt-1 + α5INDGENt-1 + α6ISSt + α7ECONt-1 
+ α8CGQt(ad) + α9BLAMEt + α10PERFt + α11INSTt-1 + εt  
 
Where: 
ΔCGQt→t+1(ad) = the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event year change in the score assigned 
  to one of the ten CGQ components.  
RESNPRt = newspaper reporting in the event year, measured using the residual values 
  obtained from the first stage regression model (Equation 5.1; Table 7.28). 
CGQt(ad) = the benchmark-adjusted score assigned to one of the ten CGQ components in 
  the event year. 
 
In both instances, the additional explanatory variables are: 
 
AGEt-1   = company age in the pre-event year.  
CSIZEt-1  = company size in the pre-event year.  
INDGENt-1  = the general industry in which a company operates in the pre-event 
   year.  
ISSt   = the primary reason for regulation of takeover or market abuse case as 
   reported in the event year. 
ECONt-1  = the economic environment in the pre-event year. 
BLAMEt   = a binary variable which assumes a value of 1 if the company is  
   responsible for regulatory intervention in the TMA case and 0 if  
   otherwise as reported in the event year. 
PERFt-1/PERFt   = industry-adjusted company performance in the pre-event/event year. 
INSTt-1   = the proportion of institutional ownership of the company in the pre-
   event year. 
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.The variables employed to make initial measurements of the ten components of CGQ are 
defined in Chapter Five and again in the relevant tables below. Scores are assigned to the 
components and adjusted as described in Chapter Five. As explained in Chapter Seven, analysis 
of the association between the pre-event to event year change in CGQ and pre-event newspaper 
reporting is not performed for the market abuse subset of the sample in isolation due to low 
levels of pre-event year newspaper reporting.  
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Table H.1a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Board Meetings on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for board meetings (∆MEETt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆MEETt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.430 0.159 0.033 RESNPRt-1 0.693 0.491 0.008 CSIZEt-1 2.270 0.027** 0.079 AGEt-1 0.657 0.514 0.007 INDGENt-1 0.154 0.878 0.001 ISSt -0.818 0.417 0.011 ECONt-1 -1.470 0.146 0.035 MEETt-1(ad) -4.360 0.001*** 0.240 PERFt-1 -1.050 0.297 0.018 INSTt-1 0.888 0.378 0.013 BLAMEt -1.010 0.318 0.017  R2: 0.320  Adj. R2: 0.207  F (10, 60):  2.832 (0.006)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 0.524 0.603 0.007 RESNPRt-1 0.683 0.499 0.011 CSIZEt-1 1.840 0.073* 0.075 AGEt-1 0.721 0.475 0.012 INDGENt-1 0.219 0.827 0.001 ISSt 0.435 0.666 0.005 ECONt-1 -0.579 0.566 0.008 MEETt-1(ad) -3.640 0.001*** 0.240 PERFt-1 -0.830 0.411 0.016 INSTt-1 0.388 0.700 0.004 BLAMEt -0.239 0.813 0.001  R2: 0.328  Adj. R2: 0.168  F (10, 42):  2.052 (0.051)*  
Definitions for Board Meetings MEET: No. board meetings in the year  ∆MEETt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board meetings between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H1b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Board Meetings on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for board meetings (∆MEETt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆MEETt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 0.772 0.444 0.012 RESNPRt -0.793 0.431 0.012 CSIZEt-1 -0.045 0.964 0.001 AGEt-1 -0.094 0.926 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.710 0.481 0.010 ISSt -0.559 0.579 0.006 ECONt-1 -0.753 0.455 0.011 MEETt(ad) -3.000 0.004** 0.150 PERFt -0.092 0.927 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.015 0.988 0.001 BLAMEt 0.772 0.444 0.012 
 R2: 0.249  Adj. R2: 0.101  F (10, 51):  1.688 (0.109) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant -0.220 0.827 0.001 RESNPRt 0.217 0.830 0.001 CSIZEt-1 -0.345 0.732 0.003 AGEt-1 0.612 0.545 0.011 INDGENt-1 0.894 0.377 0.022 ISSt 0.130 0.897 0.001 ECONt-1 0.239 0.812 0.002 MEETt(ad) -3.160 0.003*** 0.222 PERFt -0.211 0.834 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.851 0.401 0.020 BLAMEt 0.491 0.626 0.007 
 R2: 0.325  Adj. R2: 0.132  F (10, 35):  1.682 (0.124) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant 1.560 0.179 0.328 RESNPRt 0.827 0.446 0.120 CSIZEt-1 1.060 0.336 0.185 AGEt-1 -0.695 0.518 0.088 INDGENt-1 -0.417 0.694 0.034 ISSt -1.790 0.133 0.391 ECONt-1 -1.560 0.180 0.327 MEETt(ad) -1.340 0.237 0.265 PERFt 0.036 0.973 0.001 INSTt-1 0.459 0.666 0.040 BLAMEt -0.920 0.400 0.145 
 R2: 0.596  Adj. R2: -0.211  F (10, 5):  0.739 (0.681) 
 Definitions for Board Meetings MEET: No. board meetings in the year  ∆MEETt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board meetings between the event and post-event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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Table H.2a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Board Leadership on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for board leadership (∆CEOCHt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆CEOCHt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 2.780 0.008 0.155 RESNPRt-1 1.520 0.137 0.052 CSIZEt-1 2.370 0.023** 0.118 AGEt-1 -0.200 0.843 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.498 0.621 0.006 ISSt -0.147 0.884 0.001 ECONt-1 -2.830 0.007*** 0.160 CEOCHt-1(ad) -5.570 0.001*** 0.425 PERFt-1 -1.240 0.221 0.035 INSTt-1 2.040 0.048 0.090 BLAMEt 0.440 0.662 0.005  R2: 0.601  Adj. R2: 0.506  F (10, 60):  6.702 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 3.140 0.003 0.141 RESNPRt-1 2.590 0.012** 0.101 CSIZEt-1 2.610 0.012** 0.102 AGEt-1 -0.238 0.813 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.399 0.691 0.003 ISSt 0.347 0.730 0.002 ECONt-1 -3.210 0.002*** 0.147 CEOCHt-1(ad) -5.550 0.001*** 0.340 PERFt-1 -2.140 0.037** 0.071 INSTt-1 2.030 0.047** 0.064 BLAMEt 0.035 0.972 0.001  R2: 0.528  Adj. R2: 0.449  F (10, 42):  6.317 (0.001)***  
Definitions for Board Leadership CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise  
∆CEOCHt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board leadership between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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Table H2b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Board Leadership on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for board leadership (∆CEOCHt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆CEOCHt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 0.033 0.974 0.001 RESNPRt 1.390 0.171 0.036 CSIZEt-1 1.650 0.105 0.051 AGEt-1 -0.065 0.949 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.481 0.633 0.005 ISSt 0.260 0.796 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.059 0.953 0.001 CEOCHt(ad) -5.080 0.001** 0.336 PERFt -0.140 0.889 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.203 0.840 0.001 BLAMEt 0.275 0.785 0.002 
 R2: 0.392  Adj. R2: 0.273  F (10, 51):  3.292 (0.002)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant 0.024 0.981 0.001 RESNPRt 1.140 0.261 0.036 CSIZEt-1 1.570 0.125 0.066 AGEt-1 0.040 0.968 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.645 0.523 0.012 ISSt 0.392 0.697 0.004 ECONt-1 -0.056 0.956 0.001 CEOCHt(ad) -5.770 0.001*** 0.487 PERFt 0.101 0.920 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.220 0.827 0.001 BLAMEt -0.163 0.872 0.001 
 R2: 0.558  Adj. R2: 0.431  F (10, 35):  4.413 (0.001)*** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant 3.369 0.001 0.999 RESNPRt -0.051 0.962 0.001 CSIZEt-1 -0.722 0.503 0.094 AGEt-1 0.252 0.811 0.013 INDGENt-1 0.559 0.600 0.059 ISSt -0.314 0.776 0.019 ECONt-1 -0.658 0.540 0.080 CEOCHt(ad) -0.555 0.603 0.058 PERFt 0.056 0.958 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.803 0.458 0.114 BLAMEt 0.710 0.509 0.092 
 R2: 0.359  Adj. R2: -0.930  F (10, 5):  0.288 (0.979) 
 Definitions for Board Leadership CEOCH: 1 if the CEO is the chairman, 0 if otherwise  ∆CEOCHt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board leadership between the event and post-event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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 Table H.3a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Board Balance on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for board balance (∆EDt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆EDt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 2.830 0.006 0.118 RESNPRt-1 0.345 0.732 0.002 CSIZEt-1 -1.740 0.086* 0.048 AGEt-1 -0.213 0.832 0.001 INDGENt-1 -0.280 0.781 0.001 ISSt 1.710 0.093* 0.046 ECONt-1 -2.800 0.007*** 0.116 EDt-1(ad) -5.170 0.001*** 0.308 PERFt-1 1.050 0.298 0.018 INSTt-1 0.354 0.724 0.002 BLAMEt -2.530 0.014** 0.096  R2: 0.483  Adj. R2: 0.397  F (10, 60):  5.613 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 1.030 0.308 0.025 RESNPRt-1 -0.341 0.735 0.003 CSIZEt-1 -1.610 0.116 0.058 AGEt-1 -0.023 0.982 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.214 0.832 0.001 ISSt 0.297 0.768 0.002 ECONt-1 -0.996 0.325 0.023 EDt-1(ad) -3.640 0.001*** 0.240 PERFt-1 1.570 0.123 0.056 INSTt-1 -0.541 0.591 0.007 BLAMEt -2.820 0.007*** 0.159  R2: 0.348  Adj. R2: 0.193  F (10, 42):  2.241 (0.034)**  
Definitions for Board Balance ED: Percentage executive directors on the board  ∆EDt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board balance between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H3b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Board Balance on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for board balance (∆EDt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆EDt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.333 0.741 0.002 RESNPRt 1.550 0.127 0.045 CSIZEt-1 -1.780 0.080* 0.059 AGEt-1 0.815 0.419 0.013 INDGENt-1 1.260 0.212 0.030 ISSt 1.240 0.220 0.029 ECONt-1 0.361 0.719 0.003 EDt(ad) -2.000 0.051* 0.073 PERFt 1.010 0.317 0.020 INSTt-1 -0.718 0.476 0.010 BLAMEt -2.160 0.036** 0.084 
 R2: 0.280  Adj. R2: 0.138  F (10, 51):  1.979 (0.055)* 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant -0.651 0.519 0.012 RESNPRt -0.235 0.815 0.002 CSIZEt-1 -0.936 0.356 0.024 AGEt-1 0.412 0.683 0.005 INDGENt-1 0.465 0.645 0.006 ISSt 1.910 0.065* 0.094 ECONt-1 0.604 0.550 0.010 EDt(ad) -1.710 0.096* 0.077 PERFt 0.084 0.934 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.242 0.811 0.002 BLAMEt 0.001 0.999 0.001 
 R2: 0.187  Adj. R2: -0.045  F (10, 35):  0.805 (0.626) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant -0.323 0.760 0.020 RESNPRt 0.399 0.707 0.031 CSIZEt-1 -1.250 0.267 0.238 AGEt-1 0.319 0.763 0.020 INDGENt-1 0.684 0.525 0.086 ISSt 0.108 0.918 0.002 ECONt-1 0.337 0.750 0.022 EDt(ad) -0.424 0.689 0.035 PERFt -0.585 0.584 0.064 INSTt-1 -0.041 0.969 0.001 BLAMEt -0.883 0.418 0.135 
 R2: 0.728  Adj. R2: 0.183  F (10, 5):  1.335 (0.395) 
 Definitions for Board Balance ED: Percentage executive directors on the board  ∆EDt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board balance between the event and post-event years 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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 Table H.4a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Board Size on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for board size (∆SIZEt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆SIZEt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 0.960 0.341 0.015 RESNPRt-1 0.473 0.638 0.004 CSIZEt-1 -0.109 0.914 0.001 AGEt-1 0.040 0.968 0.001 INDGENt-1 -0.426 0.672 0.003 ISSt 0.469 0.641 0.004 ECONt-1 -0.940 0.351 0.015 SIZEt-1(ad) 0.411 0.683 0.003 PERFt-1 0.214 0.831 0.001 INSTt-1 0.133 0.895 0.001 BLAMEt -2.050 0.044** 0.066  R2: 0.079  Adj. R2: -0.075  F (10, 60):  0.514 (0.873)  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 1.050 0.299 0.026 RESNPRt-1 -0.720 0.476 0.012 CSIZEt-1 -0.790 0.434 0.015 AGEt-1 0.026 0.980 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.024 0.981 0.001 ISSt 1.950 0.058** 0.083 ECONt-1 -1.070 0.289 0.027 SIZEt-1(ad) -0.539 0.593 0.007 PERFt-1 0.509 0.614 0.006 INSTt-1 0.208 0.836 0.001 BLAMEt -2.000 0.052 0.087  R2: 0.193  Adj. R2: 0.001  F (10, 42):  1.008 (0.453)  
Definitions for Board Size SIZE: No. directors on the board  ∆SIZEt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board size between the pre-event and event years 
 **Significant at the 5% level 
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Table H4b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Board Size on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for board size (∆SIZEt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SIZEt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.294 0.770 0.002 RESNPRt 1.280 0.205 0.031 CSIZEt-1 0.335 0.739 0.002 AGEt-1 0.763 0.449 0.011 INDGENt-1 0.239 0.812 0.001 ISSt 0.985 0.330 0.019 ECONt-1 0.266 0.792 0.001 SIZEt(ad) -1.890 0.065* 0.065 PERFt -1.110 0.274 0.023 INSTt-1 -0.132 0.896 0.001 BLAMEt 0.183 0.855 0.001 
 R2: 0.127  Adj. R2: -0.044  F (10, 51):  0.745 (0.679) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant -0.548 0.587 0.009 RESNPRt 0.889 0.380 0.022 CSIZEt-1 0.301 0.765 0.003 AGEt-1 0.903 0.373 0.023 INDGENt-1 0.336 0.739 0.003 ISSt -0.383 0.704 0.004 ECONt-1 0.552 0.584 0.009 SIZEt(ad) -0.276 0.784 0.002 PERFt -0.712 0.481 0.014 INSTt-1 -1.210 0.234 0.040 BLAMEt 0.411 0.684 0.005 
 R2: 0.130  Adj. R2: -0.119  F (10, 35):  0.521 (0.863) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant -1.730 0.145 0.373 RESNPRt 0.223 0.833 0.010 CSIZEt-1 2.040 0.097* 0.454 AGEt-1 0.425 0.688 0.035 INDGENt-1 0.103 0.922 0.002 ISSt -0.211 0.841 0.009 ECONt-1 1.720 0.146 0.372 SIZEt(ad) -2.580 0.049** 0.571 PERFt -0.852 0.433 0.127 INSTt-1 1.110 0.318 0.197 BLAMEt 0.316 0.765 0.020 
 R2: 0.753  Adj. R2: 0.260  F (10, 5):  1.527 (0.335) 
 Definitions for Board Size SIZE: No. directors on the board  ∆SIZEt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for board size between the event and post-event years 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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 Table H.5a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Director Independence on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for director independence (∆INEDt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆INEDt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 0.394 0.695 0.003 RESNPRt-1 0.954 0.344 0.015 CSIZEt-1 0.493 0.624 0.004 AGEt-1 -1.860 0.068* 0.055 INDGENt-1 0.635 0.528 0.007 ISSt -0.486 0.629 0.004 ECONt-1 -0.407 0.685 0.003 INEDt-1(ad) -1.700 0.094* 0.046 PERFt-1 -0.597 0.553 0.006 INSTt-1 0.862 0.392 0.012 BLAMEt -0.282 0.779 0.001  R2: 0.184  Adj. R2: 0.048  F (10, 60):  1.353 (0.224)  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant -0.256 0.799 0.002 RESNPRt-1 0.126 0.900 0.001 CSIZEt-1 -0.205 0.839 0.001 AGEt-1 -1.550 0.129 0.054 INDGENt-1 0.578 0.567 0.008 ISSt 0.186 0.853 0.001 ECONt-1 0.254 0.801 0.002 INEDt-1(ad) -1.850 0.071* 0.076 PERFt-1 -0.002 0.998 0.001 INSTt-1 0.238 0.813 0.001 BLAMEt 0.132 0.896 0.001  R2: 0.206  Adj. R2: 0.016  F (10, 42):  1.087 (0.394)  
Definitions for Director Independence INED: Percentage non-executive directors on the board who are independent  ∆INEDt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for director independence between the pre-event and event years 
 *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H5b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Director Independence on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for director independence (∆INEDt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆INEDt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 0.034 0.973 0.001 RESNPRt -0.979 0.332 0.018 CSIZEt-1 1.380 0.174 0.036 AGEt-1 0.978 0.333 0.018 INDGENt-1 0.267 0.790 0.001 ISSt -0.001 0.999 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.085 0.933 0.001 INEDt(ad) -3.200 0.002*** 0.167 PERFt 0.845 0.402 0.014 INSTt-1 -0.191 0.849 0.001 BLAMEt -0.074 0.941 0.001 
 R2: 0.216  Adj. R2: 0.062  F (10, 51):  1.407 (0.204) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant -0.297 0.768 0.003 RESNPRt -0.149 0.882 0.001 CSIZEt-1 1.760 0.087* 0.081 AGEt-1 1.310 0.200 0.047 INDGENt-1 0.568 0.574 0.009 ISSt -1.340 0.189 0.049 ECONt-1 0.276 0.784 0.002 INEDt(ad) -2.600 0.014 0.162 PERFt 0.455 0.652 0.006 INSTt-1 0.117 0.908 0.001 BLAMEt 0.534 0.597 0.008 
 R2: 0.307  Adj. R2: 0.109  F (10, 35):  1.548 (0.164) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant 2.490 0.055 0.554 RESNPRt 1.360 0.231 0.271 CSIZEt-1 0.203 0.847 0.008 AGEt-1 0.380 0.720 0.028 INDGENt-1 0.522 0.624 0.052 ISSt -1.960 0.107 0.435 ECONt-1 -2.390 0.062* 0.534 INEDt(ad) -1.270 0.261 0.243 PERFt 2.630 0.046** 0.581 INSTt-1 -1.640 0.162 0.349 BLAMEt -1.110 0.318 0.197 
 R2: 0.761  Adj. R2: 0.284  F (10, 5):  1.596 (0.316) 
 Definitions for Director Independence INED: Percentage non-executive directors on the board who are independent  
∆INEDt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for director independence between the event and post-event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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 Table H.6a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Audit Committee Size on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for audit committee size (∆ACSt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆ACSt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.220 0.227 0.024 RESNPRt-1 1.090 0.278 0.020 CSIZEt-1 2.590 0.012** 0.101 AGEt-1 0.082 0.935 0.001 INDGENt-1 -0.145 0.885 0.001 ISSt -1.180 0.242 0.023 ECONt-1 -1.270 0.211 0.026 ACSt-1(ad) -2.860 0.006*** 0.120 PERFt-1 -1.280 0.207 0.027 INSTt-1 0.235 0.815 0.001 BLAMEt 1.440 0.156 0.033  R2: 0.230  Adj. R2: 0.102  F (10, 60):  1.794 (0.081)*  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 1.100 0.276 0.028 RESNPRt-1 0.820 0.417 0.016 CSIZEt-1 2.610 0.012** 0.140 AGEt-1 1.240 0.221 0.035 INDGENt-1 0.008 0.994 0.001 ISSt 3.340 0.002*** 0.210 ECONt-1 -1.260 0.216 0.036 ACSt-1(ad) -5.530 0.001*** 0.421 PERFt-1 -1.370 0.177 0.043 INSTt-1 0.838 0.407 0.016 BLAMEt 2.600 0.013** 0.139  R2: 0.562  Adj. R2: 0.458  F (10, 42):  5.388 (0.001)***  
Definitions for Audit Committee Size ACS: No. members on the audit committee   
∆ACSt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for audit committee size between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H6b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Audit Committee Size on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for audit committee size (∆ACSt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ACSt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.597 0.553 0.007 RESNPRt -0.820 0.416 0.013 CSIZEt-1 0.018 0.986 0.001 AGEt-1 0.662 0.511 0.009 INDGENt-1 -0.619 0.539 0.008 ISSt -0.121 0.904 0.001 ECONt-1 0.613 0.543 0.007 ACSt(ad) -1.250 0.218 0.030 PERFt 0.496 0.622 0.005 INSTt-1 -0.825 0.413 0.013 BLAMEt -0.250 0.804 0.001 
 R2: 0.089  Adj. R2: -0.089  F (10, 51):  0.501 (0.881) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant -1.220 0.232 0.041 RESNPRt 0.524 0.603 0.008 CSIZEt-1 -0.144 0.886 0.001 AGEt-1 0.642 0.525 0.012 INDGENt-1 -0.946 0.351 0.025 ISSt 0.521 0.606 0.008 ECONt-1 1.220 0.232 0.041 ACSt(ad) -0.264 0.793 0.002 PERFt -0.409 0.685 0.005 INSTt-1 -1.620 0.115 0.070 BLAMEt 0.910 0.369 0.023 
 R2: 0.180  Adj. R2: -0.053  F (10, 35):  0.773 (0.654) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant 0.507 0.633 0.049 RESNPRt -0.387 0.715 0.029 CSIZEt-1 0.319 0.762 0.020 AGEt-1 -0.021 0.984 0.001 INDGENt-1 -0.246 0.815 0.012 ISSt -0.607 0.571 0.069 ECONt-1 -0.498 0.640 0.047 ACSt(ad) -0.668 0.534 0.082 PERFt 0.431 0.685 0.036 INSTt-1 0.196 0.852 0.008 BLAMEt -0.771 0.476 0.106 
 R2: 0.358  Adj. R2: -0.925  F (10, 5):  0.279 (0.959) 
 Definitions for Audit Committee Size ACS: No. members on the audit committee   
∆ACSt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for audit committee size between the event and post-event years 
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Table H.7a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Audit Committee Independence on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for audit committee independence (∆ACIt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆ACIt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 2.760 0.008 0.113 RESNPRt-1 1.220 0.227 0.024 CSIZEt-1 0.663 0.510 0.007 AGEt-1 0.626 0.533 0.007 INDGENt-1 -0.065 0.948 0.001 ISSt -2.360 0.022** 0.085 ECONt-1 -2.720 0.009*** 0.110 ACIt-1(ad) -4.440 0.001*** 0.247 PERFt-1 -0.777 0.440 0.010 INSTt-1 0.551 0.584 0.005 BLAMEt -0.744 0.460 0.009  R2: 0.364  Adj. R2: 0.259  F (10, 60):  3.449 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant 1.960 0.056 0.084 RESNPRt-1 -0.177 0.861 0.001 CSIZEt-1 0.108 0.914 0.001 AGEt-1 1.070 0.289 0.027 INDGENt-1 0.831 0.411 0.016 ISSt 1.400 0.168 0.045 ECONt-1 -1.970 0.055* 0.085 ACIt-1(ad) -6.160 0.001*** 0.475 PERFt-1 0.021 0.984 0.001 INSTt-1 0.606 0.548 0.009 BLAMEt 0.054 0.957 0.001  R2: 0.560  Adj. R2: 0.455  F (10, 42):  5.340 (0.001)***  
Definitions for Audit Committee Independence ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise  ∆ACIt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for audit committee independence between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H7b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Audit Committee Independence on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for audit committee independence (∆ACIt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ACIt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 1.550 0.127 0.045 RESNPRt -1.360 0.180 0.035 CSIZEt-1 2.670 0.010** 0.123 AGEt-1 0.956 0.344 0.018 INDGENt-1 -0.122 0.903 0.001 ISSt 0.946 0.349 0.017 ECONt-1 -1.640 0.108 0.050 ACIt(ad) -3.170 0.003** 0.165 PERFt 0.815 0.419 0.013 INSTt-1 0.250 0.804 0.001 BLAMEt -1.500 0.140 0.042 
 R2: 0.282  Adj. R2: 0.142  F (10, 51):  2.006 (0.052)* 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant 0.980 0.334 0.027 RESNPRt -0.328 0.745 0.003 CSIZEt-1 2.350 0.024** 0.137 AGEt-1 1.130 0.264 0.036 INDGENt-1 -0.213 0.833 0.001 ISSt -1.370 0.181 0.051 ECONt-1 -0.999 0.325 0.028 ACIt(ad) -1.040 0.307 0.030 PERFt 0.496 0.623 0.007 INSTt-1 0.375 0.710 0.004 BLAMEt -0.634 0.530 0.011 
 R2: 0.317  Adj. R2: 0.122  F (10, 35):  1.624 (0.140) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant 2.110 0.089 0.471 RESNPRt 0.203 0.848 0.008 CSIZEt-1 0.645 0.547 0.077 AGEt-1 0.143 0.892 0.004 INDGENt-1 0.986 0.369 0.163 ISSt -1.690 0.151 0.364 ECONt-1 -2.050 0.096* 0.456 ACIt(ad) -1.480 0.199 0.305 PERFt 1.960 0.107 0.435 INSTt-1 -1.270 0.259 0.245 BLAMEt -1.450 0.206 0.297 
 R2: 0.711  Adj. R2: 0.132  F (10, 5):  1.229 (0.434) 
 Definitions for Audit Committee Independence ACI: 1 if the majority of the audit committee is independent, 0 if otherwise  
∆ACIt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for audit committee independence between the event and post-event years 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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 Table H.8a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Audit Committee Meetings on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for audit committee meetings (∆ACMt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆ACMt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 0.982 0.330 0.016 RESNPRt-1 3.930 0.002*** 0.205 CSIZEt-1 3.050 0.003*** 0.134 AGEt-1 -0.881 0.382 0.013 INDGENt-1 -1.370 0.176 0.030 ISSt -0.957 0.343 0.015 ECONt-1 -1.020 0.314 0.017 ACMt-1(ad) -4.110 0.001*** 0.220 PERFt-1 -2.160 0.035** 0.072 INSTt-1 -0.963 0.340 0.015 BLAMEt -1.800 0.077* 0.051  R2: 0.425  Adj. R2: 0.330  F (10, 60):  4.443 (0.001)***  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant -0.005 0.996 0.001 RESNPRt-1 3.000 0.005*** 0.177 CSIZEt-1 2.950 0.005*** 0.172 AGEt-1 -0.839 0.406 0.017 INDGENt-1 -0.518 0.608 0.006 ISSt 1.550 0.129 0.054 ECONt-1 -0.091 0.928 0.001 ACMt-1(ad) -4.480 0.001*** 0.323 PERFt-1 -0.931 0.357 0.020 INSTt-1 -0.768 0.447 0.014 BLAMEt -0.692 0.493 0.011  R2: 0.495  Adj. R2: 0.375  F (10, 42):  4.115 (0.001)***  
Definitions for Audit Committee Meetings ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year  ∆ACMt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for audit committee meetings between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H8b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Audit Committee Meetings on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for audit committee meetings (∆ACMt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ACMt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 0.887 0.379 0.015 RESNPRt -1.830 0.073* 0.062 CSIZEt-1 1.330 0.191 0.033 AGEt-1 -0.529 0.599 0.006 INDGENt-1 0.675 0.503 0.009 ISSt -0.816 0.418 0.013 ECONt-1 -0.899 0.373 0.016 ACMt(ad) -3.630 0.001*** 0.206 PERFt 0.297 0.768 0.002 INSTt-1 -0.443 0.660 0.004 BLAMEt -0.507 0.614 0.005 
 R2: 0.350  Adj. R2: 0.223  F (10, 51):  2.749 (0.009)*** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant -0.107 0.915 0.001 RESNPRt -0.900 0.374 0.023 CSIZEt-1 1.640 0.110 0.072 AGEt-1 -0.050 0.961 0.001 INDGENt-1 0.817 0.419 0.019 ISSt 0.485 0.631 0.007 ECONt-1 0.073 0.942 0.001 ACMt(ad) -3.710 0.001*** 0.283 PERFt -0.482 0.633 0.007 INSTt-1 -0.672 0.506 0.013 BLAMEt 0.585 0.563 0.010 
 R2: 0.401  Adj. R2: 0.230  F (10, 35):  2.342 (0.031)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant 2.700 0.043 0.593 RESNPRt -0.352 0.739 0.024 CSIZEt-1 0.687 0.523 0.086 AGEt-1 1.270 0.259 0.245 INDGENt-1 0.760 0.482 0.104 ISSt -0.508 0.633 0.049 ECONt-1 -2.690 0.043** 0.592 ACMt(ad) -1.470 0.202 0.301 PERFt 2.800 0.038** 0.610 INSTt-1 -1.550 0.182 0.324 BLAMEt -2.030 0.098* 0.453 
 R2: 0.801  Adj. R2: 0.404  F (10, 5):  2.018 (0.227) 
 Definitions for Audit Committee Meetings ACM: No. audit committee meetings in the year  ∆ACMt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for audit committee meetings between the event and post-event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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 Table H.9a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (∆PPSt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆PPSt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 0.969 0.336 0.015 RESNPRt-1 1.170 0.246 0.022 CSIZEt-1 0.211 0.834 0.001 AGEt-1 -0.500 0.619 0.004 INDGENt-1 -1.110 0.270 0.020 ISSt 0.158 0.875 0.001 ECONt-1 -0.988 0.327 0.016 PPSt-1(ad) -0.429 0.670 0.003 PERFt-1 -0.716 0.477 0.009 INSTt-1 2.110 0.039** 0.069 BLAMEt 0.860 0.393 0.012  R2: 0.133  Adj. R2: -0.011  F (10, 60):  0.924 (0.517)  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant -0.974 0.336 0.022 RESNPRt-1 2.100 0.042** 0.095 CSIZEt-1 0.422 0.675 0.004 AGEt-1 -0.932 0.357 0.020 INDGENt-1 -1.490 0.144 0.050 ISSt -2.040 0.047** 0.091 ECONt-1 1.040 0.306 0.025 PPSt-1(ad) -0.135 0.894 0.001 PERFt-1 -0.842 0.405 0.017 INSTt-1 -0.902 0.372 0.019 BLAMEt 1.210 0.232 0.034  R2: 0.239  Adj. R2: 0.058  F (10, 42):  1.321 (0.251)  
Definitions for CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity PPS: CEO pay-performance sensitivity ratio, measured as: annual change in CEO pay: annual change in shareholders’ wealth 
 
∆PPSt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for CEO pay-performance sensitivity between the pre-event and event years 
**Significant at the 5% level 
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Table H9b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (∆PPSt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆PPSt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant -0.831 0.410 0.013 RESNPRt -0.013 0.990 0.001 CSIZEt-1 0.227 0.821 0.001 AGEt-1 -0.407 0.685 0.003 INDGENt-1 -0.396 0.694 0.003 ISSt -1.500 0.139 0.042 ECONt-1 0.857 0.395 0.014 PPSt(ad) -2.190 0.033** 0.086 PERFt -0.016 0.988 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.763 0.449 0.011 BLAMEt 0.818 0.417 0.013 
 R2: 0.152  Adj. R2: -0.014  F (10, 51):  0.915 (0.527) 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant 0.299 0.767 0.003 RESNPRt 0.401 0.691 0.005 CSIZEt-1 0.432 0.668 0.005 AGEt-1 -0.346 0.731 0.003 INDGENt-1 -0.365 0.718 0.004 ISSt -0.343 0.734 0.003 ECONt-1 -0.296 0.769 0.003 PPSt(ad) -1.660 0.105 0.073 PERFt 0.605 0.549 0.010 INSTt-1 0.364 0.718 0.004 BLAMEt -0.540 0.592 0.008 
 R2: 0.144  Adj. R2: -0.100  F (10, 35):  0.590 (0.811) 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant -0.893 0.413 0.138 RESNPRt 0.876 0.421 0.133 CSIZEt-1 -1.990 0.103 0.443 AGEt-1 0.055 0.959 0.001 INDGENt-1 1.800 0.132 0.393 ISSt -0.314 0.766 0.019 ECONt-1 0.960 0.381 0.156 PPSt(ad) -2.350 0.065* 0.526 PERFt 0.426 0.688 0.035 INSTt-1 -1.910 0.114 0.422 BLAMEt 2.520 0.053* 0.559 
 R2: 0.778  Adj. R2: 0.335  F (10, 5):  1.756 (0.278) 
 Definitions for CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity PPS: CEO pay-performance sensitivity ratio, measured as: annual change in CEO pay: annual change in shareholders’ wealth 
∆PPSt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for CEO pay-performance sensitivity between the event and post-event years 
 **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
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Table H.10a: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Pre-Event to Event Year Change in Directors’ Share Ownership on Pre-Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted pre-event to event changes in the scores assigned for directors’ share ownership (∆SHAREt-1→t(ad)) upon the pre-event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt-1) and the additional explanatory variables. Dependent Variable: ∆SHAREt-1→t(ad)  t-value t-prob Part. R2 Full Sample (n=71) 
 
   
Constant 1.500 0.139 0.036 RESNPRt-1 1.580 0.120 0.040 CSIZEt-1 -1.220 0.227 0.024 AGEt-1 -0.827 0.411 0.011 INDGENt-1 -1.170 0.245 0.023 ISSt 0.163 0.871 0.001 ECONt-1 -1.470 0.146 0.035 SHAREt-1(ad) -3.130 0.003*** 0.141 PERFt-1 -0.727 0.470 0.009 INSTt-1 2.670 0.010** 0.107 BLAMEt -0.667 0.508 0.007  R2: 0.296  Adj. R2: 0.178  F (10, 60):   2.520 (0.013)**  
Takeover Subset (n=53) 
 
   
Constant -0.742 0.462 0.013 RESNPRt-1 2.500 0.016** 0.130 CSIZEt-1 -0.630 0.532 0.009 AGEt-1 -1.410 0.166 0.045 INDGENt-1 -1.660 0.105 0.061 ISSt -0.882 0.383 0.018 ECONt-1 0.806 0.425 0.015 SHAREt-1(ad) -1.380 0.174 0.044 PERFt-1 -0.616 0.541 0.009 INSTt-1 -1.010 0.317 0.024 BLAMEt -0.380 0.706 0.003  R2: 0.259  Adj. R2: 0.083  F (10, 42):  1.468 (0.185)  
Definitions for Directors’ Share Ownership SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board  
∆SHAREt-1→t(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for directors’ share ownership between the pre-event and event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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Table H10b: OLS Regression of Benchmark-adjusted Event to Post-Event Year Change in Directors’ Share Ownership on Event Year Newspaper Reporting 
Below are the results of the OLS regression of the benchmark-adjusted event to post-event changes in the scores assigned for directors’ share ownership (∆SHAREt→t+1(ad)) upon the event year newspaper reporting variable (RESNPRt) and the additional explanatory variables. 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SHAREt→t+1(ad) 
 
t-value t-prob Part. R2 
Full Sample (n=62)    Constant 0.143 0.887 0.001 RESNPRt 0.506 0.615 0.005 CSIZEt-1 -1.000 0.320 0.019 AGEt-1 0.187 0.853 0.001 INDGENt-1 -1.300 0.198 0.032 ISSt -1.460 0.150 0.040 ECONt-1 -0.085 0.933 0.001 SHAREt(ad) -3.840 0.001*** 0.225 PERFt -0.557 0.580 0.006 INSTt-1 -0.423 0.674 0.004 BLAMEt 0.645 0.522 0.008 
 R2: 0.329  Adj. R2: 0.197  F (10, 51):  2.496 (0.016)** 
 Takeover Subset (n=46) Constant 0.395 0.696 0.004 RESNPRt 1.040 0.304 0.030 CSIZEt-1 -0.648 0.521 0.012 AGEt-1 0.328 0.745 0.003 INDGENt-1 -0.912 0.368 0.023 ISSt -1.160 0.252 0.037 ECONt-1 -0.328 0.745 0.003 SHAREt(ad) -3.010 0.005*** 0.206 PERFt -0.035 0.972 0.001 INSTt-1 -0.427 0.672 0.005 BLAMEt -0.407 0.687 0.005 
 R2: 0.377  Adj. R2: 0.199  F (10, 35):  2.121 (0.049)** 
 Market Abuse Subset (n=16) Constant -0.193 0.854 0.007 RESNPRt 0.022 0.983 0.001 CSIZEt-1 -0.239 0.821 0.011 AGEt-1 0.366 0.729 0.026 INDGENt-1 0.519 0.626 0.051 ISSt -0.111 0.916 0.002 ECONt-1 0.217 0.837 0.009 SHAREt(ad) -0.034 0.952 0.001 PERFt 0.482 0.650 0.044 INSTt-1 -0.803 0.458 0.114 BLAMEt 0.898 0.410 0.139 
 R2: 0.627  Adj. R2: -0.118  F (10, 5):  0.841 (0.620) 
 Definitions for Directors’ Share Ownership SHARE: Proportion of company shares owned by the board  
∆SHAREt→t+1(ad): Benchmark-adjusted change in score assigned for directors’ share ownership between the event and post-event years 
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
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